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The evolution of Ne-...v Zealand's policies concerning the 
diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China and 
concernin9 the security of South-east l>.sia is ex2mined with a. view 
t.o identifying the major objectives determining those policies, and 
the priorities among the objectives. Particular interest is in t.he 
role of allies in foreign policy determination, and whethEr objectives 
and priorities were constant for governments of different political 
colour .. 
The thesis examines China policy, then South-east Asian policies, 
chronologically from 1949 to 1975. The chapters a.re divided o.ccord-
ing to four variables: the political party concerned; whether it is 
in 90vernment or opposition; the parti~ular policy, or policy area, 
and finally, the particular time period. 
It was found that New Zealand's policies in both fields were 
greatly influenced by the attitudes of L~e country's closest friends. 
The influence of friends was po>Jerful because of New Zealand • s sense 
of military and economic dependence upon them and the consequent high 
priority given to maintaining strong relationships with them. On 
several occasions, New Zealand governments took courses of action to 
>~hich they were not inclined, or refrained from courses of action to 
which they >~ere inclined, because of allies. It was further found 
that the influences of the United States and Australia were the most 
pervasive throughout the period, although British attitudes >•ere also 
important. 
iii 
Of Ne\v Zealand 1 s other objE:ctives influential on policy, that 
of promoting a stable, anti-Corn.munist South-east Asia wa..s of importance, 
and so was the upholding of certain principles promoted by the United 
Nations. 
It \Otas found that Nev1 Zealand's Asian foreign policies were not 
significantly altered by changes of government. The two major political 
parties shared t...'1eir important objectives and, rr.ost of the timer the 
priority among them. 
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This thesis has bo.lc.h narrow and broad objectives. In the 
first instance, the pUrpose is to make as full a study as possible 
of New Zealand's policies concerning the diplomatic recogni·tion of 
the People's Republic of China between 1949 and 1972 and to rr.ake a 
study of Ne,.,.~ Zealand 1 s security policies in South-east Asia o"~~""er 
rr:.uch 'the same period. The sti."llulus to undertaking these studies ;.;as 
the fact that these policies have not been examined in detail before~ 
Only one study of any sort exists of New zealand 1 s policies concern-
ing China: R,G, Shuker's 1971 M.A. thesis, Apart from the fact 
that it does not cover the important l971-J.972 period, this thesis 
does not concentrate on recognition policy and is uot structured to 
examine the policy of successive New Zealand governments in detail. 
~The coverage of available information is not exhaustive. Security 
policies in South-east Asia have been studied more frequently, but 
again, by no means fully. There is, for instance, only one study 
of New Zealand's policy during Indonesia's Confrontation of Halaysia: 
Caird's 1970 M,A. thesis, 2 New Zealand's Vietnam policy has not yet 
been studied at all, and neither has the Third Labour goverru-nent' s 
Malaysia/Singapore policy. New Zealand's policy after the anno~~ce-
ment of the British military withdrawa~ from Malaysia has been covered 
1 Shuker, R.G. 11 New Zealand Policy and Attitudes to1:1ards Communist Chinan 1 
unpublished M.A. thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1971. 
2 Caird, R.J. "New Zealand's Foreign Policy and Malaya/Malaysia 1955-55", 
unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Canterbury, 1970 
2. 
only by W.K. Jackson's article in the Journal of South-east Asian 
Studies. 3 At the time this thesis was begun, there had been no 
study of the period from 1949 to 1954, but tlus was rectified in 
some degree in 1977 by two essays~ 4 
The second, and broader, purpose is to use these studies to 
identify, a,d to assess the relative iw~ortance o~ some of the 
main objectives of New Zealand's Asian foreign policy during the period 
under consideration, and to examine the questiun of partisan difference 
in New Zeal~~d's Asian policy. 
The stimulus to a study of the relative importance of objectives 
was the questions raised in recent years about the role of external 
influence in New Zealand's foreign policy. Shortly after coming to 
po~1er in 1972, Labour Prime Minister Kirk declared that henceforth 
New Zealand's foreign policy would be more independent a.'1d related to 
its O\\'n interests. New Zealand, he wrote 7 
nhas emerged from the phase in its national development when 
it allowed its policies to be determined by the views and 
interests of its most influential ally; at one time Britain, 
more recently, the United States 11 • 5 
3 uBecause it's there .. ~ A consideration of the- decision to commit New 
Zealand troops to Malaysia beyond 1971", Journal of South east Asian 
Studies, vel. II, No. 1, March, 1971. 
4 McKinnon, M.A. "From ANZUS to SEAT011 1 and MacGibbon, I.e .. "The. Defence 
of New zealand 1945-1957", both in New Zealand in rvor?-d Affairs, vel. 1, 
New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 1977. 
5 Introdu:::tion, .4nnual Report of the Ministry of Foreign .4ffairs 19?3, 
p7, A.J.H.R. 1973 A-1. 
3 .. 
Those schola!:'s '\vho have >:Jri tten about the period from 1951 tr.,;. 
1972, while hesi tatiEg to say that policies \Vere !!determined': by the 
interests of allies, have agreed that foreign views were very important 
in the fonnation of policy. Kenna\vay 1 for instance 1 says: 
and, 
"For nearly 20 years after 1951, New Zealand's external 
relations were dominated by the two relationships V.'i th 
Britain and the United States11 , 6 
11 Concern for both relationships has been an important factcT• 
in Ne\·l Zealand policies n .. 7 
W.K. Jackson says: 
:'Generally speaking, .. .. • . .. it [New Zealand] acquiesced in 
the policies of its major partners even where it had important 
reservations about such policies, for New Zealand's approach 
to foreign affairs is fundamentally cautious and conservative" .. 
8 
,Jackson says that there are 11 indicationsu in the cases of the· com.mi·tment 
to Malaysia in 1963, the sending of troops to Vietnam in 1965, and the 
commitment to Malaysia in 1969, that New Zealand was fa.r from subservient 
to the wishes of its allies. 
In the absence of detailed studies of New Zealand's Asian 
policies, Jacksons's 11 indications" are all that are available to 
justify his claims of reluctant acquiescence. 
Some of those involved in the policy-making have appeared to 
deny that Ne>~ Zealand owed much to the attitudes of its allies. 
6 Kennaway, R.N. N~~ Zealand Foreign Policy 1951-1971, p32 
7 Ibid., p38, emphasis added. 
8 Jackson, Keith, "Aspects of New Zealand Foreign Policy", in 
Wood, G.A. and O'Connor, P.S (eds.), TI.P. Mol'reU -A Tribute, P232 
G.R. Laking, Secretary of Foreign Affairs from 1966 to 1972., said in 
1969 that the decision to keep New Zealand troops in Singapore after 
1971 was 
"indicative of a reality that has been unnecessarily obscured 
- the determination of successive governments to frru~e their 
decisions in the light of a New Zealand assessment of New 
Zealand's interests 11 • 9 
This thesis seeks more answers to the question: How far does 
it seem that New Zealand's Asian policies were influenced by the 
attitudes of other powers rather than by its government's perceptions? 
Since the degree of foreign influence on policy must depend upon the 
objectives of New Zealand's foreign policy and their relative import-
ance, the question may be stated more basically as: what objectives 
were the most important in determining New Zealand's Asian policies? 
The thesis comes to the conclusion that the policies studied 
were heavily influenced by the attitudes and policies of allies, 
although these allied policies were, for the most part, those that 
New Zealand policy-makers were basically inclined towards anyway. 
On several occasions, however, New Zealand's policy did not reflect 
its government's inclinations. The influence of allies was based on 
the high priority New Zealand governments accorded to objectives of 
strengthening relationships with allies. 
As well as the question of the role of external influence, 
there is the question of which external influence was most important 
9 Laking, G. R. "International Problems Confronting New Zealand in 
the 1970s", in Brown, Bruce (ed.) Foreign Policy in the 19708, pl9 
5. 
at which times. F.L.W. Wood was the first to suggest, in 1953, ~~at 
there was a tension in New Zealand's policies caused by ~~e sometimes 
competing demands of its two dominant relationships. This tension 
was labelled "the ANZAC dilemma". 10 More recently, W.K. Jackson has 
stated that the period 1951-72 saw a steady tilting of the balance of 
influence in favour of the United States, >rith the turning points 
coming in the late 'fifties, after Suez, and the early 'sixties, 
after Britain's first announcement of an attempt at entry into the 
European Economic Oommunity. 11 Jackson says that his hypothesis 
(as he concedes it to be) involves reducing the significance of the 
fall of Singapore in 1942 as a turning point in New zealand policy; 
that is, he believes that New Zealand policies did not reflect a primary 
dependence on the United States until much later. Jackson does not 
offer much in the way of policy proof to justify his selection of 
turning points. He says: 
" even after the conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty, British-
oriented policies continued to prevail, whether in Indo-china 
in 1954, Malaya in 1955, or in the important differences of 
opinion over Suez in 1956". 12 
The role of Australian influence is discussed only >rith reference to 
the Vietnam commitment. In this thesis, an attempt is made to draw 
some conclusions about the pattern of foreign influence in Asian 
foreign policies. Once again, the pattern of influence must stem 
from the priority among New Zealand objectives. 
10 Wood, F.L.W. "The Anzac Dilemma", Internationa~ Affairs (London) 
April, 1953, pl84 
11 "Aspects of New Zealand Foreign Policy", in W.P. MorreH: A Tribute, 
pp223-225. 
12 Ibid., p224 
The thesis concludes that. American, and especially Australian, 
vie\vs i.;ere generally more i;-tfluential than British attitudes i£1 d0ter-
mining· Ne\.; Zealand policy towards Asia .. Even in the I fifties r Nev.r 
Zealand's policies more than once differed from tho:;e of Britain, 
while remaining closely aligned v;ith those of Australia .. Nev.; Zealand 
\<!aS ahvays more hesitant to oppose American policy ·tha..'1 to oppose 
British policy. 
Ne·w Zealand 1 s foreign policy objectives in Asia have been little 
commented on .. W.K .. Jackson claims that 11 traditionally our soals h2ve 
ter.1.ded to be largely undefined and often obscured behind those of other 
powerstl. 13 In 1975, the Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Asian 
Division. Brian Lynch, suggested that some of New Zealand's goals in 
Asia in the 'fifties and 'sixties had been: to oppose aggression by 
one country against another; t.o upho"Id the right of a people. t.o self-
determination; to contain 11 the spread of Communismn, so that. close 
friends, closer to home, would not be exposed; and to help maintain 
non-Communist governments in power. 14 Lynch did not suggest an order 
of priority for these objectives. 
This thesis also examines the bi-partisan development of New 
Zealand's Asian foreign policy. Once again, this aspect of foreign 
policy has not been much investigated. There has been an article on 
the claims of the Third Labour government to have broken the pattern 
13 Jackson, Keith, "New Zealand's International Interests and the 
Search for Peace 11 , in New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 
New Zealand Foreign Policy: Occasional Papers 1973-74 p49. 
14 . --Lynch, B. 11Asian Security - A New Zealand Viewpointn, 1n 1VeUJ 
ZeaZand Foreign Affairs Review, November, 1975, ppl3-24 
7. 
of foreign policy of previous National governments, but nothing else. 15 
It has been assumed by some of those commenting briefly on the 
issue that New Zealand's policies have been bi-partisan. J.S. Hoadley 
asserted in 1975: "Only Question Time queries by backbenchers disturb 
general bi-partisanship in foreign policy". 16 The then-Leader of 
the Opposition, and ex-Prime Minister, J.R. ~~rshall, spoke in Parlia-
ment in 1974 of "the bi-partisan policies New Zealand has followed 
for many years". 17 Labour Party members, however, disagreed with 
him, and three years earlier, G.R. Laking had described the 1960s as 
the period when bi-partisanship in foreign affairs had ended. New 
Zealand's involvement in Vietnam, he wrote, "was the first significant 
foreign policy question over which Parliament divided in a partisan 
wayn .. 18 During the period studied, there were four changes of 
government between the National and Labour Parties (in 1949, 1957, 1960 
and 1972) with National governments dominating the period. The thesis 
looks at the differences in Labour and National approaches to Asia, 
and at how this difference affected policy. .It asks the question: 
did the Labour Party in Opposition formulate different objectives 
from those of the National Party, and did Labour in office recognise 
a priority among objectives similar to that of the National Party? 
15 Roberts, Nigel s. "Foreign Affairs: The Legend and Legacy of 
Norman Kirk", in IsZa:nds 10, vel. 3, No.4, Summer 1974. 
16 Hoadley, J. Stephen, "Domestic Influences on Foreign Policy: An 
Interpretation of New Zealand-Indonesian Relations", in Levine, s. 
(ed.) New ZeaZa:nd PoZitias: A Reader, p443. 
17 New ZeaZa:nd Parliamentary Debates (N.Z.P.D.), vel. 390, pp994, 996, 
1051 and 1053, March 19 and 20, 1974. 
18 Laking, G.R. "Foreign Policy in the 1970s", in New Zealand's 
Heritage, vel. 21, p2895. 
a. 
The conclusion reached is that policy was largely bi-partisan 
and that this was because the parties shared their major objectives. 
It was found, however, that Labour did formulate some different 
objectives in Opposition, and that there were some differences from 
National in the priority that Labour in office accorded its objectives. 
These facts accounted for the policy differences that there were. 
The two sets of policies examined were thought to lend them-
selves well to the role of "case studies" for the wider objectives, 
for two reasons. First, each set of policies seemed likely to have 
been subject to a major external influence, and the external influence 
in each set was different. Kennaway notes that New Zealand's policy 
towards China was "more influenced by United States' than by British 
policy'!. 19 On the other hand, he states that the Federation of Malaya 
(later Malaysia) was an area "where British influence was an especially 
important factor in New Zealand policy during the 'fifties and early 
sixties". 20 Second, China recognition policy and security policies 
in both the Malaysian area and in Indo-China concerned each of the 
four governments of different political hue that ruled between 1949 
and 1975. It was known that China recognition was one foreign 
affairs issue on which New Zealand's political parties had differences, 
and that there had been partisan differences about South-east Asian 
policies, too. The interaction of these differences with a constant 
external factor was thought likely to provide some evidence of the 
strength of the latter. 
19 Kennaway, R.N. Op. Cit., p62 
20 Ibid., p52 
9. 
Method 
Any study of contempor~-y New Zealand foreign policy is 
constrained by two major factors. First, the public record lacks 
important components compared with a more "historical" period. The 
files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs less than 25 years old are 
closed to scholars, and files for some years before that are not yet 
deposited with the National Archives and are not available. Records 
of Cabinet discussion and decision are not available, and neither are 
Caucus records. Thus the public record, for the most part, contains 
only the "public" face of policy - official explanations and justifi-·· 
cations, and not a record of all the considerations that influenced 
policy. 
The other major constraint is that the private record is also 
limited. Collections of private papers of policy-makers are few, 
and where extant, access is often restricted. Three Prime Ministers 
of the period studied - Holland, Nash and Holyoake - are known to 
have left papers, but all three collections present difficulties. 
The Nash papers are deposited in the National Archives, but will not 
be available to the public until 1980. The Holyoake papers are held 
by the General Assembly Library and will not be available until five 
years after Holyoake's death. Some Holland papers are held by the 
General Assembly Library and are available, but are unrevealing in 
the foreign affairs field. Nash and Holyoake were also the Ministers 
of External {or Foreign} Affairs in their governments; I am not aware 
of the existence of papers belonging to any of Holland's Ministers of 
External Affairs. 
Given these factors, the public record, such as it is, must 
serve as the basis for study. The evolution of policies, and of 
10. 
the stimuli and constraints, then, is traced by reference first to 
the considerations that government and party spokesmen said influenced 
their decisions. This approach can show the evolution of policy at 
one level - the rhetorical level - provided some caution is observed. 
Explanations and justifications will differ in differing contexts. 
Official explanations destined for overseas consumption will stress 
different factors from justifications given to a domestic audience for 
political purposes. The absence of certain elements from one sort 
of statement will not necessarily mean that they are not active 
considerations, or even the most important considerations. Factors 
stressed in another sort of statement may not be influential at all. 
A contrast between different types of statement made at similar times 
may prove illuminating. A careful eye to the political exigencies 
of the moment will be necessary. 
Of course, even a satisfactory study at the rhetorical level 
will not give a clear picture, since some important considerations 
will never be voiced publicly at any level, and some that are voiced 
will not be true. 
Hoadley notes: "Public debate of a particular policy often 
takes the form of the government espousing noble motives and its 
critics doubting them, with neither side acknowledging the many 
mundane domestic motives that bear on any policy decision". 21 
To try to overcome the difficulty of unacknowledged consider-
ations in some measure, the thesis does three things. First, where 
possible,rhetoric is contrasted with what a government actually does: 
21 Op. Cit., pp443-444 
11. 
actions often speak louder than words. Second, the public and 
private records of other countries are utilised where these throw 
light on New zealand policies. In particular, the memoirs or diaries 
of British, Australian and American policy-makers are used for their 
references to New zealand attitudes, but some foreign public documents 
also serve this purpose. Third, where at all possible, information 
beyond the public record is obtained, to compla~ent or contrast with 
the public record, as the case may be. The major sources in this 
regard have been the Research Division of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, t<hich was always willing to answer questions; surviving 
policy-makers, some of whom were prepared to give interviews or 
answer letters; and finally, private papers. Access was obtained 
to a very limited number of the papers of Walter Nash, and the Labour 
Party Research Unit permitted a perusal of its files for foreign 
policy position papers. In general, information about the 'fifties 
was easier to obtain than information about more recent times, and 
thus the balance of sources is more even for the earlier parts of 
the thesis. 
The time-span of the thesis is from the end of 1949 to mid-1975. 
1949 was the logical starting point for a study of China recognition 
policy, since the People's Republic came into being on October 1 of 
that year. Since South-east Asian security policies were linked to 
the rise of Communist China, the date is also a convenient one for the 
start of ~~at study. The study of China recognition policy comes to 
a natural end with New Zealand's recognition of the People's Republic 
on December 22, 1972, but since some of the South-east Asian security 
policies of the Third Labour government continued to develop beyond 
that date, the last chapter goes on until 1975. 
12. 
China and South-east Asian security policies are examined 
separately and in chronological order so that the evolution of each 
may be clear. The chapters are divided according to a combination 
of several of four variables; the political party concerned; 
whether it is in government or opposition; the particular policy 
or policy area, and finally, significant time periods. 
Chapter One deals with China policy under Labour and National 
governments before the Korean War and the signing of ANZUS, while 
Chapter Two deals with policy made by the first National government 
(1949-57) in the slightly different context that existed after those 
events. Chapters Three and Four deal with Labour Party policy 
between 1950 and 1960, with .Chapter Three chronicling the development 
of a distinctive China policy by Labour when in Opposition, and 
Chapter Four examining its fate while the party wasihoffice, 1957 
to 1960. Chapters Five and Six deal with the China policy of the 
Second National government (1960-1972) before and after the changes 
in American and Chinese attitudes in the late 'sixties. Chapter 
Seven deals with the Labour Party's attitude in the 'sixties and its 
eventual recognition of China when the government in 1972. 
In the South-east Asia section, Chapter Eight examines the 
policies concerning South-east Asian security of the National 
government between 1949 and 1957. Chapter Nine covers the same 
period for the Opposition Labour Party, and then goes on to deal with 
the policies of Labour in government, 1957-60. The next three chapters 
examine three policies of the Second National goverr~ent: - the 
response to Indonesia's Confrontation of Malaysia; the involvement 
in Vietnam, and the response to Britain's military withdrawal from 
Malaysia. Chapter Thirteen deals with Labour Party attitudes and 
13. 
policies towards Malaysia 1967-75. It may be noted that there is no 
separate chapter dealing with Labour's Vietnam policy. This is mainly 
because the party's Vietnam policy was one articulated entirely in 
Opposition. By the time the Labour Party came to power in 1972, 
the issue of the presence of combat troops was a dead one, since the 
Americans and New Zealanders had substantially withdrawn. 





At the end of 1949, New Zealand was in the middle of a period 
of transition in its foreign relations. The country's foreign 
policy-making context had been altered substantially by the events 
of the Second World War and its aftermath, and four years after the 
end of the war, New Zealand was both trying to retain what it could 
of the old order of things, and to adapt to the new. New Zealand's 
national interests had not changed, but the uptionsopento fulfil 
them had. 
After the war, as before it, New Zealand was a small physic-
ally isolated state, with a dependent, agricultural economy, and 
virtually no resources for effective defence. To survive, it had 
always needed guaranteed foreign markets for its agricultural produce, 
and protection from powerful nations. Before the war, as indeed 
from the time of its foundation as a nation, New Zealand had relied 
upon Britain to fulfil both its needs. Created as a colony of 
Britain while Britain was the pre-eminent global power, New Zealand 
developed under the protection of the Royal Navy as a supplier of 
cheap food to the British market. In its foreign policy decision-
making, such as it was, for New Zealand had few resources to conduct 
a foreign policy, New Zealand's relationship with Britain was the 
major factor. To a large extent, New Zealand saw British interests 
and goals as, ultimately, its own, and with some excep~ions, the 
1939 Prime Ministerial declaration that where Britain went, New 
Zealand went also, held true. The exceptions occurred where British 
lS .. 
policy \.;as judg-ed not to be serving New Zealand's eccncmic or 
security interes·ts .. 1 
rrhe basis for New Zea.land r s loyal outlook began to cha...Tlge in 
1940 and 1941, t-.rhen British power to protect New Zealand was sudc!enly 
revealed to be limi·ted. Japa~ attacked British possessions in Asia. 
and the Pacific v.,rht~n Britain ··;-;as heavily engaged ac;ainst Germany and 
Italy in Europe. It was see.n that the only effective friendly pov,rer 
in Ne'io'J Zealand 1 s region was ~.:he Uni t.ed States. 
New Zealand was forced to appeal to the United States for 
protection, and American troops landed in the country in 1942. In 
1944, Labour Prime Minister Pete:- Fraser declared: 11 New Zealand 
realises that the security and future development of the Pacific can 
only be satisfactorily achieved in co-operation with the Uni·ted States !I ( 
and he had gone on to express the hope that wa-rtixr..e mutual assistance 
,would develop into a policy of permanent mutual collaboration after 
I 
the war. As a direct result of the experience of the v1ar, Ner,.r Zeale.nd 
became interested in bringing the United States and Britain together 
formally in a pact to ensure Antipodean protection. rrhe ll.mericans 1 
however, were preoccupied with European protection in the late 'forties, 
and were not willing to extend guara."l.tees to New Zealand and Australia. 
1 The standard work on New Zealand's pre-war policies is Wood, F.L.W. 
"The Neu; Zealand People at Far - Political and External Affairs"; 
see also Ross, A. "Reluctant Dominion or Dutiful Daughter? NHkJ 
Zealand and the Commonwealth in the Inter-War Years", Jow:nal of 
Commonwealth Political Studies, vol. x. No. l, March, 1972. 
2 Statement by the Rt. Ron. Peter_Fraser in Washington, 17 April. 1944, 
in N.Z. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Neu Zealand Foreign Policy 
Statements and Docwnents 1.943-195? p65 
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In 1949, the N8'\·J Zealand govern_ment \ .. -as still ir4tc~LE!Sted in a. Pacific 
pact, but hot hopeful of acbieving it. 
II'fu"Uediately a.f·ter the war a superior means o:E ensurin~; Ne;..~ 
Zealand's physical security was thought by New Zea.land!s Labour govern-
rnent to lie in a system of Universal Collective Security. Nevl Zealand 
had been a vigorous supporter of the old League of Nations system in 
the mid-1 thirties, and v;as keen that the nev1 United Nations system be 
more effective than the League's had been~ By the end of t.he :forties, 
however, it was evident to the Fraser government that the ani:agonism 
and rivalry between the two largest powers, and the subsequent division 
of the world into tvTO rival camps, had rendered the system u.:.!·wor}:uble ~ 
Although it intended to continue to promote the system and United 
Nations principles to the best of its ability, New. Zealand knew that 
it must seek protection alsewhere6 
The major threat to world peace was seen to have chan9ed as a 
result of the war, and in New Zealand's eyes this role was, by 1949, 
filled by the Soviet Union, •<hich was believed to be intent upon 
imposing cormnunism on as many countries as it could. Fraser told 
Parliament in 1948 that an attempt by one nation to force its 
political and social system on to others was tyranny and must be 
opposed. 3 
Although the New Zealand government recognised that the strategic 
balance of power in the •·;orld had been fu.l'l.damentally altered by the 
war, and that British power was no longer on a par with that of the 
3 N.Z. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Foreign PoZicy 
Statements «ad Documents plBO 
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Soviet Union or the United States, it continued to bel.ieve that 
New Zeal.and's future was primarily linked to that of Britain and 
the Commonwealth. In 1949 New Zealand was still economically and 
culturally much more closely connected to Britain than to any other 
state, and militarily Britain was still a global power with strong 
forces in the Pacific. New Zealand was still prepared in its 
foreign policy to assist Britain in its global role. Fraser told 
the 1949 Labour Party Conference that New Zealand's destiny was 
"wholly and completely" bound up with the British Conunonwealth, 4 and 
later in the year was prepared to conunit New Zealand to send troops 
to assist Britain in the Middle East if global war should break out. 
Despite a willingness by New Zealand to resume the patterns 
of the past in foreign pol.icy, the claims of a new situation were 
insistent. The war had made ~~e Pacific region and Asia in 
particular - of real importance in New Zealand's foreign pol.icy, and 
British priorities were elsewhere. In the 'twenties and 'thirties 
New Zealand had been somewhat concerned about·a threatfromJapan, but 
after that threat had materialised, Japan's future became a subject 
of great importance to New Zealand. 
• 
In the absence of any guarantee of its security from the United 
States, New Zealand, along with Australia, was determined to prevent 
Japan becoming a threat again. New Zealand had spoken out since the 
end of the war for a "hard" peace treaty that would limit Japan's 
armaments and industrial development. New Zealand's views, however, 
4 Brown, B. New Zealand Foreign PoZioy in Retrospect, plO 
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were opposed by the United States, which was eager to "rehabilitate" 
Japan and build it up as a democratic ally against the Soviet Union. 
Since the United states was the power in control of the administration 
of Japan, New Zealand knew that it depended on American goodwill for 
the protection of its interests in the matter. 
treaty was still not in sight. 
In 1949, a peace 
Developments in other parts of Asia were impinging on New 
Zealand's consciousness, and by 1949 were coming to cause as much 
concern as the Japanese issue. The single most important development 
was the upsurge of Asian nationalism in the wake of the war, and the 
beginnings of decolonisation. India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and 
the Philippines had been granted independence between 1946 and 1948. 
Anti-colonialist wars had broken out in French Indo-China, the Dutch 
East Indies, and British Malaya. New Zealand's reaction to this 
development was mixed. The Labour government which had been in power 
since 1935 was sympathetic to the aspirations of the Asians. support 
for the self-determination of peoples was part of the Labour Party's 
credo as well as being a principle of the United Nations Charter. 
On the other hand, the nationalist forces were unknown quantities 
compared with the colonial governments, and some were dominated by 
Communists. In the context of the Cold War, these latter were seen 
as advance-guards of hostile Soviet power. In 1948, Prime Minister 
Fraser spoke of the Communist-led insurgency in Malaya as "that dark, 
turgid, dangerous flood", 5 The Civil War in China between the 
Communists and the independent Nationalist government was being watched 
5 New ZeaZand Foreign Policy: Statements and Documents, pl79 
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with some concern: - New Zealand was sympathetic to the non-Communist 
government which had been an ally against the Japanese during the war. 
In Indonesia, the non-Communist nationalist government was publicly 
supported. 
The war wrought another change in New Zealand's policy-making 
context by initiating the development of a close relationship with 
Australia. Despite Australia's nearness and similar heritage, there 
had been little consultation between New Zealand and its neighbour 
before the war. The common threat of Japan inaugurated a close 
working relationship, symbolised in the Canberra Pact of 1944. In 
this agreement, the two governments pledged to collaborate in external 
policy in all matters affecting the peace of the Pacific, and in 
defence. 6 After the >1ar, the governments collaborated in the setting 
up of the United Nations and in regard to the question of Japan. By 
1949, Australian opinion was an important factor in New Zealand's. 
policy-making. 
The 'forties had seen New Zealand start to establish a diplomatic 
network - an essential for an independent foreign policy - but by 1949, 
there were only five posts all told - in Britain, Australia, Canada, 
t.~e United States and the Soviet Union. New Zealand had no diplomatic 
eyes and ears at all in Asia, 
1949 then, found New Zealand bala.~cing old attachments and 
concerns against new ones. The close traditional friendship with 
Britain was already tempered in some degree by the influence of 
Australia and the need for co-operation with the United States. 
G For the Canberra Agreement and the background to it, see Kay., R.L. 
(ed.) The AustraZian-New Zea~d Agreement 1944, Wellington, 1972. 
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Belief in the United Nations Collective Security System and·United 
Nations principles was tempered with knowledge that the Cold War had 
severely limited their application; a traditional concern with 
European affairs was balanced by a growing awareness of Asia's import-
ance to New Zealand, and a decades-old fear of Japan was being tempered 
with a new fear of Communist influence in Asia. By 1965, the balance 
would have tilted strongly against the old attachments and concerns, 
and by 1975, even the new would be somewhat outdated, being replaced 




NEW ZEALAND AND THE QUESTION OF THE 
RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA 1949-50 
21. 
When the Chinese Communist Party announced its assumption of power 
in that country by the proclamation of the existence of the People's 
Republic of China, New Zealand was faced with the decision of whether 
or not.to grant the new government diplomatic recognition. Although 
the British government was in favour of an early recognition by all the 
Commonwealth countries, New Zealand's Labour Party government was not 
prepared to recognise. It was believed that recognition of the 
Communist government would help to strengthen it, and the Labour 
government did not believe that such a strengthening was in New 
Zealand's interests, primarily because it feared Chinese intentions 
in South-east Asia. New Zealand also took into account the fact 
that recognition would upset the United States, whose goodwill New 
Zealand needed in connection with the Japanese Peace Treaty. 
Morally, the Labour government was reluctant to throw over its war-
time ally, the Nationalist government of China, or put its seal of 
approval on a regime that had come to power by violent means. At 
the end of November, 1949, the Labour government was defeated, and 
the new National Party government was faced with the same question, 
Although the government's foreign policy advisers thought early 
recognition desirable, the National government, too, was not 
prepared to go along with Britain. The reasons were the same as 
those put forward by the Labour government, with the addition that 
22. 
National believed that recognition would be embarrassing politically 
because of the strong anti-Communist election campaign the party had 
mounted. 
After the close of the Second World War, Civil War resumed in 
China between the Nationalist government and the forces of the Chinese 
Communist Party. This war had begun in the early nineteen-thirties 
and had been officially suspended after the Japanese attack on China 
in 1937. During the war with the Japanese, the Communists had 
strengthened their position, while the hold of the Nationalist govern-
ment on the population had weakened. In the resumed civil war, the 
area of Communist control began to spread. 
The advance of Chinese Communist power was watched with some 
concern by the Labour government in New Zealand. Undoubtedly this 
was because a Communist country - the Soviet Union - was considered 
the greatest threat to world peace in the post war years. After 
the fall of North China to the Communists in late 1948, Prime Minister 
Fraser said: 
-" •• we do not like to see the Communists becoming strongly 
established in China, but actually this is a matter for the Chinese 
people". 1 
He predicted that the advance of the Communists would have a 
"disturbing effect" on other Pacific nations, but not a decisive 
effect at that stage. 
1 Waikato Times January .10, 1949, pS 
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Two days after having made that comment, Fraser, who was 
returning to New zealand from Britain at the time, declared that 
Communist successes in China did not present "an immediate threat 
to New Zealand and Australia, but there is no telling what may 
happen in the future". 2 Once back in Auckland, the Prime ~~nister 
repeated his belief that developments in China would have no direct 
immediate effect on New Zealand, but said that they posed a danger 
to other areas of Asia. 
"Luckily there are 6000 good Pacific miles between us and 
China, but the danger to South-west Asia is very serious and immediate. 
We cannot possibly take up a complacent attitude and must be pre-
pared for all emergencies". 3 
During 1949, the Communist forces gradually occupied most of 
China. 
At the opening of the 1949 session of Parliament at the end 
of June, the Governor-General, in his Speech from the Throne, said: 
"During the past year, the political situation in East Asia 
has engaged the particular attention of my Ministers. They 
are devoting careful consideration to the developments which 
have recently occurred and to the implications which they may 
have for the security of New Zealand and of the British 
Commonwealth as a whole".~ 
In Parliament in September, however, Labour backbencher 
G.H.O. Wilson declared that the threat from Japan was "infinitely 
greater" and "nearer to us than any threat which may have come from 
2 Waikato Times (W.T) Jan. 12, 1949, p5 
3 W.T. January 25, 1949, p4 
4 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD) vel. 285, p3, 28 June, 1949 
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Commnnist China". 5 A threat from China was only likely to develop if 
China moved into the Russian orbit, Wilson thought, and this, in turn, 
"would depend largely upon the policy of the Western powers, and upon 
our policy as a minor portion of those powers". A policy that didn't 
prejudge China could well see it leaning towards the West. Otherwise, 
Wilson said, he did not see why Communist China "should more than 
superficially resemble the shape of Russia". However, even if China 
were pushed into the Soviet orbit, "it would still be nonsense to 
think of a Communist China - even one closely allied with Russia- as 
the worst threat to us in the Pacific". 
On October 1, 1949, the Communist Party of China announced its 
assumption of power in that country by formally proclaiming in Peking 
the existence of the People's Republic of China. At the same time, 
the new government asked for diplomatic recognition from the world. 
New Zealand's initial reaction was to temporise until the 
policies of its closest friends became clear. The New Zealand 
delegation at the United Nations was told that the Prime Minister 
was unwilling to make any commitments on the subject of recognition, 
and that New Zealand's attitude must depend in part on the attitudes 
of the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia and "other" 
countries. 6 
Britain had announced, a few days after the proclamation of 
the People's Republic, that it would proceed to discuss "with the 
Commonwealth and other interested powers", the Communist request 
for recognition. 7 
5 NZPD vel. 287, pl888, September 6, 1949 
6 Information supplied by the Research Division, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
7 Evening Star, October 4, 1949, pS 
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The foremost interested pov;er was the United States. On 
October 12, Secretary of State Acheson stated that there were three 
tests which the administration believed should be passed by any 
gove~lll~ent before it was granted recognition: it should control 
the country it claimed to control; it should recognise its inter-· 
national obligations; and it should rule with the acquiescence of 
the people who were ruled. 8 The Secretary did not say whether 
China passed these tests. On the same day, however, the Department 
of State, in an instruction to its diplomatic posts abroad, stated 
that the United states government's position was one of non-recog-
nition, if any foreign government raised the question. 9 
Later in the month, the new Chinese government upset public 
opinion in the United States by jailing the American Consul-General 
in ~1ukden, Angus Ward, and four of his associateE r on charges of 
assaulting a Chinese employee. President Truman called the jailing 
an outrage, and it made any immediate move towards acceptance of the 
Peking government out of the question. 10 
In Australia, the Labor. government, too, seemed to be dis-
inclined to grant recognition. On October 25, the Minister of 
External Affairs, H.V. Evatt, said that China would P~ve to pass the 
same three tests set out by Acheson, and then went on to declare that 
8 Department of State Bulletin October 15, 1951, p605 
"U.S. Policy towards China 1949-50: Statement by Philip C. Jessup, 
Ambassador at Large, to Special Sub-Co~~ittee of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, October 4, 1951". 
9 Ibid. 
10 Dulles, F.R. American Policy TOUJard Communist c:hina, pp.51-52 
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recognition could not be granted in the absence of "firm and specific 
assurances that the territorial integrity of neighbouring countries, 
notably Hong Kong, will be respected". 11 
The British government, however, pushed on with its consultations. 
At the end of October, the British Foreign Secretary asked the Common-
wealth High Commissioners in London to meet him on November 10 to 
discuss the question. 12 The British government was inclined towards 
an early recognition to protect British trading interests in China and 
to avoid leaving the Chinese government exposed solely to Russian 
influences. 
Prime Minister Fraser was involved in the campaign for the 1949 
general election in New Zealand when the High Commissioner's request 
for the government's opinion was conveyed to him. New Zealand's 
representative in London was told that Fraser was "very much adverse" 
to according recognition at that time. Any such recognition, Fraser 
believed, would be hailed as another important victory for the 
Communists, with consequent strengthening of their position and prestige 
in China, and in all other troubled areas in the Far East. The Prime 
Minister conceded that the Nationalist government of China was a spent 
force, but considered that it would create a bad impression - especially 
among non-Communist Chinese - if the British Commonwealth were to take 
the initiative in throwing them over in favour of the Communists. 
Fraser did not think that British arguments in favour of recognition 
were really strong enough to justify the granting of i.t. 13 
11 Albinski, H.s. Austral.ian Pol.iaies and Attitudes tO'uJards China p31 




Therewasa further factor in the Prime Minister's thinking 
which was also conveyed to the High Commissioner: the proximity of the 
New Zealand general election. This was scheduled for November 30, 
1949. The government was firmly opposed to any New Zealand recognit-
ion before the election. 1 ~ A government which recognised the People's 
Republic of China would run the risk of being damaged electorally by 
charges of being sympathetic to Communism, and Fraser was not going 
to give the Opposition a stick to beat him with. 15 
The New Zealand Prime Minister had been invited to Canberra by 
H.V. Evatt to discuss the attitude of Commonwealth countries to the 
new regime in China with visiting British diplomats who had just 
concluded a conference in Singapore on Britain's China policy. The 
meeting was scheduled for November 10 and 11. The chief British 
delegate would be Esler Dening, head of the Foreign Office's Far 
Eastern section. Fraser, busy with the election campaign, sent the 
External Affairs Department's permanent head, A.D. Mcintosh, instead. 
Mcintosh discussed Fraser's views on China with Evatt prior 
to the meeting, mentioning the constraint of the elections, and these 
views may have influenced the Australian government's decision not to 
• 
recognise until after the Australian elections on December 10. 
Australian Prime Minister Chifley's biographer, L.F. Crisp, certainly 
implies that New Zealand's decision influenced the uncertain Chifley 
to wait. 16 
1 ~ Ibid. 
15 Interview, Sir Alister Mcintosh, 21.2.74 
16 Crisp, L.F. Ben Chifley p294 
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At the conference, Hcintosh, on behalf of t.he Netv' Zealand 
government: made out an extreme case against recognition& The vie'f,,?S 
he expressed \\'ere conceived by Fraser, but had b2en endorsed by Nash~ 17 
Mcintosh told the conference that New Zealand r-egarded the advent 
of a Communist China 11 With the utmost concern'l, fearing it '\vould lead 
to a Commrmist Asia with the subsequent loss of \'Jes·tern influence OVf?-:C 
Asiatic peoples. Recognition i.\'Ould strengthen Cormnunists every>.<~here, 
and help consolidate the Corrununist regime in China, 't'Jhich t-1as not in 
New Zealand's interest. 
Further, recognition by the Commonwealth would "antagonise and 
irritate11 the United States, and tend to increase American determination 
to strengthen Japan at the expense of ·the security of New Zealand. 
Apart from these practicC'I.l grounds, Fraser believed that it 
would be morally wrong to recognise the seizure of power by the 
1Commnnist Party in China, since the people would holJ po-:.;rer against 
I 
the wishes of a majority of the people. 
Recognition 'W'Ould involve throwing over 11 Urmecessarily and 
ungratefully", a former ally, >1hich, despite its sorry record, vms 
a victim of aggression. Fraser's com.t-nent that Nationalist China 
had beer, the victim of aggression sho>1ed that he believed the 
Communist victory in China to be the result of Russian machinations~ 
Finally, the Prime Minister believed that people who thought 
that China would turn Titoist were deluding themselves, and that a·t 
best, any such prospect was a wild gamble. 18 
17 Information supplied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
18 Information provided by the Research Division, 11inistry of 
Foreign Affairs 
The coun~cer-arguments of the ot:her officials "i':ere Sl'!Ch, 
however, that He Intosh left the meeting agreed that he ldonld re.cornr;1e.nd 
to the New Zealand government that Ne't'." Zealand should J:ecogEise., 1 s 
In the meantime, hm.'Vever, it was suggested tO the BritiEh 
representatives -'chat any Cortm\onv-.realth. decision on recognition be held 
over until the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers Conference at Colo:rbo 1 
Ceylon, in Januar)."'. 
IJ.1he British government later indicated that it was prepared to 
wait at least tmtil after the Austre.lasian elections before raising 
the subject again. On November 13, British Foreign Secretary Bevin 
told United States Secretary of State Acheson that the British 1rJould 
probably not recognise the comraunist regime before mid-Decerrber, 1949.20 
In the House of Com.111ons three days later 1 Bevin said: 11 I ~""n mo~ce 
concerned in acting together with the Commonwealth and with other 
friendly governments t!1an with taking a hurried decision on this 
matter. A combined decision 4 •• is much the best". 21 
On November 30, 1949, the general election. was held in Ne-w 
Zealand a:1d Fraser's Labour government was defeated by the National 
Party. Ten days later, at the Australian general election, Chifley's 
Labor governrnen·t was defeated by its opponents, the Liberal-Coun·try 
Party Coalition led by Robert Menzies. 
The victorious National Party of Sic~,ey Holland had not taken a 
position on the recognition of China prior to the election. Foreign 
Affairs were, as usual, not election issues. The new Prime t1inister 1 s 
19 Mcintosh Interview 21.2.74 
2 0 Acheson, D. Pl'esent at the Creation p332 
21 House of Commons Debates vol. 469, Column 2013, 16 November, 1949 
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first statement on foreign policy was w.ade on December 8, and it 
stressed the continuity of existing policy a.'ld increased attention to 
solidarity with Britain: nit is our intention to carry on existing 
policies concerning international affairs 1 but with emphasis on 
strengthening imperial relationships". 22 
On the face of it, this might seem to suggest that Britain's 
proposed policy to"ards China would be endorsed. However, the new 
government had come to pO\tJer on a staunchly anti-Cornmunis·t platform. 
A memo from a senior member of the Eastern section of the Department 
of External Affairs noted in mid-December that •1hile the balance of 
prac·tical advantages seemed in favour of early recognition, ·there were 
several likely constraints. These were that recognition would be 
contrary to the political thought of the National Party and its 
supporters, that the new Australian government might not be in favour, 
and finally that recognition would meet "lith "the implacable opposition 
of Fraser, now Leader of the Opposition". 23 The same member also 
observed that the question was not of much practical significance for 
New Zealand, and that there was no call for New Zealand to take any 
initiative. Indeed, he said, New Zealand might delay doing anything 
for quite a while . 
. The British government, however, had decided that it could delay 
recognition no longer. New Zealand, along with other allies, was 
informed in mid-December that Britain would recognise in early January, 
and the new government was asked whether it felt disposed to take 
parallel action. 
22 O.D.T. December 8, 1949 
2 3 Information provided by the Research Division, t-1inistry of Foreign 
Affairs 
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It was an awkward time to make a decision. The National govern-
ment had been in office for a little over a week, and the Minister of 
External Affairs, F.W. Doidge, was still in the process of preparing a 
series of foreign policy recomrnentations to Cabinet, including one on 
the recognition of China. 24 
If the Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs had been 
mainly influenced by their advisers in the Department of External 
Affairs, it would seem probable that New Zealand would have followed 
Britain. A comprehensive survey of the arguments for and against 
had been drawn up by the Eastern section, and it had come to the 
conclusion that the weight of argument supported early recognition. 
The survey was ruthlessly realist. There was no prospect of the 
re-establishment of the Nationalist government in China, it said. 
The Chinese people were unlikely to suffer as much corruption and 
oppression under the new regime as under the old, and therefore the 
growth of effective counter-revolutionary forces could not be 
expected. China was undoubtedly in for a long period of Communist 
domination. [A month previously, with the Nationalists still holding 
parts of South China, Fraser had been interested in not undermining 
the morale of the non-Commu_~ist Chinese]. The survey said that 
Fraser's points about recognition being an act of encouragement to 
other Communists, and an irritation to the United States, were 
important, but even so, did not justify a determination never to extend 
recognition. The memo argued strongly that continued contact with 
China was the West's best policy. By refusing to recognise China, it 
said, the West was giving an open field to the Russians •• Western help 
24 Information supplied by the Research Division, Ministry of· Foreign 
Affairs 
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for China would prevent China's being economically integrated into 
Russia, and it would also strengthen the position of the non-
Communist element in the population. Unlike Fraser, the author of 
the survey believed that Communism in China, as in Yugoslavia, had 
been largely a local growth. 
He said that l<hile it could not be lightly assumed that Mao 
was a potential Tito, it had to be recognised that the history of 
the Communist Party of China and the nature of the Chinese people 
made the emergence of nationalist (and ultimately even anti-Soviet) 
policies not so wildly improbable. The many natural points of 
conflict between China and Russia should not be overlooked. 
The summary noted that Western diplomats in Asia believed 
that the Overseas Chinese already regarded the Communist government 
as the legitimate government of China, and that therefore Coxnmon-
wealth recognition would give the Communists no greater filip. 
Non-recognition would strengthen the pro-Russian, anti-Western 
extremists in the Chinese government. 
The summary then listed some factors in favour of a later, 
rather than an early, recognition. As long as the Nationalist 
• 
government remained in existence, it would be a betrayal of 
democracy and a wartime ally to recognise the Communists. [The 
Nationalist government had just fled to the island of Taiwan]: 
the United States set great store by a United Front with regard to 
China among the democratic countries; and finally, recognition 
would strengthen the intransigence of the Vietminh in French Indo-
China. 25 
25 Information provided by the Research Division, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
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The conclusion about early recognition was endorsed by the 
Assistant Secretary of External Affairs, who saw the memorandum. 
This officer noted that the only important counter-argument was that 
which concerned the attitude of the United States. If the United 
States had offered to underwrite New Zealand's security, then that 
counter-argument might have been decisive, he wrote, but it was not 
so.26 The officer accepted that American disapproval should have 
been a decisive constraint if New Zealand were allied with the United 
States. However, since the United States was not an ally, there was 
no problem. The American attitude was important, but not overriding. 
There was no thought here of an "insurance" policy against future 
threats, a necessity to curry favour. 
A further memo on the China question was prepared on, or near, 
December 18. It said that Communist China had now fulfilled the 
normal international requirements for recognition, and that dislike 
of its policies could not be a sufficient reason for withholding 
that recognition. While the New Zealand government would be naturally 
reluctant to drop the Chiang Kai-shek government which fought the 
Japanese as New Zealand's ally, the balance of argument seemed to 
favour the re-establishment of relations between the current govern-
ment of China and the democratic countries, which would to some extent 
offset Soviet influence. Although New Zealand had no direct interest 
in the issue and could delay doing anything about it, it would 
strengthen the United Kingdom's position if other British Commonwealth 
countries also extended early recognition. 27 
26 Ibid. 
27 Information supplied by the Research Division, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
The government was also given an opinion by its military 
advisers on the strategic implications of the recognition of 
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Communist China. The Army felt that on the whole the benefits from 
recognition outweighed the disadvantage, but cautioned against moving 
out of step with the United States. The military assessment was that 
a Communist Chinese government did not involve any direct threat to the 
security of New Zealand while the Commonwealth retained control of sea 
communications. It was militarily desirable that China did not become 
a satellite of the Soviet Union, and therefore Titoist tendencies 
should be encouraged. A diplomatic presence by the Commonwealth in 
China would be the means for seeking out and encouraging deviationists. 
It was acknowledged that recognition would encourage the Communist 
factions in other Far Eastern countries, and even the growth of 
Communism among the New Zealand Chinese, but these factors did not 
outweigh the advantages of a diplomatic presence. As for the timing 
of the recognition, delay would mean that the Chinese would treat an 
eventual recognition as an unwilling gesture, performed with bad grace. 
However, recognition by the British Commonwealth countries in 
opposition to the United States might well provide an opportunity, in 
the event of a Far Eastern crisis in which A.~erican support for 
Commonwealth countries was most desirable, for the United states to 
insist that British Commonwealth countries accept the consequences of 
having acted independently in the matter of recognition. 28 
28 Ibid. 
35. 
Other influences apart from the External Affairs Department and 
the Armed Services were at work upon Doidge and Holland, however. one 
of Doidge's first moves after hearing of the necessity for decision on 
the China question was to consult Peter Fraser, the Leader of the 
Opposition. Fraser's advice was consistent with his earlier opinion 
as Prime Minister, and he and Doidge agreed in their discussion that 
New Zealand was being pushed too far too fast by the United Kingdom. 
Fraser endorsed a Doidge suggestion that a protest be made against 
the haste, and that a suggestion be made that the matter be held up 
for discussion at the Ceylon conference. 29 
The Minister of External Affairs, then, was encouraged by the 
Leader of the Opposition to stall on the matter. Further encourage-
ment came from New Zealand's nearest ally. The Australian government 
told Holland that it, too, was keen for a delayed recognition. 
On December 21, the government told the British government that 
it could not help feeling regret that a matter of such great importance 
to the members of the British Commonwealth in the Asian and Pacific 
areas should be decided in advance of the Ceylon conference. The 
conference would have provided the most appropriate opportunity for the 
consultation necessary for agreement on parallel action. The government 
said that it preferred to reserve its position until after the conference, 
which would enable it to ascertain the views of other Commonwealth 
governments. 30 At that stage, New Zealand's diplomatic network 
covered only Britain, Australia and Canada in the Commonwealth: there 
was no machinery for consultation with India, Pakistan, Ceylon or South 
Africa. 




In the later part of December, further influences against 
recognition were conveyed to the government. The department was 
apprised by its representative in the United States that British 
recognition was likely to arouse strong resentment among the press 
and public in the United States as well as in the Administration. 
The feeling in the United States was believed to be that 
Britain, in this matter which had implications far beyond the actual 
fact of recognition, should co-ordinate its activities with the 
United States. If Britain did rush into recognition unilaterally, it 
was hoped that there would be no bloc recognition by the Commonwealth 
which would unnecessarily isolate the United States. 31 
The government was also aware that the Chinese Nationalists 
were anxious about New Zealand's intentions with regard to the 
Communist government. Secretary Mcintosh told the Nationalist Consul-
General on December 22 that New Zealand at. that time had no intention 
of recognising Communist China, but that this could change in the New 
Year, especially if other countries recognised. He said that he 
thought it was only a question of time. 32 
At the end of the month, the Minister of External Affairs 
stated publicly that the recognition of China was an issue which the 
government expected would be discussed at Colombo, and that New 
Zealand's attitude was likely to differ from other Commonwealth countries. 
"It might be", he said, "that New Zealand's att.itude, both as to 
recognition, and timing of recognition~ would differ from that of some 
of the other nations of the British Commonwealth". 33 
31 Information supplied ·by the Research Division, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
32 Ibid. 
33 Evening Star December 29, 1949, p8 
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The government had already told Britain that it would· not 
conform to Britain's timing for recognition. Now Doidge introduced 
doubt about whether New Zealand would recognise at all. The British 
government appears to have assumed that some Commonwealth countries 
would not recognise China, even if the issue was thoroughly discussed 
at Colombo. When taken to task in the House of Commons in March, 1950, 
for not waiting until after the Colombo conference to announce recog-
nition, Mr Younger said there had been no point in Britain's waiting. 
There had been full consultations, but "in the course of these, it 
became clear that because of the varying attitudes of differing members. 
of the Commonwealth, united action was not expected". 3 ~ On December 21, 
the New Zealand government had not told Britain that it was against 
recognition, but simply that it wanted to know more about other Common-
wealth governments' views. 
more definite. 
The Australian government may have been 
Even after a decision not to follow Britain's lead had been taken 
in Wellington, the traditional rhetoric of loyalty to the Mother country's 
guidance was being voiced by the Prime Minister in his New Year's message 
to the nation. "Where Britain goes, we go" , he said, 11 in peace as in 
war" • as • 
Doidge, in his press statement of December 29, acknowledged that 
it was possible to make a case, almost equally strong, either for or 
against recognition. In favour of such a move, he said, was the fact 
that China was in for a long period of Communist dominance; that British 
administrators in the East had urged the earliest possible de jure 
Luard, E. Britain and China, p80 
35 
Evening Star December 30, 1949, p4 
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acceptance; t.hat a refusal of recognition v.Jould isolate China from the 
rest of the \>Jorld; and that as far as the United Nations Organisation 
was concerned, it \'lould be bette:r· to concede recognition TI0'\!7 1 rather 
than have rival groups lining up over the ma·tter. 
The External Affairs Hinister then stated his reasons against 
recognitione First, he said, recognition would break faith with th-=.""' 
Chinese Nationalists, and 'itlOUld mean abandoning a v..rar-ti.rne ally. 
Secondly, there was the fact that the Com.11unists had seized po~:ter 
in China, an act that peace-loving r..ations could not condone. In 
making this point, Doidge 't'las echoing Fraser's view that the Corr.rnun.i.sts 
had mounted some sort of coup contrary to the wishes of the people. 
The Minister ignored the fact that there \-Jere no facilities in China 
for a change of government by any other means~ Doinge's third and 
fourth reasons for holding off recognition were probably the most-
important ones. Recognition, he said, would be "a gratuitous act 
of encouragement to the forces of disruption throughout Asia". 36 
Commlli~ist-inspired insurgency against non-Communist governments was 
seen as "disruption", which New Zealand had an interest in discouraging. 
Back in Septernber, a National Party backbencher, E. P. Aderman, had 
attacked Labour's G.H.O. Wilson for not seeing "some danger in the 
revolutions takinc:; place in Halaya, Burma and the surrounding 
countries". 37 Doidge repeated another point raised by Fraser: ·that 
recognition would antagonise and irritate the United States and 
increase her detE;nnination to strengthen Japan at the expense of New 
Zealand's security. The government was concerned that the United 
36 N. z ~ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NetL.1 Zealand Fo1,eign PaZ. icy 
Statements and Doouments pp204-206 
37 z N. • P. D. vol. 287, pl928, 6 September, 1949 
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States might not agree to keep Japan disarmed, and there was thus 
a need to keep New Zealand's influence with the American government 
at a maximum. There was another, interrelated, point upon which 
New Zealand needed American goodwill: the proposed Pacific Security 
Treaty. New Zealand was anxious to induce the United States to 
enter into a Pacific Security pact, and was aware that this was an 
uphill fight, as the Americans at that time were unwilling to take 
on commitments in the Pacific. Bruce Brown says: 
"Obviously, in these circumstances, any New Zealand ••• 
government with such a primary defence objective in mind 
would have hesitated before risking upsetting the Americans, 
particularly when no very tangible return from a gesture of 
recognition could be foreseen". 38 
Doidge's final point against New Zealand's going ahead with 
recognition was that it would mean the transfer to the Soviet bloc 
of the Chinese seat in the United Nations Security Council. 
Continuing with his statement, the Minister of External 
Affairs looked at the British attitude. He said that recognition 
had been debated in the British House of Commons in November and "it 
was clear that the British government was disposed to an affirmative 
policy". Doidge said that this policy had the "reluctant approval" 
of Conservative leader Churchill, who had said that recognition was 
not necessarily an act of approval, but was granted to secure a 
convenience. It should be noted, Doidge said, that Churchill had 
also emphasised that no step be taken except in consultation with 
the whole of the Commonwealth and also with the Unite,d States. 
With this, the Minister of External Affairs came back to the attitude 
38 Brown, B. New Zealand Foreign Policy in Retrospect, p20 
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of the United States, and he expressed doubt that Britain's policy, 
in view of this attitude, was the right one. 
"America's attitude was possibly correctly summed up by The 
Economist when it said, 'a large section of American opinion 
will regard recognition as a selfish British effort to steal 
a march on America in Chinese favour. If, later on, there 
is a Far Eastern crisis, and Britain asks American support, 
there will be a strong inclination in America to say that 
Britain, having taken its own way, must bear any unpleasant 
consequences'". 39 
Far from being a situation of having to choose between the 
leads of New Zealand's two mentor powers- the United States and 
Britain - the government believed that there was no question of choice. 
Even Britain, the government believed, could not afford a Pacific 
policy that ran counter to American views. This indicated a very 
hard-headed appraisal of where real power in the Pacific lay, despite 
the rhetoric of greater solidarity with Britain. If there ""'s a 
Pacific crisis, Americ~~ support would be needed. 
Doidge said that "on the evidence, it may seem that recognition 
is the practical, and in the end, the inescapable course. But the 
question still remains: Is it the moral course?". 
The Minister of External Affairs showed that he was not disposed 
on this question to follow the traditional British empirical approach 
to the granting of recognition. Like his Labour predecessor, Doidge 
evidently thought that recognition should involve a judgement of the 
nature and policies of any government. The Labour government had 
refused to recognise the Franco regime in Spain because of the way it 
came to power, its doubtful representativeness, and its policies. All 
of these factors had been mentioned in connection with China. 
39 New ZeaZand Foreign PoZiay: Statements and Documents p206 
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R.M. Algie, the Minister of Education in Holland's Cabinet, 
recalled in 1974 that party feeling was very much against New Zealand's 
recognising China, because it was thought that recognition would imply 
approval of the regime and acceptance of its policies. 40 Those members 
of Cabinet who did not take this view were reluctant to get "off-side" 
with the rest of the party on the issue. 
On December 31, 1949, India granted diplomatic recognition to 
the People's Republic of China, the first Commonwealth country to do 
so. Pakistan followed shortly afterwards. Three days before the 
Colombo Conference was due to open, on January 6, 1950, the United 
Kingdom recognised China. There was no immediate public reaction 
from the government in New Zealand. In Australia, Prime Minister 
Menzies replied "no comment" to a question about the.Australian govern-
ment's reaction to London's move. 41 
The Commonwealth Foreign Ministers met in Ceylon on January 9, 
1950. The New Zealand government had by this stage adopted a definite 
viewpoint on the recognition of China, although the position was, 
publicly at least, not a fixed one. Prime Minister Holland said on 
January 11: 
"Before Mr Doidge left New Zealand, he discussed subjects likely 
to be considered at Ceylon with Cabinet, and he left having 
clearly in mind the government's views on those questions, but 
at the same time preserving an open mind to consider views that 
might be put forward at the conference by representatives of 
other Empire countries11 • 42 
The government's view on the question of recognition of 
Communist China was that it didn't want to recognise, and because of 
this it did not want Britain or the Commonwealth to recognise either. 
4 0 Sir Ronald Algie, pers. comm. 25.7. 74 
41 Albinski, H.S. Australia and the China Problem During the Korean h'ar p3 
42 O.D.T. January 12, 1950, p4 
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A.D. Mcintosh [now Sir Alister Mcintosh] recalls that the goYernment 
was angry with Britain for "jumping the gun" on the conference because 
it had been planned to persuade the United Kingdom there not to go 
ahead.~ 3 New Zealand and Australia, says Mcintosh, would have argued 
strenuously against recognition. There was no real question, then, 
of gathering views at the conference to help New Zealand make up its 
own mind on recognition: New Zealand was planning to convert others 
to its predetermined position. 
At the conference, Doidge, along with Australian Minister of 
External Affairs, Spender, championed the cause of the Commonwealth 
speaking with a common voice on major international questions, and 
on this basis were critical of the United Kingdom's premature· 
recognition. Doidge conceded that diplomatic recognition of the 
People's Republic was inevitable, but felt that the timing was all 
important. In other words, later was better than sooner. The 
Minister went on to point out that domestic political considerations 
made it very difficult for the New Zealand government to grant 
immediate recognition. The recent election had been won on an anti-
Communist platform, and recognition of a Communist government would 
be very embarrassing. • 
Doidge reiterated some of the arguments against recognition 
that he had listed on December 29: He mentioned the encouragement 
of the destructive forces led by the Chinese Communists in other parts 
of Asia, and the antagonism that would be felt by the United States 
government. Doidge said that he appreciated that the purpose of 
~ 3 Mcintosh Interview 21.2.14 
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recognition was not to convey approval of the government recognised, 
but he believed that this might not be adequately understood among 
peoples of South-east Asia and other parts of the world in danger of 
being engulfed by Communism.~~ 
Discussion of future policy towards China revolved around the 
likelihood of China's remaining independent of the Soviet Union. 
The press reported that there was division between those who thought 
that the Peking government was destined to become simply the obedient 
puppet of Moscow and those who thought China would be more Chinese 
than Communist.~ 5 British Foreign Secretary Bevin and Indian Prime 
Minister Nehru stated that they thought that China's national traditions 
were too great for her to fall into the role of Russian camp follower, 
and they recommended a policy of friendship towards her. Bevin said 
he thought New Zealand and Australia could make valuable contributions 
in developing friendly relations with China. Doidge and Spender 
belonged to the group that counselled the utmost caution in dealing 
withPeking. They said they feared that Communist China would become 
a menace to South-east Asia, where there was a large potential Chinese 
fifth column.~ 6 It seems likely that Doidge and Spender were the 
unnamed protagonists of the puppet theory. Bevin and Nehru advocated 
friendship with China because they believed China was independent. If 
Doidge and Spender were unwilling to move close to China, it could well 
have been because they did not accept that China could be independent 
of Russia. Indeed, later in the year, Doidge was to say that the 
~~ Information supplied by the Research Division, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
~ 5 O.D.T. January 11, 1950, p5 
~ 6 O.D.T. January 12, 1950, p5 
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triumph of Cormnunism in China had given Soviet imperialism the chance 
in Asia it had been waiting for.~ 7 
When Doidge returned to New Zealand later in the month, he 
issued no clarification of New Zealand's China position. 
China's actions in the following months served to decrease 
further the likelihood of New Zealand's recognising its government. 
The Communist regime continued to seize the consular properties of 
Western states, conveying an image of being indifferent to inter-
national obligations. The seizure of American property in Peking 
stimulated the United States to instruct its missions abroad to explain 
to their host governments that it was the American belief that 
"recognition of the Cormnunists or any change in the existing position 
regarding diplomatic relations with the Nationalist government would 
be premature". 4 8 With no United States recognition in sight, New 
Zealand would not be encouraged to take the recognition pl<L~ge. 
In February, China concluded a treaty of alliance with the 
Soviet Union. This did not help the British argument that China 
could be wooed from Russia's side by Western recognition. The same 
month, the Chinese government extended diplomatic recognition to the 
Vietminh insurgent government in French Indo-China. This act created 
suspicion in New Zealand and Australia that China intended to aid the 
"disruptive forces" that they opposed in South-east Asia. 
P.C. Spender, the Australian Minister of External Affairs, 
told the Australian House of Representatives on March 9: 
~ 7 N.Z.P.D. vel. 291, p2139, September 5, 1950 
~a Albinski, H.S. AustraZian Attitudes and PoZiaies towards China p53 
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"There is still doubt and uncertainty about the way China is 
likely to act under the new regime. China could foment dis-
affection and disorder in other countries. This government's 
attitude is necessarily influenced by its judgement of what 
China will try to do to stir up unrest in Asia ••. such 
evidence as we have of the Communists' behaviour up to date, 
including their treatment of the United States property and 
citizens, and their eager recognition of the rebel forces in 
Vietnam, leaves us uncertain whether the Peking government 
will conduct itself in accordance with the recognised 
principles of international law and refrain from interfering 
in the affairs of neighbouring states".~ 9 
Spender stressed the importance of developments in the Indo-
China situation to the Australian government's attitude towards China. 
"Above all, we will watch closely for evidence of China's interference 
in the affairs of the neighbouring state of Vietnam". 
In February, New Zealand and Australia had been quick to recognise 
the non-Communist, French-sponsored governments in Indo-China as they 
were set up. P.C. Spender admitted that these states were not fully 
independent of France, and thus not in normal circumstances qualified 
for recognition, but he said that the prompt recognition by Australia 
and "other powers" was meant to "encourage moderate Nationalist leaders 
in Indo-China who did not want their country [sic] to become a satellite 
of Moscow or Peking" • 50 Prompt recognition of Peking, by the same 
token, was thought likely to discourage moderate governments which felt 
threatened by China. Doidge told the Hutt Valley Junior Chamber of 
Commerce on March 23, 1950, that 
"We in New Zealand have not yet recognised Communist China, and 
we will keep away from it as long as we can, even if only out of 
consideration for the feelings of the other nations of Asia". 51 
~ 9 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of Representatives) 
vel. 206, p626, 9 March, 1950 
50 Albinski, H.S. Australia and the China Problem During the Korean 
War pll 
51 Dominion, 24 March, 1950, quoted in N.Z. Foreign Policy: Statements 
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Six months later, looking back on the pre-Korean War period, 
Doidge told the New Zealand House of Representatives that the 
government had "refused recognition [of China] because we felt we had 
to keep faith with those countries still fighting to maintain their 
independencen.S2. In an earlier part of the same speech, Doidge 
accused "Communistic imperialism" of threatening the independence 
of "millions of newly-freed peoples in Asia and South-east Asia", and 
declared that" •• the fate of our neighbours- and they are our neigh-
bours- is a matter of the greatest and gravest concern to this country •• " 
Doidge's reference to "Communistic imperialism" showed that he saw 
Communism as a monolithic entity, bent on expansion in Asia. 
New Zealand believed that it had an interest in the preservation 
of a non-Communist South-east Asia, and since Communist China posed a 
threat to that interest, New Zealand was not inclined to legitim~se 
the regime. 
In March, 1950, another Commonwealth member, Canada, was 
considering extending recognition to China, but New Zealand had no 
inclination at that stage to take part in a joint recognition. Doidge 
told Australian Minister of External Affairs Spender early in the month 
that while he had not yet had the opportunity of discussing the timing 
of recognition with Cabinet, his personal view was that New Zealand 
should be in no hurry to recognise, though he saw some advantages in 
several of the Dominions acting concurrently at some future date. 53 
52 N.Z.P.D. val. 291, p2143, September 5, 1950 
53 Information provided by the Research Division, Ministry of Foreign 
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Up to the outbreak of the Korean War, then, the New Zealand 
government had a policy of no early recognition of China. This decision 
seems to have been taken by Cabinet just prior to the Colombo 
Conference in January. 
Conclusion 
New Zealand's non-recognition of the new Communist government 
of china in the period up to the outbreak of the Korean War in mid.:-
1950 had several bases. One of the most important was the desire 
to avoid encouraging Communist insurgent groups in South-east Asia 
and to support the non-Communist governments who were under attack 
by Communist forces. Both Fraser and Doidge thought that a too-ready 
acceptance by the Western countries of the Communist takeover in China 
would strengthen the position of other would-be revolutionaries and 
help lead to a Communist Asia, which was not seen as being in New 
Zealand's interests. Doidge in March and September 1950 stressed 
New Zealand's concern for the countries in Asia fighting to keep their 
independence, and the need to "keep faith" with them. Another import-
ant reason was the negative attitude of the United States. It does 
not seem that the American government ever formally discussed its 
. 
attitude with New zealand, but both the Labour and National Ministers 
of External Affairs believed that recognition was likely to antagonise 
the United States at a time when a favourable United States attitude 
with regard to the Japanese Peace Treaty was considered very important 
for New Zealand's security. Even at this stage, government was 
sensitive to even the presumed opinion of the United States. 
Both Labour and National governments were also concerned that 
the West should not throw.over lightly its friend and former ally, 
the Nationalist government of China, which remained in existence 
48. 
after December, 1949, though confined to the island province of Taiwan. 
Both governments were reluctant to put a seal of approval on a regime 
that had overthrown by military force what they saw as the legitimate 
government of China. Fraser definitely, and Doidge probably, thought 
that the Communist takeover had been engineered to a large extent by 
the Russians, rather than being a genuine expression of the popular 
will. 
The domestic political situation also made the government 
reluctant to recognise the Chinese government. The National Party 
had come to power on an anti-Communist theme, and Doidge told the 
Colombo Conference that the government would have found the early 
recognition of a Communist government embarrassing. 
The government's advisers in the Department of External Affairs 
tended to favour early recognition so that the Western nations could 
establish contact with the Chinese government and perhaps be able to 
influence it. A Western diplomatic presence would help to offset 
Soviet influence. The advisers believed the Chinese revolution to 
have been an indigenous one, and that there was some potential for 
differences with the Russians. The politicians were more inclined 
to believe that the Chinese government was a Russian puppet, and 
therefore not likely to be receptive to western friendship. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE CHINA POLICY OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
1951-57 - LOYALTY TO THE PROTECTOR 
Introduction 
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In the period from the beginning of the Korean War to the end 
of the National government's tenure of office in 1957, New Zealand's 
China policy was dominated by the country's interest in ensuring its 
protection by the United States. The Korean War proved to New 
Zealand's policy-makers that the attentions of what they saw as 
Communist imperialism had turned to the Pacific and that the direct 
danger to New Zealand had thus substantially increased. In this 
situation, the securing of American protection, both directly 
through treaties and indirectly by ensuring that the Americans were 
committed to the resistance of the Communist advance in Asia, became 
more urgent for New Zealand than it had ever been. New Zealand's 
China policy was thus predicated on the need to support American 
policies in the Pacific both before and after the signing of ANZUS 
in 1951. After the casualties of the Korean War, the American 
government had become extremely hostile to diplomatic recognition of 
China and to its admission to the United Nations. Although the New 
Zealand government, after the end of the war, showed some reservations 
about American policy, it had no intention of opposing it. Not only 
did New Zealand not oppose American policy, but it tried to prevent 
other allies opposing it too, arguing that the unity of the free world 
was more important than any particular free world policy. 
so. 
The government found little difficulty in following the 
American line because other policy determinants pushed it in that 
direction rather than with Britain. The traditional moral approach 
to aggressors led the government to insist that China prove its 
peaceful intentions before it was admitted to the United Nations, 
while other governments thought that admission would be a practical 
way of ensuring peaceful behaviour. New Zealand was also concerned 
that recognition could help undermine the governments of the non-
Communist countries of South-east Asia. 
The coming of the Korean War in June; 1950, rather than 
freezing New Zealand's China policy in the process of formation, 
confirmed and hardened an existing policy by supplying what was seen 
as proof to the thesis that Communist China was an imperialist power 
which must be resisted. China was condemned in the first instance 
as a backer of North Korean aggression, and then in its own right as 
an identifiable aggressor after its troops intervened in the conflict 
in November, 1950. 
On September 11, 1950, Doidge said he was sure that the 
majority of members of the United Nations would wish to see the Korean 
issue settled before they would vote for the admission of the Chinese 
government to the United Nations. "Our position on this question is 
fairly clear since we have not taken the step of recognising the 
Chinese government" •1 At the opening of the Fifth Session of the 
1 Otago Daily Times (O.D.T.) September 12, 1950. p6; 
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United Nations General Assembly, New Zealand voted with the United 
states and Australia, and against Britain and India, for not re-
placing the Chinese Nationalist representatives with Chinese Communist 
ones. 
The National government eagerly took over the hig~y rnora~­
approach to international relations which had been the trademark of 
the previous Labour a&~nistration. This was shown up by the New 
Zealand representative's attitude during the Ad Hoc Political 
Committee's deliberations on the criteria for judging the rights of 
claimants to represent member states. 
The British representative stated that moral considerations 
should not enter into the question of representation. Once a 
state had been admitted to membership, logic and the. requirements of 
order demanded that any government which was able to exercise effective 
control over the state and was thus in a position to carry out the 
obligations imposed by the Charter, should be recognised as the 
government entitled to represent that state in the United Nations. 
The New Zealand representative disagreed. Sir Carl Berendsen 
said that New Zealand could not a~cept the view that once a state had 
been admitted to the United Nations its membership held good whatever 
the actions of the government in power. Once a state had ceased to 
be a peace-loving state, able and willing to fulfil its internationa~ 
obligations, it should no longer be entitled either to the privileges 
of membership or to reco9nition of its representatives. Moreover, 
the moral aspect should be considered not only when there had been a 
change of government resulting from external aggression, but also when 
a change had been brought about by internal violence, or indeed, by 
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any means other than normal constitutional processes. 2 The govern-
ment's view, as expressed by Berendsen, that a state that did not live 
up to the expectations of the Charter should be deprived of the privil-
eges of membership, was fully in accord with the attitude taken by the 
Labour government in drawing up the United Nations Charter in 1945. 
In the course of his speech, Berendsen had stressed that the Committee's 
approach should take into account the current cases the United Nations 
had to consider: specifically, the question of Chinese representation. 
Six months later, in July 1951, Berendsen, in a speech given in 
his capacity as New zealand Ambassador to the United States, was to 
reaffirm the primacy of the moral aspect in New Zealand's approach to 
the recognition question. The Ambassador told a San Francisco 
audience: "The doctrine that the Communist regime should be recognised 
because it controls China is a hangover of the bad old days of power 
politics; 3 
The New Zealand approach to recognition was not, it seems, just 
a case of selective morality on the part of the National government 
because the target was a Communist state. In 1950, New ~ealand did 
not vote with the United States in favour of rescinding the 1946 United 
Nations resolution debarring the recognition of the Fascist government 
of Spain.~ However, neither did New Zealand vote against the 
2 The United Nations. Summary of the Report of the New Zealand Delegation 
to the Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly, Appendices to the 
Journals of the House of Representatives, (AJHR)A-2 1951 p76. 
3 Clemow, C.W.A. "New Zealand, the Commonwealth and the Korean War", 
p.368, quoting 'Freedom', 18 July 1951 p7. 
• The United Nations. Summary of the Report of the New Zealand Delegation 
to the Fifth Regular Session of the General Assembly. p67 AJHR A-2 1951. 
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rescinding motion. Along with Britain, Australia and India, it 
abstained. Canada voted with the United States to rescind. The 
1946 resolution on Spain had recommended that United Nations members 
withdraw their ambassadors from Madrid, and that Spain be debarred 
from membership of all international agencies associated with the 
United Nations until a government more representative of the people 
was formed. Explaining the British abstention, the British delegate 
said that nothing had taken place to justify any change in the United 
Kingdom's attitude towards the Spanish regime and towards the earlier 
resolution of the Assembly. 5 The rescinding motion was nevertheless 
adopted by 38 votes to 10, with 12 abstentions. 
The other consequence of the Korean War which bore heavily on 
New Zealand's China policy was the hardening of the American attitude 
towards China. The New Zealand government's desire to give all 
possible diplomatic support to the only Western power with the strength 
to resist what it saw as global Communist imperialism meant that its 
China policy became subordinate to American China policy. Doidge 
recognised, even before the direct Chinese intervention in the war, 
that the Korean situation had ended any American disposition to move 
towards acceptance of the Chinese Communist government. 
"I had the feeling some months ago that the United States of 
America and Frw~ce, which had refused recognition, might be tempted 
to, but then came the extension of the trouble in Indo-China and the 
war of aggression in Korea". 6 
At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference held in 
5 Yearbook of the United Nations 1950 pp342-344. 
6 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD) Vol. 291 p2143, 5 Sept.l950 
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January, 1951, the New Zealand government's desire to express solidarity 
with the United States even at the sacrifice of a pragmatic settlement 
with China was evident. On arriving at the Conference, which had 
Commonwealth policy towards China on the agenda, Prime Minister Holland 
gave the impression of governmental flexibility on the issue when he 
said that his government was "prepared to reconsider the whole position 
of China11 • 7 The Prime Minister went on to say that he thought that 
"ways and means should be found to develop a common policy towards 
China," a reference to Anglo-American differences on the question. 
Although the first statement could have been taken as an expression of 
sympathy for the British policy of getting Peking into the United 
Nations as fast as possible, New Zealand's aim in fact was to unite 
the Commonwealth behind United States·policy. 
A Press Association special correspondent at the Conference 
reported that New Zealand would take the earliest opportunity of 
expressing her "firm opinion" that the Commonwealth should maintain 
the closest cooperation with the United States in the international 
sphere, because the United States was carrying the burden of 
opposition to Communist imperialism and it was imperative to shore up 
that determination. ' 
If the United States were convinced afresh that she had the 
solid support, the confidence and the goodwill of the Commom1ealth, 
New Zealand believed, it could do much to check the actual and latent 
tendency towards isolationism from which America had only recently 
emerged. This attitude towards the United States, the correspondent 
reported, "is one of the main reasons why New Zealand has not so far 
7 O.D.T. January 4, 1951, pS 
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recognised the Peking government, and is opposed to the grant of a 
seat on the Security Council to Mao Tse-tung". 8 
It was reported that "some delegates" at the Conference feared 
that a Conference declaration in favour of recognition might widen the 
division between the United States and the Commonwealth. 9 Holland was 
one of these. The Prime Minister said at the Conference that the 
Commonwealth must do nothing to prejudice the willingness of the United 
States to maintain her support for the countries of the free world 
which was so important for both their own and New Zealand's security. 10 
New Zealand's role at this Conference was similar to the one it 
performed at Colombo - trying to head off Anglo-Indian initiatives that 
might be seen as objectionable by the United States. British Foreign 
Secretary Bevin's attitude was that recognition of Communist China was a 
necessary condition of a Far Eastern settlement. It was unrealistic, 
he said, to expect the Peking regime to discuss any settlement unless 
its own status was acknowledged by all parties to the negotiations. 
New Zealand and Australia argued that a Conference declaration in favour 
of recognition would be valueless without concurrent action by the 
United States. The ANZAC countries were less concerned about arriving 
at a pragmatic China policy which the Commonwealth could try to foist 
on the United States, than with giving the United States a psychological 
boost. Their main anxiety, according to a Press Report, was that the 
Conference should not give the impression that Commonwealth policy 
opposed that of the United States. 11 
8 O.D.T. January 6, 1951 p5 (NZPA-Reuter London) 
9 Ibid p7. 
10 Information supplied by the Research Division, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
11 O.D.T. January 8, 1951 p5 
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New Zealand • s China policy at this stage was based on· fear: --
not so much of China in the short term, as of being deprived of American 
protection from any threat that might appear in the Pacific. New 
Zealand's China policy hardened during the Korean War because once the 
threat of aggression in the Pacific had materialised, the interest in 
keeping the United States committed to the defence of Asia was intensif-
ied. As Doidge had said in September 1950: .. it would be dangerous 
complacency to imagine that what is happening in Korea cannot be repeat-
ed. It can be repeated elsewhere in Asia •• ". 12 
At the Conference, New Zealand, although not yet a formal ally 
of the United States, had given an indication of what it thought the 
role of a junior partner in an alliance was: acquiesence in the policy 
line of the dominant partner and the provision of public support for 
that line. 
Despite the government's worries about provoking a break with 
the United States at a critical time, New Zealand was stil~ enough of 
a loyal Commonwealth member to endorse the Commonwealth Peace Plan 
for Korea, which suggested a Far Eastern Conference to hammer out a 
settlement of issues like Chinese Representation at the United Nations. 
After the Chinese rejection of the United Nations peace offer 
based on the Commonwealth plan, New Zealand was free to endorse the 
harder American line wholeheartedly. When the American government 
arranged for a United Nations resolution condemning China as an 
aggressor, the New Zealand government, unlike the Britis~ had no 
12 N.Z.P.D. vel. 291, p2138, 5 September, 1950 
qualms about endorsing it~ Doidge declared thnt the con·tention ·tfle.t 
the Chinese Communists had comrni·tted aggression :1 seems to us no more 
than the truth, and the government has instruc·ted Sir Carl Berendse:n. 
to support this provision of the tJnited States resolution" .. 13 
In May, 1951, when the United Nations followed up its aggressio!'l 
resolution with one recommending the application of a limited economic 
embargo against China and North Korea, the Ne~v Zealand government not 
only took the necessary administrative action to comply with the 
provision of the embargo but extended the limits of it to cover the 
export of wool, although wool was not listed as a strategic material 
by the United Nations. 14 The Australian government did ilOt feel it. 
necessary to follow suit. 15 
Even as the Korean \t'lar appearc:d to ce.ltl_ent New Zealand's 
opposition to the People's Republic into a permanent mould, the~·e 
came an indica·tian that there vmre elements in the governmen·t inclined 
t.o a more liberal policy. At a United Nations Association meeting in 
February, 1951, the Attorney-General and Acting Minister of External 
Affairs, T. c. Webb, said he believed that China should have been 
diplomatically recognised and ad.'llitted to the United Nations prior to 
the Korean War. vlhile emphasising that he was speaking for himself 
only and not for the government, and also making the valid point that 
he was not necessarily expressing the views of his colleagues, ~~ebb 
said that it would be "recognising only what Has a. fact" if the regime 
13 0. D. T. January 25, 1.951, p6 
1 ~ External Affairs Review (E.A.R.) July 1951, p2 
15 Albinski, H.S. "Australian Attitudes and Policies tO'.Jards China", 
plOl-102. 
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of Mao Tse-tung were recognised as the government of China.' 6 The 
voice of the minority in the party which had been unhappy with the 
moral criteria used to deny recognition in 1950 had finally been 
heard. Webb's preference for the traditional British approach was 
to surface again. The Minister admitted that the matter of 
recognition had been "compromised" by the action China had since 
taken. As Canadian Minister of External Affairs Pearson pointed 
out the same month, Chinese intervention in Korea had made it 
inconceivable that countries which had hitherto withheld recognition 
could at that time decide to change their policies. 17 
By 1951 New Zealand ground trocps were in action against the 
Chinese in Korea, and recognition of the enemy while in the field 
against him would have been inappropriate. Only with the ending 
o£ the Korean War could conditions for fluidity in New Zealand's 
China policy be partly met. 
In the meantime, however, New Zealand had taken a foreign 
policy step that would bear heavily on any reconsideration of China 
policy. During 1951, negotiations were in train for a formal 
alliance with the United States, and these culminated in September 
with the signing of the Pacific Security Treaty, subsequently known 
as ANZUS. Far from freeing New zealand from the fear that it, 
along with non-Communist Asia, might be abandoned by the United 
States if the government denied the United States support for its 
foreign policy, the formal link was to be perceived as imposing a 
duty on New Zealand to prove itself a good ally. 
16 O.D.T. February 16, 1951, p6 
17 Albinski, H.S. "Australia and the China Problem !Jui>ing the Korean 
War", p53. 
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After the 1951 general election, held in September, Webb 
replaced Doidge as }linister of External Affairs. In April, 1953 he 
told the House of Representatives that the government believed that 
China, by her aggression in Korea, had forfeited "any right she 
might earlier have had" to recognition. "As I see it", the Minster 
said, "her task now is to work her passage back into the good graces 
of the United Nations before any thought of recognition can be 
entertained". Webb also declared that China had similarly forfeited 
"for the time being at any rate", any claim it might have had under 
the Cairo declaration to Formosa. In any case, the government 
believed that under the principles of the United Nations Charter, 
some account should be taken of the wishes of the Formosan people 
themselves. 18 
Webb proved that he was still in favour of a positive 
approach towards China, however, in a speech he made to the Auckland 
division of the National Party in June, 1953. 
The }linister said that there was a strongly-held view that 
the Western powers would never succeed in detaching China from the 
Soviet orbit if they cold-shouldered her and refused to admit her 
representative to the United Nations. Some said that China would 
stick in the Soviet orbit regardless of the actions of western 
nations, but he, Webb, did not agree. The death of Stalin had 
provided the Chinese with an opportunity of asserting their own 
views. Webb said that his own view was that it was the Chinese 
that were very largely responsible for the fact that a:anistice 
negotiations in Korea had been resumed. The Ninister emphasised 
18 . N.Z.P.D. vel. 299, p354, 29 April, 1953 
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that he 'i.·Tas not advocating appeasement; but he believed that if China 
could be converted into a 11 Ti to :r:egime" it "t<7ould be ''·!Orthwhile making 
the effort. Nobody in Nev; Zealand, he said, lrtanted to see an all-
out 'i-<7ar 'i"i th China. 19 
"Nebb repeated these viev:s to the _r.une~ican alPJJassador that sar:1e 
month, and added that non-recognition of Cornrm.lJlist China would increase 
the risk of a Chinese attack on South-east Asia. The United States 
adminis·tration at this stage v:as seeking assurances from its allies 
that they would not recognise the People's P.epublic after the con-
elusion of an armistice in Korea - an event now thought to be very 
close. The Hinister of External Affairs told the American govern-
h f . . 't' 20 ment that New Zealand had no thoug t o lm:me:hate recogru lOn. 
An armistice between Cl1ina and the United Nations forces in 
Korea vms finnlly agreed upon in July, 1953., In the international 
c;tffairs debate in the House of Representatives a month later, the 
~nister of External Affairs looked cautiously forward to China's 
acceptance by the international community. but held out no hope of 
any immediate moves. It would be up to China to prove itself 
acceptable. Webb said that China was becoming "a force in the 
world", and that accordingly, ti1.ere could be nno doubt whatever" 
that sooner or later China would have to be admitted to the United 
Nations. 
Asked by Labour's w. T. Anderton how soon this would be, 
Nebb reiterated that he did not agree with those advocating 
19 O.D.T. June 18, 1953 p5 
2 0 Interviev7, Officer, Research Division, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
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immediate admission, but suggested that the question could be consider-
ed after the forthcoming Korean Peace Settlement Conference in May, 1954, 
at which China would be given an opportunity to prove her good faith. 
" the admission of representatives of Communist China 
to the United Nations, and its recognition, should not be 
pushed with undue haste. On the other hand, it should 
not be delayed by what I might call perverse procrastination • 
••• For my part, the sooner she measures up to the responsibilities 
we think are the minimum she ought to measure up to, the better. 
We do not want to be too exacting in our requirements". 21 
The following speaker from the government side, E.H. Halstead, 
defined the requirements for recognition as he saw them. Halstead 
agreed that recognition of Communist China had to be faced up to at 
some stage, but said that recognition after the Korean armistice was 
11not good enough 11 .. China was still an aggressor in Malaya and in 
Indo-China, and she was stirring up a lot of trouble in Indonesia. 
"Until Red China withdraws the pressure she is applying to 
the troublespots of Indonesia, Malaya and Indo-China, I 
think recognition should be withheld". 22 
Earlier in the debate, Halstead had referred to the fact that the 
Vietminh troops fighting the French Union forces in Indo-China were 
supplied, equipped and stimulated by China. Chinese help for the 
insurgents was apparently considered to constitute aggression, and 
was an adequate ground for denying China recognition. 
Halstead's view was backed up by his party colleague, E.P. Aderman, 
who said that supplies of all types of military equipment had gone 
21 N.Z.P.D. vel. 299, p450, 13 August, 1953 
22 N.Z.P.D. vel. 299, p456, 13 August, 1953 
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through China to the 11 aggressive 11 forces in Indo-China. He asked 
if China should not be challenged to remove some of the elements of 
suspicion, and v;ent on to declare that he was not in favour of the 
recognition of China. 23 
The New Zealand's govern..ment policy towards China was affirmed 
at the second meeting of the ANZUS Council in September, 1953. The 
final communique declared that each Minister had expressed the view 
of his govenauent L~at under present circumstances, no question of the 
recognition of Conununist China or of the admission of its represen·t-
atives to the United Nations would be entertained. 24 In the House of 
Representatives, Labour backbencher C.R. Carr claimed that this represent-
ed a change in New Zealand's declared policy. The Prime Minister denied 
it in vie« of the fact that the conununique had qualified its decision 
with the reference to 11present circmustances 11 s Holland said: 
"Before leaving this country, the Hinister of External Affairs 
infonned the House of the government 1 s vie\V' that, while there 
was no doubt that Communist China would have to be admitted to 
the United Nations sooner or later, the question of her admission 
should be delayed until >~e had had an opportunity to observe her 
conduct in the Korean political negotiations". 25 
Earlier, Holland had denied ~~at New Zealand's policy was in any 





"If you •• ask whether, on the question of recognition of 
Communist china or something like that, it is the declared 
policy of the government, as announced by the Prime MinisteJ~~, 
to follow America right or >r£orig, then the imputation is 
entirely wrong and unjust". 26 
N.Z.P.D. vol. 299, p463, 13 August, 1953 
E.A.R. September, 1953, p26 
N.Z.P.D. vol. 300, pl556, 30 September, 1953 
N.Z.P.D. vol. 300, pl328, 18 September, 1953 
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On the China recognition issue, the government believed that 
the United States. was taking a justifiable course, and it could be 
argued that New Zealand's policy position was not the result of its 
being an acquiescent ally so much as of its having a concurring view. 
Even if the government had not held a concurring view, however, the 
future was to prove that its actions would not have been different. 
The Korean war had increased the hostility of the American 
government towards the Chinese Communists and created an American 
interest in isolating China diplomatically. Once this interest 
had been made plain and declared important, the American government 
believed that it should be able to count on its allies, of whom 
New Zealand was one, not to act against those interests. 
In a speech to the Overseas Press Club in Washington in 
March, 1954, Secretary of State Dulles made it plain that, as far 
as the American government was concerned, friendly gestures towards 
China were tantamount to unfriendly ones towards the United States. 
Dulles said that diplomatic recognition would give "increased 
prestige and influence to a regime that actively attacks our vital 
interests". 27 The Secretary had defined China as a continuing 
• enemy of the United States, and the granting of diplomatic recognition 
as an act likely to strengthen that enemy. 
27 E.A.R. April, 1954, pl2 
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In the same speech, Dulles attacked the seating of China in 
the United Nations, reminding his audience that Chinese action in 
Korea had cost 100,000 American casualties, and that membership was 
supposed to be restricted to peace-loving states. 
"The Chinese Communists' continuing lack of genuine will 
for peace is being demonstrated in Indo-China", 
Dulles claimed. 
The deterioration of the military situation of the French 
forces in Indo-China in early 1954 was attributed by the New Zealand 
government to the increased support being given to the Vietminh 
forces by the Chinese. External Affairs Minister Webb said on 
April 14 that a serious position had been created by the recent 
increase in material and service personnel being given by Communist 
China to the rebel Vietminh movement in Indo-China. 28 Since New 
Zealand recognised the French-supported governments in Indo-Cilina, 
China's actions in the area supplied further reasons for not 
recognising her. 
At the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indo-China which opened 
in April, New Zealand's Minister of External Affairs initially 
indicated that he did not think that China's international behaviour 
to that time had fulfilled the conditions New Zealand had earlier 
set down for favourable consideration of its admission to the United 
Nations. On May 7 Webb said: 
"The first qualification for admission to the membership of 
any society is willingness to uphold its principles and abide 
by its rules. I am bound to say that neither by its words 
28 E.A.R. April, 1954, p4 
nor its actions has the government of the People's 
Republic of China yet given any evidence that it could 
be relied upon to fulfil this elemental qualification. 
Horeover, t.'>e chilly reception it has accorded those 
nations which have granted it diplomatic recognition 
has not been such as to encourage other nations to make 
the same gesture of trust 11 • 2 9 
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Webb's opinion, however, changed rapidly after he had been 
exposed to the views of other participants in the Geneva Conference. 
In the House of Representatives in July, he was much more positive 
about bringing China into the United Nations than he had been two 
months before. 
"I am firmly convinced that the absence of China from 
the United Nations is preventing what is called, in 
diplomatic language, a qetente - a lessening of inter-
national tension n. 3 0 
Webb then implied that this had been his view all along when he said: 
"I am more convinced of that as a result of my visit to Geneva". 
Not only that, but: 
"I am satisfied that the view is widely held that the 
non-recognition and non-admission of Communist China is 
not only standing in the way of a lessening of inter-
national tension, it is tending to keep up international 
tension, and thus endangering world peace". 
These were strong words, especially when they could only be taken as 
criticism of the American attitude. Webb went on to say that no-one 
could seriously argue that Nationalist China on the island of Formosa 
29 E.A.R. Hay, 1954, p13 
30 N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, p212, 6 July, 1954 
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could speak for the five hundred million or six hundred million 
people on the mainland of China. It was "not satisfactory" that 
"that great nation should be debarred from the deliberations of 
what has been aptly called 'the town meeting of the world' ". The 
Minister restated his views about the constraint that China's Korean 
behaviour had introduced, and said that he had conveyed to Chou En-lai 
the view that "it was up to China to demonstrate that we could rely 
on her to be a worthy member of the organisation". 31 
Minister of Education Algie interjected to the effect that 
China would have to give up her "disguised aggression", and Webb 
agreed with him. However, the Minister said, 
"in view of the part which China has played, and is 
still playing, in relation to the Indo-china negotiations, 
I find it hard to deny China's right to be admitted to 
the United Nations Organisation". 
Webb conceded that there might be differences of opinion about 
whether China had yet earned the right to be admitted, but "I want to 
look at it ••• from our own point of view". The greatest menace 
facing the free world, he believed, was Communism, and this could not 
be combatted by military means. One other method was diplomacy. 
The Minister referred to the British Foreign Secretary's 
belief, expressed in a recent House of Commons speech, that differences 
existed between the Communist great powers. 
"It seems to me that here is a situation which we should 
endeavour to exploit. We should endeavour to drive a wedge 
31 Ibid. 
between China and Russia. We may not succeed, but at 
least we avoid what I believe is a danger, and that is 
that by cold-shouldering China we drive her more firmly 
into the Russian orbit, and defeat our own object". 
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webb was prepared to accept that Communism was perhaps not the 
monolithic unity most of his party - and the Americans - had previously 
held it to be. 
"I think we need to have a look at our policy because 
if that is correct, we are really cutting off our noses 
to spite our faces, and playing into the hands of the 
very nation whose basic philosophy is preventing the 
world settling down to a peaceful existence". 
The Minister then stated firmly that he thought that "this 
policy of taking a hard and fast rigid line was only putting ourselves 
into a straitjacket and allowing ourselves no room for manoeuvre. 
We cannot deny that China has become a great nation. She has risen 
in stature, and is a force to be reckoned with in world affairs". 
The Minister made a plea for the Western allies to be guided by "logic 
and self-interest, and not emotion", in the matter, and as a.first step, 
to give "early consideration to the question of allowing the represent-
atives of the People's Republic of China into the Council Chambers of 
the United Nations". 32 
• 
Webb, of course, was not ar~ouncing a change in government 
policy with his speech, but flying a kite publicly for such a change. 
This kite was probably aimed as much at his less liberal party 
colleagues as at the Americans. 
3 2 Ibid. , p213 
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Webb's approach to the China question was not governed by what 
New Zealand's specific interest was, but what the free world's interest 
as a whole was. He was not suggesting that New Zealand should have a 
China policy of her own. The Minister also approached China recognition 
in global rather than regional terms: China could be a valuable lever 
for the West against the Soviet Union. There was no desire to establish 
a relationship with China for its own sake. 
Webb's spectacularly outspoken speech met with a very conspicuous 
lack of support from his colleagues. Only Algie, the Minister of 
Education, gave him limited backing. Algie admitted that he found it 
difficult to believe that there was any difference between Chinese and 
Russian Communism, but he was prepared to trust Webb's judgement in the 
matter. He did not think there was any ba-sic opposition in New Zealand 
to China's admittance to the United Nations. Algie indicated that his 
view of China as an expansionist power remained unchanged, however. 
"I believe profoundly that Communist China wants South-east Asia for 
the natural wealth that is there". 33 The next day he said: "We know, 
or believe we know, that the state of affairs existing in South-east 
Asia today is such that if we did walk out, the local states could not 
maintain themselves against the pressure that would be applied from 
Communist China". 34 Like Webb, Algie seems to have thought that 
admittance to the United Nations of China might be a practical weapon 
in the fight to save South-east Asia from Communism. 
From the backbenches, only W.B. Tennent had favourable words 
33 N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, p230, 6 July, 1954 
34 
N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, p254, 7 July, 1954 
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for a conciliatory policy towards China. He saw a linkage between 
China's non-acceptance by the international community and its 
aggressive foreign policy. Tennent was in favour, however, of 
granting China diplomatic recognition rather than admission to the 
United Nations, which he was more hesitant about. Tennent said that 
he could not help feeling, "much as we dislike communists" that a 
grave mistake was made in not recognising Communist China. "I feel 
that had we done so, it might have made quite a difference to their 
attitude to this and other countries". 35 
Webb's speech won no support outside New zealand, either. 
Australian Prime Minister Menzies, was quick to throw cold water on 
the idea of China's admission to the United Nations. On July 8, 
1954, he said that Australia's attitude towards recognition and 
admission to the United Nations had not changed, and would not. 
"The whole problem of the future of Communist China is 
one that simply does not arise at the moment. When 
it does arise, Cabinet will consider it11 • 36 
Australia's Minister of External Affairs, Casey, had arrived 
in New Zealand the day after the Webb speech. On July 8 he, too, 
confirmed, after discussions with Webb, that Australia would not for 
the time being, consider the admittance of China to the United Nations. 
The Minister said that while he appreciated and respected New Zealand's 
attitude to China, he believed that China had yet to establish the 
bona fides of peaceful intent. 
35 N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, p221, 6 July, 1954 
36 Current Notes on International Affairs, July 1954, p467 
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"China will have to establish that she is a peace-loving 
state for a longer period before Australia will consider 
her admittance to the United Nations". 37 
on the same day that Menzies and Casey made their comments 
President Eisenhower made a scorching denunciation of China, in the 
course of which he declared himself "unalterably opposed to admitting 
the Peking regime to the United Nations". 3 8 Almost certainly, the 
President's statement was not connected with the Webb speech - it 
was part of a domestic campaign sparked off by right-wing Republicans 
days earlier - but it served as a timely reminder to New Zealand of 
the American attitude. 
Eisenhower had gone on to say that he believed that 95 percent 
of the American people shared his unalterable opposition. The 
Communists, he said, were occupying North Korea, had backed the 
enslavement of additional peoples in Indo-China and were guilty of 
the worst possible diplomatic conduct. He could not see how any 
impartial country could vote for China's entry into the United Nations. 
Nothing except a long and convincing record of deeds would convince 
Americans that the Communist Chinese were ready for admission, he said. 
The President further told the press conference he was addressing that 
proposals to take the United States out of the United Nations if 
Communist China was admitted required careful study. He said he was 
not ready to say what course of action should be taken. 
37 Sydney Morning HeraZd, July 9, 1954, p3 
38 New York Times, July 8, 1954, ppl and 12; reported in N.Z., 
July 9, see O.D.T. July 9, 1954, p5 
71. 
If the President was n6t, others of importance were. Senate 
majority leader Knowland had stated at the beginning of the month that 
he had no doubt that Congress would act swiftly to take the United 
States out of the United Nations if Peking's delegates were seated. 
This had been confirmed by the Senate's Democratic leader Lyndon 
Johnson, when he said: "The American people will refuse to support 
the United Nations if Communist China becomes a member". 39 
New Zealand's two closest allies had made it very clear 
publicly that proposals such as Webb's were unwelcome to them, and 
the overseas policy statements had their effect in New Zealand. 
The Wellington political correspondent of Dunedin's Evening 
Star noted that Webb's ministerial colleagues were far from happy 
over his speech. "Ministers other than Mr Webb ••• are worried 
today because New Zealand has been placed out on a limb. These men, 
and some in the External Affairs and Armed Services departments are 
wondering unhappily what repercussions Mr Webb's statement will have 
on the American State Department •• ". ~ 0 
The American State Department was not long in making its 
feelings known. It protested strongly at the apparent departure 
from the agreed policy of the ANZUS meeting of the previous year. 
The Secretary of External Affairs reassured the Americans that the 
New Zealand government was fully conscious of the terms of the ANZUS 
communique of September, 1953, and that the government thought it 
premature to concede diplomatic recognition to Communist China before 
39 For Knowland, see New York Times, July 2, 1954, ppl-2; Johnson's 
remarks were reported by the N.Z.P.A. - see O.D.T. July 5, 1954, pS 
~ 0 Evening Sta:r, July 10·, 1954, p2 
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a permanent peace in South-east Asia was established. 41 l'lebb and 
Holland together saw the l'.merican Ambassador, and l'lebb explained that 
the emphasis of his speech had been distorted. New Zealand did not 
intend to grant recognition right away or vote for China's admission 
to the United Nations at the coming session of e1at body. At t..lle 
same time, \'lebb emphasised that he thought recognition and admission 
was a question to which l'lestern nations should be giving consideraticn. 42 
Apart from their concern about the ~-~erican reaction to Webb's 
statement, the ~tinister's Cabinet colleagues still found the idea of 
the diplomatic recognition of China inherentiy distasteful. The Sta:r> 
correspondent's belief was that Holland was not enthusiastic on this 
issue, and that several senior members of Cabinet were either neutral 
or sharply opposed to the idea. 43 
Sir Alister Mcintosh's memory is that 'unenthusiastic' was a 
definite understatement of the Prime Minister's reaction to l'lebb's 
apparent proposal. "Holland was furious 11 , he recalls .. '+ 4 l'lhether 
Holland was opposed to the idea of recognition or just to a public 
airing of it which would upset the Americans is not certain. 
It is evident that the External Affairs Minister \vas convinced 
probably by the Prime Minister - that a clarification of his July 6 
speech was necessary. On July 8 l'lebb told the House of Representatives: 
"The remarks I made about the question of adrnitting the 
People's Republic of China ... seem to have attracted most 
attention. I wa.nt to sound a note of caution, however"~ 
41 Interview, Officer, Research Division, Ministry of Forei~1 Affairs 
42 Ibid. 
43 Evening Star, July 10, 1954, p2 
44 Mcintosh interview, 21. 2. 7 4 
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While the Minister declared that he did not want to take back "one 
\\Urd;' of what he had said, he did 'l>mnt to emphasise that it was "no 
easy matter to bring it about". It v.ras not a problem that should 
be tackled in haste, he said. The Minister made it plain that the 
American reaction was the reason for lack of action on the issue. 
"I thought the member for Waitakere [H.G.R. Mason - Labour] 
made a useful comment when he said that it was not easy to 
bring about the a~~ission of China because there are great 
emotional difficulties to overcome in the United States. 
We have to take account of that. The people of the United 
St.ates take a much more serious view of the menace of 
Co!lli~unism than some of us do, and certainly more than I do. 
They may be right and I may bG wrong, but at any rate we 
have to take account of the fact that there are difficulties 11 • 45 
The Minister then said that another point had to be made, and 
that was that there were other nations which had qualified for admission 
to the United Nations, but which had not been adm:'_tted. Eere Webb was 
reverting to the old party dodge that there were many nations more 
peserving of admission than Communist China. In making this point, 
kebb \-:as denying his Owr:t previous viev1 that China 1 s influential 
position in Asia made her admission a matte_r of urgency. In his 
speech of July 6, the Minister had made it plain that China's admission 
could be a key factor in the maintenance of world peace. Now he was 
saying- or being forced to say- that China should take her place· in 
the q~eue with all other aspiring candidates. Webb went on to identify 
Nationalist China's existence as a constraint on admission. 
45 p N.Z .• D. val. 303, p300, 8 July, 1954 
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"If she had never been a member of the United Nations 
it might not be such a difficult matter, but she has been 
admitted, and I say candidly, I cannot visualise an attempt 
being made to exclude her". 
Webb had made no concessions on the China issue in principle, 
but he had indicated that practical difficulties would prevent the 
adoption of a policy to implement those principles. Foremost among 
these was the necessity not to alienate American public opinion, 
which in turn controlled the attitude of the American government. 
China policy had to serve the larger objective of maintaining an 
effective American alliance. As Webb stated in his conclusion, New 
Zealand believed that it had to work for Anglo-American co-operation, 
and see that it was not weakened in any way, because that co-operation 
was the best hope for peace. 
Webb had seen the admission of China to the United Nations as 
a move towards peace, but believed that the maintenance of free world 
unity was a much more important policy for the same goal. 
Webb said that the maintenance of u_~ity did not mean that 
New Zealand could in no circumstances disagree with the United States: 
"We shall not get anywhere that way. There is room for 
healthy disagreement, and 1 have given an indication that 
I do not agree with the strong, hard and fast, rigid line 
they are taking over the admission of China to the United 
Nations" .. 
What maintenance of unity did seem to mean was that allies 
such as New Zealand should not translate disagreement into an opposing 
policy line. Webb made it clear that New Zealand's tack would not be 
to wilfully pursue her O>m line, but to work within the alliance to 
influence the alliance line. In practical terms, this meant trying 
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to modify American policy privately. The Minister said: "I hope 
that the little bit of influence that we are able to exert from 
this end will compose such differences as exist between us".~ 6 
Labour's W.T. Anderton remarked of Webb's speech later in 
the month: "It almost looked as though the Minister had changed 
slightly the views he had expressed previously on the acceptance of 
Communist China, and that would be regrettable II 47 
Webb had indeed been forced to correct the impression that 
the government intended to change its China policy. Whereas his 
original statement had been a plea for a reconsideration of current 
policy, the follow-up had been an outline of why such a reconsider-
ation was not possible. According to the Secretary of External 
Affairs at the time, vlebb "burnt his fingers very badly" over the 
speech.~ 8 
The episode shows how strongly New Zealand was committed to 
a collective approach to foreign affairs issues. Not only did the 
National government believe that New Zealand should not take independ-
ent initiatives in the face of American opposition, it believed that 
New Zealand should not even publicly expre~ses differences with its 
allies. 
Although Webb's speech probably owed a lot to Sir Anthony 
Eden's views as expressed at Geneva, the British government itself 
had no intention of translating those views into a United Nations 
policy line that would cross the American government's line. 
~ 6 N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, p303, 8 July, 1954 
~ 7 N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, pl352, 24 August, 1954 
~ 8 Interview, Sir Alister Mcintosh, 21.2.74 
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Prime Minister Winston Churchill declared in the House of Commons on 
July 12 that the question of Communist China's admission to the United 
Nations had suddenly received a degree of publicity out of proportion 
to its importance or urgency. Churchill went on to say that British 
policy on the subject of admission had been unchanged since 1951, when 
Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison had stated that Communist China 
should be admitted to the United Nations, but that in view of that 
government'spersistence in behaviour inconsistent with the purpose and 
principles of the Charter, it appeared to the British government that 
consideration of the questions should be postponed. Churchill said 
that even if agreement should be reached at the Geneva Conference on 
Korea or Indo-china, 
"the arrangements would still depend on good faith and 
co-operation, for which time would certainly be required. 
In these circumstances, although her Majesty's government 
still believe the Central People's government should 
represent China at the United Nations, they certainly do 
not consider that this is the moment for the matter to be 
reconsidered". 49 
New Zealand's Minister of External Affairs refused to give up. 
On July 14 he was reported as saying that if people were guided by 
logic rather than emotion, they would come round to the view that 
• 
"instead of giving Communist China the 'cold shoulder' 
and tending to consolidate the Communist bloc, it would 
be better to give early consideration to her admission 
to the United Nations". 
He also repeated that he now found it hard to deny the claim of China 
to be admitted. 50 
49 House of Commons Debates, Fifth Series, volume 530, No. 146, 
column 34, p46, 12 July, 1954 
. 50 O.D.T. July 15, 1954, p5 
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New zealand's policy did not change, and at the end of the 
parliamentary term a few months later, Webb gave up both the portfolio 
of External Affairs and his parliamentary seat to take up the post of 
High Commissioner in London. This position had been made vacant by 
the death of Sir Frederick Doidge in May. In accepting the office, 
the Minister was following in footsteps of his predecessor as Minister 
of External Affairs, but the Labour Party in later years was to claim 
that he was sacked because of his China views. 
In March, 1955, P.G. Connolly asked in Parliament: 
"Was he [Webb] sent to London on account of that [statement]? 
I know John Foster Dulles and others were not very happy about 
that statement. Why was Mr Webb railroaded? On account of 
that statement? It caused repercussions all over the world n51 
J. Ma~~ison was more positive about the reason for Webb's change of 
occupation. 
"We waited for an endorsement of that statement by the Prime 
Minister, but no endorsement came, and the Honourable Mr Webb 
has disappeared from the political stage, although he is one 
of the ablest men the National Party has had. He disappeared 
largely because he was off-side either with the Prime Minister 
or that important person in the United States, John Foster 
Dulles'! 52 
Certainly Webb had embarrassed the government by drawing down on it 
the critical comment of its allies, and it is at least a possibility 
that he was sacrificed to appease those allies. 
At the end of 1954 the United States signed a Mutual Security 
Treaty with Taiwan, further committing it to a position of hostility 
towards the People's Republic. New Zealand's new Minister of External 
51 N.Z.P.D. vel. 305, p96, 24 March, 1955 
52 N.Z.P.D. vel. 305, pl07, 24 March, 1955 
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Affairs, T.L. Macdonald, moved to associate New Zealand publicly with 
this American action, saying that Formosa and the Pescadores Islands 
were of special significance to the security of the Pacific and South-
east Asia, and that developments there must affect the security of 
New Zealand. 53 
Although three months earlier Webb had expressed a New Zealand 
doubt about the morality of removing Nationalist China from the United 
Nations, there had been no previous suggestion that New Zealand's 
interests were bound up in the security and survival of the Nationalist 
regime on Formosa. Macdonald stated that the island's special signific-
ance derived from its strategic position. The Mi~ster's reference to 
Formosa's link with the security of South-east Asia was based on the 
knowledge that in the Second World War Japan's control of the island 
had enabled her to invade the Philippines and thence Indonesia. 54 
Because New Zealand was concerned about hostile Great Power control of 
South-east Asia, the government did not want that hostile power in cent-
rol of Formosa. The merits or demerits of the Nationalist government 
were now irrelevant. 
New Zealand's commitment to Formosa did not extend to the 
Nationalist-controlled Off-shore islands, as Macdonald made very explicit 
in early 1955. When hostilities between the Nationalists and Communists 
broke out over these islands in February, Macdonald said that a clear 
distinction had to be made between Formosa on the one hand and the islands 
adjacent to the Chinese coast on the other. 
53 E.A.R. December, 1954, p2 
54 N.Z.P.D. val. 305, p57, 29 March, 1955 
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The Off-shore islands, the Minister declared bluntly,· were 
Chinese territory. 55 In taking this stand, Macdonald stepped beyond 
the American position, but was in company with both the British and 
Australian attitudes. The United States regarded both Formosa and 
the Off-shore islands as Chinese territory, with the Nationalists 
the legitimate occupiers thereof. The New Zealand government saw 
only the Off-shore islands as Chinese territory, and regarded the 
Chinese Communists as the legitimate occupiers. Macdonald declared 
that Formosa and the Pescadores were in a different category. 11 They 
certainly could not be regarded as integral parts of the Chinese 
mainland, since although Japan had renounced sovereignty over these 
territories •• no final disposition of them had yet been made". 
Macdonald chose to ignore the Cairo declaration, and the fact that 
Taiwan had been in Chinese hands - unchallenged - since 1945. New 
Zealand, the Minister said, did not agree with the Communist demand 
that these islands, which were of considerable significance to the 
security of the whole Pacific area, should be handed over to the 
Peking authorities. 56 
The Prime Minister reiterated this view a month later in the 
House of Representatives, saying: "One thing is certain, in our 
view, Formosa must remain with the Western powers for some years to 
come". 57 He said that the question of making Formosa a neutralised 
or trusteeship country was being studied. 
55 E.A.R. January-February, 1955, plO 
56 Ibid. 
57 N.Z.P.D. vol. 305, pl5, 24 March, 1955 
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New Zealand's hostility to Communist China and its perception 
of a threat from that country to South-east Asia, had led the govern-
ment to deny that Taiwan was Chinese territory and that the People's 
Republic had any legitimate claim to it. The government's concern 
for Taiwan was mainly strategic, and not as yet related to any brief 
for the Nationalist government. Indeed, in denying that Taiwan was 
Chinese territory and speaking of trusteeship, the government showed 
that it rejected the Nationalist government's claims to be the 
legitimate government of China, unlike the Americans, and it also 
rejected the Nationalists as the proper government of Formosa. New 
Zealand accepted the right of the Communist Chinese government to 
take over the Off-shore islands as the de facto rulers of China. 
While continuing to recognise the Nationalist government, the New 
Zealand government thought of it as the temporary government of 
?ormosa, not the legal government of China. 
It was not until the Foreign Affairs debate in the autumn of 
1955 that the Prime Minister finally commented on the question of 
China's admission to the United Nations, which had been such a 
controversial topic in the previous session. Holland admitted that 
there were "many thinking people competent to express a judgement" 
who held the view that it was not realistic to have the mainland of 
China represented in the United Nations by the Nationalist Chinese 
in Formosa: " And I suppose it is not, for that matter". However, 
the Prime Minister claimed, there was no possible chance of Communist 
China's being admitted to the United Nations in existing circumstances 
because the veto would be exercised against it. In fact, Holland was 
technically wrong, because the question of a change in representation 
of a state already a meniber of the United Nations was not subj-ect' to a 
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veto, but it made little difference to the substance of his point, 
which was that advocates of change were wasting their time because 
New Zealand would be out on a limb. New Zealand could not, in 
Holland's eyes, combat the influence of a Great Power. More seriously, 
these futile expressions of intent were likely to damage New Zealand 
in her ally's eyes to no purpose. 
"All I would say to anyone studying the problem is that 
the greatest care should be taken to ensure that we do 
not take any action that will upset our American allies". 5 8 
Holland did not believe in standing on principle to no purpose 
- a far cry from the attitude of the first Labour government, although 
Holland and his government were not enthusiastic for this particular 
cause. Even less did he intend the government to stand on principle 
to the detriment of the country's interests - the preservation of the 
American alliance. 
"It does not matter if we all agree on the admission of 
Communist China to the United Nations, it will not 
happen because of the veto. Therefore, I do not think 
we should jeopardise our friendship with &~erica for 
the satisfaction, if there is any, of having a debate as 
to whether or not China shall be admitted". 
The Prime Minister went on: "I should like at this point, to 
• emphasise what I am saying, to quote a statement by Sir Winston 
Churchill: 
'The Western world must never forget for an instant it 
lives in security only because the United States provides 
it with a defensive shield'". 
58 N.Z.P.D. vel. 305, pl6, 24 March, 1955 
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In other words, a small country dependent on another for security 
must not kick against the policy pricks the mentor power might choose 
to administer. New Zealand's priorities were a function of its size; 
it must keep its alliance with the United States, come what may. 
It could not afford the luxury of an independent policy in a 
d~~gerous world. New Zealand's lot in the scheme of things was 
supportive, not that of an equal partner. The Prime Minister still 
saw the American alliance as a fragile thing which had to be nurtured. 
For other party members, too, New Zealand's need to stay close 
under the wing of the United States was the governing factor in deter-
mining China policy, and they struck out angrily at what they saw as 
the Opposition's neglect of this fundamental. On April 20, back-
bencher R.G. Gerard declared: 
"I want to know where the Labour Party stands. Are many 
going to follow the member for Otahuhu [J.M. Deas], who 
indicated that he thought we should cut our bonds with 
America more or less a.'ld that we should embrace Red China?" 59 
To this National Party member the issue was reduced to its simplest, 
black-and-white terms. It was a choice between fealty to the United 
States, and appeasement of China, and in his eyes that was no choice 
at all. It was not sensible to offend the country's most powerful 
friend to make a gesture towards the most obvious potential enemy. 
Gerard seemed convinced that any move towards China signalled an 
irreversible break with the United States. 
59 N.Z.P.D. vol. 305, p472, April 20, 1955 
"We all want to know whether the Labour Party is going 
to advocate cutting the painter with the United States, 
which has done a grand job for peace in the world. 
None of us agrees with everything the United States does 
••• [but] America is the greatest factor, barring the 
British Empire, for peace in the world at the present 
time, and it is our job to work with her". 
Here was reiteration of the Prime Minister's point. 
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New zealand's job, as it was perceived, was not to make things 
more awkward for the United States, but more easy. In Gerard's eyes, 
standing up for China was a deliberate slap in the face of the United 
States: there could be no compatability between the two. "I want 
to know whether the Labour Party is going to turn to Red China 
instead of America". 6 0 Top priority should be given to maintaining 
the unity of the alliance. 
Apart from the effects that diplomatic recognition would have 
on the American alliance, the main concern of the policy-makers in 
the recognition issue was for the effect that recognition could have 
on the security of South-east Asia. Greater international acceptance 
of China could both encourage Communist insurgents in South-east Asia 
and undermine the confidence of governments resisting them in Western 
intentions of helping them. The New Zealand government not only 
would not recognise China outside of a movement by the Americans in 
that direction, but it did not think that the United States should 
move that way anyway. E.H. Halstead, by then a Minister, said in 
the House of Representatives in 1955 that recognition of Communist 
60 N.Z.P.D. vol. 305, p473, 20 April, 1955 
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China could present a threat to the retention of 1--lalaya in Hestern 
hands. 
11Every move is watched by the people: of Asia, and every 
irlithdra•..val is 2.n encouragement to subversi"~".'"e elements in 
Malaya and Indo-China •. 0 If an offer 'Nere m2tde to 
Courrnunist China of membership in the United Nations, our 
difficulties in Malaya \vould be considerably intensified!! 0 61 
New Zealand had committed itself to providing troops for Malaya 
in J.iarch, 1955, and ;·;ras thus to be directly involved in containing· 
Conummist guerillas of Chinese origin. The Overseas chinese factor 
simultaneously seemed to assume more importance in the recognition 
question. A policy of maximum support for t.he government on Forrr.osa 
(Taiwan) was becoming more attractive in National. Party eyes as a 
supposed means of keeping millions of potential insurgents quiescentw 
While the Formosa government existed as an alternative focus for 
Overseas Chinese loyalties, the influence of the Corrununist regime 
\-TaS lessened, and along with it, the influence of its indigenous 
supporters. 
The Minister of External Affairs said in the House: 
11 there are large populations of Chinese in all the 
other countries of the South-east Asian area .... the 
basic loyalty of the bulk of those Chinese millions is 
towards Formosa today. Where would they look to if 
Formosa went to the Communists? Because of ties of 
birt.':t and blood many of these people 11ould probably look 
to Communist China, and then there would be created in 
South-east Asia many more channels for subversion than 
exist at the present time". 62 
61 N.Z.P.D. vol. 305, pl09, 29 March, 1955 
62 N.Z.P.D. vol. 305, p56, 24 March, 1955 
T ~ P. Shand, the Post.ma.ster-Gt~ne:cal! emphasised ·t"h~ p~)in t evr.::n 
rno~e strongly~ 
11 We should s·top thinking of Chiang Kai-shek as the 
defeated head of a gover!L.'1Kmt against tvhich many chc..:rges 
of corruption have been broug·ht. VJhatever -8rimes his 
government have com.rni·tted, he is the symbol of free China 
to millions of Chinese people throughout the Horld. 
There are Chinese people right throughout South-east Asia. 
Half the people in Halaya are Chinese. In Indor~esia nearly 
all the leaders of the population - not ·the political leade~·s f but the traders, those \vho make the wheels of inth::.stry go 
round - are Chinese. Pild the vast majority of Chinese out-
side China are loyal to free China. Destroy Chiang Kai-shek and you destroy free China. Destl·oy the belief in Chiang Kai-shek and you destroy the belief by all the Chinese people 
of the -..vorld that there could be any China other than 
Communist China. Destroy that belief and you might as \·lell 
walk out of Malaya and Indonesia and the whole of Soutl1~-east 
Asia .•• so we must understand that it is essential to our 
cause that we should maintain the position of Chia..'rlg Kai-shek, but until recently only the Americans have realised the urgency 
of it. \.fuat they are doing is not really a matter of American prestige; it is to maintain the prestige of a man who, what-
ever his faults, and the faults of his regime, has been a loyal ally of the democracies in recent years. If "\18 destroy him 
or allow him to be destrcved, '"e dri~.re the Chinese of t.he world into the Communist cru.up 11 .- 6 3 
National Party backbencher C.H. Harker argued against recog-
nition and admittance on the grounds of their effect on the morale of 
the existing pro-Western governments in Asia. 
63 N.Z.P.D. vol. 305, p83, 30 March 1955 
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" the effect on the other Asian nations could only be 
deplorable. It would be regarded there as such a triumph 
for China ••• smaller Asian nations who still, for religious 
and political reasons, are opposed to Communism would feel 
they had been betrayed by the West and that they might as 
well give in before they were slaughtered". 64 
Harker quoted the Australian diplomat and lecturer W.G. Goddard65 
to the effect that it was certain that 
"any recognition of Communist Cbina in place of the 
democracy of Free Cbina could only be interpreted 
throughout East Asia as a denial on our part of the very 
thing we have in common with others in the free world, 
so often declared. The non-Communist countries of Asia 
would condemn us for our hypocrisy". 
The desire to 'keep faith' with the non-Communist countries 
of Asia had been one of the strong arguments put forward against 
recognition by Doidge in 1950. The fact that New Zealand since then 
had become allied with two South-east Asian nations - Thailand and the 
Philippines - in an anti-Communist alliance could only have strengthened 
this constraint. Harker, however,. was thinking of Japan. 
"For its own purposes, the Communist government in Cbina 
is angling at the present time to draw Japan into the 
Communist net, to make her a partner to Communism". 
64 N.Z.P.D. vol. 305, pl25, 29 March, 1955 
65 W.G. Goddard was born in Newcastle, N.S.W. Lectured in Chinese 
universities before the Second World war. Joined the Australian 
Department of External Affairs during the war, retiring in 1955. 
Acknowledged authority on Formosa. Addressed New Zealand Joint 
Chiefs of Staff on the subject in the fifties. Author (1966) of 
"Formosa, a Study in Chinese History", Michigan State University 
Press .. 
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The spectre of a Communist Japan was one that struck New 
Zealanders more forcibly than a Communist South-east Asia, for Japan 
had the proven ability to threaten the country. The Minister of 
External Affairs saw the retention of a non-Corr~unist Formosa partly 
in terms of Japan. "The loss of Formosa would seriously affect the 
position of Japan ••• I emphasise again that if Japan turns to 
Communism and forsakes t~e Western powers, the problems of the Pacific 
will be many times greater than any Pacific problem that ever existed".66 
If Japan felt threatened by Chinese Communist occupation of Formosa, 
its government might very well feel the need to move to a more neutral 
Cold War position as an accommodation to Chinese views. 
Alternatively, the act of recognition could help strengthen the 
electoral position of the Japanese Communist Party. Thus, the effect 
of China policy on Japan was as an important consideration as its 
effect on South-east Asian nations. 
As for the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, 
Harker said he not only opposed it as long as China continued to be 
an aggressor country, but until China had given proof "for at least 
the same period it has been an aggressor" that its professions of 
non-aggression were being honoured. This meant another five years. 
Although Clifton Webb had left the House of Representatives, 
the torch of a liberal China policy in the National Party had been 
picked up by a backbencher, D.M. Rae. Unlike Webb and his sometime 
supporter Algie, though, Rae was not so much concerned with China's 
admission to the United Nations as with its recognition diplomatically. 
6 6 N. Z. P. D. vol. 305, p57 ,. 29 March, 1955 
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While admitting that the act of recognition "might have repercussions 
that I do not understand", Rae said that it would be "realistic to 
recognise Chou En-lai's government as the de facto ruler of China". 
Dismissing the old bogey of the 1950 dilemma, he declared that 
recognition "would not necessarily mean we approve of them, but that 
we held them responsible for what they did. That is the meaning of 
recognition11 • 67 
When asked to comment on Rae's views two months later, the 
Prime Minister made it clear that the ball of improved relations 
with China was very definitely in China's court. 
"The first step in the allied subjects of recognition 
of the Chinese Communist government and her admission to 
the United Nations lies with that government itself", 
Holland declared. The first step that the Chinese government had 
to take was the "provision of concrete evidence" that it was 
"genuinely prepared to seek adjustment by peaceful means 
of international disputes in which it may be involved. 
Communist china must give proof by its actions that it is 
willing to fulfil the duties and obligations of membership 
in the international community. Foremost amongst these 
obligations are the requirements that members shall settle 
their international disputes by peaceful means and that 
they shall refrain from the threat or use of force". 68 
In his reference to peaceful means of settling international 
disputes, the Prime Minister was probably referring to the recently 
passed Formosa Straits crisis. New Zealand's stand against any 
initiatives towards China at the height of the Bandung era contrasted 
67 N.Z.P.D. val. 305, p74, 29 March, 1955 
68 E.A.R. June, 1955, pl2 
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with the attitude of her Comrnon\•Jeal th ally 1 C.1na.da, which seemed 
inclined to Nebb t s views. Only two months after Holland's 
statement demanding proof of China 1 s sinceri t.y, Canada 1 s Secretary 
of state for External Affairs, L.B. Pearsvn 1 said: 
""t'1e "l:vould ~ •• be unwise • "~ to get into the position 
where we would seem to be demondi.ng positive proof 
of utter purity from this or any ot.her regime before 
we could cons1.a.er giving it foimal diplomatic recog-
nition .$~: 69 
The Secretary thought also with Webb that the exigencies of the 
international situation demanded that China be recognised .. 
"We should also remernber that in present circumstances 
and in all important negotiations conce~1ing the 
situation in the Far East Ne have already recognized 
the.t the Government • . has to be present and participate 
if any agreed solutions are to be reached ..... Furthermore, 
it is becoming clearer that if tha United 1\Jations is to 
ple,y the part it should in the solution of certain Far 
Bcstern problems~ the de facto gove.rnment c.£ China has 
to be present in its discussion of these problems 11 • 
Pearson went on: 
"I mention these matters, not to indicate that we are 
rushing into - or should rush into - any chru>ge of policy 
in this matter of diplomatic recogni·tion, in a way that 
would cause bitter controversy at home and with certain 
friendly nations. I am suggesting, however, that tl:e 
time is coming - and soon - "\'>lhen we should have another 
and searching look at the problem; that we should con--
sider it also with those friendly governments with \vhom 
we like to act, and whenever possible should act together 
on matters of international importance" .. 
69 E.A.R. August, 1955, pl5 
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Pearson was saying that logic dictated dealing with China, but 
certain hard political facts of life - public opinion at home and the 
all-pervasive influence of the United States - combined to hold action 
off. He acknowledged that controversy aroused with the United States 
over a unilateral recognition would be "bitter',', and despite his 
independent attitude, had ruled out such action. 
Holland, on the other hand, was not prepared to admit that China 
should be dealt with. He much preferred to go along with the moral-
istic American attitude that China should be isolated from the inter-
national community until she mended her ways. 
New Zealand's permanent Secretary for External Affairs, 
A.D. Mcintosh, had many talks with Pearson on the recognition issue, 
and the Canadian told him that Canada was quite prepared to go ahead 
and recognise but could not see any point in doing so alone. 70 
Canada, unlike New Zealand, had made a commitment in principle to 
unconditional recognition and waited only upon a suitable time to go 
ahead. It was not until 1958 that New Zealand's attitude, with the 
change of government, drew abreast of Canada's. 
When Parliament resumed in July, 1955, the Prime Minister was 
questioned by the Opposition on the possibility of a change in China 
policy as an aid to reducing tension in the Far East. Somewhat 
surprisingly, Holland was prepared to concede that Chinese admission 
to the United Nations might have this beneficial effect, but reiter-
ated that New Zealand was not going out on a limb over the matter. 
The government was content to wait upon developments. 
70 Interview, Sir Alister Mcintosh, 21.2.74 
"There has been no change in the attitude of this 
government to the admission of Communist China to the 
United Nations, but I think I am entitled to say that 
the day when it will be admitted is coming closer. 
I would not be at all surprised if it did not come 
about much sooner than at present seems possible". 
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While Holland believed that admission would be "one of the 
factors contributing to the lessening of tension in· the world", 
he warned "we have to realise that we must not create bigger problems 
than already exist by something we might do in an effort to solve 
the original problems". 71 In other words, it was not progress to 
cause tension between the United States and her allies in order to 
try and reduce East-West tensions generally. 
The Prime Minister said that under existing conditions it 
was quite out of the question for China to be admitted, and he thought 
that it would be a pity to raise the issue just then. 
"Before we can hope for an agreement on the admission 
to the United Nations of Communist China, I think there 
has to be a lapse of time and an indication of good 
behaviour •• I hope the day will be hastened when China 
and other countries, prepared to abide by the rules of 
the United Nations, will be admitted". 
The Prime Minister saw the China problem as one that would be solved 
in the fullness of time, a time that woulq allow both China and the 
United States to modify their attitudes. 
That a purely pragmatic approach to foreign policy - an 
approach that subordinated all issues to the need of the alliance 
- dominated the Prime Minister's approach to the China issue was 
71 N.Z.P.D. vol. 306, pl062, 21 July, 1955 
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revealed in the next year, 1956. Coming to the question of China 
and Formosa in his foreign policy debate in August, Holland said: 
"Here I must urge to the utmost of my capacity that members 
of the House ••• exercise considerable caution about what 
they say about that area. We must work together to the 
common end. It is well-known that there is the widest 
difference among friends in the Pacific area. It is of 
the utmost importance, especially at this time, not to cause 
difficulty for our friends merely for the purpose of playing 
to the gallery in other directions. I am speaking of course, 
of the United States of America". 72 
The next day the Prime Minister extrapolated the point. 
"The United States does not expect us to follow her slavishly, 
and I do not think we do, either, but I do think we should 
have a proper appreciation of what the United States means 
to the whole world - to the British Empire and commonwealth 
and the world at large ~ at this time especially. The 
United States is making a contribution that entitles her 
to enjoy .•• the respect of all right-thinking paople in 
this country". 7 3 
The Prime Minister was making a case for small nation 
deference to the locus of power. He who carried the burden was 
entitled to call the tune - substantially, at any rate. Holland 
went on to criticise the Labour Party for descending to the depths 
of party politics in discussing a matter of great international 
importance. They knew there could be no result from their policy 
and therefore, in his view, were just scoring political points. 
72 N.Z.P.D. val. 309, p889, 7 August, 1956 
73 N.Z.P.D. val. 309, p963, 8 August, 1956 
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D.M. Rae backed up his leader by saying that it was "important 
and vital to the peace of the world that we should not unwittingly or 
perhaps brazenly, endanger the friendship of the United States of 
America11 • 7 '+ 
In Australia, Prime Minister Menzies had often spelt out the 
rationale for Holland's outlook. He had said that one did not argue 
in public with one's "great and powerful friends", in the hearing of 
one's enemies and those who might become so. Any differences with 
the United States government should be argued out in private. 75 
This need for circumspection was an inevitable consequence of a 
dependent relationship. "True, Australia is an independent nation 
and has a perfect right to express its views whatever the result", 
he said in 1958. 11 This is a grand conception and would be .even more 
admirable if we possessed such population and strength as made us a 
truly great power, able to defend ourselves in our. own right. But 
the fact is that we are not truly independent, except in legal terms". 76 
The New Zealand Minister for Defence and External Affairs, 
Macdonald, had stated in the course of the 1955 International Affairs 
debate that it was "plain that there were two essentials to peace in 
a world that is plagued with Communist imperialism. The first 
essential is that there should be unity, above all between the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America, and then between the other 
freedom-loving countries of the world". 77 
74 N.Z.P.D. vel. 309, p943, 8 August, 1956 
75 Miller, .J.D.B. 'Britain and the OZd Dominions' pl95 
76 Ibid., pl96 
77 N. Z.P.D. vel. 305, p58, 24 March, 1955 
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This passion for unity was expressed at the Commonwealth Prime 
Minister's Conference in London in April, 1956 where one day was spent 
in intensive discussions of future Commonwealth relations with China, 
and no agreement was reached~ 
This was revealed by the final communique, which made no mention 
of China. Although Nehru stressed the importance of doing everything 
possible to improve relations between China and the Gnited Nations, 
Australia and New Zealand had been strongly against the Commonwealth 
lining up against known United States policy. Rationalising the policy 
of deference that Holland was to articulate in the House in July, 
Australian Prime Minister Menzies said: "One of the great objects of 
the Cold War is to drive wedges between us and the United States. 
The United States must not be left alone in this conflict of opinion". 78 
In Menzies' view, the China issue was not important enough to the 
Commonwealth countries to .differ publicly from the United States on it. 
It was, however, very important to the Americans, and they should not 
have to assume a position in isolation. Holland at the Conference took 
much the same line. He told the delegates that good relations between 
the Commonwealth and the United States were so important that there 
could be no question of adopting a Commonwealth policy that would cause 
friction with the Americans. 79 
Assessments made in the Department of External Affairs in June, 
1956, conceded that the reality of Communist China's influence in Asia 
was increasingly difficult to ignore. At the same time it was 
appreciated that the American President had said that there would be no 
78 O.D.T. July, 11, 1956, p5 
79 Information supplied by the Research Division, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
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chan9·e in A.ll1eric5.n p::Jlicy before the November, 1956 e1ec·tions, and 
tha.t any move by Nev..~ Zealand on either admission or :;:ecognition 
before those elections ,..-auld not be understood by the Ur!i ted s~cates 
and ·would wectken the Western alliance against CoTI'.rnunisrt1. The 
official reconunendation. v1as that New Zealand should move in co-operc.tion 
\'lith Ccmmon,..;ealth members, a.'"".d in particular with Canada and Australia~ ao 
Canada's position at this time 'VJas much the sante as Au.stral:La's~ 
Prime Hinister St Laurent had "t,,rarned the Corr.monv1ealth Conference that 
a too hasty effort to force a change of China policy on the United 
States would meet 'l:dth such a reo.ction that the United States might 
withdra't'z from the United Nations. For Canada, the possibility of 
the United Nations existing without ·the United States v:as a matter of 
greater significance than the incongruity of havi:hg China represent.ed. 
by the Nationalists. It was a rnatter of \Vaiting and hcping that 
the attitude of the administration would not. persist indefinitely~ 131 
Departmental assessments in New Zealand, while allowing that 
China's 'Bandung' policy was effectively fulfilling the conditions of 
good faith that has been demanded for recognition, were to the effect 
that New Zealand would gain few practical advantages from granting 
recognition, while suffering the disadvantages of offending the 
United States and of having to break its links with Tait-,an. Moreo-. te.:r, 
it would be difficult to reconcile the recognition of Communist China 
'\'lith expressed apprehension over subversive activities in Laos. 
The 1957 Commonwealth Conference, like the 1956 one, considered 
the problem of the admittance of Communist China to the United Nations 
80 Ibid. 
81 Pearson, L.B. Mike - The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pe~~son, 
volume 3, pl2l. 
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and once again came out in favour of the status quo with some help 
from New Zealand. External Affairs Minister Macdonald, reporting 
to Parliament on the Conference said: 
"There is the opinion that we must recognise 
to terms with Communist China immediately. 




realities. However, there are some other realities, 
I feel, ~~at have been overlooked ••• What of Formosa? 
Is that to be abandoned? What of the overseas Chinese 
who look towards Taiwan at the present time? Are they 
to be abandoned?" 62 
Lurking behind these, as always, was the biggest constraint of all 
- the need to preserve the American alliance, which could easily 
be strained by the basically insubstantial issue of China. 
"Chou En-lai was once quoted, in replying to a question 
on the recognition of China, as saying that China can wait. 
That also represented the predominant feeling of our 
conference in London. It was felt that to press for 
recognition now would be to incur too high a price, and 
the price could well be at this stage of affairs a 
fracturing of Western alliances and could possibly mean 
a shattering of the framework of the United Nations". 63 
New Zealand had been reminded of the continuing fierce 
opposition of the United States to any moves towards China less than 
a month previously. Speaking in san Francisco on June 29, 1957, 
United States Secretary of State Dulles hap asserted yet again that 
Communist rule in China was a passing phase. 
62 N.Z.P.D. vol. 312, pl071, 23 July, 1957 
63 N.Z.P.D. vol. 312, pl071, 23 July, 1957 
Dulles had also declared that China's obtaining of a seat in 
the United Nations \<las in the interests of neither the United State.s 
nor the United Nations. As for diplomatic recognitionf this gave 
the recognised regi:ne valuable rights and privileges, and recognition 
by the United States vmuld give ·the recipient mucl: added prestige C!t 
home and abroad~ Furthermore 1 the experience of o·ther nations had 
convinced him that recognition wou:!.d not :'favourably influence the 
evolution of affairs in China" .. 84 
The New Zealand government, even if i·t had been possessed of 
a desire to recognise Communist China, believed that it could not 
afford to ignore such views. Amid what seemed a hostile environment 
and considering itself virtually defenceless, the government felt 
acutely the need for American protection. As an unidentified member 
of the New Zealand Parliament told the editor of the New Commonwealt;h: 
"if a deluge came a.gain, we would have to shout for the United States .. 
What could Britain do? What did she do before?" 85 This belief in 
complete dependence on the United States expressed itself in a 
reluctance to question American policies for fear of being branded 
a bad ally. The price of security, Nationalist policy-makers believed, 
t•as loyalty. 
Conclusion 
The initial trends of New Zealand's China policy as revealed 
in the period 1949-1959 were confirmed and strengthened in the years 
from 1951 to 1957 .. 
84 Department of State Bulletin vol. 37, July 15, 1957, p95 
&s O.D.T. July 2, 1957, pl 
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The coming of the Korean War in mid-1950 convinced New 
Zealand's policy-makers that the threat of Communist imperialism 
was now in the Pacific. The government•s immediate reaction was to 
give all possible support to the major Western pm<er in the Pacific -
the only one capable of giving New Zealand protection from any threat. 
The government wanted to keep the United States committed to the 
defence of free countries in Asia, and believed that this could only 
be achieved if New Zealand, as >Jell as the Western world in general, 
gave full support to American policies designed to achieve this end. 
It did not matter that others, notably Britain, thought that those 
policies might not be the most effective ones to achieve the objective: 
the important thing was not the policy but the support given to it. 
New Zealand had, in a basic sense, no China policy. The government 
had an American pclicy that overrode all. The important thing to be 
achieved was not China's qniesance but American commitment to the 
resistance of all threats to the peace in the Pacific. The guarantee 
of formal support which came with the ANZUS Treaty of 1951 did not 
relieve New Zealand of her desire to avoid treading on American toes 
the government was still concerned to head off latent isolationist 
tendencies in the United States by provin~ New Zealand a good ally. 
Holland made it quite clear in the House in 1955 that no matter what 
reservations New Zealand might have about the direction of American 
China policy, the government was not going to take any initiatives 
that might jeopardise the alliance with the United States. The 
government's performances at the 1956 and 1957 Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers' Conferences showed that it did not want other Commonwealth 
members to range themselves against American policy either, less the 
unity of the free world be shattered. 
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In its own attitude to China, New Zealand's government 
generally sympathised with the American moralistic viewpoint rather 
than the British pragmatic one. The government had no hesitation 
about supporting the United Nations resolution declaring China an 
aggressor, and it over-diligently implemented the embargo on strategic 
materials to China that arose from that resolution. The traditional 
viewpoint that aggressors must not be appeased, and that membership 
of the United Nations was a privilege, dominated the government's 
approach to the question of admission to the United Nations after the 
Korean War. 
Because the government believed that New zealand's interest was 
served by the maintenance of non-Communist governments in South-east 
Asia, it looked at Western policies towards China in the light of the 
effect they might have on that objective. It was thought that 
recognition of China would undermine the confidence of Asian states in 
the >lillingness of Western powers to support them against pressures 
from China. It would also damage the position of the Taiwan government 
in the eyes of the Overseas Chinese, who were a vital factor in the 
stability of South-east Asia. 
In purely global terms, elements in the New Zealand government 
were persuaded that the British policy towards china was a more 
realistic one than the American. Recognition and admission of China 
to the United Nations would, in the British view, make for a lessening 
of tension in the world, and would perhaps encourage China to take an 
independent line from thE• Soviet Union. External Affairs Minister 
Webb showed between 1951 and 1954 that he favoured this approach, 
and even Holland in 1955 agreed with it. However, with New Zealand's 
two closest allies disagreeing with it, there was no hope that it 
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would be translated into policy. 
New Zealand's China policy in the mid-1950s, then; was governed 
by her loyalty to her chief protector, the traditional propensity not 
to conciliate perceived aggressors, and her concern for the survival 
of the non-Communist governments of South-east Asia. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE LABOUR PARTY AND CHINA 1950-57 
Introduction 
During its period in opposition from 1949 to 1957, the Labour 
Party gradually adopted a position on the diplomatic recognition of 
China distinctly different from that of the National government. ~'he 
first moves in this direction did not come until the Korean vlar was 
underway. From the 1949 election to the outbreak of that war in mid-
1950, the Labour Party under the leadership of Peter Fraser was at 
one with the National Party in its suspicion of the new Chinese 
government's legitimacy and of its future intentions in Asia, and 
Labour agreed with the decision of the government not to recognise. 
Fraser had not been certain rJhat the Nationalist government of China 
had not been a victim of Russian aggression, and he thought that an 
early recognition might affect New Zealand's security by strengthening 
Communist insurgents in South-east Asia. Mid-way through the Korean 
War, after the ru1ti-communist atmosphere associated with the 1951 
waterfront dispute a~d general election had dissipated somewhat, the 
Labour Party became an advocate of the recognition of China. Fraser 
by this time was dead, and the party was now sure that the Coilli~unist 
revolution in China was a genuine expression of the will of the 
Chinese people, and that the government was thus entitled to recognition. 
Beyond an ideological sympathy with a government of the people, however, 
the party's stand was based on the belief that peace in Asia could only 
be achieved by an acceptance of the Chinese government. The majority 
of members of the party thought that recognition should not be granted 
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while China was involved in military action against the United Nations 
forces in Korea. After the close of the Korean l-Iar in 1953, Labour 
members could see no impediment to recognition and China's admission 
to the U:ni ted Nations. Acceptance of China by the West would be a 
first step towards easing global tensions. Recognition ~ms included 
in the party's manifesto for the 1954 elections, but was left out for 
tactical reasons in 1957. At the same time that they urged recognition, 
Labour members did not want to see the island of Tai,<an transferred to 
Communist control, although it was recognised as Chinese territory. 
After the defeat of the Labour government in late 1949, Labour 
Party leader Fraser continued his opposition to the recognition of 
the Chinese Communist government, though not publicly. In September, 
1950, the Minister of External Affairs, F .l'l. Doidge, said of the early 
days of the National administration: "The government of New Zealand 
refused recognition of Communist China and I think I am right in saying 
that in that attitude we were supported by the Leader of the Opposition" .1 
Labour members in the House at the time did not deny the claim. 
There was no remit concerning China at the annual Labour Party 
conference in May, 1950. This conference was dominated in its inter-
national section by questions of New Zealand's security. Perhaps in 
an atmosphere of security-consciousness, the claims of China, a country 
which was thought part of the security problem, did not seem important. 
It was not until the advent of the Korean Nar in June, 1950, that more 
thought was given to the China recognition question. 
1 N.Z.P.D. vel. 291, p2143, 5 September, 1950 
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The Korean War forced a consideration of China's relationships 
>;ith the >;orld on the Labour Party. Whereas the effect of the >1ar on 
the National Party >las to confirm it l.n its opposition to any diplomatic 
recognition of China, the effect on the Labour Party >;as the gro>1th of 
a belief that no peace in the Asian region could be arrived at satis-
factorily unless China >;as internationally accepted. 
M. Moohan >!as the first party member to raise the China issue in 
Parliament, and he did this in November, 1950. Calling the question 
of China a matter that required "some attention", Moohan noted that up 
to that date China had not been allo>1ed to be represented at the United 
Nations by a proper delegate. China >lith its huge population could 
not be ignored, he said. "Whether >1e like or dislike the Chinese 
Government, the fact remains there is a Government in charge of the 
country". Meehan >lent on to refute the National Party belief that 
the Chinese Communist government was a creature of the Soviet union. 
"I do not subscribe to the view that China, >lith its history, >;ill 
ever become like Czechoslovakia and other European countries, a 
satellite of Soviet Russia". 2 
No other Labour member mentioned the issue at that time. In 
December, 1950, Fraser, >1ho had been firmly against recognition, died. 
He >;as succeeded by Walter Nash, >;hose vie>;s on the subject are not 
a matter of public record, although in 1949 he had associated himself 
>lith Fraser's unwillingness to recognise China before the general 
election. 
At the party conference in June, 1951, a remit >;as presented 
that called for the "people's Government of China" to be recognised. 
2 N.Z.P.D. vol. 292, p3960, 2 November, 1950 
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The External Affairs Committee of the conference recommended that the 
party "support the recognition of the Chinese People's government and 
its admission to the United Nations as soon as hostilities cease in 
Korea". 3 It also asked the party to endorse a decision that the 
People's government representatives in the United Nations should 
replace those appointed by Chiang Kai-shek's administration. 
A.M. Finlay, who·had been a Labour Member of Parliament from 1946 to 
1949, moved that the words "as soon as hostilities cease in Korea" be 
deleted from the clause. This was lost. 4 The party was not pre-
pared to endorse recognition while Chinese forces vmre in action 
against the United Nations in Korea - which included New Zealand. 
China had only recently been formally conderr~ed t¥ the United Nations 
as an aggressor and had had sanctions imposed upon her. 
The lack of enthusiasm for doing anything about China's 
position in the "hot" phase of the Korean War was reflected in the 
fact that a recognition plank was not included in the policy platform 
for the snap election of September, 1951. The non-inclusion was 
probably also a matter of tactics, since the election was fought 
around the issue of Communist influence in the Unions, and, as in 
1949, a Labour Party appearing to be carrying a brief for a Communist 
government would have been at a disadvantage. At the election, the 
party went down to a further, heavier defeat. 
In the parliamentary session immediately after the election, 
several Labour members brought up the China question. A.H. Nordmeyer, 
a former Minister of Health and Industries and Commerce who was currently 
3 N.Z. Labour Party, Report of the 35th Annual Conference, p26 
4 Ibid. p27 
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President of the Labour Party, reaffirmed that China could not be 
recognised while fighting continued in Korea, but that New Zealand 
would have to get around to it sooner or later. Nordmeyer seemed to 
see recoq-nition of China as a rather unfortm1ate practical necessity. 
He did not find any virtues in such a policy. 
11 
..... whatever we may think of Communism in general, or what-
ever we may think of the particular brand of Communism that 
exists in China today, it does seem to me that sooner or later 
we shall have to recognise de facto the government of China. 
I agree that the present time is not the proper time to do 
so - that it would be unthinkable to do so while China, 
overtly or othel\~ise, is engaged in hostilities in Korea 
against the forces of the United Nations. Hm1ever, when that 
Korean episode comes to an end .•. I think the House will agree 
with the statement expressed by the Minister of External Affairs 
when he was reported some months ago as saying he regarded i·t 
as inevitable that the Chinese government should be recognised". 5 
A backbencher, H.E. Combs, expressed much more concern for 
China's rights. He condemned ·the fact that New Zealand had refused 
to recognise China, even though the four hundred million people of 
China had a stake in the world as much as anyone else. 
As for admission to the United Nations, Combs made the point 
that there were already several governments represented there that were 
Communist, so there was no reason to exclude China for that fact. 
Combs saw the Communist takeover in China as a completely domestic 
revolution, and not as the result of a Soviet effort. 
"When they finished up the war they cleaned up their m·m 
country and drove out their individualistic government. 
Now because we did not like them driving it out we say •,.,e will 
not talk to you anymore or recognise you' 11 • 6 
5 N.Z.P.D. vol. 295, p274, 11 October, 1951 
6 Ibid. p2Bl 
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W.T. Anderton declared that it was known to members that the 
current government in China had reliew:>d China of a dictatorship from 
which she had suffered for many years. 7 
The 1952 conference of the party, held in April, was presented 
with remits that called for Formosa's return to China to be supported 
and for China's admission to the United Nations to be supported. 
The policy committee recommended that both remits be rejected, and 
that a motion be substituted that linked Chinese membership of the 
United Nations to the conclusion of hostilities in Korea. 8 The 
Formosa issue was left in abeyance. 
In Parliament that year the party leader, Walter Nash, made his 
first comments on the China issue. He began by stating that the 
Chinese under a Communist government were better off than they had 
been in the pre-Cowmunist period, and he referred to Chiang Kai-shek's 
government as "the corrupt organisation that formerly ruled11 • 9 In 
moral terms, in contrast to National Party members, Nash saw the 
Co~~unist side as superior because they were more interested in the 
welfare of the Chinese people. Nash said nm1 that he believed that 
Britain had been wise in recognising Communist China. 
In keeping with the Labour Party's strong fealty to the United 
Nations and its resolutions, and its opposition to aggression, Nash 
said that China could on no account be recognised while she was party 
to aggression. However, as soon as a truce was concluded and 
7 N.Z.P.D. vol. 295, p345, 11 October, 1951 
8 N.Z. Labour Party, Report of the 36th Annual Conference 
9 N.Z.P.D. vol. 299, p357, 16 July, 1952 
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hostilities had ceased, New Zealand should join the United Kingdom and 
the Soviet Union in advocating China's admission to the United Nations. 
No-one could deny that the Conununists in China were in effective 
control of that country, Nash said. "They are, by the will of the 
people, the proper government " The party leader went on to say 
that the Chinese were more likely to be brought on to the side of 
the free world by being admitted to the United Nations than they '"ere 
by being kept out;·. 
Nash saw Formosa's status as a separate issue. He went along 
with \'/ebb in believing that while the Cairo and Potsdam agreements 
had given Taiwan over to the Government of China, "other factorsn 
had ncorne in bet\>;eenn in the meantime. After China had been admitted 
to the United Nations, the problem of Formosa could be dealt with by 
that body, Nash thought. He listed three possible solutions that 
the United Nations could opt for: trusteeship under the United Nations, 
complete independence, or transfer to the government of mainland China.10 
The next day in parliament, J. Mathison weighed in ~lith 
political arguments for the recognition of China, in contrast to the 
essentially moral and legal arguments of Nash. As a first premise, 
Mathison argued against the view that China was a satellite of Soviet 
Russia - an argument that denied the legitimacy of the Chinese Revolut-
ion and therefore found no case for recognition. 
"I do not think the Soviet has acquired China. It is true 
that Chinese Communist leaders have sought advice a.T'ld assist-
ance from Moscow. That was to be expected, however, because 
China found a hostile Western ·world. We in New Zealand have 
net done very much, but Britain has held out the hand of 
friendship to Communist China in recogn1s1ng the government 
there, and after all, that is the only logical thing to do" . 11 
!O Ibid. p36l 
11 N.Z.P.D. vol. 297, pp382-83, 17 July, 1952 
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The Nationalist government on Formosa no longer counted, and New Zealand 
had to be realistic as well as idealiBtic. 
After acknowledging the party line on delayed admission to 
the United Nations, Mathison •1ent on to suggest that immediate admission 
might have beneficial effects: it might cause an estrangement between 
Russia and China. 
"If we, too, held out the hand of friendship to China, and, 
if necessary, competed for her friendship, then we might be 
doing something well worthwhile and to the good of t.he British 
Commonwealth and other Western countries .•. Let us hold out 
the hand of friendship to China and I am sure we will reap the 
benefit11 • 
Other Labour parliamentarians were similarly of the opinion 
that despite China's aggression, her immediate admission to the United 
Nations should be favoured in the interests of a speedy settlement in 
Korea. w.w. Freer was reported to have advocated this at an Auckland 
Peace council meeting. 12 
M. Moohan believed that if the West continued its current 
policy towards China it would simply cement it to the Soviet Union. 13 
Former Attorney-General H.G.R. Mason, ho>1ever, expressed doubts 
that the strategy outlined would work in view of Chinese attitudes. 
11 The Government of China does not seem anxious to be recognised 
by any nation •• It was recognised by the British government 
but it did not .•• [send] ambassadors to Britain •• This is a 
rather peculiar attitude for the Chinese government to take 
• . . certainly it is action • • that quite sets aside any question 
of another nation recognising the Chinese government". 14 
12 N.Z.P.D. vol. 297, p504, 24 July, 1952 
13 N.Z.P.D. vol. 297, p388, 17 July, 1952 
14 N.Z.P.D. vol. 297, p395, 17 July, 1952 
By 1953, international conditions were becoming more 
favourable for recognition. In the House in April, W.T. Anderton 
said that vlith the Korean situation settling, it was time that the 
government pronounced itself definitely in favour of the admission 
of the People's Republic into the United Nations, so that China might 
assist in removing the tension and irritability that had been felt 
for so long through the world. 15 
In July, 1953, an armistice \·;as signed between the United 
Nations forces and China in Korea. A month later, in the House of 
Representatives, Nash called for early diplomatic recognition for 
China. "We could not give recognition whilst China was an aggressor, 
but we should give her early recognition". 16 After this categorical 
statement, the Leader of the Opposition did acknowledge a possible 
constraint ·· the position of Formosa. 
"If the Chinese Communist Government is recognised, then at that point, in accord with treaties, it would take control of Formosa. I would not be too keen on that. I am certain that Chiang Kai-shek should not be in charge of Formosa, but I'm not too sure about handing Formosa over to the Chinese Corrmunist government. I think the Formosans should have some say". 
The party leader broached the idea of a United Nations trustee-
ship over Formosa again, but now doubted that the government of the 
People's Republic v;ould find it acceptable. Nash did not at any 
stage mention Formosa's strategic value to the West: he seemed 
concerned only with the rights of Formosa's population to a voice in 
their future. 
Nash called also for China's assuming its rightful place on the 
Security Council of the United Nations, and admitted that British 
15 N. Z. P. D. vol. 299, p95, 16 April, 1953 
16 N.Z.P.D. val. 299, p412, 12 August, 1953 
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Labour leader Attlee's support for that policy had influenced his own 
view upon it. 
The few Labour members who mentioned the American alliance in 
connection with China policy did not see it as a constraining factor. 
H.E. Combs conceded that the United States was hostile to recognition, 
but said that the time had arrived for New Zealand to assert itself 
and to say it wanted to be friendly with China and have that country 
admitted to the United Nations. 17 H.G.R. Mason believed that the 
existence of the American alliance should be a reason for New Zealand's 
doing something positive about the isolation of China. New Zealand, 
he said, had to be concerned about situations that might activate 
the provisions of the alliance, such as a war between China and the 
United States. The status of the Chinese government was impoLtant 
because the question of peace was largely related to it. " .... China 
could be concerned with events that could lead to a war, which ••• 
would involve us ••• anything that increases the chance of war is of 
concern to us because of that rela·tionship into which we have entered" •1 8 
Other Labour speakers too were concerned about the need to avoid 
confrontation between East and West. Mathison declared that China 
could not be kept out of the Security Council and "the sooner we 
permit her to be on the Security Council the better it will be for 
relationships between the East and \'lest". 19 W.T. Anderton expressed 
disappointment that "neither the Minister nor any government member who 
has spoken was prepared to advocate the admittance of China to the 
United Nations It is wrong to keep out a nation which is a Pm<er 
in the world today and which we must admit is going to be a greater 
17 N. z. P. D. vol. 299, p42l, 12 August, 1953 
18 N.Z.P.D. vol. 299, p435, 13 August, 1953 
19 N.Z.P.D. vol. 299, p441, 13 August, 1953 
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Power in the world than it has ever be<=n". 2 0 A.H. Nordmeyer followed 
up with the declaration that the time had arrived, and indeed was past, 
when the fact of Communist government in China had to be accepted, 
however unpalatable that might be. 21 
The Opposition became more ardent champions of China in the 
1954 session of Parliament. The Geneva Conference on Korea and Indo-
China had opened in May, and China was present at the negotiations. 
The government was the first party to broach the issue with Webb's 
notable July 6 speech. The Labour Party followed his lead eagerly. 
Nash said: "I agree entirely that China should be admitted to the 
United Nations early. There should be no qualification now that 
armistice principles are operative in Korea 11 • 22 Nash appeared to 
have been greatly impressed by manifestations of a new conciliatory 
spirit in China's international relations. He was eager to believe 
in Chou En-lai • s sincerity and for the West to respond to the new 
Chinese attitude. 
After a survey of the international scene, the Leader of 
the Opposition confessed to seeing "one ray of light", and that 
came from Chou En-lai. Nash referred to the treaty concluded 
between China and India some weeks previously, which had enunciated 
the so-called Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. Nash cited 
them to the House, presumably as evidence of China's good intentions. 
The Leader of the Opposition then quoted Chou .as saying that big nations 
and small could peacefully co-exist on the basis of the five principles.2 3 
20 N. Z.P.D. vol. 299, p460, 13 August, 1953 
21 N.Z.P.D. vol. 299, p466, 13 August, 1953 
22 N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, p219, 6 July, 1954 
23 N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, p214 and pp217-218, 6 July, 1954 
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Nash seemingly dismissed Formosa as a constraint on recognition 
of the People's Republic. "1'he administration allegedly operating as 
the government of the Chinese people from Formosa has no relation to 
or jurisdiction over the people of China". There was no thought of 
a two-China policy at all. Nash wanted Formosa taken over by the 
United Nations, and the United Nations to determine whether the 
Formosans should be ruled by Chiang Kai-shek or not. 
At least one prominent Labour member, Mathison, was inclined 
to disagree with Nash's dismissal of the Nationalist Chinese govern-
ment on Formosa. 
"From the information supplied to us by 'Free' China it 
appears to me that the government there has done a remarkably 
good job. There is testimony that the Formosans are probably 
better looked after today than at any time in their history. 
I believe there is room for both governments. Formosa could 
constitute an entirely separate country and could seek 
individual representation in the United Nations 11 • 24 
Mathison•s major point, however, was a reiteration that recognition 
of the People's Republic· was necessary to divorce China from the 
Soviet Union. 
"Our continued refusal to recognise facts as they are .. is 
inevitably persuading China to go closer and closer to 
Russia, which is at the present time giving very great 
technical assistance in the effort to industrialise China 
and lift up the standard of living of her people". 
When Defence Minister Macdonald challenged the assumption that 
recognition "'Ould make China friendlier to the !vest, by quoting the 
example of Britain's poor relations with China, the Labour member had 
a ready answer. 
"I can understand China's reaction to the persistent refusal 
to recognise her in the United Nations. I think we would 
react in exactly the same \vay . • • I believe China could be 
persuaded to play a much more important part alongside the 
Western naticns if we ~rould only use our endeavours to have 
24 N.Z.P.D. vel. 303, p228, 6 July, 1954 
her included in the United Nations and brought away from 
the Soviet bloc, to \;hich she is obviously attached, not 
because of cultural relationships, but purely because of 
political and economic relationships. I believe those 
relationships can be broken any time''. 2 5 
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A.H. Nordmeyer did not think that the attitude of the United 
States should be any constraint on New Zealand's acting on the 
matter of China's admission to the United Nations. 
"It is • . . a matter to be deplored that certain influential 
opinion in the United States has indicated that, if the 
admission of China to the United Nations does in fact take 
place, a strong move \vill be made to induce the United 
States to depart from the United Nations. I think that 
would be a very undesirable and regrettable state of 
affairs, but on the other hand, I do not think a threat of 
that kind should induce any government tha·t felt it was 
the right thing to admit communist China to the United 
Nations to refrain from taking the action that seemed right". 2 6 
Mason, too, attacked deference to American views. He conceded 
that "we have to recognise •. that with China there are great emotional 
difficulties in America11 , but he saw American China policy as 
unrealistic and counter-productive. 
n it is difficult to accommodate ourselves to a position 
that offers no hope for the future ••• it does not lead us 
to any result. Are we to go on till the crack of doom "'ith 
two parties always antagonistic? •.. That attitude has no 
aim and consequently cannot secure the sympathy of other 
peoples for very long" • 
While it would probably have done little good recognising 
China previously because of its attitude, Mason said, 
"the Attorney-General [webb] ... has said that the 
representative of China [at the Geneva Conference] is in a 
conciliatory mood and «ants to try to come to some under-
standing. With that, I believe the affair takes on an 
entirely different complexion ..• When we have that desire 
to co-operate ... then we must do something to reciprocate 
China is certainly a great nation. It is impossible to 
discuss Asian affairs without reference to the Chinese" .. 27 
25 Ibid. 
26 N.Z.P.D. val. 303, p261, 7 July, 1954 
27 N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, p257, 7 July, 1954 
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Nordmeyer supported Hathison's vie» that China should be 
recognised so that the Soviet Union's influence over China could be 
reduced. The example of Yugoslavia, Nordmeyer believed, held out 
the hope that the strategy might work. 
" in spite of the. fact that the country as a whole has 
embraced a Communist form of government, it has seen fit 
to break with Russia •.• Although Communism may be, and 
probably is, very well established in China, it does not 
necessarily follow that China and Russia will, for military 
purposes at any rate, be regarded as one. If China can be 
wooed away from Russia, then that »ill be to the advantage 
of the free world". 
Not all in the Labour Party took a hopeful view of the benefits 
of coming to terms with China. P.G. Connolly disagreed with his 
colleagues on both the possibility of separating China and the 
Soviet Union, and on the practicality of ignoring American opinion. 
"It appears to me that it is now impossible to drive a wedge 
between those two nations, for they have mutual non-aggression 
pacts, .. and the leaders of China today •.• have been devout 
Communists for more than thirty years ..• There are very 
strong ties between those two countries, and I believe they 
are being consolidated day by day. I cannot see how the action 
proposed by the Minister [Webb] can be put into effect". 2 8 
As for American opinion, Connolly believed that attention had to be 
paid to the consequences of ignoring it. 
"The mere fact of saying that consideration is being given 
to China's admission is, I think, of minor importance compared 
to the reaction of other nations, and especially of the United 
States". 
Connolly evidently went along with the National Party members 
in believing that New Zealand could not make a decision in isolation 
oblivious of its long-term effects in other, more important, policy 
areas. vfuereas Nordmeyer put principle first, Connolly thought the 
practical effect of a potential New Zealand action was much more 
important. He wanted to know how the government was going to deal 
28 N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, p281, 8 July, 1954 
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with the inevitable American 1:eaction. Connolly also wanted to know 
if the Minister ;.;ras proposing a definite policy change by Net·l Zealand 
or not .. 
The Deputy-leader of the Party, C.E,. Skinner~ spoke up in 
favour of recognition as a practical way of helpi!:g to solve "the many 
complicated problems with which international affairs in the East are 
surrounded11 • 29 
Speaking in September on the China issue, Nash agreed \'lith Hathison 
and Nordmeyer in believing that the c:ultivation of China could deprive 
the soviet Union of pernicious influence ov8r that country. The party 
leader then went on to say that he thought that 0::1e of the West's major 
difficulties was caused by the fact that China was outside the Uni:Oed 
Nations. 
11 What the quaJ.if·ications should be for he.r to come into the 
United Nations I am not concerned about for the moment, but 
the sooner l.V"e get her in the better it t.·lill be. In a \\~orld of 
2,400 million people, you cannot keep a natio~ of 600 million 
out of the United Nations ana expect to get the results you 
want to achieve. l'le on this side of the House support in 
general the policy of the United Kingdom government". 30 
In September, 1954, British Labour leader Attlee visited Ne\'7 
Zealand after a >ridely-publicised tour of China. Attlee was a firm 
advocate of recognition. At a press conference held after a State 
luncheon given by Prime Minister Holla~d and the Cabinet, Attlee 
claimed that the British Labour Party mission to Russia and China haC 
eased tension between East and West. It could be further relieved by 
recognition of the Peking regime, he said, but he could not say whether 
the United States would accept it. "To think that you can have no 
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The month after Attlee's visit, the Labour Party released its 
election manifesto for 1954. It was revealed that party policy was 
"to press for the admission to the United Nations of all established 
sovereign governments" as well as to 11 support the recognition of the 
de facto Chinese government" .. 32 
The party's policy corunittee had decided that a positive 
attitude towards china would not be received unfavourably by the 
electorate in the more relaxed international atmosphere that followed 
the successful conclusion of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China. 
The mood towards China had mellowed to such an extent that Labourites 
felt that they could advance the cause of recognition without the 
danger of being tarred by the pro-Communist brush. 33 
Significantly for its later policy in government, the party 
promised only to 11 press11 for China's admission to the United Nations, 
not to vote for it. Similarly, there was no firm declaration of 
intent to recognise China diplomatically, only a pledge to support 
recognition. The Labour Party's policy in 1972 was to be much more 
definite. The 1954 platform did not promise New Zealand initiatives 
outside an alliance context: it pledged advocacy of a cause. 
In the general election of November, 1954, the Labour Party 
failed to regain power, but it recovered the parliamentary strength 
it had lost in 1951. 
The end of 1954 and beginning of 1955 saw Communist China "spoil" 
the Geneva atmosphere by launching an attack on the Nationalist-held 
Off-shore islands in the Taiwan Strait. Despite this development, and 
32 O.D.T. October 20, 1954, pl 
33 Bruce Brown, Private Secretary to Nash, Interview, 24.1.75 
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possibly because of it, Labour Parliamentarians continued to press 
China's case for international recognition strongly in the 1955 
session of Parliament. 
Opposition leader Nash restated his plea that China should be 
admitted to the United Nations. 
"The Prime Minister adrnits that one body is in charge of the 
mainland of China. It is farcical to imagine that Chiang 
Kai-shek is representing China at the United Nations. He is 
not. Out of the 600,000,000 Chinese, 8,000,000 or 9,000,000 
in Formosa are taking the part of China in the United Nations. 
That is not fair. It does not make sense 11 .. 34 
As for Formosa, Nash reaffirmed that it was historically part 
of China, but that circumstances were such that "the question of 
occupancy by the Communist section is wrong and will do harm". The 
locrj c:al thing to do would be to follow the advice of Pearson of Canada: 
neutralise Formosa completely and ensure that Chiang Kai-shek's forces 
were protected, and ultimately give the Formosans some chance to say 
what they wanted to do with regard to their o~~ island. 
Nash had noted in his preparation for the International Affairs 
debate that while there would be no easy solutions to the problems 
posed by Communist China's presence in Asia, there were steps that 
could be taken to help, and the first among these was the recognition 
of China and her admission to the United Nations Organisation. This, 
he wrote, would do much to relieve tensions by reducing Chinese 
truculence as well as by recognising reality. Facing realities and 
dealing with them ~las not appeasement, but practical statesmanship. 35 
34 N.Z.P.D. vol. 305, pp36-37, 24 Harch, 1955 
35 Nash Papers, Bundle 132 
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Deputy-leader Skinner also saw the cause of peace in the Far East 
as the pressing reason for the recognition of China. 
"When I was in Korea . • • we spoke to people who had spent 
practically all their lives in the Far East •.. They were 
sure there would be no peace in the Far East until the 
Communist government \-"laS recognised11 • 36 
When National's E.H. Halstead objected that Skinner's visit to Korea 
had been two years previously, when the Korean War was still on, Skinner 
said that he felt even more strongly at the current moment that there 
was no chance of a lasting peace until the Chinese government was 
included in the United Nations. China should have been recognised in 
1953, he said, when it would have had more effect, but it was not too 
late now. 
P.G. Connolly, perhaps surprisingly in view of his attitude the 
previous year, followed up the point. "Most thinking people would 
agree that admission of Communist China is inevitable, and in my opinion 
the sooner the better. I think it would relieve a lot of tension that 
exists today in that area". 37 
Nordmeyer, too, seized the theme: "l·le on this side of the House 
believe .•• that it is imperative for the peace of the world that the 
present de facto government of China should be recognised, and that 
China should be admitted to the United Nations". 38 
Some Labour Party speakers attacked the Prime Minister's determin-
ation to avoid jeopardising friendly relations with the United States 
over the China issue. Hathison's condemnation, however, was not so 
36 N.Z.P.D. vol. 305, p60, 29 March, 1955 
37 N.Z.P.D. vol. 305, p96, 30 March, 1955 
36 N.Z.P.D. vol. 305, pl44, 31 March, 1955 
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much of New Zealand's taking an independent line as of its following 
the wrong leader. 
"Does this mean in fact that our foreign policy on the 
admission of China to the United Nations is not governed by the United 
Kingdom but by the United States of America?". 39 Mathison said that 
he would be surprised if the United States were offended if New Zealand 
expressed an opinion that differed publicly from its o~n. The United 
States, he claimed, had not been offended by the United Kingdom's 
disagreements with American policy. 
"Why should we not advocate the admission of China just because 
a few Americans such as Senator Knowland and Mr Dulles do not 
like China? Unless America is going to agree to everything we 
want to do, we cannot do it~ Is that the position?" 
A new Labour member of Parliament, J.M. Deas, also rebuked the 
government for following the lead of the United States rather than 
that of Britain. The question of whose judgement was to be deferred 
to was apparently almost as important as the substance of the judgement. 
"Have we here in New Zealand .• acted wisely in refusing to 
recognise the Peking government, in refusing to accept the 
lead of Britain ... ?" 40 
Deas went on to ask whether the Korean War would have occurred if China 
had been in the United Nations and had been generally accepted by the 
West. He said that it was not too late for New Zealand to make amends, 
and that Ne11 Zealand should be more concerned about the loss of Chinese 
goodwill than the loss of American goodwill. 
" ••• 11ould it not be less dangerous if we took the view that it 
is better not to offend 500,000,000 Chinese people? 
39 N.Z.P.D. vol. 305, pl07, 30 March, 1955 
~ 0 N.'Z.P.D. vol. 305, p40l, 19 April, 1955 
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We are assured of the co-operation and goodwill of the American people, so they tell us, and they have proved it. VIe have not had the co-operation of the 500,000,000 Chinese people or their government ..• ". 
After Parliament had recessed, it was reported by the press 
that a Labour member of Parliament, w.w. Freer, who had been travelling 
abroad since December, had managed to gain entry to China and would be 
in Peking for May Day. Freer, however, was evidently not an emissary 
for his party. The Leader of the Opposition expressed surprise at 
news of the visit. 41 
Freer was one of the younger, more radical members of the 
parliamentary party. He had advocated the minority view that China 
should be recognised before the Korean Vlar was over. On his return 
from China later in the year, Freer told a university political group 
that there were few signs that China intended infiltrating through 
Asia. He said: 
"Communism is there to stay; we have to learn to get on with her. Only by doing this can there be a basis of reconciliation between the two ideals, and until >Je do, we must agree to differ or face the future without hope". 4 2 
At the thirty-ninth Labour Party Conference in May, 1955, a 
remit to admit the Chinese People's Republic to the United Nations 
was again put before the delegates. It included a recommendation that 
Formosa be returned to Peking. The Policy, Industry, Commerce and 
Defence Committee readily endorsed the section relating to China's 
admission to the United Nations, but it rejected the call for the 
41 O.D.T. May 2, 1955, p4 
42 O.D.T. October 3, 1955, pB 
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return of Formosa to Peking. Instead, the Committee recommended that 
the conference support a new Fonnosa clause reading "that Formosa 
be placed under a United Nations Trusteeship for the purpose of deter-
mining their future by vote of the people of Formosa". 43 This, of 
course, was the parliamentary party's rather impractical line, and 
reflected the influence of moderate Members of Parliament on the 
Conuni ttee. 
When Parliament resumed for 1955's second session, the case 
for China in the united Nations was still being actively pushed by 
Labour members. Mathison noted with disapproval that American 
Secretary of State Dulles had moved again that the question of 
Chinese representation be deferred. 
"We affirm, and we have repeatedly affirmed, that one of the 
things that would relieve tension in the East more quickly 
than anything else would be the recognition of Red China. 
We have always argued that, if we are to have a United Nations 
Organisation at all, all nations should be in it. we firmly 
believe that if all nations are represented there will be a 
far better prospect of maintaining world peace than there would 
by the definite and deliberate exclusion of some major powers". 114 
Freer agreed that the isolation and containment of China was 
counter-productive: 
"There can be no assurance of peace, nor can there by any 
sincere approach to achieving peace, when one-quarter of the 
world's total population is locked out from the very council 
which will decide the fate of mankind •.. 
We must learn to co-operate with the Communists. 
believe that peaceful co-existence can and must be 
I firmly 
achieved" . 4 5 
Carr thought that New Zealand would be encouraging "international 
amity and concord by taking this big step of giving China her rightful 
43 N.Z.L.P. Report of the 39th Annual Conference, p33 
44 N.Z.P.D. val. 306, pl062, 21 July, 1955 
45 N.Z.P.D. vol. 306, pl667, ll August, 1955 
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place in the councils of the world". 46 
A new Labour member, P.N. Holloway, condemned National Party 
members :!'or sitting back and saying that China had to earn its passage 
back into the community of nations. He said that the negotiations in 
Indo-China could not have been brought about without the help of the 
government of Communist China, and that that had been a degree of earn-
ing its passage back that the whole world had appreciated. Holloway 
urged that New Zealand cast off the constraint of American opinion and 
say what it thought. 
11 Some people consider that too much attention is, perhaps, 
being paid to the views of othe.r nations with vlhom we are 
friendly, and that we shall not consider that China has 
earned her passage back until those nations have said so". 4 7 
The ·theme of no subservience to the Americans was reiterate::d in 
the 1956 parliamentary session by Mathison, who said that while the 
concern of the Americans for China's admittance to the United Nations 
was appreciated, "surely we do not have to follow slavishly everything 
America does or says. It would be very dangerous if we did". 4 8 
Mathison said that the difficulties associated vdth China's exclusion, 
particularly in South-east Asia, were greater than any difficulties 
associated with her inclusion. Nash in that session said: "It is 
time we conceded that China is governed by the men approved by the 
people of China ••• we should be recognising the men who are governing 
China II 49 
It was in the 1956 session that a National Member of Parliament 
raised the question of the propriety of visits to China, in connection 
46 N.Z.P.D. vol. 306, pl064, 21 July, 1955 
47 N. Z.P.D. val. 306, pl065, 21 July, 1955 
48 N. Z.P.D. vol. 309, p944, 8 August, 1956 
49 N. Z.P. D. vol. 309, p894, 7 August, 1956 
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with a group of Ne>J Zealanders who had been invited to go to China in 
April. Several Labour members made it plain that in their vie>J any 
contacts between China and New Zealand could only be positive steps 
towards a general improvement of international relations. Hathison 
said he thought that Freer's visit to China had been a very good idea, 
and that he hoped the time would come >Jhen the Hinister of External 
Affairs >Jould also visit Peking and try to establish better relation-
ships bet>Jeen China and the SEATO signatories in particular. 5° 
F. Kitts said: 
"I think an essential job of any government •• is to develop 
harmonious relationships with all the nations of the vmrld • ; 
particularly with China and the nations which are in association 
with Russia ••. the greater the exchange of visits between this 
country and Russia, China, or any other nation, the better .. " 51 
Included in the group of Ne>J Zealanders visiting Peking that 
year >Jas university lecturer and former foreign correspondent in China 
James Bertram, who had spoken with Nash on the China question before 
he left. Bertram was asked by Chou En-lai when New zealand would 
recognise China, and Chou was told that while the current National 
Party government was opposed to diplomatic recognition, the Labour 
Party's views were very different. If the Labcur Party were to '~in 
the comir .. g election, Bertram said, "I think it is possible that New 
Zealand support for Peking representation in the United Nations, and 
for direct recognition of the People's government, may follow". 5 2 
Bertram's opinion of a Labour government's line of action on China 
50 N.Z.P.D. vol. 308, p622, 2 May, 1956 
51 N.Z.P.D. vol. 308, pl56, 12 April, 1956 
52 Bertram, J. "Re-turn to China", p89 
124. 
was very guarded. It was only "possible", not "probable 11 , or "certain", 
that Labour would advocate recognition in office. It may be concluded 
that Nash was not prepared to give an assurance to the Chinese that 
China would be recognised by a Labour government. This apparently 
newly cautious attitude was reflected in the fact that support for the 
recognition of the People's Republic and for its amnission into the 
United Nations did not appear in the policy manifesto for the 1957 
general election. The party went into the election campaign of that 
year technically uncommitted to recognise China should it win. Thee-
retically, the fact that recognition was left out of the manifesto 
meant that this plank was no longer party policy, since in New Zealand, 
unlike in Australia, the party platform does not include semi-permanent 
planks of a specific nature. 53 
The Labour Party constitution of the time said: "The policy 
submitted to the electors in the manifesto shall be the official policy 
of the party until the next manifesto is issued". 5 4 Certainly the 
omission of the China recognition clause was deliberate, rather than 
an oversight. Bruce Bro>m, who was Nash's private secretary at the 
time, recalled in 1975 that the 1957 manifesto deliberately made no 
mention of China recognition or of support for China's entry into the 
United Nations. 5 5 The abandonment of China in the manifesto was, 
however, a tactical move rather than a reflection of any change in party 
outlook. Labour thought it had a good chance to win in 1957, but it 
suspected - correctly, as it turned out - that the election would 
53 Kelston, R.N. "The Private MerlilJer of Parl-iament", plB 
54 
New Zealand Labour Party, Consti-tut-ion and Rules as Amended at the 
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nevertheless be a cliff-hanger. 5 6 After the Formosa Straits Crisis 
of early 1955, and trouble in Tibet in 1956, there were no votes in 
the China. issue, and the party needed all the votes it could get. 
It believed that it could not afford to put forward any possibly 
controversial policy planks. 57 The mood of goodwill towards China 
that had prevailed immediately after the Geneva Conference, and t<hich 
had spurred the Labour Party's enthusiasm for recognition, had 
dissipated by 1957. There was hardly any mention of China in the 
1957 parliffinentary session. 
Labour, however, was committed in principle to recognition, 
and once the party had been elected, it was reasonable to suppose 
that, all things being equal, it would follow through on its declarat-
ions of earlier years. 
Conclusion 
During the period up to the 1957 election, the Labour Party 
had gradually adopted a position on the diplomatic recognition of 
China distinctively different from that of the National government. 
From the 1949 election to the onset of the Korean War, the Labour 
Party joined the National government in its suspicion of the new 
Chinese government's legitimacy and therefore acquiesced in its non-
recognition. Fraser, the party leader until December, 1950, was not 
certain that the National Government of China had not been a victim 
of Russian aggression. He had also believed that l'lestern recognition 
could have detrimental indirect effects on New Zealand's security by 
strengthening Communist insurgents in South-east Asia. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Brovm Interviet<, 24.1. 75 
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During the Korean war and after the passing of the leadership 
to Nash, the Labour Party became an advocate of the recognition of 
China. As Nash's 1952 speech in Parliament showed, the party was now 
sure that the Communist revolution in China was the legitimate expression 
of the Chinese people's wishes, and that the government was entitled to 
recognition and admission to the United Nations. The majority of 
Labour Party members, and certainly the senior ones, believed, however, 
that diplomatic recognition could not be granted while China continued 
to defy the United Nations in Korea. China had been declared an 
aggressor, and it was thus, in Labour's eyes as in National's, morally 
incumbent upon members of the United Nations to deny China the privilege 
of membership until it had ceased violating the Charter. some J_,abour 
members and ex-members advocated imnediate recognition a3 a practical 
means of ensuring a peace settlement in Korea. 
After the Korean War, Labour members could see no impediment to 
China's admission to the United Nations and urged it as a means of 
preventing further situations like Korea developing. While Nationa.l 
Party members believed that China must expunge its moral guilt, the 
Labour members adopted the pragmatic attitude that \'/estern contact 
with China would be more productive than isolating China. The party 
believed that ~crnerican disapproval should not prevent New Zealand 
from advocating what it thought was right. The party did see the 
fate of the inhabitants of Taiwan as a possible factor in complicating 
a decision to recognise, however. Labour was not prepared to ignore 
the Formosans' right to self-determination. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE SECONll LABOUR GOVERNHENT AND THE 
PROBLEM OF THE RECOGNITION OF CHINA 
Intmduetion 
The Labour Party regained power in the general election of 
November, 1957, by the narrow margin of tHo seats. The Party 
came to office committed in principle to recognising the government 
of the People's Republic of China, even if this had not been a 
specific plank in the 1957 election platform. In vie\'7 of this, it 
might have been expected that sometime during the term of the new 
government, New zealand would extend diplomatic recognition to 
China. It did not happen. In the final analysis, the government 
,found the constraints articulated by the National government as 
i 
compelling for itself. Nash was not prepared to takE> a course that 
was strongly opposed by the United States. New Zealand continued 
to urge on its allies the desirability of recognising China, but 
assured them it would not act unilaterally. The possible effects 
of Western recognition on non-commu.11ist Asia11 governments were nor..r 
appreciated by the Labour government, and Nash \·1as particularly 
concerned for Formosa~ China's policies themselves during the. 
government's term of office did nothing to help bring about a 
suitable political atmosphere for recognition. 
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On New Year's Day, 1958, Walter Nash, who had taken the 
External Affairs portfolio as "1611 as the Prime Minister's office, 
listed the foreign policy goals of the nev.• govern1uent. As has been 
noted by one scholar, a reference to policy towards the People's 
Republic of China was conspicuous by its absence from the list, 
considering the Labour Party's reiteration of the necessity for 
recognition during itsOpposition years. 1 Once in a position to 
implement its wish, the Labour Party was suddenly much more cautious. 
In eight declared aims for the coming year, the nearest Nash came to 
broaching the China question \·las his pledge to establish new diplomatic 
posts abroad 11 \'lhere necessary". 2 
A question in the House of Representatives in January broughL 
out the fact that Labour in office did not consider the recognition 
of China a matter of pressing urgency. Asked by National t s R. Hanan 
whether the Labour government intended to recognise the Chinese 
Connnunist governttlent, Nash said that recognition. had· to come sooner or 
later, but left no doub·t that as far as his government was concerned, 
it would be later. 
"The government considers that the question •. does not warrant 
precipitate action11 .. 3 
The Prime Minister said that in the world situation 
as it 't¥as at the time, the timing of any decision was uobviously a 
very delicate problem". Nash did not define the world situation, 
but was probably referring to the absence of any climate of detente. 
1 Shuker, R.G. "N. Z. Policy and Attitudes t01»arc.s Corru11u:nist China", 
unpublished M.A. Thesis, v.u.w. 1971, pl45. 
2 
E.A~R. January, 1958, plS 
3 N.Z.F.D. vol. 315, p217, January 29, 1958 
He implied t.:i1.at recognition ~ .. ~onld come durinq ·the gDvernmen·t t s term 
of cffice by assuring the Hoc.::s':! t:Ett it. \-1/~·:::·;Jld havo the chu.!lce to 
del"''1.3.to the issue 11 'Wht~h the occasion a.rises 11 • l_l1!:e Pri.me I:1inioter 
acknO\'iledge.d that the recogniticn decision ~..:as ·teo important a one 
to be taken ur:ilater::;--..lly. The fL1al deci.sio.n 1.vould be ta'l<.en "only 
afttr the fullest ccnsultation t-,~ith our a.l.J iss a..'>'ld other friendly 
cov.ntries11 • 
T!1e rig.id att.i tnde of ·t:.·le United St:.c:tes government. v-:-as the 
biggeGt obstacle to positive ac·ticn on the part of its small ally. 
Shortly a.fter assuming office, Nash ha.d approached A.D. Nclntosh. 
the SecY·etary of Ext.ernal Affairs, and told him that he wished to 
recognise the People's F.epublic. Ths Secretary said he '\-JOuld drav.; 
up a list of 2'.dvantacJeS and di::advantages of the, move for the Prime 
Mi::t:Lster to ponder. The mos'!: considerable t.1isadvantage t.·1as the 
fact that recognition of China would !!lean 11 a break \vith America". 
1
l· 
Recognition, it 't'lElS btdieved, would have been regarded as an 
m1friendly act by the United Stat,es and would have quite narkedly 
damaged relations wit,h that cotmtry at a time when New Zealand :'el t 
the need for the ffinerican alliance very strongly. 5 
Sir Arnold Nordmeyer 1 who 'ivas I~ ash's Minister of Finance, 
rememhers that the Prime. N.inister was '1very conscious of t.he fact 
that at that sta.ge British interest in this area was diminishing! 
and from a defence viei!;point it appeared as if v.~e -wuuld have to rely J 
in the event of further trouble, to a greater extent on the United 
4 Sir Alister 1-1cint.osh, Interview, ... 21. 2. 74 
5 
By·uce M .. Brown, pri:vate secretary to Nash 1 interview, 23.1. 75 
J.30. 
S-tutes tha..'1 vmuld othf!n\~ise ~ave beer. t1"1e case ~ .. ~ even though he me.y 
ha·ve personally fel·t r~.t.her strongly o.bot:.t the need t:o recognise the 
Chin•~.se gove:r:nrr,en·t, he would feel that it ~,..;auld be um,rise to ge-l:: off-
:::;ide v;ith the United States11 ~ 5 
Lc.bour had been in office j-.;st over a month when the Dni tee 
States made pt.tbl.:L.:: another sta"i:.emen"t Gf its opposition to the recog-
ni t.ion of China.~ Secretary of State D"Dl} __ es 1 e.ddressing the National 
Press Club on \Ja.."'lua:r.y 17, 1958, se.id that the Unit.ed States would 
recognise the government of China 11 anytime it Hould serve our in·terests 11 .. 
At the prA:sent time, hmt.JeveT, it did not serv~e the United Stai.:.es' 
interests tv recognise China. 7 
The attitude of the American government, and its possible 
reaction to a New Zealand recognition of China, was very much to the 
fore of the Prime Hinister's mind when he discussed recogniticn i-:ith 
the visitinq- British Prime Hinister 1 Harold Macmillan, a lit·tle later 
the same month .. 
Macmillan noted in his memoirs that some Commonv1ealth Prime 
Ministers, "particularly Nash in New Zealand", felt very s·trongly 
about the American insistence that Chiang Kai-shek's representative 
should occupy China 1 s seat on the United Nations Security Councilb 
During his visit to New Zealand, Nash e.xplained to him, 11 more than 
once and at some length11 why he wanted to recognise Corrm.nmist China,, 
r.At. the sa.1.1e time, he was very a..~xious not to offend the Uni t.ed 
t " 8 States governmen . 
6 Sir Arnold Nordmeyer, Interview, 30.5.74 
7 Domin1.:on 1 J2nua:::-y 13, 1958, pll 
9 Nacmillan, H~ ll RZ:di1-zg i:.Jze Storm 11 , p542 
' 
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~Y:lcmillan h:imseJ..f did not offer Nash a..'ly encou.rag·ement to 
pursue the rnatt.er. 11 I "'a.s obliged ~o tell him that I did net thin}: 
cur recognition r al th012gh based on sotm.d t:rc.di tion 1 had done us Inl.l.ch 
good .. Indeed, :;:-ather t ... ':.e reverst~, since we had failed .,.:c follow 11p 
recognition by supporting ·their cla.i.m to the Chinese se:~at at the. 
United. Nations"~ 
'!'he desire not to incur the ·urath of the A.rnerico.n gove:cnmcnt 
\>laS based not only on prac·tical grounds, as far as Nash was concerned 1 
hut on personal ones, tooc Nordmeyer believes that Nash's very close 
involvement ~;i th t.he Uni teet Stat.es as New Zealand 1 s awbassador tlJere 
during the Seccmd ~·lorld W&r led to h:i.s being 11 Vexy considerably influen-
ced by United Stat9G thinkingn w Nash, he feels, '\IJas "pe~csona.lly 
reluctant to take any step there might cffenC. the government"., 9 
Apart from the bi-lateral s:trains between New Zealand and 1::.he 
United States Hhich 'i'lould be set up by a uni1atc:ral recognition of 
the People's Republic, the government's advisers v-Jere concerned atoLlt 
the possible effects on the Unites states' intern~tional posi·tion of 
a New Zealand initiative on the China question w 1 0 To weaken the 
position of Ne,.; Zealand 1 s security guarantor in any way ;vould ba 
irresponsible, and for Ne>'l Zealand to go off at a tangent in this 
matte.r could be for her to stab her O\\'l!l side in the Cold war in the 
back. In b~e battle for influence in Asia between the West and the 
Cornrrru ... "'list powers, a New Zealand recognition could cause uncomr:ti tted 
nations to have doWJts about American policies. The Australian 
9 Nordmeyer, Interview, 30.5.74 
1 0 I t . ff' h ' . ' M ' ' " F ' " ~f . n erv2ew, 0 2cer, Rescarc Dlvlclon/ 11n1stry OI ore1gn ~~ a1rs, 
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~overn.Jngnt app:t:-_eciated this point~ The Aus·tralian Ninister of 
r::xternal Affairs, R. G. Casey, told the Australian House of Represen"!:.-
ativeH in t·iar.:h, 1959: 
11 The viev.r of the Australian government is that recognition by 
Australia at this timE; could be exploited by Peking in such 
ways as to affect adverseJ.y attitudes in Asian countries 
towards, and confider~ce in, United States polici8s and 
' . t' If 11 oo]ec ~ves . 
External 1\.ffairs Depa.rtment advice to Nash emphasised t.\<JO 
factors - the dama9e that. \'lou.ld be done to the Arnerican connect.iorq 
and the inutility of any diplon:atic link tc. China~ 
Mcintosh told Nash, as !1acrnillan had done 1 that Britain had 
achieved little by recognition~ The Chinese government's attitude 
was unfriendly at least partly because Britain ,,,Yould not acknowl~dge 
China 1 s sovereignty over Ta.i\~a.."J .• British represzntation had been 
confined to the Charg€ d'Affaires level~ 
no better treatment: since her position on Taiwan was similar. 
Diplomatic relations could be only imperfectly achieved. ~~nat then 
would New Zealand get out of recognition? Were ·~he country• s best 
,interests served by maintaining the friendship of the L1nited States, 
or by thJ~'O\-Jing that overboard a.'ld recognising China in an imperfect 
fashion? 12 It would be better not to grant recognition until there 
if-las some tangible political advantage to be derived from doing 
, " 
so.-.:~ 
In the existing circumstwJ.ces, Ncintosh believed, recognition 
was an unrealistic option. P. ... change in New Zealand' s China policy 
11 Commonwealth Pa.PZiomentar'd Debates 1 House of Representatives, 
vol. 24, pl96, 13 August, 1959' 
12 !-1cintosh Intervie..,, 21.2.74 
1 3 Interview Officer,. Research Divisionr I-1inistry of Foreign Affairs 
should only be maGe: in the co11t:ext. of a changed China policy by Jche 
whole ~·~est.e:t:n alliax1ce ~ Tl:.at, in turn, \<JaS dependent upon a cbange 
in the utt.itude of thE'! Onited States~ 
n In my viev: t it depended on the l-ilnericans .. _ there v1as no 
point. in the rest of us mOiling unless and until Iunerica 
8ho~-;ed a dir;po.sition to mo\7'8 11 ~ 14 
Ne'\•l /jealand t s tack r therefore, should be to try and modify 
The~ government could do i:.his by constar.o.-L:ly expressing· 
r:evi Zealand v s belief in the need :for a chanqe, a:ad by enlisting the 
aid of othex· allies \';ho held similar views - such. a.s Canada - in making 
In ti1ne 1 I~ie.;·l Zeal2nd nligbt be able to slo~ .. lly 
erode the hardline .Psr.erican pcsiticn~ 15 
A mE~morandum \·,Titt.en in ?.ugust, 1958, and k":!pt by Nztsh, :r.-eit:erated 
t-hat advice. 
11 Jt is obvious i:hat at this stage New Zealand <;,~ould do mo:r:e hai."'tQ 
than g-ood by unilateral recogTd.tio;.;_ and/or by voting for the 
admission of Comnunist China to th'3 United Nations ..• the 1:1ost 
profitable approach, even if long •..2:::t;awn out,. appears t:o be one 
of persuading the Uni·ted States to revise her a·ttitude, on 
practical as v.;ell as e·thical grou.nrls 11 • 
The memorandum continued: 11 Apart £~om the a.daxnant opposition of 
individual American statesmen to the recognitj_on of China, perhaps the 
bi9gest sturr:bling block is P..raerican public opinion: itself very 
efficiently moulded by past and present administrations for policy 
reasons. If the United States government can first be privately 
persuaded to admit the desirability of accepting th_e Chinese Communis-t 
government, sufficjent time must. be given it to recondition Americcm 
public opinion before making any overt move to~.,,·ards rec•:tgni tion 11 • 1 G 
1 
tt Ncint.osl: IntervL::'!\V 
1 5 Intervie1:·1, Officer r Hesearch Di·.,rision, Hinistry of I'ore:Lgn Affairs 
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Th~ cntho-:: of the Hh?norandum believed that the practical grounds 
on '\•;hie:h China. had to be recognised vvcre that non-recognition and non-
ad.rnission to the United Nations •.vere s·trengthening Russian ties with 
China, ··1hich V!as not good for the comfort and security of the free 
world~ These ties, the officer held, YJere not natural. Inherently, 
the Russian-Chinese relationship had ultimately to develop into one of 
mutual suspicJon and distrust, since neither could envisage being a 
satellite of the o-t:her. l1G long as China had no direct voice in 
\..;orld councils, it vJould speak and act in close collaboration \'lith 
Russia. When China had a voice, through increased diplomatic 
recognition and admission to the United Nations, it \.'lould have less 
need of Russian go c .... offices~ 
Prime Hinister Nash V,"as thus confronted Hi th a choice going 
ahe.ad as per party policy or bo\·7ing t:.o departmental advice a Nash 
could not make up his mind 1 7 - a charac-t.eristic he \•lCLS noted for .. 
He decided to think t:he matter over, v,.rhich was tantarnount to a 
negative decision. In later years 1 he was to blame the Secre·tary 
of External Affairs for having stopped him recognising China the 
moment the party came into office. 18 
The I..~a.bour goverlli-nen·t had no suppo~t in the matter from its 
other rr.ain ally, Jl.ustralia. The government there \Vas of a different 
political colour and not interested in opening relations \vith China~ 
In !-1arch, 1958 1 Nash attended the South-·east Asia rrreaty 
Organisation' 3 conf,~rence at I•lanila, and here he \'las reminded 
17 Ncintosh :Cntervie\v 21. 2. 74 
l£! Ibido 
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forceft:J.Iy of J:...nr;-~:rican policy on China~ 
J;merican Se..:::reta.ry of St~ate ~John Foste:r Dulles said "'chat it 
was "csse.rr~lal" t.hat 1.:b.e free v,ror1d should stand finn and united, 
nnot. tryi.nc; to buy peace by conceding to cor..r11unist impe:;:ialism the 
victories that. \-Jould enhance ito prestige and prolong the reac-tionary 
and abhorrent aspect:s of its life'1 ~ 19 
VJheiJ. Dulles spol;:e of victo:c:i.es that Hould enhance China 1 s 
prestige, he meant diplomatic recognition. A State Department 
explanation of &-:1erican China policy issued in August, 1958, claimed 
t.hat I! the: !'::.xtension of diplomatic recognition by a Great Pov;er 
no~nally c;::s:-rics ~;ith it enhanced intBrnat:ional standing and prestige. 
Denial of recognition, on the ot;her hand1 is. a positive ha.ndicc,_p 
to i:he regime affect.ed 11 2(/ 
At this mee~cing, Nasb seems t.o have followed External Affairs 
advice on tactics by urging t.hat China be. recognised -:;.,ithout saying 
that Hew Zealand '''ould go ahe.:;:,.d c:::.nd grant recognition on its or.-1111~ 
Casey, the Australian l<!in.ist.er of External Affairs, noted in his diary 
that 
11 Nash ~ e. indicated to the Council that he did not pl:opose 
to rush into 'che recognition of Conununist. China 1 though he 
thm.1ght such action was inevitable sooner or lateru. 21 
After his arri 1..ral in Hong Kong 1 following the SEA'I·O meeti?1g, 
Nash declared that he had learnt much >~both here and in Nanila11 
that \;'ould help thG government to decide its policy on the recognition 
of Red China, act.ion ';.o?hich .i.t ha,.:l sough~c '\'h:Lle in opposition~ The 
------------· 
19 Depa.r•tment of 8"f;ate. Bul.Ze-t:in (D. 0. S,. B~), Harch 31, 1958 i p508 




streng·:_:.h of the cotmter-argrnnents was implicitly ackno\.;rledged by the 
Prime Minister's allov;ance that "all the ramifications would have to 
be debated before such a step was taken". 22 Asked his opinion of 
JJ1.1lles 1 anti-Peking recognition remarks in HaniJ.a, Nash conceded that 
Dulles had put: fon1ard 11 a clear, firm argumentn, but added that ''that 
does not mean it \•dl1 change my mind". 2 3 Indeed, the Prime Hinister 
used the occasion to make a further declaration of principle .. uThe 
Pekb1g government ought to be recognised as the governing body of 
China" 1 he stated. 
on Nash at Manila. 
Nevertheless, Dulles had made a great impression 
The two had got on tremendously well, and 
although Nash regarded Dulles as a conservative, the New Zealand Prime 
!tinister had great respect for the AL-r:.erican and 'V!rould not disregard 
An indicat:i.on that Nash had, as casey's diary 
reccrdsf put 2.side any thoughts of i..'tlmediate recogrdtion came i.·rhen the 
Prime Minister raised the possibility of extending trade with mainland 
iChina nwithout necessarily involving recognition of the Peking go·v·ern-
ment11 8 25 Asked on his return to New Zealand whether he had any 
specific proposals to put before Parliwuent on the recognition issue, 
he admitted t:hat he had not. "I have not changed my mind that the 
mainland govern..Ttlent should be recognised .s.s tl"l€ government, but we 
want to discuss every a.t1gle before we take action". 2 6 A radio inter-
vie\-:er put the question to the Prime Minister again~ "Having come 
back from this tour, ~1ould you like to say anything about the 
possibility of our recognition of the People's Republic of China?" 
22 0. D. T. ~.arch 17, 1958, pl 
2 3 O.D.T. Ma!"ch 18, 1958, pl 
2~ Mcintosh Interview 21.2.74 
25 O.D.T. March 17, 1958, pl 
26 0. D. T. April 3, 1958, p2 
137. 
Nash replied: 
11 NO.. He said at the election 1 and I repeat it no'i.V" r that 
the People's Governrr"ent of China s!!ould be recognised as 
the govern~ent. of China and ,.,-e 1·1ill consider the best "t\•ays 
and means of removing any di.fficul·ties in the ~Nay of doin'J 
that.. But. there are difficulties that must be consider·ed 
befor.e He t.ake the final step .. . Ne will do all we can to 
ensure What we think ought to be Cone to bring it about at 
the earli·=st possible moment11 • 2 7 
Some roembers of the pa~liamentary party \<Jere impatient for 
action on the China issue. W. 't'L Freer had asked ·the Prime I"'inist~er 
in Parliament in January to make an early statement on the government's 
attitude to the Peoplets.Republic, "so that the policy of this csuntry 
will conform to that of the Uni~ced Kingdom11 .. 2 8 According to one 
scholar, Caucus was trying to put pressure on Nash to recognise China 
throughout the three years of the Labour government. 29 Cabinet 1 
however, was solid for the Nash line, 3 0 and as Ministers bulk larger 
in a small majority, the Prime Minister could not have been grently 
worried. The China recognition issue vms never formally brought 
before Cabinet by any Minister, leaving Nash to determine policy. 3 1 
As far as the rest of Cabinet was concerned, Chi_na was a very lov 
priority at a time of economic crisis. The burning question of early 
1958 was the state of the economy and the measures to be taken to 
correct it, and a Cabinet under pressure in this field had no time to 
pressure Nash on foreign affairs issues. Nordmeyer recalls: "We were 
very much involved in domestic policy. Foreign policy, therefore, did 
27 Nash Papers B2336 N.Z.B.S. Interview with ~'le PM 3.4.58 
28 N.Z.P.D. val. 315, p218, 29 January, 1958 
29 Mitchell, A. V. "Caucus: 'i'he New Zealand Parliru'"!lentary Parties" in 
Journal of Commom""'eaZth Poli#caZ Studies 
30 Mathison, .:r. pers. com1.n. 9.5* 74. 
3 1 Nordmeyer Interview, 30.5.74 
!>larch, 1968, pl8 
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t b th .r- ~ .. ' th ..... ,.,...· dlf 32 no · come very muc ·" to .e :t.O:r:e aurJ.ng _ a~.- Pt'~ ..... 1.c 6 
Apart from the que.Stio:l of priorities, there was the pow~erful 
constraint of the govennnent 1 s electoral position .. La.bcur ha.d 
squeaked into po\vex· witt. a majority of t.i.vo, so could claim no mandate 
for radical changes 6 It didnot feel itself in a position to make 
unpopular moves t.h.at would lose it votes a": the next election. After 
the so-called "Black Budget11 of June, 1958, the government's populaJ:-i ty 
was already in decline. Nordmeyer recalls: 
nchina didn't rank in importance at that tiine, because .. '1-'.rith a 
majority of cne we were deeply concerned abou·t the Ne't'l ZeaJ.and 
political attitude and we had a ra-ther sensitive ear to the 
ground at that stage". ~ 3 
The Lab~ur Party conference in May approved a recommendation 
to the government that it "should seek an early opportunity to give 
effect to party policy in respect to the recogn:i;'tion of the Chine.se 
1
People's government". 34 A radica.l and a conservative amenili--nent wE::re 
I proposed to the China remit, but each failed to be adopted. A 
representative of the Wellington Labourers' Union moved that ~~e 
remit. read that the government seek an early opportu.'1ity to give 
effect to the party's China policy, consis·teut with New Zealand's 
obligations to the free peoples of Asia. 35 In other words, the 
government shou:!..d not move on the recognition issue until the free 
states of Asia >Jere satisfied that such a step would not harm them. 
conference would have none of the qualification. Equally, though, 
32 Ibid. 
33 Nordrr.eyer IntervieN, 30.5. 74. The Labour government's effective 
majority >;·las one, after the provision of a Speaker .. 
34 Ne" Zealand Labour Paxty-Report of the 42nd Annual Conferenee p32 
es The Ne•.-J Zealand Labour Party Repo1•t of the 42nd Annual Confe1•ence pJl 
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conference "VJas not prepared to force the government's hand. A 
second amendment proposed that the Chinese People's Republic be 
recognised uwithin the life of the present parliament" 35 'rhis 
too was voted down. 
Nash himself, in delivering the repor'c of the parliamentary 
party, did not touch directly on the China issue at all.. Obliquely 
hQ'I'Rever, he took a swipe at Jl.. merican policy on China which was 
dictating the attitudes of its allies. 
"In what might be termed the post-Sputnik era of the nuclear 
a9e, \'o:re could be in some d2.nger of becoming imprisoned in 
fixed conceptions of policy that have come to bear increasingly 
little relation with reality.. It is salutary to remember that 
in international affairs, 'all things flow, and there is nothing 
constant but change'" .. 37 
In August and September 1958 an international crisis develope.d 
when the Chinese Communists began an artillery bombardment of the 
Nationalist-held islands just offshore from the coast of Fukien 
province. The capture of these islands was regarded as a necessary 
preliminary to the invasion of the major Nationalist stronghold on 
E'ormosa. The United States goverr..ment, committed to the defence of 
Formosa, implied that it 'wuld help the Nationalists defend the islands. 
The crisis domina·ted the international affairs debate in the New 
Zealand parliament in September, 1958. 
Labour members expressed a certain arnolli•t of sympathy for China's 
claim to the offshore islands, while at the same time being disturbed 
by China's readiness to use force to solve disputed questions. 
36 Ibid. p32 
37 Ibid. p22 
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The Prime Ninist.er recognised that the crisis had not helped 
tr.~e cause of recognition r since China was even less acceptable to 
the United States than previously. On September 11 te said: 
"As for the recognition of Communist China by the free \-lorld, 
the final solution can only come c..bout in the r:atural course 
of evolution and development, and that is a long journey". 38 
The Prime Minister did not refer to recognition by New Zealand, 
but by the free world - a further ir.dication that he saw a New Zealand 
recognition of China coming in the context of a change in attitude by 
the vlestern alliance generally, rather than unilaterally. P. .. change 
in Western attitudes depended on the evolution of .American public 
opinion and possibly also of Chinese international behaviour. It 
would thus be a "long journey11 to recognition: not something for 
the near future. 
One Cabinet member - the Attorney-General, H .. GoR. Hason 
believed that China's foreign policy should not be relevant to the 
recognition question. Speaking of a National member 1 s contribution 
to the debate, Mason said: 
"I was rather disappointed in his attitude .•• when he 
spoke of the reasons for not recognising Corrununisi: China 
- that it had been very unfriendly to neighbouring states; 
that it had taken up an aggressive attitude, that it ha.d 
been condemned by the United Nations for what it h3.d done .. " 39 
Evidently none of those reasons was considered sufficient to 
deny China recognition. The Atton1ey-General went on to say: "Will 
anyone tell us if the Chinese have been encouraged by any of the 
people condenming them to take a different course of action? .•• the 
38 N.Z.P.D. vol. 318, pl721, September 11, 1958 
39 Ibid. pl743 
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point is hcK little disf-osition there .is to look at ~~e rnatter frora 
o~'1er people's poin·t of vie'\·1 11 • 
Nason 'i.'ll'as one of the I.ra})our members who tended to see a cause-
and-effect relationship between continued denial of recog:r..ition and 
China's apparent aggressivenesso 
W~W. Freer was quick to seize en the fact that China had shown 
a willingness to negotiate wi·th the United States on the Formosa 
Straits issue, as proof of her suitabili"".:y for United Nations member-
ship. He bl1mtly asked the Prime Hinister whether he \--rould instruct 
New Zealand's delegate to the United Nations to support China's 
admission to that body in view of L~e offer of "the Prime ¥~nister cf 
China to negotiate with the united States, and oJ' the fact that China 
had been excluded from t.he United Nations in the past because some 
nations thought that she would resort to force in the settlement of 
disputes rather than negotiation. 
Nash replied: 
"The government does not consider, having ·regard to the 
almost continuous bombardment 1vith heavy casualties at present, 
that this is an appropriate time to press the issue with r.e.gard 
to the representation of China in the United Nations. Because 
of existing conditions, and ·the strong o;dnions held on both 
sides, the Nev1 Zealand government feels t...~at any move at: present 
to oust. the Nationalist Chinese and introduce the ccm..'1lur..ist 
Chinese into the United Nations woulri cause irreparable da."Tia.IJe 
to that orga.'l'lisation". 4 0 
The da;nage to the United Nations would come from a possible United 
States >Iithdrawal from that institution. Nash apparently had no 
objection to "ousting" the Nationalist Chinese from the institution, 
only to the timing of such a move. There was no suggestion at this 
40 N.Z.P.D. vol. 318, p2256, October 3, 1958 
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point that the Republic of China Has entitled to separate represent-
ation. 
In September, it had been annow1ced by the Minister of 
Industries and Co~erce, P .. N. Holloway, that "che first visit by a 
New Zealand trade officer to mainland China would be made. Hollm.;ay 
""'as quick, ho'"...;ever, to say there was no political significance in the 
visit. ;'It llill be strictly business aimed at exploring prospects 
for increasing exports" .. 
1~ 1 
In the latter part of the month, Nash embarked on a three-week 
trip to North l'.!llerica, the highpoint of .rhich was the meeting of the 
1\NZUS Council. 
On his return, reporters at Whenuapai airport asked the Prime 
Z..1in.ister: n~;:r .. at is sJcopping Nev1 Zealand from recognising the Peking 
g·overnment?" Nash replied, uNo-one is stoppin9 us .. Unforb . l.>tately 
it is not just a simple matter of just deciding to recognise thG 
Corrununist government. There are many millions of Chinese outside 
the mainland and we have to >latch that". 42 
Here for the first time in his public utterances on the 
subject, the Prime Hinister had advanced a specific constraint on 
recognition. Although Nash did not spell out the relationship of 
the Overseas Chinese to the recognition problem, it had been detailed 
in the House of Representatives the previous year by his Labour front-
bench colleague, P.G. Connolly, who was now Minister of Defence. 
41 O.D.T. Septewber 20, 1958, pl5 
42 O.D.T. October 16, 1958, pl 
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Connolly told the House that the America.Tls Vlere against any move, 
such as recognition, that gave Communist China 11 facen because of 
Jche influence that nface11 had on the Chinese minorities in South-
east Asi:a. 
lli think the policy America has been pursuing is to keep 
those ten million Chinese looking to>;ards Chiang Kai-shek •• instead 
of north\varc1s to mainland china". 4 3 
Any move which detracted from the authority of the Nationalist 
government on E'orrnosa. and added to tha.t of the Communist. government 
might increase the ability of the latter to win the allegiance of 
the overseas Chinese and thus turn them into instruments for subversion 
a9ainst governments ,,..,hich Ne\'l Zealand supported. The State Depar~~£nt 
release of August, 1958, on the subject of recognition of China had 
said: 
"Recognition of Com.rnunist China by the United States *. would 
have such a profound psychologi_cal effec·t on the overseas 
Chinese that it would make inevitable the transfer of the 
loyalties of large numbers to the Communist side. This in 
turn >IOuld undermine the ability of the host countries to 
resist pressures tending to promote the expansion of Communist 
influence and povvern. 4 4 
The Labour government, in its Defence Reyie\1 .of 1958, had made 
a commitment, like its predecessor, to the preservation of the independ-
ence of the countries of South-east Asia. The P~view had stated that 
New Zealand "recognised the importance to her own security of assisting 
the free democracies of South-east Asia to maintain the independence 
achieved since World war Tw"'"O". 4 5 Having declared an interest in the 
continuing independence of South··east Asia, the government was not 
4 3 N. z. P. D. voZ. 311, p. 47, 13 June, 195? 
44 Dept. of State BuUe-tin Sept. 8, 1958, p387 
45 Review of Defence Policy 1958 AJHR A-12, p5, paragraph 13 
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likely to make. a policy move that could adversely affect tha.t independ-· 
ence. 
The fact that the possible effect of recognition on the secm:it.y 
of New Zealand's Asian allies was a major constraint on New Zealand 
pursuing the line she desired \'las reiterated in the Prime Hinister' s 
review of foreign affairs in 1958 a couple of months later. 
"The problem of recognition of the Communist government of 
China remains one of vital irnportance 11 , 
Nash said on January 2, 1959. 
11Tl:e New Zealand government is very much aNare of the inter-
national implications of any decision to gra~t recognition. 
I believe L~at recognition is inevitable. But New Zealand 
can take this s·tep only after weighing all the factors, 
particularly regarding the effect on countries contiguous 
to mainla.TJ.d China" • 4 6 
The Prime Minister stated that the gravest crisis of the 
previous year in the Far East - apart from the shelling of Quemoy and 
Hatsu - had arisen from "the heav"Y pressure exerted by Communist China 
on neighbouring countries of Asian. The American government believec 
that recognition could affect the will of those qountries to resist 
that pressure, and Nash, it seems~was conscious of the argmnent. The 
United States State Department had declared in August, 1958, that 
11 recognition of Communist China by the United States \vould have 
an adverse effect on the other free governments of Asia 'vhich 
could be disastrous to the cause of the free ~rorld in that part 
cf the >!Orld. 
Those nations which are closely allied to the United States 
and are striving to maintain their independence on the perimeter 
of Chinese Communist power, especially in Korea and Vie~ra~, 
would be profo~~dly concerned and demoralised. Tbey would 
interpret such action as abandonment of their cause by the 
United States 11 • 47 
46 E.A.R. January, 1959, pl2 
47 s D.O .. B. Sept~nber 8, 1958, p387, col. 1 
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In February, 1959, Nash paid an official visit to Japan • 
. During a 1ithorough and exhaustive exchange of views 11 with Japanese 
leaders at Osaka, Nash outlined the New Zealru,d goverrunent's policy 
towards Communist China. The Prime Minister reiterated that the 
Peking government should be recognised, but this time revealed two 
fl>rther constraints on action by the Labour government. He said that 
the consequenc<S of recognition, such as the effect on the United Nations 
and the status of Formosa, should be weighed carefully before any 
decision Was made. 48 
Hash had implied that the diplomat.ic recognition of China by 
New Zealand and other countries would logically commit them to support 
China's entry into the United Nations. He made the point explicit 
later in the year in his annual report to the Labour Party Conference. 
11Recognition 11 , he said then, "would seem to involve also the question 
of Chinese representation in the United Nations Organisation. The 
issue· is, therefore, a complex one, and aspects of it cannot be 
considered in isolation 11 .. 49 
The United States had violent objections to United Nations 
membership for China, and there had been in the past indications that 
if China were admitted the United .States would withdraw. This would 
destroy the institution • 
... 
New Zealand could not add her vote to thatof 
the faction whose trillinph would drive the United St.ates from the body. 
Sir Alister Mcint~sh recalls: 
11 The Americans were pretty good at wringing our arms~ and 
putting it to us that we had to support them on this issue, 
which was vital; that they didn't want to leave the United 
Nations, and that there was always a da'1ger that if China 
were admitted, Congress ..... would force them outn.so 
48 Evening Star February 23, 1959, p3 
49 • Even"ng Star May 6, 1959, p4 
~ 50 Sir Alister Hcintosh, Intervievl 21.2.74 
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Depar:tmen~c of External Affairs appraisals noted that the Free 
Vlorld would be disadvantag·ed by the Chinese seat on the Security 
Council going to an unfriendly power .. This, it was believed, could 
cripple the United Nations as an effective peace-k~eping organisation. 51 
Nevr Zeala'l'ldr s voting stance on the China represen·tation question 
at the United Nations General Assembly did not change in substance in 
1958. India had requested the inclusion on the agenda of the Assembly 
of an item entitled 'Question of the Representation of China~~ The 
United States countered with a two-part moratorium resolution.. ':[!he 
first part resolved that India's reques·t be rejected, and the second 
clause asked that the Assembly decide not to consider any proposals 
to exclude the representatives of the Republic of China or to seat 
the representatives of the Government. of the People's Republic of 
China. India came back with an amendment to the resolution, which 
proposed substituting the word naccepts 11 for "rejectsn in the first 
clause, and deleting the second clause altogether. The New Zealand 
government decided to show sympathy for the governments which want:ed 
a discussion of the China question, by abstaining on the Indian 
amendment to the first American clause. New Zealand also abstc.ined 
on the vote to pass the first clause. While New Zealand would not 
stand in the \-Iay of those nations wanting a discussion of the issue, 
neither would the government encourage such a discussion with a 
positive vote. 
said. 52 
The tir.le >Jas not propitious, the New Zealand delegate 
51 Interview, Officer, Research Division of the Hinistry of Foreign 
Affairs 
52 E.A.R. Septerr~er,l958, p29 
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:r·he government opposed the Indian a111endr:-cent to the second clause, 
which called for the deletion of the latter, and voted for the second 
clause. On the vote to pass or reject the American resolution as a 
whole, NeN Zealand i.·Jas one of 46 countries that v·oted for it. 
Nash had realised earlier in the d~cade that concern for 
Formosa was a possible obstacle to recognition .. In 1953, Nash had 
said that recognition of Peking could be interpret.ed as sanctioning 
her claim to Fcrmosar a move he opposed .. The Labour Party believed 
that the Formosans had no desire to come under the sway of the main-
land government. 
During the years in Opposition, party members had suggested 
that Formosa be put under United Nations trusteeship. In government 1 
the party ceased to advocate trusteeship, but believed that Fonr.osa 
should be denied to Commt:mist China. In the 1958 international 
affairs debate, Nash had said: 
11 I cannot see any reason why there should not: be an arra.Dge-
ment ••• which would enable Formosa to be completely independ-
ent and completely demilitarised ..• The Fo~~oswt people coulC 
go their own way under their own management, with, for the 
time being, a guarantee by the United Nations of safety from 
>lar . . • I certainly do not think the solution is the handing 
over of Formosa to Conununist China 11 .. 53 
The problem was that the government of the People's Republic 
made acknowledgement of its claim to Taiwan (as it called Formosa) a 
prerequisite for the establishment of full diplomatic relations. 
The British government had recognised the CoiTLrnunist government in 
1950, but continued to maintain that the status of Taiwan was undeter-
mined and had kept a consultate open on the island. As a result, the 
53 N.Z.P.D. vol. 318, pl721, 11 September, 1958 
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Chinese had confined British representation in China to the Charg6 
d'Affaires level, refusing to accept an ambassador~ A.H. Nordmeyer 
recalls: 
"One of the reasons we were relucta..'tlt to recognise China 
- net ~Jithstanding the fact that .we had underta'k:en in our 
policy t.o do so - \•las t.hat l4r Nc.sh becar.te info.nned that the 
Chinese were not anxious at all to have any country recognise 
t..'t!em u..r1less it recognised their sovereignty ave!:' Taiwan. And 
to recognise their sovereignty over Taiwan \>'auld, in our view, 
have meant bloodshed11 • 54 
Apart from the government's reluctance to sign away, as it were, 
Taiwan's right, as it sa\ ..l it, to a non-Communist existence, there i.·;ras 
. also t..l}e fact that New Zealand 1 s ally, the United States, was committed 
to defend Taiwan under the 1954. treaty. A..11 acknowledgement of China 1 s 
claim to Taiwan would put New Zealand on the opposite side of the fence 
from her ally in the event of a Sino-American clash over the island. 
Taiwan, hoY.Jever, had a significance 1;vider than the fate of the 
people living there. It was a piece of "free" - or at lec.st, non-
Communist - Asia: a symbolic outpost of the West. To hand over 
Formosa to the Chinese Co~munist government - s)ombolically or literally 
- would reflect a lack of interest in preserving the existence of other 
Western-oriented governments in Asia, and perJ:!?PS fatally undermine 
their confidence. They might come to accommodations with Peking or be 
othe~1ise more open to Chinese pressures and influence. If Labour ·..;ere 
to acknowledge the claim of the People's Republic to Taiwan, the party 
would have to abandon the whole concept of containment. Abandoning 
the containment concept would be to declare that Chinese domination 
of South-east Asia would not conflict with New Zealand's interests. 
"4 , Nordmeyer Interview, 30.5.74 
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A recognition of ·the People's Republic \·:ithout a."ly guarantee about 
Taiwan v..~ould rnaan a rejection of the prernises upon v;hich SEATO was 
constructed~ 
Australian Prime. Minister Henzies spelled out the implications 
of abandoning Taiwan to the Australian House of Representatives in 
1960: 
"The simple truth of the proposal that VJe recognise Cornmunist 
China is that we must also advocate a course of policy that 
will hand over these 10 million people - now free - to 
Communist control. I invite honourable members to consider 
wha·t that would mean . • • First, it would mean,, of course, 
the co:nplete destruction of SEATO . ~ • if, C2rnically, we ""ere 
prepared to hand over Formosa to the Corr~unists in china, 
what effect '\>JOUld it have on the protocol countries - Laos, 
Cambodia, Thailand, South Vietna"Tt and Halaya? . They \<lould 
say 'Well, if you can give a~vay 10 million people to Formosa, 
you can give away 10 million people somewhere else'. It 
would utterly destroy the whole basis of confidence un which 
SEATO rests.. I said so at the MinistE:rial Conference of 
SEATO, in tVashington, \~1i th the unanimous approval of all the. 
Ministers there present11 • 55 
New Zealand's Prime Hinister Nash was one of the Hinisters 
present on that occasion. 
The experience of France in 1964 was to sh6>1 that it was 
possible for some countries to recognise the People's P~public >lithout 
making an explicit recognition of Co!llinunist aut:hority over Tai\'lan, bu-t: 
in 1958 the Labour goverrJment knew only of the cold attitude of China 
towards a Britain that n1a.intained that Taiwan's status was undetermined. 
It seems that Lc~ur's leaders had moral qualms about just avoiding the 
issue of Tai-;.Tan' s status. They wanted Taiwan's position as a separate 
entity recognised by China before China >las recognised. This was made 
clear by Nash in the Ne>J Zealand Paz·liament in August, 1960. Certainly 
55 Commonwealth Parliamentcu~ Debates - House of Representatives vel. 28, 
p987, 8 September, 1960 
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this VK>uld ha.ve. been the only tlay around a detrimental effect on the 
friendly countries of South-east Asia. 
Further constraints on recognition \-;ere acknowledged in the 
second year of the Labour government, and these were related to chinars 
in·ternational behaviour. 
In March, 1959, there W?.s a rebellion in Tibet against Chinese 
rule. The Tibetan ruler, the Dalai Lama, fled to India, along with 
som<?: thousands of others. The actions of the Chinese army in 
suppressing the revolt aroused concern in t.he ~Vest. Prime Hinister 
Nash said on April 7: "As free democracies, we are naturally deeply 
concerned at what has been happening in Tibet, as we should be at 
similar events anywhere else in the world'!. 56 
A month later, Nash stated that Chinese actions in Tibet had 
further complicated the problem of recognition. In his report to 
the Labour Party Conference in Hay, Nash said: 
"The question of the recognition of Conununist China remains 
a very difficult problem, by no means simplified by recent 
events in Tibet. 'I'he government has stated its belief 
that recognition of the Chinese People's Republic must come. 
The question is one of timing, since it is essential that 
recognition should have the minimum of undesirable consequencesn~ 57 
Chinese actions in Tibet ensured that the 'time 1 for recognition 
~uuld be further off. Even if all other constraints had fallen away, 
it would have been :O.mpolitic to appear to be giving the seal of approval 
to the Chinese government just as it was horrifying the world. 
56 E.A.R. April, 1959, pl8 
57 New Zealand Labour Party RepOX't of the 43rd AnnuaZ Conference, pl6 
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Anm\re:r·i:ng a parliamentary question on recognition in July 1 the 
Prime Minister said: 
" ... it is only to be expected that the international conduct 
of the Chinese Colfu-nunist a1.1thorities - a.r;.d notably their 
recent actions in Tibet - \"7ill influence New ·zealand &J.cl other 
countries in their judgement of the appropriate timing of a 
decision on recognition11 • 58 
The uprising in Tibet had given the Chinese a concern Hith 
sealing the borders of that co~~trz, and the ill-defined bolli>dary 
between Tibet anc1 India now led to a deterioration of relations vrith 
India. In August, 195;:1, at Longju, Chinese and Indian troops clashed 
with slight casualties on both sides. In a protest note to Peking 
the next day, the Indian government accused China of deliberate 
aggression in an attempt to implement border claims by force~ 59 In 
September, in a letter to Nehru, Chinese premier chou En-lai informed 
the Indian Prime Minister that China did not recognise the border 
claimed by India between Assam and Tibet a~d, in effect, laid claim 
to a large slice of «hat the Indians regarded as their territory. 
IJ."he next month, at Kongha Pass, there was another clash bet'f,;•lecn 
Indian and Chinese troops. 
In late 1959, China's relations with Indonesia also deteriorated, 
after the Indonesian government passed laws restricting the business 
activities of aliens, most of \•ihich v1ere of Chinese nationality. The 
Chinese government was quick to condenm the Indonesia.~ goverTI.m8nt and 
warn that it \vould not simply look on vlhile Chinese ~1ere persecuted 
abroad. 60 The Indonesians in turn complained that Chinese Embassy 
officials were roa~ing over the country inciting Chinese to defy 
government regulations. 
58 N.Z.P.D. vol. 319, p421, 15 July, 1959 
59 l·laxwell, N. India's China Tia:t' ppl09-ll0 
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In his end of year summation of foreign affairs/ Nash reiterated 
that the principal problem remaining vrith the recognition question Has 
that of timing, and that this would be affected by China's foreign 
policy. 
"During the past year .... the actions of the Chinese authorities 
have been disturbing and provocative, no less towards China's 
neighbours, than towards the princip<ll Western powe::-s. 
such conduct - and the attitude of mi.nd it reflects - has scarcely 
created the right abnosphere in which to consider steps to~·?ards 
more general acknowledgement of the established position of the 
Communist regime. It is hardly surprising that the United Nations 
General Assewbly this year expressed the concern of world opinion 
about developments in Tibet, and decided once again not to 
consider the representation of China in the United Nations". 61 
Nash recognised that diplomatic recognition of China by the 
!Vestern allies - the only context in which he was prepared to recog,ise -
could only come about in an atmosphere of detente, such as had existed 
for a short time after the Geneva conference in 1954. Actions by the 
Chil'lese such as those in Tibet or on the borders of India postponed the 
i 
corni"g o:f that atmosphere by accentuating Western distrust of China. 
In the 1959 parlia~entary session, Nash had been asked by Duncan 
Rae to state clearly his government's policy on the matter of reco~1ition. 
~'le Prime Minister had replied that wnile believing that recognition was 
inevitable, the government acknm•ledged that such a step could be taken 
only after the fullest consultation with other friendly powers, Asian 
as well as Western, t1hich might be affected by any New Zealand decision. 62 
In a letter to Rae shortly afterwards, Nash pointed out that 
there would be no tangible benefits to the free world from recognition 
at that t~~e, and that, indeed, recognition would be of material 
61 E.A.R. January, 1960, p33 
62 N.Z.P.D. vol. 319, p421, 15 July, 1959 
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assista.."'lce to Chin.:'! in her campaign to inc~-:ease her infl-uence in Asia. 
Because of the geographic proximity of New Zealand to Asia, New Zealand 
did not wa"'1.t to see Commu.11ist. domination of that continent. 6 3 In this 
letter, realpolitik dominated. Recognition might harm the cause 
New Zealand. sponsored in Asia. 
Nash also recognised that recognition of China by the TRest had 
definite advantages. A policy of isolation and confrontation was not 
condu.cive to solving on-going problems. China ~1as a power "ith a 
great deal of influence in Asia, and her inclusion in any international 
discussions v..'as imperative if any p!:'ogress were to be made. 
At the end of the year Nash declared t.llat 11 no settlement of 
major issues, such as disarmament ... could be considered secarely 
established unless it provided for the full participation of the 
G1inese Communist authorities. Considerations of this nature make 
it impossible, in my view, to continue to act indefinit.ely as if the l 
Peking regime did not eXist11 • 64 
In March Nash reiterated to the Dunedin Chamber of Commerce 
that provision would have to be made for the full participation of 
the Chinese commtl!list authorities in any disarmament conference. 
He said that Ne" Zealand had a special interest in ensuring that 
the military capacity of "this rapidly' gro"L'lg po"er" was brought 
under international control at the earliest possible op?ortunity. 65 
At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference in London in 
May, 1960, Nash continued to promote the cause of bringing China into 
63 Information provided by the Research Division, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
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the community of nations. He said: 
nr think there is a gro"dng realisation that the policy of 
keeping China at arm's length from the Western world is one 
of diminishing returns and may not be in the best interests 
of our peace and security in the region". 66 
Follo\Ori.i·l.g up this view, the New Zealand Prime Minister v.rent 
on to suggest to the SEll.TO Foreign Ministers at their conference in 
Washington that consideration should be given to China's entry into 
the United Nations. Nash suggested that agreement to Co~nunist 
China's membership in the United Nations might help ease the tense 
atmosphere in the wake of the failed 1960 sunimit. meeting. 
The New Zeala..""ld Prime Minister said that the United States 
had tried to ignore Communist China, and that means should be found 
to bring it into the family of nations. 67 
Nash's proposition produced a sharp reaction from the American 
Secretary of State, now Christian Herter. 68 He launched into a 
"blistering attack1169 on Com."Tlunist China, calling it an outlaw, and 
saying that the United States would not agree to its admission to 
the United Nations. Herter contended that giving China the prestige 
of United Nations membership would only strengthen Peking's campaign 
to neutralise Japan, and to install Communist governments in small 
nations around the Chinese border. 70 He also made the point that 
Communist China had made it clear that complete abandonment of the 
Taipei government \•Jas a prerequisite to the acceptance of membez-ship .. 71 
66 O.D.T. May 16, 1960, p4 
"' 7 Noble G. Bernard, "Christian A .. Herter" p232 
66 John Foster Dulles had died in May, 1959 
69 O.D.T. June 3, 1960, p7 
70 Ibid. 
71 Noble G. Bernard, op. cit., p232 
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The New .Zeala.nd Prime 1r1ir1isi:e.r, however, did not give up .. 
In a lab2.r discussion, Nash strongly advocated dip lorna tic recognition, 
while other mernbers 1 notably Australia, the Philippines and Thailandr 
attacked Nash's arguments, a...11d, in varying degrees,· supported Hert:er 1 s 
72 arguments. Herter stated that the United States h2.d no intention 
of changing its policy of refusing to extend diplomatic recognition 
to Corrnnu..""list China. 
Following this !llinor split, Nash conferred with Herter for 
some thirty minutes after the meeting closed. The Prime Minister 
told the press afterwarc1s that they had discussed Communist China 
and the problem of >~het:her Peking shculc1 be admitted to the United 
Nations. Asked about the difference of opinion between New Ze~latld 
and t.'>e United States, the Prime .Minister revealed in his reply that 
the P.merican had pushed him into retreat. "I thin.~ you have got to 
>~eigh it all up, all the factol.·s associated ,;ith their admission and 
non-admission. We have said that we >~ould recognise China. That 
is not necessarily recognising them to come into the United Nations". 73 
Nash >~as prepared to continue to refrain from supporting China's 
entry to the United Nations, >~hile clinging to the idea of extending 
diplomatic recognition. 
The Prime Minister then went on to give the impression that 
China's recent behaviour in Asia >~as the main obstacle to recognition 
on Ne>~ Zealand's part. He recalled that at the time of the New 
Zealand election in 1957, the Labour Party had said that it would 
recognise the government of mainland China. But, said Nash, since 
7Z Noble, op. cit., p233 
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then there had_ been the Chinese Communist suppression of the rebellion 
in 'I'ibE:'!·t, the border dispute \rlith India, and other events in Jl.sia .. 
"That would make it very difficult for us to recognise them now. We 
want to find out when t..'l).e time and circumstances wOuld make it pro-
pi tious to be done" ~ '7 4 
In fact, of course, the Labour Party had said as little as 
possible about China in t..~e election campe.ign of· 1957. 'l'he subject 
had not been brought "P in any of the major speeches. Nash's 
recollection showed, however, that despite the tactical silence on 
t..lo.e subject, the party at t..'le time still considered China recognition 
to be part.y policy, and this conunitment was more strongly imprinted 
on his mind tha.'l the exigencies of t..lo.at particular campaign. 
Despite New Zealandts acquiescence in alliance views, and 
especially American views, the divergence of opinion between Ne~., 
Zealand and the United States as to the solution to the problem of 
China and the security of Asia remained. ~mile the United States 
clung to a policy of isolation of China, Nash be~ieved that a 
reaching out to.China \<ould produce better results. In the 1960 
Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs, tabled in 
Parliament in July, the Prime }l.inister said that while Chinese conduc·t 
towards·Tibet, Formosa and India was a handicap to early recognition, 
"I regard protracted exclusion of China from the United Nations 
and the international community as self-defeating~ It is, 
moreover, a source of danger, since it tends to confi1.--m Chinese 
leaders in their ignorance of the outside world and in their 
misconceptions of Chinese strength and capacities". 75 
74 O.D.T. June 4, 1960, p6 
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Nash believed that recent ·troubles involving China only underlined the 
necessity for contact with the People's Republic .. 
110n ~· Asian questions, no lasting settlement is possible 
\'lithout the participation .and co-operation of the Chinese 
People's Rt?.publicq I hold this opinion more strongly in 
the light of developments in China in the past year, and of 
its truculence tot•lards India and Indonesiar its defiance of 
United Nations condemr1ation of its brutality in Tibet, its 
menacing actions in the Formosa Straitsn .. 
At the same time that he advocated a bridge-building policy, 
Nash appreciated the force of the American coun.ter-arguments ~ He 
said: "I fully understand the objections of those who see Corrrrnunist 
China as aggressive in character and intent, as a sou:r:ce of fear to 
its neighbours, and as a nation whose influence in the Vn.i·ted Nations 
would inevitably be destructive a.nd hostile 11 • 
Reaching out to China, Nash held, implied no less commitment; 
to the Western cause .. In the External Affairs debate in July, 
'1960, Nash said: "We are fully determined to stand !:Jy our friends 
and al~ies in the Western.democracies •• but that does not mean that 
we do not associate with those who are not our friends 11 • The 
Prime Minister admitted that China had been 11 forceful and unfair" to 
other countries - avoiding the use of the conderrmatory 'aggressive' 
-but said that this could not stand in the way of recognition. 76 
When he wound up the debate, Nash claimed that the future of 
New Zealand was likely to be more affected by mainland China than by 
any other country. Since China exercised no economic influence over 
76 N.Z.P.D. vel. 322, p590 and p655, 14 and 15 July, 1960 
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Ne':.-'1 Zealru"1d, the Prime Minister could only i"J.ave been referring to 
the country's securitya 
Nash found himself subjected in the House that month _to a 
barrage of que.stions by National Party m~rnbers on t.he subject of 
the recognition of China. R. H. Algie asked 1•hy the government had 
done nothing about recogni·tion if it was so keen on it. Opposition 
leader Holyoake accused the Prime Minister of do1..!tle-talk, and t:!:}.,ing 
to run with both the recognition hare and the non-recognition hounds. 
He pointed out that Nash had claiined in Washington that Communist 
China could not be recognised because of inciden·ts .1.n Tibet and on t..1.e 
Indian border. 
"The incidents in Tibet and on the Indian border are of recent 
origin. h"hat about the position prior to these incidents?n 
Holyoake further stated that Nash had said that if Conl.'l!unist 
China were given recognition, then Fonnosa had to be protected, yet 
the Prime Minister knew that the Communist Chinese government would 
not agree to such an arrangement. 77 
Nevertheless, Nash was prepared to continue to insist that 
some O.efinite arrangement over Formosa was a prerequisite to 
recognition. In August, 1960, he stated that he would not be a 
party to recognition unless Formosa was declared free without fear 
of aggression and unless it had some guarantee from the major nations 
that it would be defended against the Cornmunist gove~nment of the main-
land. 
77 N.Z.P.D. val. 322, p330, 6 July, 1960 
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Nash sai-d he had alvays said that if the mainland government 
would give up its claims to Formosa, then it ought to be recognised_ 
New Zealand, because of its obligations to free peoples who -.vanted to 
. run their own countries, could not agree to Formosa going to mainland 
China. 78 
After his insistence that recognition >Ias only a matter of 
timing, Nash had revealed that there >?as still another major constraint 
on action. Communist China could not be recognised until it accepted 
a two C~inas solution. In July, the Prime Minister had said that 
recognition of the mainlru1d goveL~ment should be synchronised with 
recognition of the Government of Formosa. 79 Since New Zealand 
already recognised the Government of the Hepublic of China on Formosa, 
Nash seemed to be suggesting that the People's Republic would be 
recognised when it granted diplomatic recognition to the Republic of 
China. 
At the general election in November, 1960, Nash's government 
was defeated, and it went out of office without having recognised 
China. 
Conclusion 
Since the end of the Korean 1'7ar, the N·2w Zealand Labour Party 
had been advocating the diplomatic recognition of China as a step 
towards peace in Asia. In doing so, it had separated itself from 
the foreign policy of the National Party. Once in office, however, 
the Labour Party was forced to face up to all the implications of 
78 N. Z.P.D. vol. 323, pl521, 16 ll.ugust, 1960 
79 N.Z.P.D. vol. 322, p325, 6 July, 1960 
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implementing its policy, and found itself Hith little freedom to 
manoeuvr2 .. 
The National Party sovernment had openly adro.itted that it did 
not int.end to promote policies that held ths possibility of straining 
the alliance with the United States. The Labour Party had never 
admitted that the alliance could or should restrict any of the 
partners from exercising their independent policies, but in government 
it showed that it, too, was unwilling to take action that might 
conceivably jeopardise the alliance upon '"hich it believed that New 
Zealand's security depended. It was prepared to continue to state 
its contrary views publicly, but not to take action on them unilaterally. 
Hm;ever desirable a conciliato~y approach to China might be, it did not 
rank in importance with preser:ing the goodwill of the United States 
in a threatening world. The Labour government accepted that New 
Zealand was a member of two alliances, and that the vie\Vs of its 
partners should always be= a constraint. Not only was New Zealand's 
proposed course of action strongly disapproved of by the United States, 
it was also not supported by any of the country's other allies. The 
Labour government's preferred tack, then, "i.'las to try to persuade its 
allies to its point of view, a task undertaken at the SEATO meetings 
of 1958 and 1960 without success. 
The Labour Party was also, in office, more inclined to accept 
arguments advanced-by its predecessor that recognition of China could 
adversely affect ths country's wider interests. Both the National 
and Labour Parties had similar objectives - the preservation of non-
Communist governments in Asia as bulwarks of New Zealand's security~ 
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The Labour government, l:ihile belieYing that recogni-tion of 
China was desirable, &lso believed that the con~ainment of China's 
influence \Vas necessary 1 and came to appreciate that the two objectives 
might not be compatible. Nash a.ck11owledged that the ·transference of 
recognition from the Nationalists on Taiwan to the People's Republic 
might have adverse effects on the loyalties of the Chinese minorities 
in South-east Asia, ru1d L~at it might also affect L~e confidence of 
non-CorrrrnUt."1ist countries contiguous to China. The Prime Minister 
apparently realised, too, that a meaningful diplomatic relationship 
"ith China could only be established if the recognising country 
acknot<ledged China's claim to Tai,.an, and repudiated the Nationalist 
government. This Nash >10uld not do. Apart from recognising ~;e 
right of the islanders to a non-communist future should they desire 
it, there was also the fact that concern for Taiwan symbolised the 
Western nations' commib-nent to the preservation of non-coTIJmunist 
!governments in Asia. w1lile New Zealand continued to see a non-
Communist Asia as important to her security, there could be no 
11betrayal n of Tai~gan. 
During 1959 and l960, the Prime Minister continually emphasised 
that recognition was only a matter of correct timing, and that this 
l.Jas rela:ted to China's international behaviour .. He said that 
recognition was affected by China's suppression of the Tibeta.n 
rebellion and the border troubles with India. 
was dependent on an atmosphere of detente. 
Apparently recognition 
Even if non-recognition had not been essential to contairill,ent, 
it is possible that the Labour government may have held back because 
of the domestic political situation. Its tenuous grip on public 
affection - expressed by a narrow majority dictated caution when 
approaching controversial moves. The party had recog11ised that 
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China recognition was a controversial move in the post-Bandung era 
by not re-including it as a plank in the 1957 election platform. 
Shortly after assuming office the government had been forced to take 
unpopular measures to correct the economic situation, and \'las in no 




THE llATIONAI. GOVERNMENT AND CHINA, 1961-68 
Introduction 
During the nineteen-sixties, the National government consist-
ently put forward t.wo basic reasons for not changing NevJ Zealand's 
longstanding policies with regard to the diplomatic recognition of 
China and its admission.to the United Nations. These 'l,·;•ere China's 
international behaviour and New Zealand's comrnib~ent to Taiwan. 
Perhaps surprisingly, loyalty to the United States alliance, which 
figured prominently in justifications of China policy in the 1950s 
(and which ><as figuring in justifications of Vietnam policy) was not 
mentioned during the decade, although on one occasion the Prime 
Minister provided evidence that it was a continuing determinant of 
policy. 
With regard to China's international behaviour, New Zealand 
was particularly concerned with China's encouragement of revolution-
ary elements in South Vietnam, as part of vlhat-the government saw as 
a Chinese attempt to regain suzerainty over South-east Asia. While 
China continued to pursue a policy of undermining non-Ccmmunist 
governments in South-east Asia, the government believed that any 
recognition was out of the question, since the maintenance of non-
Co~~unist governments in Asia was seen as a vital security interest 
of New Zealand. Only when China's "aggressive 11 foreign policy 
changed could there be progress towards an accommodation. In the 
United Nations, New Zealand argued that fealty to the principles of 
the Charter must be as weighty a criteri.on for entry as the reality 
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of Corr:naunist control of mainland China. 
The 1960s saw the issue of Taiv;an emerge as perhaps the funcla-
mental public constraint on a pos~ti .. ,re policy to'i..;ards China. Taiwan 
was portrayed now as a viable, separate nation with a right not to be 
incorporated into Communist China and a right to have this interest 
protected in the United Nations. Ne"; Zealand argued that a substit-
ution of China for Taiwan in the Assembly would be construed as 
endorsing China's claim to take Tai\van over by force if necessary. 
Similarly, recognition of China would both endorse China's claim to 
Taiwan and preclude a New Zealand diplomatic relationship with the 
Taiwan government. 
During the period of Labour government from 1~57 to 1960, the 
I 
Opposition National Party made it clear that it strongly opposed 
Labour • s campaign for the recognition of the People's Republic of 
China. The grounds for its ,opposition had not varied from the party's 
time in office: recognition, it was felt, constituted an act of 
unnecessary disloyalty to New Zealand's greatest ally, and to ~~e 
free governments of Asia fighting off Communist subversion. It 
implied acceptance of China's unaccept~Je international behaviour. 
Questioned at the National Party's conference in July, 1959, 
on the party's policy towards Communist China, the Leader of the 
Opposition, K.J. Holyoake, said: "l'le feel that the time has not yet 
come for the recognition of Com..Titunist China". 1 Although a sparse 
1 Evening Star July 27, 1959, pl 
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statement, it did show that the National Party f unlike the P ..mericans r 
assumed that eventually some sort of acceptance of the People.~"s 
Republic ,.,oulcl have to be made_ The time for recognition, however, 
would be 't.Yhen the kllericans felt ·that it v:ould benefi·t the \'\'estern 
world to do so. 
The case for deference to the judgement of the larger ally 
\.V"as most strongly put in these years by R~ Algie 1 former Minister of 
Education, in 1958a 
11 For New Zealand to recognise Communist China vJithout the 
approval of the United States would be running counter to 
one of our partners in ANZUS .... Iviy view is that if the 
United States came to the conclusion that. by giving Communist 
China recognition she \•lOuld be going nearer tO\.•rards peace in 
the Far East, it would be a step v1orth taking. I would 'JO 
further and say I would not ba in a hurry on any grounds at 
all to recognise Comr-:-:::.1nist China before that is done by the 
United States. If the United States felt tha·t the ti-cne was 
ripe then v.re, as her pa.rtner 1 although obviously a junior 
partner, could well follow along the same lines:' G 2 
Algie had stated that alliance partners had to move together, 
i 
and Ne'tv Zealand, as a junior member, must wait upon the senior member 
to agree to a course of action. Other party members agreed with 
this line of thought. D.M. Rae reiterated in July, 1960, tha·t 
"external policy should be based on close support for the United 
States of America", and said that he believed that recognition of 
Communist China would "greatly \<leak en .Ne\1 Zealand's relations with 
the United States11 • 3 T.P. Shand stated in the same debate that 
New Zealand could not live under the umbrella of the democratic 
countries if it was not prepared to play its part in assisting its 
allies,~~ and D. J.. Eyre asked: "Does the Labour government have to 
2 N. Z.P.D. vol. 318, pl73l-32, ll September, 1958 
3 N.Z.P.D. vol. 322, p3l3, 6 July, 1960 
4 Ibid. p324 
166. 
be reminded who won the battle of the Coral Sea? . ~ Let us s .. cick to 
the principle of loyalty". 5 
The Leader of the Oppositi?n, when he spoke ~n 1960 on the 
recognition issue, preferred to stress the need for loyalty to the 
non-Communist countries of Asia \.;ho \oJere fighting Chinese influence{ 
particularly those associated with New Zealand in SEATO. Why talk 
about recognising Communist China when it v1as trying to infiltrate 
and subvert those countries on its borders vlho were so vital to New 
Zeala,-,d, he asked Parliament in July. 6 The countries in South-east 
Asia were under great pressure from the Communists, and the Prime 
Minister should not say that the people of New zealand wanted to 
~ecognise their aggressor.' Holyoake believed that it vJaS contra-
dietary for New Zee.land to be talking of recognising CoiD..t-nunist China 
when it had ele.ments of its armed forces in Asia defending countries 
against subversion aided and abetted by China. 8 Recognition of main-
i 
land China would increase the potential for subversion in Asia by 
affecting the loyalty of the millions of overseas Chinese who currently 
saw the Taiwan government as their goverr~ent. ·New Zealand could not 
recognise both Chinas. "These things, are, I think, too lightly put 
aside by people who talk ••. about the recognition of Communist china". 
The Leader of the Opposition's appreciation of Taiwan's irr~ortance 
had almost certainly been strengthened·by the visit he had made to the 
island in February of 1960. During this visit, he had had talks >lith 
the Nationalist Chinese leader, Chiang Kai-shek. 
5 N.Z.P.D. vol. 322, p403, 7 July; 1960 
6 N.Z.P.D. vol. 322, p331, 6 July, 1960 
7 N. Z.P.D. vol. 323, pl521, 16 August, 1960 
e N.Z.P.D. vol. 322, p593, 14 July, 1960 
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Holyoake told Parliament that diplomatic recognition of 
Conununist China would coiP.mit Nev; Zealand to supporting the Communist 
government's admission to the United Nations, and its accession .to 
the Chinese seat on the Security Council~ China did not measure up 
to the requirements for membership. The Leader of the Opposition 
felt that Ne>< Zealand should be paying more attention to working in 
with its friends than to cultivating ·the enemy. 
11 1 am posi·tive it is no answer to weaken the Vlestern allia.T'lce 
in its critical hour by making moves ... which seem to me to 
amount to appeasement. surely the world has paid dearly 
enough for moves of appeasement in the past. I believe that 
this is the ti.'Tle to close our ranks and to do everything we 
can ·to strengthen and sustain the countries of South-east Asia, 
lVhich are doing their best to resist Communism 11 • 
and later he said: 
"in the name of Common sense, J_et us strengthen our alliar4ces 
with our friends and allies instead of continually talking of 
appeasing those who are not so friendly to us"; 9 
Addressing a large gathering of voters at Dannevirke on July 19, 
1960, Holyoake said that he believed that Foreign Affairs ~<ould play 
a major part in the forthcoming election campaign. There was a 
definite cleavage between the two parties in this area, he said. 
"I have violently di-sagreed with Labour T s views. They have 
lost their sense of proportion in the matter of our allegiances 
in the vzorld n ~ 1 0 
In· Holyoake's eyes, the Labour government had overstepped the bounds 
of alliance loyalty in its desire to reach out to China. New Zealand 
should stay firmly on its own side of the fence. 
9 N.Z.P.D. vel. 322, pp594-596, 14 July, 1960 
10 O.D.T. July 20, 1960, plO 
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The Opposition leader was w-rong in his assumption that foreign 
affairs would play a major part in the 1960 election campaign. As in 
most Ne't-<J Zealand elections, foreigh affairs were not an issue. 11 
The National Party preferred, in the event, to concentrate on 
Labour's economic record, particularly high taxation, 'Vlhich it evidently 
believed ,;as more likely to strike a productive chord with the voters. 
The belief was borne out in the comfortable National victory on 
November 26. The party gained seven seats to win with a majority of 
twelve. 
In the neVl govern:nent, Holyoake took the portfolio of Exter:1al 
Affairs as well as the Prime Hinistership. With a National party govern-
ment, it could have been expected that the China issue would become 
donnant. In the United States, ho'\V'ever, there was a new Democratic 
administration, and the possibility existed that there might be a 
change in American China policy. Holyoake addressed himself to this 
possibility first when he spoke on the issue in the House in July, 196L 
" it is difficult for me to see how, in the face of China's 
continued denunciation of the United States of ~nerica~ and 
the unremitting efforts of the Communist government of the 
mainland of China to weaken, destroy or drive out the whole of 
the influence of the United States on the Asian continent, 
President Kennedy can be led to any early or ready decision to 
welcome her into the United Nations or to recognise her 
diplomatically". 12 
The New Zealand Prime Minister thus disposed of any hope that 
the primary obst.acle to a New Zealand policy change was going to be 
removed. Holyoake moved on to other obstacles. Difficult questions 
11 Chapman, Jackson and Mitchell "New Zealand Polities in Aation", pl04 
12 N.Z.P.D. vol. 326, p219, 4 July, 1961 
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of principle had to be solv<?"d before Communist china could be admitted 
to the United Nations~ The most important of these, Holyoake said, 
was the future of the people of the Republic of China on Formosa .. 
"Surely no one ·Hill suggest that at any time, against their 
t'lishes, VTe shoUld hand them over to the tender mercies of 
the Peking regime". 
Holyoake was making a presumption that admission to the United Nations 
of Communist China would result in a handing over of Formosa to Peking. 
The Prime Minister did not, appao:-ently, object to a two-China solution 
in principle. The problem was only that it was impractical. 
"I know there is talk of two Chinas. I discussed this with 
President Chiang Kai-shek and his advisers some time ago 
~Jhen I visited the East •. and also >-lith 1-lr Kennedy recently 
neither the Peking regime nor Chiang Kai-shek will accept 
the two-China proposition". 
The other question of principle was Communist China's fealty 
to the principles of the United Nations Charter. 
"In addition, the continued aggressive conduct of the Peking 
regime of Communist China in Tibet and on the Indian border 
•.. arouse very grave doubts, at least in my !!lind, concerning 
its readiness to abide by the United Nations Charter. In 
these circumstances ..... I see no reason to hasten Communist 
China's admission to the United Nations, and it will meantime 
remain the policy of this vovernment to support the government 
of the Republic of China".- 3 
The following month, August, the government demonstrated that 
support by raising the level of relations between New Zeala:1d and 
Nationalist China from the consular to .the diplomatic level. 14 Although 
New Zealand would continue to be unrepresented on Formosa, or Taiwan, 
the Republic of China would establish an embassy in Wellington. This 
move was probably the result of Holyoake' s trip to Taiwan the previous 
year, and his appreciation of the.· Republic of China as a solidly 
13 N.Z.P.D. vol. 326, p219, 4 July, 1961 
14 A E .. R. August, 1961, p20 
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established, eqonoillically prosperous state. In the •tiftiesr the 
image of ti-,.e Republican government had been that of a discredited 
remnant associated Hith the loss of the mainland, and propped up with 
American money. By 1961, the Republic of China could be seen as a 
viable sovereign state, responsible for considerable economic 
reform and progress. The Nev; Zeala.nd go·.rernment • s decision to 
establish full diplomatic relations with the Republic of China did 
not rest on any economic relationship. In 1961, Nevv Zealand • s 
trade w·ith Taiwan was statistically non-existent, 15 while exports 
to the People's Republic were valued at 1.3 million New Zealand pounds 
($2. 6 million) . 
Despite the reaffirming of support for Taiwan and the declar-
ation that China's admission to the United Nations need not be hastened, 
if: was the New Zealand goverru11ent which brought forward an item to 
consider the question of Chinese representation at ·the 1961 session 
of the General Assembly that October. 
This apparent paradox is easily explained •. The item was not 
an initiative on New Zealand's part, but the collective reaction of 
the Western allies to the expected appearance of a Soviet resolution 
to seat Communist China at Tai.\-Jan' s expense. The New Zealand-presented 
resolution \·Jas not the result of a desire to find an answer to the 
Chinese representation question, but a means of heading off the 
. passage of the Soviet resolution. 
15 Appendix I, Annual Report of the Department of Industries and Commerce 
1964, p62 (AJHR H-44) 
l71.. 
In Sept~rr.ber, it was announced that the government had instructed 
its United Na.tions mission to propose the inclusion on the agenda of 
the General Assa~bly of an item to discuss Chinese representation~ 
The explanation offered by the Department of External Affairs tvas that 
over the years there had been clear signs of a grov.Ti:ng desire by member 
states to undertake a full discussion of the issue~ 16 
The real reason for New Zealand•s action, however, was contained 
in a statement by Prime !-1inister Holyoake on Sept&"T'.ber 17 .. He said: 
11 The representation of China is a serious issue. If the 
General Assembly were to deal with the matter without the 
mos·t careful and deliberate consideration, the very stability 
of the United Nations could be imperilled". 17 
In Holyoake's eyes, there was a risk that the Asselllbly wouJd 
deal with the issue without careful and deliberate consideration -
that is, the members would vote for the Soviet resolution and Taiwan 
would be out, as well as Communist China being in. The entry of 
Communist China could well have undesirable consequences for the 
United Nations, such as t:.he exit of the United states. The New 
Zealand representative to the United Nations, when urging the 
inscription of the item on the agenda, noted that the issue "has 
profoundly affected, and continues to affect, relations ••• within 
th ' ' ' ' ' t t mb ·t t n lB e domest~c pol~t~cal l~fe of L~por an me ec s a es . To 
remove the risk of precipitate action, New Zealand would counter the 
Soviet resolution with a proposal for discussion without suggesting 
any solutions. In the course of the discussion, the Western allies 
could impress upon members the disadvantages of admitting China. 
16 E.A.R. September, 1961, p27 
17 E.A.R. September, 1961, p28 
18 E.A.R. April. 1962, p9 
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From 1951, the United States had annually put forv-,1ard a motion 
to defer consideration of the question of Chinese representation, and 
P~d had it passed. However, as the Ne\v Zealand government had noted, 
a growing number of na·tions \':ere chafing at the moratorium on consider-
ation of the issue, and it seemed unlikely that the American motion 
would pass again. Aware of this, the Americans decided to shift course 
and encourage discussion as a safety valve that would keep votes away 
from extreme solutions. 19 Albinski says that the United St<ttes tried 
to collect several of its allies to sponsor the opening up of the 
China question, and all but New Zealand hesitated to do so. 20 An 
account of New Zealand's activity on the issue published by the 
Department of External Affairs confinns that New Zealand's 'initiative' 
\'las decided upon in consultation with other countries: 
"In 1961 •.• the decision to abandon the moratorium meant that 
it was of particular importance to those who wished the question 
to be thoroughly examined and debated that they should retain 
the initiative and be in the best possible position to defea·t 
any attempts to force the Assembly into an ill-considered and 
hasty decision. With this objective in mind, New Zealand, 
in consultation with other governments which shared this view, 
propcsed a comprehensive discussion of the ~1ole question of 
Chinese representation". 21 
Britain was one of the countries which was keen for the issue 
to be discussed. Since 1951, despite its diplomatic recognition of 
Peking, Britain had gone along with the American moratorium resolution. 
In early 1961, however, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, declared 
that international life required that Communist China be seated in the 
United Nations. 22 Britain ,..,as reluctant to see Taiwan EJ}pelled from 
the United Nations though, and tried to amend the Soviet resolution to 
this end. The British representative proposed a simple resolution 
19 Albinski, H.S. Australian Attitudes and Policies Towards China p438 
20 Ibid. 
21 A E .. R. April, 1962, p8; emphasis added. 
22 Ibid. p7 
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that Peking be admitted, without reference to Taiwan. 
New Zealand did not vote for this amenC1-nent, showing that at 
this stage the government was not interested in a two-China solution. 
New Zealand \;Janted to_ keep Conmunist China out. The British amendment 
was defeated, and subsequently Britain voted for the unamended Soviet 
resolution. 
During t.he debate in December, Ne'" Zealand's United Nations 
representative, F.H. Corner, condemned the Soviet resolution for calling 
for 11 an impossibly simple solution to the problem". He told the 
Assembly that in dealing with the question careful thought had to be 
given to the provisions of the Charter; to the effects of any such 
decision on the United Nations, and to the consequences of any decision 
on the peace and stability of the Far East. 
A decision had to be based on the best possible balance between 
'morality and realism, he said. 
i 
The Assembly was well mvare of the 
moral issues which had to be faced when deciding what action would be 
taken on the China items. The principles of the Charter had been 
related to the events in Korea and the situation in Tibet by many 
speakers. 
"My government, for its part, has strong views upon these 
moral elements of the problem and will urge that they be part 
of any decision •••. a solution of this great problem which 
ignores the moral elements, ignores the principles and purposes 
of the Charter, will destroy this Organisation and undermine 
peace". 2 3 
The Nev; Zealand representative then said that one aspect of 
reality stood out above all others. It was that the Assembly could 
not conte.'ttplate action which could have vastly more serious consequences 
than the problem which it set out to solve. The Soviet delegate had 
23 E.A.R. December, 1961, p30 
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stated that the Chinese Communists had the right to liquidate the 
Chiang Kai-shek government by any means t.~ey sav; fit since the problem 
was an in·ternal matter of China. Corner said that the Soviet represent-
ative 
"implied, if he did not say, that the Assembly, by seating 
the representatives of the Communist government and expelling 
those who now sit in this hall, 'WOUld set the \-70rld seal of 
approval on this bellicose thesis. It seems an inescapable 
conclusion that by adopting the Soviet resolution the Assewbly 
would be represented as agreeing that the People's Republic of 
China had every right to attempt the conquest of Formosa by 
force of ai!lls n .. 
An attsnpt to conquer Formosa would lead to a large-scale war 
in view of Formosa 1 s defence treaty ~:lith the United States and China' s 
with the Soviet Union. Denying Peking representation preserved 
Taiwan's international position and thus averted war .. 
New zealand 'V'Ias "conscious of the desire to ensure more direct 
representation of 650 million of the most industrious and intelligent 
:people in the world", Corner said. He did not say that New Zealand 
shared the desire, although he admitted: "We desperately want progress 
on disannarnent, which is unlikely to occur in present circumstances 11 • 
Despite the 'consciousness', 
"New Zealand .. . has no intention of abandoning ·the Government 
of the Republic of China with which we are in friendly dipiomatic 
relations" .. 
New zealand believed that the debate should be followed by the 
Assembly's providing "some means" to further examine the probl~u. 
New Zealand had no ready-made solution to propose, Corner said. 
At the end of the debate, the Assembly rejected the Soviet 
resolution, and accepted an Arneri·can one that required ·future· proposals 
to change Chinese representation to obtain a two-thirds majority. 
17~. 
In the following years, concern for Taiwan's position replaced 
loyalty to American alliance as the publicly expressed fundamental 
constraint on Ne" Zealand's acceptance of China diplomatically and at 
the United Nations. This change L~ the public justification for 
China policy may have been due to a change in what was perceived to be 
politically acceptable among an audience that was becoming more 
sophisticated in the foreign affairs field. I·t came at a time vrhen 
New Zealand's oldest ally, Britain, had shocked the nation by announcing 
a policy that seQ~ed likely to have a very detrimental effect en New 
Zealand's economic position: the policy of entering the European 
Economic Community. Britain's membership of this body would inevitably 
mean the end of New Zealand's position as a major supplier of the 
British food market. It is possible that this event was the one that 
prompted a de-emphasising of the virtues of loyalty to an ally. 
Paradoxically, the threat to New Zealand posed by Britain's entry into 
the Community meant that New Zealand needed its allies, the United 
States and Australia, more than ever as alternative markets. In 1960, 
the United States was New Zealand's secondlargest market for exports, 
providing 13.10 percent of its export income (Britain provided 53.0 
percent). Australia was New Zealand's fourth~~most valuable market, 
although taking only 4.46 percent of New Zealand's exports (France was 
third that year with 6.73 percent). 2" 'Politically, however, support 
for the interests of other small nations could have seemed more 
appropriate as a policy justification than loyalty to a Great Power. 
24 Direction of New Zealand Exports, Appendix I, Annual Report of the 
Depa1•tment of Industries and Commerce 1961, p66 
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In 1961 the goverPJnent gave the appearance of being primarily 
concerned, in its China policy at the United Nations, \>lith protecting 
Taiv:an's United Na·t.ions membership, rather than blocking Peking 1 s entry 
for its o'\m sake. Taiwan's right to a separate existence seemed to 
be Ne\1 Zealand 1 s fore.most principle, and it was believed that this 
right would be enhanced by continued United Nations membership. The 
meJ:-its or otherwise of Peking 1 s membership t-<1ere. secondary v;rhile Peking 
insisted that its entry could only be achieved at the price of Tai\\1an' s 
exit. New Zealand saw the Republic of China as a separate state, and 
because it was a small state and a friendly bne, the New Zealand govern-
ment WQS prepared to stand up for what it believed were Taiwan 1 s rights. 
In 1963 the Prime l1inister was to claim that New Zealand, as a small 
power, had al«ays been vigilant concerning the treatment of small states, 
and was particularly insistent on the rights of small states to have 
access to the processes of settlement of the United Nations. 25 The 
fact that the United States insisted that the Taiwan government was 
the only legitimate government of China, "as, ho>mver, undoubtedly a 
po,.erful stimulus to the upholding of Tai,.an's rights. 
Apart from preserving the existence and status of the govern-
ment of Tai,.an, Ne" Zealand had indicated that in considering the 
Chinese representation question it was concerned "ith the People's 
Republic's adherence to the principles of the Charter. The early 
'sixties did not help China's reputation in the Western world. The 
Himalayan "ar with India "as a further heavy count against China 
because Ne" Zealand, along "ith its mentors, held China to be the 
guilty party. 
25 E.A.R. August, 1963, p20 
, ....... 
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The war had its origin in the dispute over the border between 
India and China tha·t had been going on since 1958. China claimed 
that t_l-}e border had :aever been properly delimited, while India 
declared that its map claims were the legal alig~~ents. Each side 
moved to occupy the areas claimed by it. In late 1962 Indian forces 
moved beyond the British-established border, the !1cHahon line, and 
came face to face wi·th the Chinese army. Skirmishing occu~red. 
In early October, Neh>:u said that the Army had been given instructions 
to expel the Chinese from Indian-claimed territory. 26 On October 20, 
the Chinese attacked the Indians in force, and for the next month 
advanced to their own territorial claim line. 
New Zealand chose to interpret the border crisis as the result 
of acts of aggression by China. The picture of peaceful India, 
champion of non-violence and negotiation, was cont..rasted wi-th tha.t of 
provocative and aggressive China. In his first statement on the 
Sino-Indian War, Holyoake said: 
"New Zealand cannot fail to be concerned over the acts of 
aggression committed by Communist China against a fellow 
member of the Commonwealth . . . We all, .I am sure 1 have full 
sympathy with the government and people of India in the 
present crisis ..• 
In the area where fighting has occurred, the New Zealand 
government recognises the traditional boundaries of India, 
and we have admired the remarkable restraint exercised by 
India in the face of continual Chinese provocation and 
encroachment. The Chinese, on the other hand, have show-n 
by their actions how little store the government in Peking 
sets upon the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 
vrhich in company \vith India, it proclaimed only eight years 
ago"~ 27 
2 6 11a."nvell, N. India's China Vlar, · p342 
27 External Affairs Review (E.A.R.) october, 1962, p39 
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New Zealand follow·ed up her verbal support of India 1--vith some 
concrete assistance, in the form of army blanket£ and butterfat to 
the value of ten thousand pounds~ The Prime l>iinister co:rrunen ted that 
Ne\v Zealand v,ras not in a position to provide modern military equipment, 
but the government "wanted to h~lp India in the present crisisn. 28 
At the United Nations General Assembly on October 26, 1962, 
Corner said that the aggressive acts of Chinese forces along the 
Indian border inevitably heightened New Zealand's doubts "about the 
present willingness of the Government of the People's Republic to 
accept the obligations, or the essential spirit, of the United Nations 
Charter". 29 
A year later, it was still China's India policy that Holyoake 
quoted as a reason for denying China a~~ission. Asked by a Labour 
member, W.W. Freer, in October, 1963, whether he would instruct Ee" 
Zealand's representative to vote for the a~~ission of China that year, 
Holyoake said' 
"In the light of Communist China's conduct over the last year, 
particularly its brutal attacks on India last October and 
November, and its vicious assault on the partial nuclear test 
ban treaty recently, the government does not believe there 
should be any change in the position". 30 
Nineteen sixty-three sa" the prophets of 1950 borne out in 
the shape of a public split between China an>:l t.'le Soviet Union. 
However, the split did not take the shape hoped for by the optimists 
of a decade before. Instead of a moderate China breaking with Soviet 
28 E.A.R. November, 1962, p23 
29 E.A.R. November, 1962, p54 
30 N.Z.P.D. val. 337, 16 October, 1963, p2490 
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goals, a radical. China was breaking with the Soviet Union for not 
pu1:suing those goals in the most aggressive manner. The Sino-Soviet 
dispute thus seemed to most Western nations to offer little scope 
fo:r· improved relations \-;rith China. As a consequence of ~,e dispute, 
the Soviet Union stopped introducing the annual resolution 1n the 
United Nations to a~~it Peking and expel Taiwan, and from the 1963 
session, left the task to Albania. For the next eight years, it 
was to be the Albanian resolution that the United States and New 
Zealand would argue against. 
One Western nation did see the changing rela·tionship between 
the Soviet Union and China, and that between the Soviet Union and 
the West, as justifying moves towards China. In January, 1964, 
France granted diplomatic recognition to China, the first Western 
nation to do so in a decade. 
Unlike the United States and Ne•; Zealand, France had no vital 
' I, • • 1.nterests to protect 1n. the Far East and there v1ere no confl1cts 
bet>~een it and China. 31 Thus, once China had shown itself independsnt 
of Russian policy, there was no reason for France not to recognise it~ 
The French gcvernment considered it unrealistic to ignore the 
existence of a rising power with a growing influence in Asia. 
De Gaulle and his Cabinet beli~ved that no Asiru< problem, 
including the Indo-China conflict, could be solved without Chimi' s 
cooperation, and recognition was designed to facilitate the advance-
ment of the French plan to neutralise South-east Asia. Neutralisation 
was seen as serving both legitimate Chinese interests in South-east 
31 K 1 ,_. W W u s .... l., . . De C-auUe a:nd the f-lorld - 2'he Fol'eign Policy of the 
Fij'th F'"Pench Republic p314 
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Asia, and French interest L~ reestablishing its influence in an area 
from which it had been ousted by the United States. 
Neither the United States or Ne,. Zealand favoured neutral-
isation because they were not prepared to accommodate any Chinese 
interests in South-east Asia. When asked to comment on the French 
recognition, New Zealand Prime Minister Holyoake made it clear that 
New Zealand would continue not to recognise, and that China's 
international behaviour, in South-east Asia and elsewhere, was the 
primary consideration in this decision. Taiwan's position was 
mentioned only secondarily. 
"Though the time may come when the recognition of Comrnunist 
China should be considered, its actions and policies up to the 
present have not provided any demonstration that persuades the 
New Zealand government that we should depart from r..he attitude 
of previous New Zealand goverrunents on this issue. Our attitude 
has never been an inflexible one, but we must have a consistent 
regard for both principles and facts 11 • 32 
The Prime Minister went on to claim that New Zealand's policy 
of non-recognition had been based since 1949 on this ·country's dis-
approval of China's international behaviour. 
"Since the establishment of the Communist government in 1949, 
successive New Zealand governments have felt that the behaviour 
of the Peking regime gave no indication .. t.hat it was willing to 
accept. the normal standards of international behaviourn~ 
This behaviour consisted of. "pressure on its neighbours, including its 
aggressive attacks on India in 1959 and 1962", and "subversive activityn 
which was a continuing threat to the independence of all the countries 
of the Far East. 
32 Statements by Ministers of the Crown 1964, pl6 
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Holyoa...'<.e even cited China 1 s refusal to sign the Nuclear test-
ban treaty as evidence of her unworthiness. 
It was only after the recitation of China's misdeeds that the 
Prime Minister made mention of Taiwan as a constraint. 
"Horeover, successive New Zealand governments have been 
unt-1illing to accept the claim of Peking to establish, by 
force if necessary, its rule over Taiwan. We have not 
been willing to sacrifice the people of Taiwan, in the 
absence of the expression of any wish on their part, to 
come within the domination of the Cormnunist regime" .. 
The Prime Minister laid down a stringent set of conditions for 
the admission of Peking to the comity of nations. 
"Were there any indication that the Peking government was 
prepared to conduct itself properly, to modj_fy its claims 
to Taiwan, and to demonstrate its willingness to \'JOrk for 
international peace, or if there were some other significant 
change in the situation, we would be 1<illing to :::-eview the 
situation" . 
Diplomatic recognition of Communist China would not, in fact, 
nave necessarily involved an acknowledgE:ffient of China's claim to 
Taiwan. Th<> French recognition had not included any reference to 
China's claim. 
The French government publicly indicated that it did not regard 
its recognition of the People's Republic as precluding a continuing 
recognition of the Chinese administration on Taiwan, and the fact that 
the French were able to say this shows that the Chinese Communists had 
not insisted on France's adopting a one-C:~ina policy as the price for 
diplomatic relations. 
In a statement to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the French 
National Assembly on January 2, 1964, the French Foreign Minister 
stressed that the decision to recognise had been "without conditions 11 , 
and that France would not take any initiative in breaking off her 
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existing· diplomatic relations with the Chinese Nationalists in Formosa., 3 3 
It was Nationalist China that severed relations with France, and 
it did this on February 10, thirteen days after the French recognition. 
New Zealand's government, however, believed that any recognition 
of Peking would implicitly endorse the Communist claim to Taiwan. Thus, 
logically, Peking could not be recognised tmtil the claim to Taiwan <~as 
dropped, or at least a disclaimer of the use of force to assert the 
claim was made, or until Peking recognised the existence of the Nation-
alist government. It w~s not standard practice for diplomatic recog-
nition to involve acknmvledgement of a country's te=itorial claims, 
so New Zealand could not really be accused of prejudicing Taiwan's 
future by recognising China. 
In his imrrtediate comment on the French recognition, Holyoake 
had not mentioned the American attitude as an influential factor on 
New Zealand's policy, but he included it -.hen he discussed the recog-
nition question in his introduction to the 1964 Annual report of the 
Department of External Affairs. The Hinister of External Affairs said 
that he proposed to keep New Zealand's position under review, 
"Taking special note of Communist China_~s conduct a:nd of the 
attitudes of friendly governments".'" 
The United States, of course, was the foremost friendly govern-
ment and it had made it very clear that it disapproved of the French 
recognition. A State Department release of January 27, 1964, admitted 
33 Keesing's Archives February l-8, 1964, p19877 




that pressure had been applied to the French. 
"We have repeatedly expressed to the Goverrunent of France 
our reasons 't\rhy He consider this would be an unfortunate 
s·tep, particularly at a time when the Chinese Corrununists 
are actively promoting aggression and subversion in South-
east Asia and elsewhere 11 • 35 
If New Zealand had been of a mL~d to do the sa~e as France, 
the same pressure would have been applied, but with better results. 
The government of General de Gaulle believed that in an era of increas-
ing detente with the Soviet Union in Europe, France was less dependent 
on the United States and could and should develop an independent role 
on the international scene. Since the United States regarded solidar-
ity on the China issue as an indicator of alliance loyalty, the French 
recognition was, in part, a deliberate move to emphasise French 
independence from American policy. 5 6 New Zealand, on the other hand, 
feeling more vulnerable than France, was eager to strengthen the alliance 
with the United States, and was constrained in its China policy . 
. At the next ANZUS meeting, in July, 1964, the Americans were 
concerned to recommit their smaller allies to a non-recognition policy. 
~ne ANZUS Council reaffirmed its 1953 decision not to grant recognition 
or United Nations admission to China, although_this was not mentioned 
in the communique. 37 
The United States government under the Johnson administration 
continued to believe that the grant of recognition by Western states 
~1ould only encourage the Chinese to persist in their militancy. The 
3 5 Department of State Bul-letin February 17, 1964, p260 
36 See Fejto, F,. "France and China - The Intersection of Two Grand 
Designs", in Halpern, A.N. Policies Toward China - Views frcm Six 
Continents, esp. pp42-43 and 57-58 
37 Starke, J.G. The Anzus Treaty Allia~e. p241 
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policy of assertiveness wuuld be seen by the Conununists to be paying 
appeas6nent dividends. At a press conference in February# 1964, 
Secretary of State Rusk said: 
11 1 think that the problem of French recognition of Peiping [sic] 
is only a portion of what to me is the central problem and that 
is whether the authorities in Peiping are going to be led to 
believe that their policy of militancy will pay dividends". 38 
Even ,qithout the Arnerican attitude, there were plenty of other 
friendly govern..."Uents v1ith negative attitudes. In 1960 Holyoake had 
declared that Nev1 Zealand should take account of South-east Asian 
goverr'"'ent attitudes, and now in 1964 the public stances of the South-
east Asian members of SEATO were against recognition. 
On January 28, the Foreign Minister of the Philippines stated 
that five days previously President Macapagal had asked General de 
Gaulle not to recognise Peking and th.ereby "let down the many nations 
in Asia which are the actual or potential objects of subversion and 
al:tack by Communist China". 39 
Australia's Minister of External Affairs, Barwick, said that 
Peking's attitude on "a number of crucial issues 11 was the principal 
impediment to its wider acceptarice into the international community, 
and that no change in Australian policy in respect of recognition was 
desirable." 0 
Apart from objecting in principle to China's general inter-
national behaviour, New Zealand objected particularly to China's 
actions in South-east Asia which it saw as a direct threat to its 
38 Department of State Bulletin, February 24; 1964, p284. 
is the name by which the Nationalist Chinese call Peking. 
39 Waikato Times, January 28, 1964, pl 
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"
0 Current Notes on International Affai:r;s, January, 1964, p69 
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interests. While China continued to threaten New Zealand's interests 
it could not be recognised. The New Zealand gover~~ent believed that 
its security was linked to a stable_, non-Communist, independent South-
east Asia, and that China threatened that state of affairs because it 
wanted to dominate South-east Asia. Prime Hinister Holyoa.'ce outlined 
the case against China in the House of Representatives in August, 1964. 
The Chinese Communists, he said, TtTere ~'obsessed with the need for 
violence and revolution 11 • They had said that the existing free, 
democratic countries had to be overthrown by armed revolution .. "They 
are quite clear about it .•. they argue that· local wars must be provoked". 
Holyoake said that it >las a doctrine that could not possibly mean peace 
in South-east Asia. He went on to cite. China 1 s record of )!continuous 
aggression" since 1949, mentioning constant Chinese support for renet..red ' 
attacks in Laos and South Vietnam in recent years, and China 1 s support 
for Indonesia's Confrontation policy~ "The point I am making is t.hat 
this is the t.hreat \•hich faces South-east Asia today - a policy of 
armed insurgence, violence I say it must not be allowed to succeed 11 •41 
In December, 1965, at the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association 
Conference, ·the Prime Hinister told delegates that Communist China 
posed the chief threat to world peace by its attempt to take over the 
countries of South-east Asia. New Zealand's aim was to see a world in 
which national identity was respected, he said, but Communist China was 
trying to deny the national identity of South-east Asian states. 
41 N.Z.P.D. vol. 339, pl658, 27 August, 1964 
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nAs we see it:, China has passed through a century of weakness
1 but is now embarking apparently upon a period of strength, and 
is apparently determined to restore its domination and suzerainty 
over the countries which it enjoyed domination and suzeraintv 
ove:]:' in· past centuries. This 1 in our view, is a demonstration 
of the new imperialism". t; 2 
It was not a time for conciliation, but for resistance. In 
May, 1965, New Zealand soldiers joined American troops in what was 
seen as the military containinent of China J.n South Vietnam. New 
Zealand and American military involvement in Indo-China put a 
constraint on moves to\-vards China, as the Korean War had done. At 
the same time, it inevitably gave New Zealand, tvhich feared an escal-
ation of the war to involve China directly, an incentive to bring China 
into the international comity to achieve peace. 
The first signs of a more positive attitude towards China's 
entry to the United Nations - at least in words, if not deeds - did 
not come immediately. In reply to a Labour question in July 1965 
about Communist China and the United Nations, the Prime Minister said: 
"When Cornmunis·t China behaves herself in a normal fashion, l'lhen 
Communist China agrees to settle international disputes by 
peaceful means, instead of by revolution as she proposes to do 
••• and \'lhen Communist China says, 'Yes, we will consider the 
question of the two Chinas', then the attitude of this government 
will change". 43 
Two months later, \<hen the Indo-Pakistani war broke out, and China sent 
a warning to India on Pakistan's behalf, the Prime Hinister used the 
fact to justify China's continuing exclusion from the United Nations. 
The Chinese ultimatum was "another example of the threatening, bellicose 
42 E.A.R. December, 1965, p33 
43 N.Z.P.D. val. 343, pl300, 14 July, 1965 
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and bullying 2<J::titude of Communist China", and it was 
"further proof and justification for the view that Communist 
China is not yet ready or qualified for membership of an 
organisation the central objective of which is to settle 
disputes between nations by peaceful means 11 • 44 
In November, however, in front of an international audience at the 
United Nations, the New Zealand repres.entative was more inclined to 
see a place for China in that body. The obstacle was Taiwan, rather 
than China's international behaviour. F.H. Corner told the Assembly 
that New Zealand recognised the force of many of the arguments in 
favour of Peking's participation, but the difficult part was the price 
of Peking's admission. If the Assembly were to act in conformity 
with the Charter, it could not subscribe to the notion that the fate 
of the island of Taiwan was of no concern to the international corrununity. 
That would be to make a mockery of all that was said about self-
determination. Corner now declared that New Zealand did not want to 
see Communist China proscribed. 
"We look forward to some acceptable opening up of the present 
impasse which would enable Peking to participate in the work 
of the United Nations". 45 
The next year saw an upsurge of public interest in the United 
States in China policy. The Senate began to hold public hearings 
on the issue, and the Secretary of State delivered a general revie•" 
and projection of American dealings with China to a subcommittee of 
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives on 
Harch 15. Rusk reiterated that the United States must take care to 
do nothing which would encourage Peking to believe that it could reap 
44 N.Z.P.D. vol. 344, p3176, l October, 1955 
45 E.A.R. November, 1955, p25 
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gains from its aggressive actions and designs, but it would continue 
to make plain that if Peking abandoned its violent strategy the United 
States \'lOUld v:elcome an era of good relations~ 4 6 The Secretary then 
set forth elements of future policy towards China. In the course of 
these, he said: n So long as Peiping follm.vs its present course it is 
extremely difficult for us to see ho" it can be held to fulfill the 
requirements set forth in the Charter for membership, and the United 
States opposes its membership". Rusk said, ho\.·Jever, tha.t the United 
States would continue to enlarge the possibilities for unofficial 
contacts bet"een China and the United States·. Contact and co~~unication 
were not incompatible with a firm policy of containment. 
When Holyoake next conLrnented in Parliament on NeH Zealand's 
attitude to the recognition of Conununist China and its admittance to the 
United Nations, in June, 1966, he did not say that New Zealand wanted to 
see China in the United Nations. The Prime l<'.inister made the old point 
that China was continuing policies that constituted a serious threat to 
world peace and security, as well as to the objectives of the United 
Nations. He went on to say: 
"There is no doubt that Conrrnunist China's voice must be heard anc1 
its legitimate concerns taken into account in any major inter-
national negotiations. For that reasofl., the government has supp-
orted the proposal for a world disarmament conference in which it 
was envisaged that Communist China would participate, and 't'!e have 
also supported a proposal that Communist China should be included 
in discussion on any negotiations on peace in Vietnamn. 47 
That was as far as the Prime Minister was prepared to go. Nineteen 
sixty-six was an election year, and the government was making its 
Vietnam policy an issue at the polls. Since a major justification for 
that policy was the need to check the spread of Chinese influence, 
46 !1acFa.rqu.'>ar, R. (ed.l Sino-A.merican Relations 1949-19?1 p223 
47 N.Z.P.D. vol. 346, p222, 7 June, 1966 
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there could be no concessions to China. At the United Nations 
General Assembly session in November, 1966 1 hot ... Tever, New Zealand 
revealed an interest in including China in the world body by its 
involvement in the putting forward of a proposal to set up a 
committee to study the issue of Chinese representation. Prime 
Minister Holyoake described the move, initiated by Italy, Belgium and 
some South American nations, as "sensible and practical", 4 8 and said 
that on his instructions, the Nev; Zealand mission had been playing an 
active role in discussions which led to the tabling of the new resol-
ution. It is notable that Australia did not support this ini·tiative, 
and voted against it. 49 The United States, however, did support it. 
The motion did not pass. 
It seemed that while the Australian goverP~ent was staying 
with the purely moral-ideological stance that both ANZAC governments 
had adopted hitherto, New Zealand was prepared to shift ground slightly 
in the direction of pragmatism. In doing so, it was not going beyond 
the ~cmerican position. 
New Zealand's United Nations representative Corner told the 
General Assembly that New Zealand's approach to the China representation 
question was that there existed a series of concrete political realities 
that had to be,. in effect, balanced out. The existence and nuclear 
power of Com.~unist China had to be balanced against its policies and 
doctrines, and against the existence of the Republic of China. Corner 
said that the proposal to establish a committee to study the question 
48 E.A.R. November, 1966, pl9 
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of Chinese representat."Lon recognised that a solution to the problem 
would have to be consistent \>Jith the principles of the Charter as 
\>Jell as the aim of universality. 
He did not expect the committee to come up «ith a readily 
acceptable solution, since 
"The basic problem will remain: that the Peking government 
has espoused doctrines that are dangerous to world peace 
and security and has imposed conditions upon its associations 
with this body that are unacceptable". 
The New Zealand delegate "'as thus saying that China's entry 
to the United Nations should still be conditional on acceptable 
behaviour. The weight of China's policies was still enough in Ne« 
Zealand's eyes to offset her compelling claims to menlbership. 
Although 'che onset of the Cultural Revolution in China see1ned "to 
betoken more rather than less intransigence and a greater rather 
than a lesser determination to reject the world and .• to deny 
CorruLtunist China•s responsibilities", Corner said that New Zealand did 
not foreclose the possibility of useful results from the study 
committee. The Assembly had to face up to its responsibilities in 
an issue of this importance, "whatever we may think of the likelihood 
that the Peking government will face up to the,-1rs". 50 In other 'to-lOrds r 
it was important that an effort be made to formulate a fair solution. 
Corner went on to extend the point Holyoake had made in June: 
China's voice had to be heard, not only where its interests were 
directly affected, but in all major international negotiations. He 
related this directly to the United Nations, which Holyoake had not. 
50 . E.A.R. November, 1966, p35 
"We accept that . . . the right of China to be a party to 
negotiations that affect its legitimate interests - is 
relevant to the situation in the United Nations". 
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Accordingly! Ne•..-1 Zealand was prepared to give "serious consider-
ationn to any proposal aimed at seating Cornmu..rdst China in the United 
Nations, provided this was not brought about at the expense of the 
Republic of China or in a manner that would jeopardise the right of 
the people of Tai"t.van to a voice in their future. 
At this stage, a proposal to seat China v.;ould receive only 11 Serious 
consideration 11 , not necessarily support. China's right to participate 
in international discussions, and the value of her doing so, were not 
overriding factors, but just elements in the balance. 
For all that New Zealand seemed to be prepared to see China in 
the United Nations as an aid to international negotiations, the govern-
ment had more reservations about granting diplomatic recognition to 
China. Whereas United Nations membership could be seen as a necessary 
evil - a realistic bowing to the facts of pm1er to help ensure peace -
diplomatic recognition could be seen much more e.s a mark of approval. 
Holyoake came back from the SEATO Council meeting of 1966 saying, in 
effect, that there could be no conciliatory moves until Chinese ambitions 
had .been frustrated: the priority was for resisting China, and only 
"hen the clash of influences in south-east Asia had been resolved 
(that is, when the Vietnam War had been won, and China changed its 
tactics) could there be moves towards co-existence. The Prime Minister 
stated that the SEATO countries should in the long-term \vork towards 
living peacefully with Communist China, but that currently it was 
essential to resist the.Chinese pressure being felt everywhere in Asia. 5 1 
51 O.D.T. June 29, 1966, p6 
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The impression conveyed by the Prime 11inister that a relatior1-
ship wi·th 'china could not be inaugurated until there had been changes 
in China's South-east Asian policies was somewhat overshadowed in 
these years by his frequent reference to Taiwan as.the major constraint 
on Ne~., Zeal arid • s recognition of China. 
In Hay, 1967, Holyoake indicated that he saw the Taiwan issue 
as the basic impediment to the recognition of China by Ne\•7 Zealand~ 
Requested by one of his a~..m bacY..benchers in Parliament for an assurarwe 
t"11at, in considering the recognition question, the goverlhilent \•iould 
give due weight to the right of the people of Taiwan to determine 
their own future, Holyoake gave it. 
"I have always believed that a just and reasonable settlcme:ot 
of this problem must safeguard the rights of the 13,000,000 
people of Formosa to deterll'ine their own future. That is 
why I am not prepared to recommend that Ne¥7 Zealand should 
extend formal recognition to Co~~unist China. That is the outstanding obstacle". 52 
The Prime Hinister went on to insist that granting recognition 
in the current circumstances would mean withdrat'ling recognition from 
the Republic of China and "acknowledging Conununist China's authority 
over Formosa". 
Holyoake's linking of these two factors reiterated the apparent 
belief of the government that the,first would lead to the second. 
Both Britain and France recognised Peking without acknowledging 
Peking's authority over Formosa. Britain, indeed, had explicitly 
stated that it regarded Taiwan's status as undetermined. Ne1v Zealand 
however, was committed to the continuing recognition of the Republic 
of China as the only means of guaranteeing Taiwan's right to remain 
52 N.Z.P.D. vol. 350, p795, 24 May, 1967 emphasis added 
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ncn-Commun.ist .. 'hThen the New Zealand government spoke of trying to 
preserve Taitvan' s right to self-determination, it meant the Republic 
of China's right to exist as an entity separate from the People's 
Republic. It did not mean the right of the people of Tai\\'an to 
choose their own govermnent - be it the Republic of China, the 
~eople's Republic, or some non-Chinese alternative. New Zealand 
presumed that the Republic of China government was truly represent-
ati ve of the 1-1ishes of the Taiwanese .. Britain, on the other hand, 
did not. Britain upheld the right of the Taiwanese people to 
choose their oo;.vn government, but it did not recognise the Republic 
of China as either the government of mainland China or of TaiHan. 
New Zealand wanted to pursue a two-Chinas policy, but since 
this was not acceptable to the parties involved, the govermnent 
preferred to recognise the friendly China rather than the unfriendly 
regime. The question was not the objective one of which represented 
China, but of what was necessary to continue to support the gove~~ment 
of Taiwan. This could only be done by diplom2.tic recognition of it 
as the government of all China. 
For all its professed concern for demonstrating support for 
the separate regime on Taiwan, the government did not see the establish-
ment of an embassy on the island as a matter of high priority, or even 
of necessity. In July, 1966, the Holt government in Australia .under-
lined its support for the Nationalists on Taiwan by establishing a 
diplomatic post on the island. The Holyoake government did not follow 
suit .. In reply to a suggestion ironically advanced by former Leader 
of the Opposition Nordmeyer - that New zealand should send an ambassador 
to Taipei, the Prime Minister said that New Zealand;s diplomatic resources 
were stretched to the limit as it was, and that besides, the existing 
arrangement was quite adequate. 
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"A very satisfLlctory charmel of communication exists between 
the two governments, so tha'!:: no practical difficulties arise from the absence of a Ne\\7 Zealand representative in Taipeh11 • 53 
The satisfactory charu1el was the Chinese Embassy in Wellington. 
The recent establishment of two posts in Europe, at Bonn and Rome, 
had been responsible for the straining of the Department of External 
Affairs' resources: these posts had obviously been thought more 
important to New Zealand's interests than one in the Tai·..ranese capital. 
New Zealand, in the wake of BritaiD 1 s c.n.rJ.ounc.:ed interest in joining· 
the European Economic Community, was giving high priority to iruproving 
relations with EEC nations in order to keep access to the British 
market. Taiwan had, by comparison, no economic significance for 
New Zealand. 
Holyoake commented that he thought the suggestion of establish-
ing a post vm.s "an indication of the gro\'zing acceptance of the i.rnportant 
role in Asian affairs which the Government. of the Republic of China 
has to play". 
New Zealand had, in the previous month, bacome politically 
associated with Taiwan in the Asian and Pacific Council, a body designed 
to promote closer political and economic relat!ons a~ong the anti-Communist 
nations of East Asia. As >vell as Taiwan and New Zealand, the members 
were South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Japan, 
Malaysia and Australia. Australia's decision to establish an ambassador 
in Taipei was partly prompted by this new relationship >lith Taiwan. 
Although Holyoake claimed that the relationship between Nationalist 
China and New Zealand did not need a New Zealand representative in Taipei 
53 E.A.R. July, 1966, p25 
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to be fruitful~ in political terms the sending of an ambassador would 
have demonstrated very viv·idly the COIP.mibnent New Zealand claimed to 
the Taiwan government. The Australian government felt the need to 
make t..~is demonstration, but New Zealand's did not.· 
By 1967, the Prime Minister, when he spoke against China's 
international behaviour, was talking also of the desirability of 
making moves to encourage change in China's attitudes .. In South 
Korea in January, Holyoake averred that the nmenace of Communist 
Chinese expansion" still threatened the peace and security of the 
Asian-Pacific region. He accused the Chinese of attempting to 
hamper the peaceful economic and social progress to which the free 
coun·tries of Asia were dedicated, by 11 constant propaganda and mate:t:ial 
support of so-called liberation fronts". 54 The Prime Hinister 
appeared, however, to have had second thoughts about the best ,..,~ay of 
dealing with the recalcitrant giant. 
"We have to face the fact that the regime in Peking is in 
effective control over the most populous nation in the world. 
It is no ans'li;ier to merely isolate it". 
'£his attitude marked a definite change from the pre-1965 period, 
when the policy seemed to be based on just sucp an answer. Holyoake 
continued: 
"We must, of course, remain ready to contain aggression wherever 
it may threaten to take place ••. At the same time, however, >Je 
must strive ·towards a greater and more constructive goal, nru-nely, 
that the true voice of the Chinese people will once more be heard 
and welcomed in the councils of the world". 
54 A E •. R. January, 1967, p39 
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In earlier years, the emphasis had been wholely on con·tainment: 
no1v, the Prime Minister thought that efforts had to be made to encourage 
the development of moderate tendencies in the Chir..ese government, ·which 
were the 11 true" expression of the outlook of the Chinese people. Once 
that had been done, China could take her rightful place in organs like 
the United Nations. 
Holyoake now admitted that he could see advantages in increasing 
the contacts between mainland China and the rest of the world, 
"so t.hat all the Chinese people may eventually come to feel 
that they do, in fact, belong to the brotherhood of the nations 
of the world. Only by cowbining firw~ess with flexibility 
can we pave the way for an eventual settlement of the problems 
which at present appear insoluble". 
In May, 1967, the Prime Minister sta·ted that he saw continuing New 
Zealand trade with China as one possible way of modifying Chinese 
attitudes. After announcing the cessation of the export of tallo\\T 
to No1:th Vietnam for the duration of the Vietnamese War, Holyoake 
\vent on to defend its continuing export to China. 
"The government will ... keep the question of trade in tallow 
with mainland China under review. Without clearer evidence 
that this export is of strategic ~ignificance, however, the 
government does not propose to take steps to curtail it. 
It has always seemed to me that a steady increase in trade 
between Western countries and mainland E:hina is perhaps o!'le 
of the more persuasive factors that may eventually convince the 
Chinese Communist authorities of the desirability of seeking 
a more normal relationship with the outside world. The 
government would be very sorry' to make any move, without good 
cause, \'lhich might hinder that ~evelopment". 55 
During the decade, Ne\v Zealand exports to China had been rising 
in value, although the total by 1967 was not significant in terms of 
New Zealand's total trade. In 1961, New Zealand had exported £1,323,000 
55 E.A.R. May, 1967, p24 
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($2,646,000) worth of goods to the People's Republic and had taken 
.!2.434,000 ($868,000) \-rorth of Chinese imports. 56 In 1964, the export. 
trade to China was worth£2,313,000 ($4,526,000) and in 1966,£.2,567,000 
($5,134,000). 57 In 1967 it was to jump to $7,696,000, with Nevl ZE!aland 
buying $2,945,000 worth of Chinese goods. 58 The 1967 figure represent-
ed one percent of the total value of New Zealand's exports that year. 
At a time v;hen New Zealand v;as attempting to diversify its markets 
in response to the threat of Britain's joining the EEC, the government 
was likely to be hesitant about imperilling trade with a grov;ing 
customer. 
Later in 1967, the Prime Minister went as far as to say that 
the achievement of a modus vivendi with China was a major objective 
of New Zealand' s foreign policy. In answer to a question in Parlia-
ment from a mernber of his own party about government policy towards 
China, Holyoake said: uAll members of this House must recognise that 
there can be no lasting stability in Asia and the Pacific until a way 
has been found to live at peace with Communist China. Certainly 
this government acknowledges that this is a major objective of New 
Zealand foreign policy". 59 
The Prime Minister was quite ready to acknowledge now that 
a policy of containment alone was ultimately an unsatisfactory one. 
He was prepared to give an accommodation v;ith China high ranking 
on a list of New Zealand foreign policy objectives. Significantly, 
however, there was no suggestion of a policy initiative to realise 
56 Appendices I and II, Annual Report of the Department of Industries 
and Commerce, 1964, pp62-63 
57 Appendix I, A.R.D.I.C. 1967, p59 
58 Appendix I, A.R.D.I.C. 1970, p72; Appendix II, p73 
59 N.Z.P.D. vol. 351, pl681, 7 July, 1967 
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that objective. Holyoake thought that the accommodation ball was 
in China•s court, and that China gave no sign of being interested 
in returning it. 
"I must say .. that at the present ti...'1le Communist China shows 
very fev7 signs of desiring or working towards a more normal 
relationship with any outside country, whether Communist or 
non-Communist, Asian or otherwise; so it does seem that 
prospects for an early accommodation with Communist China a=e 
not ver:1 promisi:r..g 11 • 
New Zealand 1 then, '\>las prepared to deal with China once China 
showed signs of wanting to be dealt \·lith, but not before. There 
would be no moves towards China. Two months later the Prime Minister 
made the point again when he was asked to comment on a Japanese 
politician's statement about the necessity for peaceful co-existence 
>lith China. Holyoake replied that New Zealand had never wished for 
anything but peaceful co-existence wi.th China, but to attain that 
state, efforts had to be made on both sides, 11 and I do not belie\te 
that anything will be achieved until Communist China's aggressive 
foreign policy is changed". 6 0 
In the House of Representatives in July, 1968, a new government 
backbencher, G. Gair, spoke out. for the view that China must mend 
her ~<ays before she could be accepted by any country. Gair challenged 
the view that China's entry into the United Nations would serve a 
useful purpose. He said tha·t the proponents of China's entry said 
that her presence was necessary for international discussions, if for 
nothing else. 
"I question whether the opportunity to talk is really a vital 
point; it is more a willingness to discuss, to reason, to 
listen, to compromise, and· ·to act in good faith ... 
60 N.Z.P.D. vel. 352. p3004, 13 September, 1967 
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. . The admission of Red China to the Un:Lted Nations in the 
pre,sent atmosphere and with the present attitude of the 
Government of Red China would be tantamount to debasing the 
value of the United Nations. It would be like rewarding 
a bad boy for his behaviour. ITI the short-ter~t, China's 
present attitudes cast a very real shadow upon the Eastern 
hemisphere, and in fact, upon the whole world". 61 
Gair believed that good behaviour and peaceful intentions 
should still be the prime prerequisites for China's admission to the 
United Nations. The western world should continue to play a waiting 
game until China "matured" by itself. 
11 in the long-term, I believe ... that the feelings 
\vhich cause t..l-J.at country to adopt so many unreasonable 
stands on the international scene today will mellow. As 
the standard of living in China improves, her attitude 
towards the world will become more responsible". 
That Gair's attitude epitomised that of the government is 
borne out by the fact that the sentiments were endorsed by New 
Zealand's United Nations representative in the General Assembly that 
November. F.H. Corner told the Assembly that New Zealand could not 
see the issue of Chinese representation as a sL~ple procedural one, 
but as "a question involving the attitudes of each member of this 
Assembly towards fundamental issues of pea~e and security •• ". 62 
The gover~~ent continued to see China'~-attitudes as relevant 
criteria for admission to the United Na·tions. In taking this position, 
however, the goverrunent did not deny the continuing need for China'a 
admission. Corner said that he wished to make it clear that in 
rejecting the Albanian resolution, the government in no way denied 
"the need for Conununist China's voice to be heard" .. It was axiomatic 
to New Zealand, he said, that peace and security could not be established 
61 N.Z.P.D. val. 355, p642, July 19, 1968 
52 E.A.R. November 1968, p40 
200. 
in the area on an enduring basis without the support - or at leas·t 
the acquiesence - of the Peking gover~~ent. 
Echoing Gair's point, Corner said that the acceptance of 
Peking's representatives in the United Nations would not, in itself 1 
guarantee that problems such as the peace of Asia would come nearer 
to solution. 
"Regrettably 1 't.re are here cons1.aering the case of a government 
which over the years has not only rejected the accepted norms 
of domestic and international conduct, but has made of such 
rejection a philosophy and a way of life". 
The representative said that during the year, the New Zealand 
government had "looked in vain11 for any signs that the Peoplers 
Republic had moderated its attitudes, and he referred specifically to 
China's encouragement of North Vietnam to reject any prospect of 
negotiating a settlement to the conflict in Vietnam, and t.o the 
continued testing of nuclear weapons in the ab~osphere. These 
"failures of the Communist Chinese government to act·as a responsible 
member of the international community" l...rere "essential elements" in 
New Zealand's consideration of the question. 5 3 
Taiwan was thus not the only obstacle in New Zealand's eyes 
to China's admittance. 
At the same time that Corner was telling the United Nations 
that there was a second major objection in New zealand's eyes to 
Chinese entry, Prime Minister Holyoake, when replying to pressure 
group demands that the government support China's admission, continued 
to refer only to the Taiwanese constraint. 
63 E.A.R. November, 1968, pp40-41. Emphasis added 
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In November, l968, Holyoa'<e claimed that he had frequently 
ackno;,vledged the value that would be derived from associating main-
land Cb.ina with the main currents of international activity, including 
the Uni·ted Nations. However, 
"the government 1 s position is that it cannot support moves 
to bring Communist China into the United Nations so long as 
Communist China and its supporters insist that this can only 
be done on the basis of denying the right of the Republic of 
China to continuing representation in the world organisation" .64 
At the end of 1968, then, New Zealand's position with regard 
to Chinese representation did not differ greatly from that of l961. 
The government now acknowledged that China's presence in the United 
Nations was necessary - something it had not said earlier in the decade 
but it continued to hold that China's international behaviour could. not 
be overlooked in any decision, although it did not always say so ~n 
public pronounc~"ents. The protection of the Taiwan government's 
interests had emerged as the most prominent public constraint on 
New Zealand's China policy. 
Conclusion 
The return of the National Party to office in 1960 meant a 
return to an essentially negative policy on China. The detenninants 
of China policy remained the same as in the previous decade, but 
their order of importance, as avo-;•md by government spokesmen, changed. 
In the period of Opposition from 1957 to 1960, the National 
Party seemed primarily concerned, as it had always been, that moves 
towards a relationship with the People's Republic of China would 
strain New Zealand's alliance -;1ith the United States. Beyond that, 
6
'' E.A.R. November, 1968, p27 
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recognition would convey approval of China's policies in. South-east 
Asia, and a non-interest in the fate of those Asian states resisting 
Chinese pressure. Finally, recognition would undermine the position 
of the Taiv-;an government and thus make Conununist subversion of the 
Chinese minorities in Asia easier. New Zealand's firs·t priority, 
the party believed, should be the support of its friends rather than 
conciliation of the enemy. 
These attitudes carried over into government in the sixties, 
but in public there were changes. 
alliance was now never mentioned. 
The concern for the American 
Instead 1 it was a perceived 
commitment to the Tai\..m.n government that was increasingly emphasised. 
The only public clue to L~e fact that American views were still 
influential on New Zealand's China policy came indirec·tly in 1964 
when the Prime Ninister said that the government would take the 
attitudes of friendly governments into account in formulating China 
policy. Yet neither the domestic political environnient nor the 
international environmen-t had changed substantially to account for 
this. The government was quite prepared to justify its Vietnam 
commitment in terms of the needs of the American alliance, and the 
need to toe the line on China policy >ras almost as compelling under 
a Democratic administration that was deeply involved in south-east 
Asia as it had been under a Republican administration guided by Dulles. 
The Taiwanese people were to be guaranteed the right to self-dete~ination 
and this could only be done, it was believed, by continuing to recognise 
their government diplomatically as the government of China. Seemingly, 
the New Zealand government had convinced itself that a derecognition 
of the Taiwan government would give Peking a moral and legal carte blanche 
to take over the island. Not only would this be wrong, but it could 
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lead to international \var. Once the government had decided that 
the regime on Taiwan could not be derecognised, Communist China could 
not be recognised until it accepted the t'i·JC-China concept. 
People's Republic had said it would never do. 
'I'his the 
Tlrroughout the decade, China's international behaviour was used 
as a justification for New Zealand 1 s l10n·-recognition policy, and its 
opposition to China's admission to the United Nations. Wi·th o:·egard 
to the United Nations, New Zealand was concerned that China's actions 
did not square ·with the principles of the Charter, and insisted until 
1968 that fealty to those principles must be as compelling a criterion 
for entry as any demand of realism or universality. In 1962, the 
New Zealand delegate in the United Nations said that China's India 
policy had heightened doubts about China's willingness to accept the 
principles of the Charter, and in 1964 the Prime Minister demanded 
that China demonstrate her worthiness for membership in the United 
!Nations. After 1965, the government began cautiously to suggest 
that China's presence in the United Nations would be useful, and 
that she had a right to participate in discussions where her legitimate 
interests were concerned. However, this still did not override the 
factor of her unacceptable international behaviou,:. New Zealand . 
demonstrated her interest in China's entry into the United Nations 
"ith her support for a study committee on the issue. 
Whereas China could not be admitted to the United Nations 
because its policies violated the moral strictures of the Charter, 
it could not be diplomatically recognised by New Zealand because its 
policies threatened New Zealand's·interests. China, in New Zealand's 
eyes, wanted to undermine the independence of South-east Asian countries, 
\-lhich Nev.1 Zealand believed was vital to its security. China was, in 
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particular, seen as the motive force behind the v1ar in Vietnam in 
which New Zealand tvas involved~ Even if the Taiwan obstacle could 
be overcome, the government believed that China could not be recognised 
while NF~v Zealand and South-east ],.sia were trying to resis·t her 
subversion. Recognition in these circumstances could only be appease-
ment. 
As the decade wore on - and the Vietnam War continued -
official rhetoric changed from stressing resistance to Chinese policies 
and non-appeasement to the desirability of an accommodation with China. 
In January, 1967, Holyoake said that it was not an answer to isolate 
Peking, and contacts between China and the VJestern world were desi1.:able~ 
The government was careful to emphasise, however, that there could. be 
no real relationship until China changed her policies. 
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CHAPTER 6 
NEW ZEJI.LAND AND CHINA 1969-72 
Introduction 
The year 1969 saw the beginnings of change in the policies of 
Western states towards China, and also signs of a more receptive 
attitude on the part of the Chinese towards Western overtures. 
Canada began to negotiate with China in February for diplomatic relat-
ions, and t...h.e ne~· Nixon administration in the United States announced 
itself eager for a new relationship with China. China, after the 
belligerence and chaos of the Cultural Revolution, and in the face of 
a. perceived threat from the Soviet Union, seemed to be assu..u.ing a more 
moderate outlook. New Zealand in ·this period declared positively 
that it wanted to recognise China and see it admitted to ~~e United 
iNations, and, publicly at least, discarded China's international 
behaviour {which it did not see as fundamentally changed) as a con-
straint on recognition. The' Taiwanese constraint, however was upheld. 
Moves towards an improved relationship with China did not get underway 
until 1971, after New Zealand's two closest allies, the United States 
and Australia, announced positive measures to increase contact, ~~d 
after the Labour Opposition began pressing the issue. By the end 
of the government's term of office, however, little progress had been 
made. 
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In May,. 1968, the new Canadian Prime Minister, Piei·re Trudeo.u, 
a.!lJ.!OUilced in his first foreign policy statement that his government 
would proceed irnmediately to enter into negotiations \\"~'ith the govern-
ment of Communist China .. 
nour aim will be to recognise the People's Republic of China 
gover!'lrr..ent as soon as possible and to enable that government 
to occupy the seat of China in the United Nations 1 taking into 
account that there is a separate government in Taiwan 11 .. 1 
Canada 1 s government was no1·1 prepared to seize the initiative 
in the matter of coming to terms \'lith China, even though it, too, had 
a concern for the interests of the Taiwanese and had in the past been 
unwilling to cross t.l-Ie .P....mericans on the issue. 
Unlike New Zealand, C~~ada did not see China's attitude to the 
rest of the world as a reason for standing off from it diplomatically. 
Canadian negotiations opened with the Chinese in Februa.ry, 1969. 
Prime ~linister Holyoake took the opportunity of discussing 
the question with Trudeau when the two met for the first -ti __ me in 
January, 1969 at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference in 
London. Holyoake told Trudeau that New Zealandi too, was prepared 
to extend full diplomatic recognition to Communist China, but not 
at the expense of New Zealand's diplomatic re1_ations with Taiwan. 2 
'I'his was the most positive statement yet made by the government on 
relations with China, and there >Tas apparently no reference to 
China's international behaviour. The New Zealand position differed 
from Canada's in its insistence that the world acknowledge two Chinas; 
and in its determination to stay with the Republic of China if L~ere 
1 Dobell, P.c. "Canada's SeaJ:>ah for New Rol.es- Foreign Pol.iay in the 
Trudeau Ex'a" ppl03-l04 
2 Otago DaiZ.y Times January 29, 1969, pS 
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'\<Jere no movement in that direction .. The Canadians did not mind 
severing the diplomatic link with t.he Nationalist Chinese government 
as long as thsy did not thereby legally endorse the Co:nmunist claim 
to Taiwan. In May, 1969, Canadian Minister of External 11ffairs 
Hitchell Sharp said: 
11 Canada has a One-China policy, and since the Nationalist 
government purports also to be the government of China we 
cannot recognise boL~ Peking and Taiwan at the same timen. 3 
New Zealand believed that a continuing comrnib~ent to the 
government of Taiwan 'tV'as necessary to preserve the rights of the 
people of the island. Canada did not. 
Holyoake discussed the recognition of Peking with t>m other 
governments while he was in Europe: those of France and Italy. 
The latter was, like Canada, seeking to develop a relationship with 
China. 
Again, Hol.yoake emphasised that Taiwan was the only constraint 
on New Zealand's supporting a positive policy tm<ards Communist China. 
11 I told them I was as a:-ware as they of the anomalous features 
of China's international position, and I acknowledged the 
absurdity of having the most populous nation on earth outside 
the United Nations organisation. But, I emphasised, New 
Zeal~~d was not prepared to see CommuniSt Chinars entry 
achieved at the expense of the right of the people of Taiwan 
to their o~m representation". 4 
The Prime Minister told the Italians that the Taiwanese 
government was as much a reality as that of Communist Chinar and it 
~las one with "hich New Zealand had friendly and fruitful relations. 
New Zealand valued the contributions made by Taiwan to forms of 
regional co-operation in which New Zealand was engaged, he said. 
3 Externat Affairs (Ca~ada) vol. 22, No.l2, p415 
4 Annuat Report of the Department of Externat Affa·irs 1969, p7, 
AJHR A-1 
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[This was a reference to the Asian and Pacific Council]. In addition, 
New zealand, as a small nation near Asia, could not lightly regard 
the wishes of the people of Tah·Jan themselves. 
Back in New Zealand, the Prime Minister repeated these sentiments 
publicly. At the annual conference of the United Nations Association 
in March, Holyoake said that he -;."anted to make it quite clear that 
New Zealand's policy was not directed towards excluding Ccrr~unist 
China from the United Nations. The Prime Hinister reiterated that 
it >-laS now "patently absurd" that the most populous country in the 
world did not take part in the United Nations Organisation, but for 
New Zealand it was objectionable that Taiwan had to be ejected to 
make room for it. 5 
The Prime Minister explained New Zealand's obsession with 
Taiwan by saying: "We have a special sympathy for the position of 
other small states and we value our association with Nationalist China, 
particularly in regional activities which we share with them 11 • 
Holyoake noted tha·t some faint indications of a possible change in 
Commru1ist China's attitudes had appeared. "Perhaps the Canadians 
will find more when they discuss the question of recognition with 
the Chinese Commlli1ists. We'll be following these talks with great 
interest". 
In his introduction to the Annual Report of the Department of 
External Affairs, tabled in Parliament in Jlli1e, Holyoake ;oaid that 
he thought that the Canadian and Italian negotiations offered " a most 
useful opportlli1ity for testing Commlli1ist China's disposition to seek 
5 Exte?aal Affairs Review March 1969, p27 
( 
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wider and better relations in the international cmmnunity at large" .. 5 
Evidence of such a disposition, it seemed, ,_.,rould be a willingness to 
compromise on the Taiv1an issue. 
When a member of the Opposition, J.L~ Hunt, asked Holyoake in 
Parlia.Ir.ent 1vhether members could assume that if Canada and Italy 
recognised Communist China, New Zealand would shortly afterwards do 
so, the Prime Minister replied that this would depend entirely on 
the terms and conditions under which these governmen-ts gra.nted 
recognition. Holyoake said that he had already made some reservations, 
one of which was in respect to the position of the Nationalist Chinese, 
and there ·v.;ere 11 some other considerations toe lengthy to go into now"~ 7 
Another Opposition member, J. Mathison, suggested that one of 
these other considerations was the vie'ir'lS of Ne"t'l Zealand's allies. 
11Would it be a fair interpretation of the Prime Ninister' s 
answer to say that we will have to wait until America and 
Australia follow the lead of Canada and Italy before New 
Zealand reconsiders her attitude on this question? 118 
The Prime Minister denied that interpretation of his answer, 
saying that New Zealand •.qould make up its own mind on the matter. 
He went on to emphasise that th€ "basic problem11 for New Zealand was 
Communist China's refusal to a~cept the existence of two Chinas. 
Whatever the other considerations were, they were not publicly as 
important as New Zealand's co~~itment to Taiwan. 
One of the other considerations seems to have been a reluctance 
to encourage the South-east Asian states to enter into too close a 
relationship with China. The effect of a New zealand recognition of 
e A.R.D.E.A. 1969, p7 AJHR A-1 
7 N.Z.P.D. vol. 360, p446, 3 June, 1969 
8 Ibid. ' 
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China on the governments of South-east Asia had alv;ays been a fac·tor 
in recognition policy. The Ne~v Zealand government still feared the 
security implications of an extension of Chinese influence over South-
east Asia, and recognition by New· Zealand, a close associate of South-
east Asian nations, could ser\le as a bad example to them. In ~lay, 
the Assistant Secretary of External Affairs, O.P. Gabites had posited 
this problem. 
Gabites told the Institute of Public Administration in Hay 
that New Zealand shared a concern \'lith the Soviet Union nto see 
limits imposed on the extension of Chinese influence"A [Holyoake 
had reiterated in ~srch that the extension of Chinese influence in 
South-east Asia would pose a long-te~Jn threat to Australia and New 
Zealand]. Gabites said that al~~ough China's attitudes would seem 
to modify after the Cultural Revolution, probably in the form of a 
return to the policies of the Bandung era, this would only be another 
tactic to expand Chinese influence. Any reaching-out policy on 
China's part he said would tax New Zealand's political skill to the 
utmost. 
"We will need to strike a sensible balance between 
encouraging moves which will enable the rest of Asia 
to live at peace \"Jith China, and urging a degree of caution· 
in the face of what we know of Chinese determination to 
shape the destiny of Asia in accordance with Chinese 
interests". 9 
The government was worried that if it encouraged moves by 
South-east Asian states to develop relations with China, those nations 
•rould find themselves more open to subversion. A move by New Zealand 
9 •political Developments Affecting New Zealand in the PacifiC 1 
E.A.R. ~my, 1969, pl3 
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to grant diplomatic recognition to China would hardly be "striking 
a sensible balance 11 : it would be a spur when caution was necessary. 
The Minister of Industries and Commerce reflected this ambi-
valence in a speech made in Tokyo a month later at ·the fourth meeting 
of the Asian and Pacific Council. N.H. Shelton said that his govern-
ment agreed that the time had come for Asian leaders to try to have 
talks with the leaders of Corrum.L'rlist China~ 
"Because of its size, its vast population, and its grovJing 
military strength, Corrmtlmist China will have a major impact 
on the future of our area. Our task is to see if we can 
persuade the Communist Chinese to act in ways which will not 
threaten the independence of other states". 
Shelton went on to warn: 
"We do not believe for a moment that Communist China will 
abandon its objective of establishing itself as the dominant 
influence throughout Asia. It may, however; modify its 
methods" . 1 0 
Tne dilemma was that while the objective of persuasion seemed to 
;point towards a policy of establishing diplomatic relations, an 
' 
unpersuaded China could use this policy for its own nefarious ends. 
Despite Holyoake's saying that New Zealand would make up its 
own mind on the China issue, the government had always regarded the 
American attitude as the major factor in any decision on China. A 
new, Republican, administration under Nixon had taken over the 
United States in January. Initially, it appeared there would be no 
change in China policy. Asked at his first Presidential press 
conference about plans for improving relations with China, Nixon had 
said: 
10 O.D.T. June 11, 1969, pl 
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"The policy of this country and this administration a·t this 
time will be to continue to oppose Communist China's admission 
to the United Nations". 
The President saw "no immediate prospect'! of any change in United 
States policy 1m til some changes occurred on the Chinese side. 11 
It was soon evident, however, that new policies towards Asia were in 
train. In June, Nixon announced ·the first withdrawals of American 
troops from Vietnam, and the next month, in a speech at Guam, said 
that in the future the United States would avo.:'.d sending its own 
combat troops to threatened Asian countries. The United States 
would expect those countries to bear the main burden of their own 
defence. This was labelled the "Nixon doctrine". It was evident 
that the Americans were disillusioned with the policy of military 
contaiament of China. Accompanying the beginnings of disengagement 
were new gestures tot'lards China. 
On July 21, lg69, the State Department announced a slight 
leasing of the travel and trade restrictions applying to China. 
Certain categories of people would henceforth have their passports 
automatically validated for China, ~~d American tourists could bring 
up to $100 worth of Chinese goods into the country. Previously there 
had been a total embargo on trade. 12 The steps v1ere in themselves 
minor, but a break with the pattern of the past, and symbolic of 
American preparedness to take the initiative to establish more normal 
relations with China. 
At the ANZUS Council in August, 1969, New Zealand represent-
atives heard the new attitude expounded by Secretary of State 
11 MacFarquhar, R. Sino-American Relations 1949-1971, p247 quoting 
Department of State Bulletin, February 17, 1969, pl4l 
12 Congressional Quarterly Inc. China and U.S. Foreign Policy pl9 
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William Rogers. Corr~tL~ist China, he said, had 
11 obviously long been too isolated from world affairs. l)."~hiR 
is one reason ,..,hy we have been seeking to open up channels 
of communication .... our purpose (is) to remove irritants in 
our rela.tions and to help remind people on mainland China of 
our historic f~iendship for them .. Vle \\~ere prepared to offer 
specific suggestions on an agreement for more normal relations 
when the Chinese cancelled the scheduled xeslliuption of the 
Ambassadorial talks in Warsaw last February . • l'ie would like to 
resu.rr.e the dialogue, and we would hope that they do, too 11 • 13 
The view· of the new Australian Minister of External Affairs, 
Freeth, 14 was a definite contrast. The Australian government had 
no interest in contact with Peking. 
"We have ourselves no proposals at the moment for specific 
attempts to get into contact with Peking •.• vie do not 
believe that we would have success \~here others don't 11 • 15 
The New zealand representative's view was not made publicly 
available. 
l'ihen Prime Minister Holyoake visited Canada the next month, 
ihe publicly approved the Canadian moves towards relations with China. 
Answering a question at a press conference in Ottawa, he said: 
"I'm encouraged that your government should be carrying out this 
initiative. Probing, seeing if they can find some way of 
persuading t~is very populous country ••. to come into the 
community of nations and to play its part. I think its very 
important. The conditions on which it comes •.. is another 
thing ..• But any nation ••. that is prepared to carry out a 
d . 1 . t . d d" 16 1a ague ... 1s, o my m1n, goo . 
13 Greenwood, G. "The Political Debate in Australia" in Greenwood 
and Harper, (eds.) Australia in World Affairs 1966-?0 p82 
14 Freeth replaced the long-serving Paul Hasluck in April, 1969. 
15 
Freeth was himself replaced as Minister of External Affairs by 
Mcl1ahon in October, 1969. 
Greenwood f op cit. , p82 
16 E.A.R. September, 1969, p29. 
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Holyoake said ~hat if Canada could find a way around having to with-
drai-.' recognition from Taiwan, Net-J Zealand would be very interested. 
Although there were no announcements of a New Zealand move to 
contact Peking for bi-lateral discussions, the government did raise 
the issue of Chinese representation again at the United Nations. 
New Zealand Ambassador t.o the United Nations J.V. Scott asked the 
General Assembly in November whether the time had not come to 
consider \olhether there was some fresh approach which could be made 
which might bring a more const1uctive response from the Chinese 
Cornmnnist gO"vernment. The Ambassador reiterated that New Zealand 
believed that the presence of Communist China in the United Nations 
could make a significant contribution to many of the fundamental 
problems affecting world peace and security. Net'l Zealand 1 s 
representative went on to suggest, for the first time, that China's 
presence in the United Nations could lead to a modification of that 
country's policies. This suggestion was something of a vol.te-faoe 
from the position of previous years that China should not be admitted 
to the United Nations untiZ it had modified its policies. 
"The effects of isolation on Peking are severe. Its visions 
of the world outside are restricted, doctrinaire and hostile. 
We should like to believe, therefore, that the presence of 
Communist China in the United Nations might serve to draw it 
towards a less militant and more reasonable and out\1/ard-lookir:g 
approach to the pressing problems of its own region and the 
world. It is true that in the past Communist China has shown 
little respect for either the principles of the United Nations 
Charter or this Organisation. But that does not mean that 
we, ourselves, should not try to bring about some movement 11 • 17 
Scott, however, did not present the Assembly with any resolution to 
act upon. 
17 E.A.R. November, 1969, p53 
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When Parliarnen-t opened in 1970, foreign affairs - and China 
among them - <Tere early topics of debate. The Prime Minister said 
that he was happy to note L~at Communist China appeared ready to move 
away from its self-imposed isolation, but he noted also that China 
continued to follow its publicly proclaimed policy of supporting 
insurgent movements in the surrounding countries. 
"Nobody knows whether ·the situation there will develop in 
such a way that China will be willing to live and let live 
in the international community", 
Holyoake said. 18 He went on to declare that he thought New Zealand 
had to do all it could to pave the way and make it possible for 
change in communist China, but offered no clues as to how New Zealand 
would do this. The government did not· seem prepared to advance 
beyond the stage of platitudes of good intentions. The obvious 
method of an increase in cultural contacts was not mentioned. 
When a Labour spokesman, A.J. Faulkner, callec explicitly for 
I 
the recognition of Comrnrmist China, the government continued to insist 
that it wanted to recognise, but could not get around the insuperable 
obstacle of Taiwan. Government Whip J.P.. Harrison said that the 
Opposition knew that the government would "very much like" to recognise 
China and support its admission to the United Nations, but that China 
imposed the condition that only one China should be recognised, and 
that New Zealand could not accept that.condition because it would 
mean throwing over one of the country's "trusted friends", the govern-
ment of Nationalist China. 19 The Minister of customs, L.R. Admns-
Schneider said: "We are concerned, if we take this step, to ensure 
that Communist China recognises the independence and integrity of 
lB N.Z.P.D. vol. 365, p499 & p501, 16 April, 1970 
19 N.Z.P.D. vel. 365, p513, 16 April, 1970 
21G. 
Taiv1an. This is fundament:a1 to -the position i.'ie take up 11 .. 2 0 
Later in the rnont.h, Holyoake admitted that it Vlas not only 
Communist China 1 s attitude to a continuing recognition of 'I'aii.-van 
that was a problem, b_ut also Nationalist China 1 s attitude to a 
recognition of Peking. The Nationalists Vi'ere likely to break 
diplomatic relations even if Com.rnunist China \vere to agree to a 
two-China proposition. Until both parties were prepared to accept 
a two-China situation there could be no .r-eal progress .. 21 
Even as the government admitted that the situation v;as dead -
locked, it was acknowledging ever more readily a necessity to 
normalise relations with the People's Republic of China. Answering 
a parliamentary question in June, 1970, the Prime Ninister said it 
lr'laS nbecoming a matter of increasing urgency" that Corm:nunis·t China 
should be enabled to take part in United Nations discussions on 
.disarmament and other questions of international importance~ Some 
I 
solution, he said, ought to be found soon to the question of Chinese 
representation. Holyoake said that he had pointed out to the General 
Assembly two years previously that the effectiveness of the organisat-
ion "as impaired ••hen a quarter of the world's population was not 
represented. The problem, however, was one of overcoming the teridency 
in the Assembly to approach the question from mutally exclusive viev.r-
points instead of seeking the ~iddle ground where a just solution might 
be found. 22 The Prime Ninister's questioner, Dr A .. N. Finlay, had asked 
him to indicate what proposals the government had in m:tnd in view of 
20 Ibid., p547 
21 N.Z.P.D. val. 365, p751, 24 April, 1970 
22 N.Z.P.D. val. 366, pl203, 24 June, 1970 
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Scott's United Nations statement the previous year tha.t the time had 
come for a new atternpt to find a solution to the Chinese representation 
problem. Holyoake told him that the government did not have any 
concrete proposals in mind: the views of the United Nations represent-
ative \.;ere to be seen only as "a move to create the right climate of 
opinion" for a solution. Before a proposal could be a.dvanced, there 
would need to be some indication that the two Chinese governments 
would be disposed to consider it. In the light of this explanation, 
the New Zealand representative's speech appears to have been both an 
appeal to the backers of the Albanian resolution to desist, and to 
the Chinese governments to think again about accepting a two-China 
solution. 
In October, 1970, after almost two years o"f negotiations, 
Canada and China finally established diplomatic relations. It "i.Y-as 
the first such agreement between China and a \'/estern nation since 1964. 
In their announcement of the establishment of relations, the Canadians 
declared that they recognised the Goverlli~ent of the People's Republic 
as the sole legal government of China. As for Taiwan, the Canadian 
government merely "took note" of the reaffirmed position of the 
Chinese government that Tab1an was an inalienable part of the People's 
Republic of China, without agreeing with it. This non-committal 
attitude was in line with a declaration by Foreign Minister Sharp in 
February, 1969, that the Canadian government was unlikely to "recognise 
or challenge the sovereignty of Peking over Formosa". 23 
23 External Affairs (Canada) val._ 22, No.l2, December, 1970, p415 
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For several months the Chinese had demanded that the Canadians 
declare their acceptance of Peking's rights of ·sovereignty over ~raiwan, 
but Canada had held out. The Chinese had demanded, and received, an 
assurance that Canada's attitude in the United Nations would be consist-
ent with its declaration of recognising only one Chinese government: 
that is, they would support L~e seating of Peking at the expense of 
Taipei. The Chinese also wanted an assurance that official relations 
with Taiwan would be severed >rhen relations >rith Peking were established~4 
The New Zealand Prime Minister called the announcement 11 an 
interesting development", but was quick to thrO'w· cold '\·later on any 
idea that Canada's recognition presaged movement in the same direction 
on New Zealand's part. 
"I should again stress, that New Zealand's policy will be 
decided on the basis of our own interests and our own assess-
ment of the situation, which are not necessarily the same as 
Canada's 11 .. zs 
The Prime Minister said that the New Zealand government had 
acknowledged that it would 11 in due course" be necessary for Asian 
and Pacific countries to come to terms with Peking, and that New 
Zealand itself was "prepared to seek direct ties with Communist China 11 • 
He went on to reiterate the usual constraints. 
11 0n the other hand, I have st.ressed many times the values 
we place upon our links with the Government of the Republic of 
China on Taiwan. We intend to retain them. We do not 
acknowledge Peking's claim to Taiwan, nor its right to assert 
that claim with forcen. 
Canada's recognition had moved contrary to New Zealand 
policy in three respects. First, it had involved the derecognition 
24 • IbJ.d., p416 
25 Statements by Hinisters of the Crmvn 1970, p371 
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of the Nationalist Government on Tai\.;an, since the People's Republic 
had been conceded to be the sole legal government of China: New 
Zealand would not countenance that. Secondly, the Canadians had 
agreed to vote for the Albanian resolution to replace Taipei with 
Peking in t.l1e United Nations, a vote New Zealand was not prepared to 
make. Thirdly, the Canadians had taken no stand on Peking's claim 
to Taiwan. While they had not endorsed it, neither had they opposed 
it. 
New Zealand, in line with its two-China policy, firmly 
opposed the claim, and declared itself unable to recognise the 
People's Republic while Peking itself still held that position. The 
Sino-Canadian communique had blatantly restated the objectionable 
Chinese claim. Accordingly, Holyoake ended his statement with the 
observation that he had doubts about whether the Sino-Canadian agree-
ment provided a basis on which New Zealand could appropriately proceed 
!towards the establishment of relations with Communist China. 26 
The editor of the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation public-
ation, the 'Listener', Alexander Macleod, commented in early November: 
"If, as seems probable, we choose not to follow Canada, the 
reason will not be that Peking lacks claims to recognition~ 
It will be that the regime in Taiwan is considered to have 
prior claims. How is it that a government controlling a 
bare thirteen million people can grip our attention when 
one with nearly 60 times that ~umber car~ot? The answer 
is that • . . our policies are cl.osely geared to the 
exigencies of alliance diplomacy .. n. 2 7 
Macleod was convinced that New Zealand's solicitousness for Taiwan 
was IMinly a function of American commitment to that government. 
26 Statements by Ninisters of the Crown 1970, p371 
27 Nmv Zealand Listener, vol. 65, No.l619, November 2, 1970, p5 
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It does see..-n l~kely that: the American attitude was a continuing factor 
in Nev; Zealand 1 s fidelity to Taiwan. Despite the Nixon administration 1 s 
avowed interest in a better relationship v;it..l-1 China 1 it was not prepared 
to grant ~~e People's Republic diplomatic recognition, and it did ~ot 
want its allies to move ahead of it in that respect. w'hen the Canadians 
had announced naves to negotiate with Peking in February, 1969, Secretary 
of State Rogers had expressed American objections to the Canadian Ambass-
ador in Washington, and the State Department had publicly expressed its 
grave concern over the implications of such moves for the position of 
the Government of the Republic of China. 26 The American government 
was still concerned, too, that recognition by individual countries 
would make the eventual negotiation of _a. general modus vivendi in the 
Far East more difficult. Hov1e.ver, it brought no. pressur~ to bear to 
halt the Sino--Canadian negotiations. 29 The State Department.' s Report 
to Congress for 1969-70 noted that four governments had recognised 
communist China in 1970 {Canada, Italy, Ethiopia and.Equatorial Guinea) 
and claimed that 
"When consulted during these developments ·we have taken the 
view that the establishment of diplomatic relations \Vith 
Peking is essentially a matter for each country to decide in 
the light of its own interests". 3 0 
The Report had gone on to say: 
nBut \\l'e have also expressed the view that the interests of 
the Republic of China • • • should not be sacrificed". 
28 Quo, F .Q .. and Ichikawa, A. "Sino-Canadian Relations: A New Chapter'' r 
in Asian Survey, May, 1972, pp391-92 
29 Thomson, D.C. and Swanson, R.F. Canadian Foreign Pol.iey, Options 
and Perspectives, p115 and pl3;l 
30 Department of State United States Foreign Pol.icy 1969-70 - A 
Report of the Secretary of State p44 
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If the Ame:rican reaction to its allies! recognition of China 
had mellm-1ed considerably since 1964, it was still opposed to that 
recogni ·tion. New Zealand's other !Uajor allyr Australia, too, V."2.S 
shovling no inclination to change its mind on ·the matter.. The 
11inister of Foreign Affairs in 1970, Mcl-lahon, 31 told the Australian 
Parliament in October that C!'~na "WDUJ.d have to renounce the use of 
violence and force as a means of attaining its political objectives 
before Australia '\·lOuld reconsider its position on admission to the 
United Nations. 32 
The New Zealand Prime Minister had his own explanation 
for Taiwan's grip on the government's attention .. In November 1 he 
issued a statement explaining New Zealand 1 s unchanging vote at t._l'].e 
United Nations on the China representation issue.· Holyoake (recently 
knighted to become Sir Keith Holyoake) stressed that Ne'" Zealand 
attached great importance to the rights of small nations, and 
believed that the United Nations existed for the benefit of the >~eak 
rather than the strong. 33 Taiwan 1 s claim, as a small nation, to 
recognition thus ,.eighed more heavily with New Zealand than China's 
claim as a great power. Taiwan, it was believed, needed the United 
Nations more than did the People's Republic, although the United 
Nations as a peace-keeping body needed the People's Republic more 
than Taiwan. 
31 The Australian Department of External Affairs became the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in late 1969. McMahon became its Minister after 
the October, 1969 general elections in •;hich Freeth was defeated. 
McMahon t.;ent on to become Prime Hinister in Y.6-rch, 1971. 
32 Current Notes on Inte1>national Affairs (Australia) October, 1970, 
p539. 
33 O.D.T. November 27, 1970, pS 
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By the nineteen-seventies, too, Ne'iY Zealand had more than just 
a pcli tical affection for Tai\van. The relationship-' had a growing 
economic aspect. Before 1967, there was virtually no trade between 
the two countries. In that year, however, TaiwruJ. m.1ddenly bought 
$655,000 worth of New Zealand goods. The next year the purchase 
more than doubled in value to $1,516,000, and in 1969, it doubled again 
to 34 $3 '702' 000. . Although this figure represented only 0.35 percent 
of the value of !l!ew Zealand's total export earnings 1 the trade with 
Taiwan became a publicly mentioned factor in preserving the diplomatic 
link. In September, 1969, the .Hinister of Housing 1 ll:lr Rae, predicted 
that Taiv.7an and NevJ Zealand would move into a much closer relationship. 
Enlivened trade could cement the already good relationship between the 
two countries. 35 Early in 1970, after visitJ.ng Taiwan, the Deputy 
Prime Minister 1 l>'l..arshall, claimed that Taiwan was ;1one of the future 
growth markets of New Zealand. It will take an increasing a'Uoun·t 
of meat, wool, dairy products and timbern _ 36 It is interesting to 
note 1 however, that the next New Zealand diplomatic post established 
in Asia was in South Korea, >;hose 1969 purchase of New Zealand goods 
was half the value of Taiwan's. 37 The government was being cautious 
about too finn a commitment to Taiwan. 
At the beginning of 1971, President Nixon, in a foreign policy 
me~sage t.o Congress, made an important s·tatement of his administration • s 
attitude to China. He said that it was prepared to establish a 
dialogue with Peking, provided that the evolution of the dialogue 
34 "Direction of Ne" Zealand Exports", Appendix I, Annual Repo:rt of 
the Depa:rtment of Industries and Comme:rce 1970 p72 l\JHR H-44 
35 O.D.T. Septe~~er 1, 1969, p3 
36 O.D.T. ~pril 28, 1970, pS 
37 A.R.D.I.C. 1970, p72 ' 
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was not at the expense of A.t-nerican commitments. The United States 
><as prepared to see the People's Republic of China" play a construct-
ive role in the family of nations, but the question of its place in 
the United Nations was not merely a question of whether it should 
participate. The United States would·continue to oppose attempts 
to deprive the Republic of China of its place in the United Nations. 
In the coming year, Nixon said, he would carefully examine wha:t 
further steps might be taken to create broader opportunities for 
contacts between the Chinese and lilllerican peoples. "l~e hope for 1 
but will not be deterred by a lack of reciproci ty11 • 3 8 On April 14, 
the President announced an end to visa restrictions on Americans 
going to China; a review of the restricted exports list to China; 
permission for American ship::; to ca:rry Chinese cargoes, and a 
relaxation of currency controls so that the Chinese could use American 
dollars. 39 
The People's Republic suddenly clearly signalled the United 
States that it was interested in an acco~modation, in April, 1971, 
by inviting the Anerican table tennis team, playing in the world 
championships in Japan, to visit China. The American government was 
only too eager to respond. 
In mid-April the Australian government suddenly began to issue 
some policy statements on China. The first came on April 15 from 
the ne\v Prime Minister, McMahon, and this \vas followed by a lengthy 
statement by the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, R.W.C. Swartz, 
on April 22. These statements seem to have been primarily reactions 
38 S · • • R - . MacFarquhar, R. ~no-Ame~c«a etat~ons 1949-1971, p252 
39 Ibid. p254 
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to the April 14 announcement by the Australian Labor Party that it 
would seek' to send a delegation to China. 
McMahon's speech was a defence of existing China policy. The 
Prime Ninister said that whila an accommodation with mainland China 
was a necessity, the first priority for the Australian government was 
the preservation of t.l-.te security of the Taiwanese government. 40 The 
Acting Hinister of Foreign Affairs noted first that President Nixon 
had said that it '\Vould be premature to talk of diplomatic recognition 
of China by the United States. Then he said that while it was true 
that the Chinese were now showing an interest in regularising their 
relations with certain Western st:ates, they '\vere continuing their 
support for a:::rned revolution and insurgency in other areas. '£he 
Minister implied that recognition could not be granted while the 
Chinese continued that support. Finally Swartz reiterated Mct-1ahon' s 
point t.l}at Aus~ralia could not leave Tait·Jan to face China alone. 
The Acting Minister said that, in sum, conditions for diplomatic 
recognition had not been realised. 41 
In Australian eyes, then, there were three factors inhibiting 
recognition - the fact that the P.mericans were not ready to grant it 
(and Australia would not move ahead of the Americans); China's con-
tinuing support for South-east Asia revolutionary movements and 
concern for the effect on the Taiwan government. 
Only two days .after Schvartz's statement, a spokesman for the 
National goverment in New Zealand said that the New Zealand government 
4° Fitzgerald, s. Talking u;ith China: The AustraZia:n. Labor. Party Visit 
and Peking's Foreign Po Z·iay pl4 
41 Cu.rl'ent Notes on International Affairs I;pril 1971, p210 
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would not be maJ<ing any moves to discuss recognition \·7it.h Conmmnist 
China. However, it was clear tbat this \'las not because such a move 
was undesirable, but because it would be unproductive. 
Addressing the annual conference of the New Zealand United 
Nations Association on April 24 in the Prime .Hinister's stead,. 
backbencher W. IJ. Young justified the government's un\.,.illingness to 
initiate negotiations \•lith Peking for recognition on the grounds that 
Ne\or Zealand's attachment to the relationship with Taiwan made the 
exercise futile. 
11 The experience of Canada, Italy and other countries has made 
it clear that Peking is not prepared to enter into diplomatic 
relations with any government that maintains such relations 
with Tai\\ran. We have reluctantly concluded that there is at 
present no basis for the establrshment of relations betweer:. 
New Zealand and Communist China, a.nd that there would be little 
point in entering into negotia·tions with Peking on the question 
while this situation prevails". 4 2 
Young's statement, however, did seem to shew that the New 
Zealand government's attitude was in advance of Australia's. New 
Zealand had no doubts that recognition of China was a desirable policy 
move, unlike the Australian government, which still seemed to see non-
recognition as a weapon to combat Chinese subversion. The New zealand 
government had "reluctantly" concluded that relations could not be 
established because of one practical obstacle: the Chinese government's 
demands for a break with Taiwan. If formal relations could not be 
established, there were, apparently, no other reasons for contact. 
The international scene with regard to China was still fluid, 
and on April 29, President Nixon, at a press conference, hinted at 
further American moves towards a relationship with China. Concessions 
~ 2 New Zealand Foreign Affairs Revieu~ (H.Z.F.A.R) April, 1971, p38 
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to that date had "broken the ice" between China and the United 
States, he said, and the administration now had to test the water to 
see how deep it was. Nixon said that he expected to visit mainland 
China at some time, and that he hoped to contribute to a policy which 
would mean a new relationship wi~~ China. 43 
The next significant development from New Zealand's point of 
view was the Australian Prime Minister's sudden annou.."lcement on !'-lay 11 
that his goverrunent now intended to "explore the possibilities of a 
dialogue with the People's Republic of China". 44 
The Australian government 1 s aim \'.'as simply to increase the 
amount of trading and cultural contacts between the two countries and 
not to try and negotiate recognition. McMahon made explicit SWartz's 
April implication that the Australian goverr~ent still saw China's 
international behaviour as a barrier to formal recognition. 
"We must bear in mind that a major obstacle to the development 
of formal relations with the People's Republi·c of China has 
been the government's support for insurgency and subversion in 
countries of the region with '\vhich we a.s an Australian govern-
have close relations and mutual strategic.interests". 45 
When asked to corr@ent on the Australian announceF~nt of a try 
for a dialogue, the New Zealand Prime 11inister-now admitted that his 






"We would be glad to have talks with a view to establishing 
a basis for the improvement of our relations with China". 46 
Ibid., p40 
Current Notes on International-· Affairs May, 1971, p269 
Cul'ren·t Notes on International Affairs Hay, 1971, p269 
Statements by 1-linis·ters of the Crc¥m 1971, pl57 
227 0 
Two weeks earlier Young had said that the government could see 
no point in talks about recognition; Holyoake now thought that talks 
about other matters could be valuable. The fact that recognition 
was still out was emphasised by the Prime Minister~s reiteration that 
the goverrunent had no intention of severing ties with Taiwan. Holyoake 
went on to say that he still believed that both Peking and Taipei 
would "sooner or later have to accept each other's existence 11 • If 
it had to be later, it seemed, Ne't'I Zealand would \vait. The Prime 
Minister's comment stopped short of saying that New Zealand would 
join the Australians in exploring the possibilities of a dialogue. 
A fortnight late:r:, the Prime Ninister made a lengthy state-
ment on China policy. Holyoake explained that the statement was 
being made because Peking seemed to have "turned·a new leaf and to 
be taking a more friendly attitude towards the outside world", t;i1ich 
in turn had led to q~estions being asked about New Zealand's policy 
to\·Jards China. The Prime Minister went on immediately to warn 
against the new leaf belief. 
"No useful purpose will be served by forgetting all that we 
have learned about China and imagining that everything is now 
different", he said. "It never is". 47 Holyoake went on to 
assert that the Communists had set out to make china, in reality as 
well as name, the ·dominant pcwer in Asia. This claim to hegemony 
was unacceptable "to those who believe that even small countries 
have a :r.·ight to choose for themselves". Recent events in Cambodia 
had made it clear that Peking had not given up its goal of eliminating 
foreign influence in Asia and establishing its own in their place. 
47 Statements by Hinisters of the Crown 1971, pl8l 
[In Harch, the neutralist government of Prince Sihanouk had been 
overthxnwn in Cal11bodia a'1d replaced by a pro-1rJestern government .. 
China and North Vietnam had pledged support for an effort to put 
Sihanouk back into power rrdlitarily]~ 
Despite China•s behaviour, Holyoake said that the government 
wanted better relations between China and Ne1; Zealand. In saying this, 
Holyoake rejected the old 'behaviour' criterion as a detenninant of 
policy towards China. China's moves might still be directed against 
New Zealand's interests 1 but this was no longer sufficient to justify 
a negative attitude towards her. 
11 We believe that if opportunities for movement in this 
direction [better relations] are opening up, they should 
not be missed 11 .. 48 
The Prir.te Ninister pointed out that China had special signifi-
cance for countries like New Zealand that were located in the Pacific 
1
area and that were actually or potentially \'li thin reach of China • s 
power. 
"We believe that it is important for the peace and security 
of the Pacific that the countries of this area come to terms 
with Peking and work out a way of living with it. We should 
like to have diplomatic relations and ,;e should \velcome talks 
aimed at establishing a basis for those __ relations".'+ 9 
In the space of a month, the government had changed its mind 
on the utility of holding talks on the subject of recognition. In 
April, there bad been no pcint to them. No,; they \;ere «elcomed. 
The only apparent stj~uli to this had been the Australian and American 
moves towards a dialogue with China. 
48 Ibid. 
lf9 Ibid., pl86 
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The Prime Hinister reiterated that New Zealand intended to 
maintain its relations with the Government of the Republic of China, 
mentioning yet again the long and friendly association bet,<een the 
two countries, and, this time, the economic factor. 
11 for the present and for some tirne to come, our trade 
prospects with Taiwan seem at least as good as those with 
mainland China, and this strengthens our interest in ma.in-
tajning our relations with the Nationalist government". 5° 
Trade prospects with either China were, however, a secondary 
consideration. The Prime Minister said that although it was import-
ant that the Pacific countries - for the sake of peace - came to tenns 
with Peking, it was more .important for New Zealand that a sw~ll country 
should not be abandoned in the face of the demands of a great pm1er. 
"That is why the govern1nent is resolved to mainta,in our e><isting ties 
with Taiwan and to uphold its ~·ight to its accepted place in the 
international conunlli"1ity 11 • 
Although it was seen as more important to try for a 
relationship with China than to express disapproval of its policies 
by withholding recognition, this relationship could not be at the 
expense of the interests of New Zealand's friends. 
The government saw no urgency in the need to establish links 
with China, and was quite prepared to v1ait until Peking saw fit to 
change its position on Taiwan. 
50 Ibid. plBB. In 1970, the value of N.Z. exports to Taiwan dropped to 




the P.R.C. was $3,909,000 in 1970, compared with $4,092,000 
Appendix I, Annual. iteport of the Department of Trade and 
1973, p74. (~2HR G-14) 
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"We do not believe that Peking need remain locked in its 
present position_ ••• If it is willing to reduce its demands 
or to place the issue of Taiwa~ on one side, the proSpect 
of a variety of fruitful relationships would open up .. so 
it is up to China". 51 
In mid-June, in a speech to the Dunedin branch of the Royal 
OVerseas L-eague, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, G.R. Laking, 52 
said that no-one should be surprised at the New Zealand attitude. 
Laking said that there were some who were inclined to urge that New 
Zealand forsake her ties with Taiwan and deal with the reality of 
China, but these people overlooked the fact that Taiwan was a reality, 
too. Laking claimed: 
"It has been a consistent theme of our foreign policy that the 
interests of small entit.ies should not be sacrificed merely 
because it becomes inconvenient to recognise or accooonodate 
them". 5 3 
Taiwan's interests were seen as of concern to New Zealand .. 
It would be a blow for those interests if Tah1an >Jere to be excluded 
from the united Nations, therefore New Zealand must oppose that I 
exclusion. The Secretary had virtually said that Taiwan's interests 
should take precedence over Ne>~ zealand's other interests in the 
:matter. 
The Prime Ninister in his l·lay statement--had placed the onu'? of 
improving the political relationship ben<een China and New Zealand on 
China. No fundamental change could come about without a change in 
Chinese attitudes. Nevertheless, the government seemingly did feel 
threatened by a Labour Party call on May 27 to take some initiative 
to increase trade >~ith China. 
51 Statements by Ministers of the Crmm l97l,pl88 
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On June 8, 1971, Holyoake annonnced that the government would 
be willing to send a trade mission to China if the Chinese authorities 
would be willing to receive it. In explanation of the initiative, 
Holyoake said: 
"The political atmosphere has not hitherto been such as to 
make it seem worthwhile for us to approach the Chinese 
directly .•• Recent developments suggest tha·t the situation 
may now be different. Peking has still not responded to 
attempts made by Japan and a n~ber of South-east Asian 
countries to establish contact at governmental level, but 
it has received trade missions from £.1alaysia and the 
Philippines. It seems worthwhile exploring the possibility 
that the Chinese might be prepared to go this far with New 
Zealand as well 11 .. 54 
At tho end of 1972, Holyoake was to tell the Press that he 
had been approached after the June 8 statement by a Mr La varis 
with the suggestion that La Varis's good offices might be used in 
making the initial contact with the Chinese authorities. "I welcomed 
the offer •• " 55 La Varis, who did substantial business with the 
Chinese, had some exchanges with them and found out that a trade 
mission "ould not be acceptable at that time. 
"It was therefore decided to investigate the prospects fer 
sending a representative group of New Zealanders dra•Nn from 
significant sectors of the community who could serve as a 
goodwill mission. I accordingly authorised Mr La Varis to 
make an approach to his Chinese contact-s". 
Frustrated in its efforts to send a non-political trade 
mission, the government took the decision to persist in trying to 
get some sort of mission into China. This decision was made in mid-
July, during the same week that President Nixon made his bombshell 
announcement that he would be journeying to Peking in the near future. 
54 Statements by Ministers of the Crown 1971, p208 
55 Press Statements by l'A.inisters of th"?! Cro~·.1!1 1972, p352 (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, 21 November, 197,2) • 
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After the Cabinet meeting of Monday, July 19, Holyoake announced that a.-:1 
intermediary had been given his authorisation t11e previous iYeek .. 56 
Nixon had made his an."lOU..TlCement en Thursday, July 15. The Labour 
Party 1 s spokesman on Trade and Industry, ~l. hT. Freer, claimed that 
the authorisation was a direct result of the Nixon ar~ouncement. 
In Parliament on July 20, he said that the goverTh~ent' s response to 
the Labour Party's May call to organise a mission to China had been 
tepid antil the Nixon announcement, when Lhe mission had become 2 
matter of urgency. 5 7 
It is possible, however, that it was Labour Party pressure 
rather than Ni.."<on that prompted a decision to persist with the 
Chinese. While the Australian Labor Party delegation was in Peking 
in early July, it had broken the nevlS that Chinese officials were 
considering granting visas to a New Zealand Labour Party deleg~tion. 58 
The Prime ~unister would not have been eager to have the 
Labour Party upstage his government in the field of foreign policy, 
as the Australian Labor Party was successfully doing to its opponents. 
After the National Party caucus meeting on July 15, the Prime ~unister 
told a news conference that the government "as ">~orking all the t.i..'lle" 
on ~he Labour Party's suggestion that a missioP- be sent to China. 
All kinds of possibilities were being considered, he said: a goodwill 
mission, a trade mission or a mixed delegation. 5 9 
56 W.T. July 19, 1971, pl 
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La Varis ~ s second approach produced an enquiry from tJ1e Chinese 
for further information as to the likely composition of the mission 
and the purpose it was intende.d to serve~ The governmentts answer 
was conveyed ·to the Chinese in september I 6 0 but the Chinese evidently 
did not find it to their liking and the matter went no further until 
the next year. 
The New Zealand government had ~ot been informed of the A~erican 
negotiations v1ith China that led to the announcement on July 15 t:.hat 
President Nixon intended to visit China. 61 Nevertheless, the Prime 
Minister issued a press statement the next day welcoming the develoFmenta 
"It is heartening that after so many years of es·trangement.r 
contact be·t\leen the leaders of China and the United States 
should be re-established. I r,aturally hope that this 
development will give net'l depth to recent tendencies on the 
part of China tovJards more relaxed relations ·vith other 
countries. Vast possibilities for interna.tional peace and 
securit.y would open up if the traditional friendship between 
the United States and China could be restored 11 • 62 
Despite that recognition, the dramatic American move \'Jorried 
New Zealand. At the ANZUS Council mee·ting in October, both New 
Zealand and Australia pressed the Americans for an explanation of 
American intentions in seeking a rapproahement with China. There 
60 Press Statements by Ministers of the Crovm 
1972' p352. (l1inistry of Foreign.Affairs - "Goodwill Mission to 
China: N.Z. Intermediary", 21 November, 1972). 
61 United States Department of State, United States Fo1•eign Poliay 1971 
-A Report of the Searetary of State p89: "U.S. initiatives to 
establish a dialogue with Peking caught both Australia and New Zealand 
by surprise ... lfJhile there were good reasons for the United States to 
avoid premature disclosure of its plans, the problems this created 
for its allies again underlined the need for continuing close 
consultation 11 • 
62 New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review July, 1971, p49 
seemed t:o be concern on the part of the two P..NZAC nations thai.: the 
United States might be cultivating China at the expense of relations 
with Japan. Nev1 Zealand in particula . .r, it: was reported, laid st:r:ess 
on the importance of American-Japanese good relations to stability in 
Asia and the Pacific. 63 
Once again, New Zealand was more concerned with maintaining 
understanding bet\'leen allies than about accomrnodations with the 'enemy'. 
It seems possible that the t"VlO Australasia."1 countries were fearful 
that Japan might be encouraged to move closer to the Soviet Union or 
China as the result of the ~nerican initiative. The old nemesis of 
the 'fifties was still there. If the Americans - who could not be 
affected - moved to\.;ards detente with Ghina, there was no cause for 
alarm: if, however, the West's Asian allies also moved towards 
detente with China they could be in dang2~ of subversion. 
The dramatic American announcement of July 15 was not followed 
by any NeM Zealand policy change on the recognition issue. Although 
New Zealand was not at all certain of the ultimate goal of the United 
States, the government indicated that it had no intention of budging 
f~~m the certainties of its conservative position. A few days after 
the .Nixon announcement, the Minister of Industries and Cormnerce, 
N.R. Shelton, said in Tokyo that he had assured the Taiwan government 
while he was on the island that Ne>~ Zealand's policy towards it "'ould 
not change in spite o:t; American moves towards closer contacts 'flith 
Peking. Shelton said that he had told Taiwan's Vice-President that 
Ne'\-; Zealand was one of Taiwan l s friends, and reiterated the goveJ::nment' s 
--------------------------------------------------------·----
6 s New ZeaZ~1d Herald October 4T 1971, p3 
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strong desire to see Taiwan remain in the United Nat.ionsa 64 
At the end of the month the National Party conference endorsed 
the attitude of the parliamentary party by refusing to pass a rrunit 
calling for the recognition of Communist China. 65 
In his introduction to the 1971 Anr,ual Report of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, tabled in Parliament in June, Holyoake had said 
that there was no scope for movement in the direction of diplomatic 
relations with China because Peking was still not prepared to enter 
into relations with any government that kept its relations with 
Tai\'Jana If any progress was to be made towards solving the problem, 
it was more likely to be made in the United Nations. 
'I'he Prime Minister went on to say that he believed that t.'oe 
time was ripe for a new approach in the United Nations based on the 
realities of the situation - the existence of two Chinese governments 
~lith effective control over their territories and their population. 
Such an approach could lead to a solution that was reasonable and 
fair to all concerned. 66 
Press reports in mid-July indicated that New Zealand was 
working with Australia and Japan on a two-Chinas resolution to be 
submitted to the next meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. 
Labour's tV. W. Freer questioned the Prime Minis·ter in Parliament on 
the matter and received indirect confirmation of it. 67 
64 O.D.T. July 22, 1971, p6 
65 O.D.T. July 31, 1971, p5 
66 Annual- Report of the Ministry of Foreign Afr<xirs 1971 p6 
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'I'he ini tia ti ve on the ti-vo-Chinas resolution, hov;ever, car-ne from the 
tinited States, which had consulted Japan atout a joint. move. 6 8 
In early August it was announced that the United States Has 
now prepared to support communist China's entry into the United. 
Nations_. although not in ·the context of the Albanian resolution ,.,.·hich 
denied Taiwan membership. 59 This policy change brought the American 
position into harmony with the t::heoret_ical position of New ZealanC.~ 
The lilll.ericans 'vere no\v prepared to activate a two-China policy, which 
New Zealand had been advocating (but not acting upon) for some time. 
The Prime Hinister described the American announcement as 
"a step in the right direction", and said that New Zealand vmuld be 
glad to see Peking in the United Nations. 
"China 1 s absence reduceS the authority of the United Na.tio:1s 
and its value as a forum for ·the discussion of political 
issues", 
he said. Holyoake then put forward the suggestion that the United 
Nations should give Peking Taiwan 1 s seat on the Security Co4ncil. 
"If the Security Council is to fulfil its functions in 
helping to maintain international peace andsecurity, it 
must include those governments that exercise real power 
in the world. China is undoubtedly one of these. It 
is hard to see how the Council can play its part in 
dealing with problems like nuclear disarmament and ·the 
war in Indo-China unless Peking is represented on it". 70 
Logic suggested that the transfer of the Security Council seat 
would be an automatic consequence of Peking's admission, but this 
was not yet United states policy. 
68 Halperin, N.H. uA.""llerica and Asia; The Impact of Nixon's China Folic~(' 
pl2 in MacFarquhar, R. Sino-Amel'{.can Relations 1949-1971 
6 9 Congressional Quarterly, Inc. China and U.S. Fore-ign Po Zi.cy p8 
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The Security Council seat issue -.as probably Ne-. Zealand's 
first real initiative on the China question, and this suggestion was 
followed up diplomatically. The preliminary American draft 
resolution on the representation of t\-ro Chinas contained no provision 
for the transfer of the Security Council seat, and the Ne-. Zealand 
government made it plain to the Americans that it wanted this pre-
vision included before New Zealand would co-sponsor the American 
resolution. In its insistence, New Zealand 't'las supported by 
Australia and the Philippines. In the middle of September, the 
Americans agreed to go along with the request. 71 
In carrying the People's Republic's banner for the Cr~nese 
seat on the Security Council, New Zealand was announcing that its 
first interest in the Chinese representation issue was the strength-
ening of the United Nations. In this instance, the wishes of Tai1>1an 
-.ere over-ridden in the interes·ts of improving the utility of the 
United Nations as a security-creating body. Minister of Industries 
and Commerce Shelton had told the press in July that the Tai-.an 
government was very worried about the content of any resolution to 
admit Peking to the United Nations, and had said: "They seem more 
concerned with their seat in the Security Council than anything else". 72 
The New Zealand government was prepared to stand by the principle of 
Taiwan's right to be represented in the United Nations, but not to 
support her claim to the China seat. 
71 O.D.T. September l, 1971, p6 (N.Z.P.A. Washington) 
72 Waikato Times July 21, 1971, p5 
On September 21, the Prime. i·1inister announced that Nev.T Zea1anc3. 
would co-Sponsor two resolutions proposed by the United States or~ 
the question of Chinese representati.:;.n~ The first proposed that 
both the People: s Republic and the Republic of China be seated and 
reconunended that Peking be given the Chinese seat on ·the Securit-:y 
Council: the second was the farrLi.liar fornmla designed to quash 
the rival Albanian resolution: that any proposal t.hat would result 
in depriving the Republic of China of rep:resentation ~>Jas an imporJcant 
question requiring a two-thirds majority to pass. 
Holyoake explained: "Vlhat the government has been looking 
for is a fair and reasonable solution which recognises the realities 
of the present situation ••• The two draft resolutions proposed by 
the United States offer a realistic solution without. prejudicing 
the eventual settlement of the claims involved 1: ~ 7 3 
In October, how~ever, the Albanian One-China resolution 
triumphed finally, and New Zealand's efforts to avoid the expulsion 
of Taiwan had failed. The Prime Ministerial statement on these 
events was accepting. 
"The decision in favour of the People's Republic of China. 
[the first time Holyoake had used the term] makes the 
United Nations more directly reflect world realities and 
for that reason, I welcome it. Henceforth the United 
Nations will provide a setting within which the . People's 
Republic will have ample freedom to explain its policies; 
at the same time it ~lill be knit into the vast variety of 
United Nations activity and exposed in many ways to the 
opinions of other nations. China's isolation will be 
greatly reduced and I am hopeful that, as it assumes the 
opportunities and obligations of United Nations membership 
and enters the work of the Security Council, it will come 
to a·new understanding of the world about it". 74 
73 Press Statements by Ministers of the Crown 1971, p342 (21 September, 
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The Prime Ninister believed that the United Nations would be 
a new contai~ing device for China: the Chinese government vrould 
have to justify its policies before world opinion and perhaps be 
constrained in its actions in the future. 
Holyoake said that he was deeply disappointed over the 
expulsion of Taiwan, and went on to make the point that the United 
Nations decision to recognise Peking did not mean that it accepted 
Peking's claim to Taiwan, or t:ha·t it empowered the former to settle 
with the latter by force. 75 In the 'sixties the Ne<' Zealand 
government had consistently claimed that Peking's admission to the 
United Nations on its own terms would be tantamount to an endorsement 
of its claims to Taiwan, and Nev1 Zealand had used ·that as a reason 
for keeping Peking out. The Prime Minister \'las quick to make it 
clear that he diQ not consider that Peking's success in winning the 
China seat at the United Nations should precipitate a change in 
New Zealand's China policy. In Parliament in Novemberp Holyoak.e 
gave a questioner an assurance that Taiwan's expulsion from the 
United Nations would not affect New Zealand's relations «ith that 
country. 
Even the seal of official approval bestowed by the United 
Nations on Peking was not enough to make N6'\V' Zealand transfer i·ts 
allegiance. Despite the continued clinging to the relationship 
with Taiwan, -the Prime Minister again expressed the government's 
interest in establishing formal ·links with Peking, and said that 
it was continuing to investigate the possibilities of this. The 
75 N.Z.P.D. vol. 376, p4288, 3 November, 1971 
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government mas~ have knor,;n that the possibility was non-existent, 
yet persisted in giving the irr.pression that something· might be 
accomplished. Reality was deferred to in one instance: Holyoake 
told a Labour questioner that there \1ere no efforts under \<ay to 
have Taiwc.n readmitted to the United Nations. 
In February, 1972, Sir Keith Holyoake stepped down as Prime 
Minister and was replaced by his deputy, J.R. Marshall. Holyoake, 
however, retained his F'oreign Affairs portfolio in the ne\-1 govern-
ment, indicating that there would be no 11 new broom11 foreign policies 
under the Marshall administration. '!'hat same month 1 President Nixon 
visited China. In the comrnunique issued at the end of the visit, 
L~e American government declared that the United States acknowledged 
that all Chinese on either side of the Tai~~an strait maintained that 
there was but one China and that Tai~;an was a part of China.. The 
American govern.'!lent said that it did not challenge that position, 
and reaffirmed its interest in a peaceful settlement· of the Taiwan 
question by the Chinese themselves. It said that it would progressive-
ly reduce its forces and military installations from Taiwan as tension 
in the area diminished. 76 When Prime Minister Marshall \<as asked 
whether Ne;,· Zealar.d' s attitude to Tah<an might change as a result of 
the communique said: "There has been no change in the New Zealand 
government's attitude and no consideration given to change". Then 
he added: "I want to hear the views of the representatives of the 
President who tvill be coming here before making any comment". 7 7 
The implication was that some considera·tion to change might be given 
after hearing the details of the American outlook in the wake of the 
Nixon visite 
76 Congressional Quarterly, Inc. China and U.S. Foreign Polioy p7 
77 O.D.T. Februayy 29, 1972, pl 
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Commenting on the Nixon visit, the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
saw possibilities for Ne\oJ Zealand in its success. 
"President Richard Nixon's visit to China gives ground 
for hoping that in due course, New Zealand, too, will be 
able to establish a working relationship with Peking11 , 
Sir Keith Holyoake said. The visit, he said, had confirmed that the 
Chinese wanted normal relations with countries whose social systems 
a~d approaches to Asian problems 'i·Jere different to thei!.." ov ... '!l. Ne\V" 
Zealand would soon be given a first-hand account of the President's 
talks in Peking from two senior American officials. 78 
The State Department officials arrived in March. The senior 
was Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs. After meeting them, 'the Prime Minister stated 
that New Zealand had much to gain from a reduction in tension in 
Asia, and that a better understanding between the United States and 
China was a prospect all would welcome. As far as Ne'i.;r Zealand v;as 
concerned, it still wished to maintain its ties with Taiwan, while 
seeking to improve relations with the People's Republic. Marshall 
said: 
"We have for some time been exploring the possibilities through 
informal channels but without positive -results. In the ligh·t 
of what Mr Green has told us about the atmosphere President 
Nixon encountered in Peking, we will consider very carefully 
what approach we might now take to carry for.:ard our interest 
in establishing a working relationship vlith China". 79 
Sir Keith Holyoake added that the ball was still in Peking's court 
over the question of a New Zealand goodwill mission to China. The 
government evidently felt that a further New Zealand initiative in 
78 O.D.T. February 29, 1972, pl 
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that direction was now in ordero The proposal had not Eeen aEy 
movement since September, 1971. 
When Parliament reassembled in June, the National Party's 
opening speaker in the Address-in--Reply debate, H ~C.. Te.mple·ton, made 
a statement in favour of early nonnalisation of relations v.;ith China. 
Templeton had previously been an officer in ·the Hinist~y of Foreign 
Affairs. 
11 We face a period of reassessment of our relations Hith 
China. We have none with the People's Republic of China, 
a great power containing a quarter of the world t s population~. a country \'lhich is opening up its trade, a nuclear po;;ve:r with great military strength bordering on an area of the 
greatest strategic in·terest to Ne~r Zealand, South-east l\sia. 
:Many countries are moving to normalise relations with China. 
I believe v1e must do so, not merely to follow the fashicn, but as a matter of hard common sensew As a minor power, 
vm can only do this slowly. The People's Republic ::Jf China 
has not shov.rn any real interest in establishing rela·tions 
with us6 Nevertheless, normalisation of relations '\V5:th 
China is, I believe, an important foreign policy objective 
for the near future" .. 80 
In July, 1972, a Chinese table tennis team was· invited to 
visit New Zealand by the New Zealand TabJ.e Tennis Association, and 
when it arrived it was met by several high-ranking government 
Ministers - including the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the 
Minister of Internal Affairs. This, Holyoake told Parliament, was 
meant to demonstrate to the Chinese that the government wished to 
see further exchanges taking place. 81 There were t•-m officials 
from the Chinese Foreign Ministry in the party, and as Holyoake 
later revealed, he 11 took the opportunity to explain once again what 
the government had in mind [regarding a New Zealand goodwill mission 
80 N.Z.P.D. vol. 378, p69, 13 June, 1972 
81 N.Z.P.D. vol. 379, pl259, 27 July, 1972 
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to China.] 11 • 62 The Minister also suggested that the matter be taken 
up bet\1een the two countries' respective delegations to the United 
Nations. This 1o-1as subsequently done, a'Tld there were several exchanges 
in New York before the change of goverrL•nent. In November, Holyoake 
><as to say that the proposal put forward by the New Zealand government 
was for a mission to visit in 1973, and that he expected that a 
satisfactory arrangement would be made within the near future. 83 
In September, P.I. Wilkinson, National's member for RciL~ey, 
enquired about the progress of the dialogue between New Zealand and China. 
Holyoake outlined the government's hopes, but it was clear that there 
had been no progress at tha·t stage. China, it seemed, was still not 
interested in Ne1f Zealand 1 s approaches; despite the welcome to the 
table tennis team. The Hinister said that New Zealand had made known 
to the C~vernment of the People's Republic of China its interest in 
establishing a better working relationship between the two, and had 
the goodwill mission in mind as the first step. 
Holyoake said that the purpose of any goodwill mission would 
be to promote a better public understanding of each others' attitudes 
and interests and to explore the possibility of more regular and 
perhaps more formal communications between New zealand a..11d the People's 
Republic. 
'
1I. am hopeful that we will, before too long, receive a 
favourable response to our sugges·tion fro..rn the government 
in Peking". 84 
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Templeton, the member \'lho had called for relations with China in the 
Address-in-Reply debate 1 wan~ced to know if the !'-1inister '!;.,ras prepared 
to confirm that the establishment of better relations with China was 
regarded as a "key issuen. Holyoake was certainly not prepared to 
go so far as that. He said he regarded the link as of nimportance", 
but 11 I also consider that the retention of our existing relationship 
with Taiwan is of considerable importance 11 .. 85 Not of paramount 
importance, it seemed, but still of considerable importance. Sir 
Leslie Nunro, a former President of the United Nations General 
Assembly, asked the H.inister why Nev; Zealand was Hin such a hurry, 
having regard to our interests 11 to establish diplomatic represent-
ation in Peking* Holyoake replied - accurately - that he had 
never mentioned diplomatic recognition. Ee said that he was well 
a\vare that New Zealand's firm stand On Tai\-tan made technical recog-
nition impossible, but he hoped that Peking might be interested in 
some semi-official ties. 86 In his eyes, even these were not of 
great importance. 
The end of September saw another major diplomatic event in 
the Pacific: the establishment of diploma'::ic relations between 
Japan and the People' s Republic. Japan, like Australia and Ne\'.~ 
Zealand, had always been a loyal supporter of American China policy, 
and, apart from the United States, was the country with the closest 
relationship with Taiwan. Taiwan had been a Japanese colony for 
fifty years before 1945, and Japan had been a hea~~ investor in its 
development since. In the communique announcing the establishment 
of relations, the Japanese government stated that it ''understood 
BS Ibid. 
SG , Ib:id., p2786 
and respected" the People's Republicts claim to TaiNan~ 
The Japanese move, ho\,;ever, had little public effect· on the 
New Zealand government. In response to a question about its effect 
on New Zealand policy, the Prime ·Minister said that policy would 
remain. unchanged, and that establishing diploma.·tic relations with 
China "",..;as 11not a matter of great urgencyll as far as Ne\';r Zealand 
was concerned. As there were no substantial interests at stake, 
"v;e are in a position to deal with the matter without undue haste"~ 87 
Here then 1 was the basis of New Zealand's attitude to China under 
the National Party government: that New Zealand had no substantial 
inte:t:est in an accommodation '\'lith China. It did not really mat·ter 
to the National Party whether there was a dialogue between New 
Zealand and China or not. 
A good relationship was desi:!'able 1 naturally, b1.1t by no means 
essential. As Holyoake said on a later occasion the distance be·t'ivetm 
1China and New Zealand - ideologically, culturally and economically 
- indicated that little advantage could be obtained from attempts to 
move closer. 88 This view was diametrically opposed to the Labour 
Party's, which was that China should be recognised diplomatically to 
try and reduce those distances. 
At the general election of November 25, 1972, the National 
government was defeated, and a month later the new Labour government 
recognised the People's Republic of China. When Parliru~ent reslli~ed 
87 Waikato Times, 3 October, 1972, p30 
88 Interview, Sir Keith Holyoake, 17.5.74 
24G~ 
in February, Marshall, no» Leader of the Opposition, said that the 
action had been, in the view of the Opposition and many people in 
t.'1e country, "too hasty to allow for a full and planned consideration 
of New Zealand 1 s best interests. 89 While Marshall agreed that in 
the light of the world trend towards the recognition of China, New 
Zealand would have followed that course sooner or later, he said 
that a National government 'ltlould have asked to retain an appropriate 
association with Taiwan. The Leader of the Opposition stressed 
that New Zealand's trading links V·tith Tai\<:an were much more va1uable 
to her than the trading connection with the People's Republic. 
Marshall did not say \'lhat an "appropriate link11 with Taiwan would 
have been, but the Party• s record su~]ge~sted that he meant a diplomatic 
link. However, Marshall wen·t on to criticise Labour for not at 
least follmving the Canadian formula of taking note of t.he mainland • s 
claim to Taiwan. 
"This sudden decision puts New Zealand clearly on the 
Communist side against Taiwan ... Many people in·New Zealand 
will be concerned not so much with the recognition of China, 
but with the callous abandonment of Taiwan". 9 0 
The National Party continued to attack the abandonment of 
Taiwan sporadically throughout t.'1eir term in Opposition, but in 1974 
conceded that any new National gove:rn.-nent would not attempt to 
reverse the decision to recognise Peking. 
Conclusion 
The period 1969-1972 saw great changes in the international 
environment in which New Zealand formulated its China policy. 
New Zealand's friends and allies began changing their attitudes and 
89 N.Z.P.D. vol. 382, pll4, 21 February, 1973 
90 Ibid. 
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and policies to\·Jards China at the same time that China showed signs 
of interest in establishing relationships with \vestern countrieS .. 
In this context, New Zealand's own attitude became increasingly 
more positive towards China. From 1969 onwards, policy-makers 
spoke of \-?anting to recognise China, a desire missing in previous 
years. China 1 s international behaviour ·Has no longer mentioned as 
a constraint on government action, leaving only 'l'aiwan 1 s status as 
a.'"'l obstacle .. In 1969, the Prime Minister said that it was absurd 
that China was outside the United Nationsr and the next year he 
said that it was a matter of increasing urgency that China be inside. 
This increasingly pragmatic strain in China pronouncements, while 
triumphing over moral repugnance at Ch~.na' s international behaviour, 
could not prevail over one principle- the 'right' of Taiwan's 
government to continuing international recognition. New Zealand 1 s 
government felt obliged - no matter what its desires regarding the 
1 People's Republic- to place a friendly fellow small country's 
interests first. By the 1970s, New Zealand had an economic interest 
in Taiwan to counter any security interest in developing relations 
with Peking. 
In its attitude, New Zealand seemed to place itself mid-way 
between Canada's advanced position and Australia's conservative one. 
Australia showed little desire to come to terms with China at all. 
New Zealand policy did seem to run parallel to that of the United 
States, \Vhich from 1969, under the Nixon administration, professed 
itself eager to establish a relationship with the Chinese, though 
not at the expense of Taiwan. F:or all its positive noises, Ne~., 
Zealand did nothing about improving relations with China until its 
Australian and South-east Asian allies followed the Ame.:r:icans in 
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doing so in 1971. Then came attc..'Tlpts to get a trade mission and 




THE LABOUR PARTY AND CHINA 1961-73 
Introduction 
The Labour Party went into the 1960s in Opposition, still 
believing that Communist China should be recognised by Western 
countries and admitted to the United Nations as a ~eans of gaining 
some influence over her. The constraints on carrying out such a 
policy were appreciated, and the party did not push the issue in its 
1963 manifesto or in 1966. Nordmeyer, who took over the party leaCer-
ship in early 1963, indicated that for him the effect on Taiwan's status 
was no longer a constraint, since he did not see recognition as implying 
recognition of China's claim to Taiwan. This v;as reiterated by Watt in 
1965. By 1969, however, when Kirk was leader, the Labour Party had 
revealed itself as being very definitely in favour of a two-China 
policy. It now wanted to continue to recognise. the government on 
Taiwan while recognising the People's Republic. The party at that 
stage differed from its opponent only in its belief that a two-China 
policy ought to be actively pursued. Whereas the National Party 
cited Communist China's known opposition to a two-china policy as 
adequate reason not to move towards that country, Labour was keen 
that negotiations should at least be initiated. Kirk believed that 
the withdrawal of British and American military presences from South-
east Asia from 1969 onwards meant that it was important for New Zealand 
to establish her own relationship i'd th po,.;ers influential i:-1 the region 6 
In 1971, after the Australian Labor Party had been invited to China 
and it seemed that American policy to'\'.rards China was changing, the 
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Labour Party urged the sending of a goodwill mission to ChL:.a. 
The Labour Party recognised the People's Republic of China 
within two weeks of its taking office in 1972. In doing so, it not 
only ceased to recogn.ise the government on Taiv.1an, but formally 
acknowledged Peking's claim to the island. The Labour government was 
prepared to throw over the two-China policy partly because the United 
Nations had rejected it, and partly because the need to ensure 
regional peace was greater than preservation of diplomat.ic links with 
Taiwan. 
During the first year i.n Opposition, the China issue was 
raised by several members in the course of the international affairs 
debate. Party leader Nash stated that there was no possibility of 
1solving the disarmament problem while China remained outside the 
United Nations, but conceded that the necessity of preserving Formosa's 
place in that body was a valid obstacle. 
"We must in the long run find a way of solving the problem 
of China ..• without sacrificing Formosa ..... The people 
of Formosa, irrespective of y.~hat is sa{d in one quarter, 
should not be surrendered to the mainland Government of China, 
and I see no reason why we should not find a way in 1vhich 
the Formosan people could gove~n themselves under some form 
of guarantee". 1 
Nash seemed to share the National party view-point that a 
transference of recognition from 'raiwan to Peking by the United 
Nations would endorse the latter's claim to the former. Only a 
United Nations guarantee of Formosan integrity would ensure that 
1 N.Z.P.D. vol. 326, p224, 4 July, 1961 
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recognition of Conutmnist China could be safely proceeded tvith. 
Former Transport M.inister Na ·thison and lV. ~1. Freer tvere not 
concerned \vi th constraints on China's admission, but only with the 
advantages of it. Nathison was sure that China's international 
behaviour could be modified if it \'lere included in the United Nations. 
11 I believe it \oJOuld be to the advantage of all concerned 
if we Kere to admit them now. We 't<7ould have some measure 
of control over th0m if they were inside; \V'e have absolutely 
no con·trol over them when they are not there.. We could 
have discussions vii th them if they were there .. ~ I believe 
she could be encouraged to change her outlook, and, I hope, 
her tactics in certain directions - particularly in respect 
to Tibet- if she were admitted. At least we would have the 
opportunity of examining her representatives and the policy 
she was pursuing, but at present we have no influence 
whatsoever because we have firmly shut the door against her11 • 2 
Freer had other reasons for urging action on the China question 
- the cause of the West in neutralis't: countries was one. 
11 let me suggest in all seriousness that the longer China is 
left out of the United Nations, the greater THill be the 
advance of Communism in some of the non-conunitted nations11 • 
Those nations who are today struggling for their freedom, 
or who have just recently obtained freedom·~· do not look 
kindly upon those of us who would try to deny the existence 
of one of their own types of nations .•. It does not pay us 
in New Zealand, as a small Pacific Pov1er looking to the fut.ure, 
to close our eyes to reality and persist in refusing to 
recognise China. It is over to us to make the move". 3 
Freer was also convinced that China could be a valuable 
customer of New zealand in the future, if political recognition v1e1.:e 
made. 
"We are worried about where we are going to find markets 
for our primary produce in the years which lie ahead, and 
yet in China, literally a~c our front door, one quarter of 
mankind is rapidly improving its standard of living ... I 
am certain from the observations I made while there that we 
2 Ibid. p236 
3 N.Z.P.D. vol. 326, p276, 5 July, 1961 
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could find a subs-tantial market in China today for our 
milk potvder and cheese; but so long as we politically isolate 
the' people of ·that country 1 so long they v.~ill isolate us by 
trade 11 • 
M. Moohan, former Rail't.'.~ays Minister, and F. Hackett, former 
Labour Minister, took up the point the next month with Moohan saying: 
"We canno·t go on forever ignoring a country with so many 
potential customers", 4 
and Hackett declaring: 
"The government should give early and possibly favourable 
consideration to the recognition of Red China. 1-Je are 
standing on the sideline watching other countries trading 
with Chinar and when the time does arrive T.Nhen '>Ve feel we 
could recognise China and establish trade posts there, v1e 
could find other countries so fiL~~y entrenched that compared 
to them we would be just babes in anns 11 • 5 
At leas·t one senior party member seemed much less enthusiastic 
about the whole issue. Fonner Attorney-General H. G. R. 1-'l"..a.son said 
bluntly: 
"I do not think it affects us very much, and I am certainly 
not fussing about whether ·He recognise China"-. 
Mason, however, went on to criticise the American moralistic approach 
to the issue which had been taken up by the National government. 
Recognition, he said, should be based on realities, not likes and 
dislikes. 6 
In January, 1963, the Labour Party changed its leader, 
replacing Nash with A.H. Nordmeyer. In July of that year, Nor~~eyer 
told the House of Representatives that no question \<¥as more complex 
and more liable to arouse greater emotion than the problem of recog-
nising the government of mainland China. He .-ent on to mildly 
4 N.Z.P.D. vol. 327, pl607' 22 August, 1961 
5 N. Z.P.D. vol. 327, 
6 
pl698, 22 August, 1961 
N.Z.P.D. vol. 326, p285, 5 July, 1961 
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deplore the existing si~cuation. 
"We on this side of the House believe - and indeed have for 
a very long time believed - that a country like China, 
containing as it does such a large proportion of the worldys 
population ... is not a country \-lhich can be penuanently 
excluded from the United Nations". 7 
If the Chinese government had been recognised and accepted 
at the United Nations, he said, "the drift in Chinese relations would 
not have developed to the extent it has 11 • 
The ne>: Leader of the Opposition then proceeded to deny two 
contraints on recognition seen by the ~atio~al Party, and used by 
the Labour Party during it.s period in office. First, he said, the 
recognition of any government did not. imply approval of that govern-
ment. In making this point, Nordmeyer seemed to be agreeing with 
Mason that China's international behaviour ':.1as irrelevant to the 
recognition question. Later in his speech, Nordmeyer said: 
"Whatever we may think of the actions of the Chinese 
government - and some of these actions in recent times 
are much to be deplored - the plain fact is that a 
country of the size, the wealth and the potentiality of 
China cannot for muoh longer remain outside the United 
Nations Organisation 11 • 
Nordmeyer's second point broke new ground for the party. 
11 The. second point is that the recognition of mainland 
China does not imply recognition of the claim of China 
to sovereignty over Formosa". 
Nordmeyer with this view differed from both his National 
opponents and his Labour predecessor, both of whom believed that 
a continuing recognition of the government on Taiwan was necessary 
to deny China's cla,im to sovereignty over it. Nord..'neyer was as 
7 N. Z.P.D. vol. 335, p408, 9 ,July, 1963 
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solicitous as they, however, for the rights of the people of Taiwan. 
11 Nhatever claims China may have had to F'onnosa - and her 
claims to sovereignty are not nearly as clear and definite 
as some of her supporters claim - there can be no suggestion 
that the people of Formosa· should be handed over to domination 
and control of the Peking government. Surely the destiny 
of Forrnosa should be determined by the Formosan people themselves 
after a free, properly conducted and democratic election11 • 
Despite Norc1.-neyer' s rejection of the two public constraints 
the National government put on a positive China policy, the Oppositic-n 
leader had not come close to advocating New Zealand's support for 
immediate admission of China into ·the United Nations. The restrained 
attitude was reflected in the Labour Party's manifesto for the 1963 
general election, which contained a less-than-positive China clause. 
The clause paraphrased Nordmeyer in saying merely: 
11 Labour believes that China is not a country v1hich can be 
permanently excluded from ths United Na·tions 11 • 8 
The party apparently did not feel that New Zealand should force the 
iissue. This could have been in deference to the electors, in vie>.v 
of China's belligerent image, or ·to the belief that New Zealccnd 
could not oppose the United States on what the latter regarded as a 
fundamental issue. 
In October, 1963, however, W. W. Freer asked the Prime r-""1-inister 
in Parliament whether he would instruct New Zealand's representative 
to the United Nations to support the admission of all nations to the 
forum, since the China representation question was being discussed 
that week. 9 
8 O.D.T. November 6, 1963, pS 
9 N.Z.P.D. vol. 337, p2490, 16 October, 1963 
255~ 
The Labour Party did not react publicly to France 1 s diplo17i.e:tic 
recognition of China in January, 1964, but during the yea..r Nash decried 
the government 1 s "yellow periln thinking. The ex-party leader told 
the Te Awarnutu Jaycees in I'1arch that Com\"Imnist China v-1as not a menace 
to other nations~ If China had any territorial claims 1 he said, 
they were in Russia. China had been an aggressor in regard to India 
and Tibet, but had had some elements of suzerainty over the latter, 
and now had backed dm,'Il in regard to India. The Labour Party would 
recognise China when it safeguarded Formosa's independence. 10 
The last assertion shO'VI7ed that t.here were differences in the 
party's senior strata about. what were or were not constraints on 
recognition. Nordmeyer had said that recognition could be extended 
without prejudicing Taiwan's status, implying that no explicit 
guarantees were needed from Peking regarding ·that status. 
The next year, Deputy-leader H. Watt reaffirmed the Nordmeyer 
contention that recognition of China could not be construed as 
endorsement of her claim to Taiwan .. In July! he demanded to know 
when New Zealand was going to take some positive action on the 
question of United Nations membership for China. 
11 We on this side of the House have for some time believed 
that the day is past when we can afford to have a nation 
the size of China outside the United Nations ... I want to 
know \-lhen we are going to adopt a reasonable at·titude 
towards [this matter]. From what I have read most of the 
nations in the world have come to t.he conclusion tho.t \Ve 
cannot hope to have a reasonable peuce on earth unless China 
is admitted to the United Nations. That does not· mean we. 
accept the form of government which China has, nor does it 
mean we accept that Formosa becomes part of mainland China 11 • 11 
10 O.D.T. March 24, 1964, pl2 
11 N.Z.P.D. vol. 343, p1272, 14 July, 1965 
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There was no hint of a two-China policy here. Watt was not concerned 
at depriving Tail-Ian of United Nations representation, only t..'"lat such 
deprivation not be interpreted as endorsing the Chinese Communist claim 
to Taiwan. The only constraint on the government that ~Vatt sa¥r wa.s 
the attitude of the United states. 
11 I cannot help wondering whether we will have to wait until 
the United States government decides that China should be 
admitted to the United Nations before the National government 
in this country is prepared to say it agrees 11 .. 
The party's spokesrna.n on defence, A~J. Faulkner, argued in the 
same debate for a positive and conciliatory approach to China. 
"I do believe that ways and means should be found to try and 
get alongside this tremendous giant. I believe some endeavour 
must be made to bring an understanding to the people of China 
of the western way of life . • . The sooner we get alongside 
them, the sooner t·1e will knO"VJ what v;e are up a9ainst and cease 
to be dependent on infonnation i-76 cannot vouch for". 12 
The defence spokesman had said, however, that he '1would not 
readily agree that Taiwan should necessarily be part of the People's 
' 
Republic of China. I do not believe it is any more 11 • This stand 
was very far from advocating a continuing recogni-tion of Taiwan. 
Rather was it a qualification to be made to a recognition of Peking: 
there should be no falling in with any demand to endorse the claim 
to Taiwan. 
At the end of 1965, the party changed its leader again. 
The new leade4N.E. Kirk, like his predecessors, believed China's 
influence should be contained, but that this did not mean that China 
should not be recognised. Kirk told the House of Representatives in 
1966 that the long-term policy of New Zealand and the United States 
and most western countries had been for the contain..'Tient of China 
12 N.Z.P.D. val. 343, pl232., 13 July, 1965 
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behind an amed v-1all, but that containment should be a matter of 
. d . d 13 pat1ence, mo erat1on a~ common sense~ The Opposition leader 
said that Ne>J Zealand ought not to become hysterical or emotional 
about problems that China as a world power posed to it or to other 
Western countries. In the early 'fifties everyone had been 
convinced that peaceful co-existence ·.vith the Soviet Union was not 
possible, and this had been proved wrong. The rising standard of 
living in Russia and the growing conten~~ent of her people had come 
to be reflected in more cautious external policies. 
Kirk asked if it were not possible for the change that had 
occurred in the Soviet Union to occur also in China. The Leader 
of the Opposition was more concerned t~ play down the significance 
of China's current militancy than to urge conciliatory moves. 
There was no reference to China in the 1966 Labour Party 
election manifesto. In the 1966 election, foreign policy was an 
issue for perhaps the first time in Ne'" Zealand political history. 
The National Party was striking a responsive chord with its Vietnam 
policy, which involved sending military help to a government resisting 
Communist guerillas believed to be supplied by the Chinese, and 
Labour's policy of not supporting military commitment was unpopular. 
With the atmosphere favouring resistance to Comrr1Q~ist advance, it 
was not a time to compound the party's unpopularity by advocating 
friendly gestures towards what was regarded as one of the enemy. 
Very little was said publicly on China by the Labour Party 
in the years before the next election. In July, 1968, in Parliament, 
A.J. Faulkner briefly mentioned the matter of Chinese representation 
in the United Nations. 
13 N.Z.P.D. val. 347, pll7l, 6 July, 1966 
'~le do not have to like the Government of China - I do not -
but we cannot ignore the Government of China • . . by all means 
let'us publicly criticise it harshly for what it does, but say 1 
"The door is open for you to come to the United Nations, to 
become a member, to learn better "~days" • 1 4 
The moves of the Canadian gove~~ent to enter into diplomatic 
relations with China seemed in 1969 to spark off the Labour Party's 
interest in the issue again. Kirk included a passage on China in his 
report to the party's annual conference in April, 1969, but was, 
however, restrained in his attitude. 'l'he Leader of the Opposition 
called the Canadian initiative "a most interesting development 11 , and 
hoped it would presage an improvement of relationships between China 
and other countries. 15 
Although Kirk did not call for New Zealand to follow suit as 
soon as possible, he twitted the Prime Minister fOr having been "at 
some pains to labour the importance of recognising -the Goverrunent of 
conununist ChinaH in recent days* The Labour leader wc:.nted to kno"'v 
whether this heralded a change of policy or was just ·a talking 
point. Kirk implied that it went without saying that recognition 
was Labour party policy. 
At the conference, the party showed signs of coming to life 
again on the China question* A remit came forward suggesting that 
the government of mainland China be recognised, and this was approved 
by the External Affairs Committee. However an amendment by the 
Palmerston North and the Karori Youth branches, to add the words 
"even if this means breaking off relations with the Nationalist 
14 N.Z.P.D. vol. 355, p645, 19 July, 1968 
1 5 New zealand Labour Party, Rfq;ort of 53rcZ AnnuqZ Conferenae p26 
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Chinese goverP.rnent"~ 6 was lost. This \vas a clear indication that 
conference could not at that time accept the logical implications 
of a decision to recognise the People's Republic, and wished the 
party to conduct a two-Chinas policy. This was the first public 
indication the Labour Party had ever given that it'was concerned 
with maintaining relations with the government on Taiwan. The 
Labour Party in the 'fifties had been concerned for the future of 
the people of Taiwan, but had wanted to protect it by a United Nations 
trusteeship: there was no acceptance of the Chiang Kai-shek govern-
ment. Now, in the 'sixties, conference wanted to keep the party's 
negotiating position flexible enough to encompass a continuing 
recognition of the Republic of China~ The Republic of China had 
become accepted as the government of the Taiwanese as the island took 
on the attributes of a viable sovereign state under its direction. 
The question of freedom for the Taiwanese thus became identified with 
the fate of the Government of the Republic of China for Labour 
Members of Parliament aS well as National~ By the 1960s, there were 
full diplomatic relations that would have to be broken if Peking's 
terms were accepted; in the 1950s, the bi-lateral links were not as 
strong. Kirk himself was friendly with the Republic's long-serving 
ambassador, Konsin Shah. 17 
Diplomatic recognition of cowmunist China appeared to have 
been relaunched on the political sea as a policy issue. However, 
when the election manifesto was released later in the year, it did 
not contain a China recognition clause. w.w. Freer claims that this 
16 Ibid. p45 
17 Conversation tdth former Secretary to Prime Minister Kirk 15.8. 75 
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was merely an oversight. The policy committee had meant for it to 
be included, and by some slip, it had not been. The party decided 
not to reprint the manifesto, as it was thought that this action ":oJould 
draw undue attent.ion to the missing clause. 18 
During the election campaign of 1969, none of the major Labotrr 
candidates made any reference to China policy in their speeches. 
All foreign policy attention 'i:las concentrated on Vietnam. The party 
had, hovmver 1 prepared candidates for questions on the China issue. 
The Research Office of the party put out a list of questions and 
ideal ansvJers on Labour's foreign policy, and China policy headed 
the list. The relevant questions on the Research Office paper 
asked: What are your party's attitudes to~..;ards the recognition of 
China and trade v-1ith China? How far vrould your party go towards 
meeting China's conditions for Unit.ed Nations entry (non-recognition 
of Nationalist China and all that involves)? Does your party 
believe in the right of the Formosan and Taiwan poeople to self deter-
mination? 19 
The answer to the first question was straight-forward. The 
text stated: "The Labour Party supports the recognition of mainland 
China11 • It went on to point out that recognition did not necessarily 
carry with it the endorsement of the type of govera~ent being recog-
nised, and to declare that New Zealand would welcome increased trade 
with any country, "including the People's Republic of China". The 
paper noted that the Asian and Pacific Council had recently encouraged 
18 Interview, 15.8.75 
19 Labour Party Research Office: "Questions and Answm•s on some Aspects 
of LaboUP 1s Foreign Policy" \'/ellington, 28 October, 1969 
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a Thai proposal to attempt to open discussions with Peking.· and said 
that the party "would support such moves for reasons of -increased 
trade and closer understanding·". The paper also declared that r..abour 
\'.~auld seek positive s·teps to have mainland China seated in the United 
Nations .. 
In ans\ver to the last two questions, the paper stated that Labour 
believed that 11 Taiwan is entitled to separate representation at the 
United Nations" and tha.t a.ll people \Vere entitled to self-determination.20 
The Research Office paper confirmed the indication given by 
the party conference in April that Labour was now in favour of a two-
Chinas policy. The party had declared that it could not agree to 
depriving Nationalist China of its UnitBd Nations representation. 
On the basis of the Research Office's paper, the Labour party 
would have been unable to vote for the Albanian resolution in the 
United Nations had it been elected in 1969. Since 1963, Albania 
had sponsored the annual resolution at the United Nations to admit 
the Peking government and expel the Nationalist representatives. 
The Labour Party was, however, committed to putting forward an alter-
native means of bringing Cormnunist China into the United Nations .. 
China policy was discussed in the first session of the new 
Parliament in 1970 and Labour members gave more indications that 
Labour policy towards China differed from National's only in the 
enthusiasm for Communist China. Backbencher J.A. Hunt put before 
the House a twelve-point plan for New Zealand's foreign policy in 
the nineteen-seventies. one point was a call for the goverPJment 
20 Ibid. 
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to recognise Corrununist China, v.•hile at the same time preserving Tai¥Tan' s 
. d d 21 l.n epen ence. This was not necessarily a call for·a two-China policy 1 
but a reiteration of the traditional Labour policy of not conceding the 
Cornmunist claim to Taiwan when reCognising the mainland. A more senior 
party spokesman, however, Arthur Faulkner, believed that a double 
recognit.ion could be negotiated. 11 If it is not possible for New Zealand 
to recognise Red China and Taiwan, why is it possible for the United 
Kingdom to do so?" 22 On being informed by the Prime Hinister that 
Britain had not been able to recognise both Chinas, and being rebuked 
for advocating the impossible, Faulkner did not retreat. He replied 
that he had said that New Zealand should attempt to recognise on a two-
China basis. 23 Faulkner's quarrel with the government was not that it 
refused to throw over Taiwan for the People's Republic, but that it 
would not even try for a two-China recognition, conceding the hopeless-
ness of it too quickly. Faulkner said: 
11We should take up an attitude that Red China should be seated 
at the United Nations, not that Taiwan should lose its member-
ship e We should take a positive linen~ 2 4 
Faulkner argued that recognition of Communist China was in New 
Zealand's interests. It would be a small but useful move towards de-






"We do not have to like the government, but ~ve should recognise 
ite It is in our area of influence, and any influence of a 
peaceful nature that we can bring to bear on 700,000,000 people 
in our area of responsibility must be in the best intere~ts of 
this country ... I do not think there is any obligation on us 
as a country to take up the prejudices of other countries and 
other times". 25 
N. Z.P.D. vol. 365, p566, 17 April, 1970 





Faulkner did not see the /.,Jnerican alliance as a constraint in the 
issue~ He went on to say that recognition would mean that New 
Zealand's thinking was being reoriented towards reality rather than 
political expediency. 
Kirk did not contribute anything on China policy on this 
occasion, but in September 1970, speaking to the O~maru Rotary Club, 
he said that it was "just nonsense" that China was not reccgnised, 
and that it was wrong that several hundred million people should be 
excluded from the United Nations. The Leader of the Opposition 
doubted whether China wanted to join the United Nations, bu·t he said 
he believed that the Western world had to come to teLcms with her. 
Then, he provided proof positive that Labour had a tv·:o--China policy 
by saying that the Western world had to recognise that there were 
two separate Chinese identities and two separate goven1men·ts -
Communist China and Nationalist China. 26 
Labour•s desire to continue recognition of Taiwan probably 
accounted for the absence of favourable public corr~ent the next 
month when Canada recognised the People's Republic. Canada broke 
relations with Taiwan while refusing to endorse the Communist claim 
to the island. In earlier days, this might have been enough for 
the Labour Party. Now, however, there was no urging that New 
zealand follow suit. The Canadian recognition, however, and 
the flurry of moves by European countries to follow in Canada's 
footsteps, were signs that the international environment was changing. 
26 N.Z.H. September 2, 1970. 
' 
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In April, 1971, the Australian Labor Party annou...TJ.ced that 
it had applied to China to send a delegation there 11 to discuss the 
terms on ,.,..hich your country is interested in having diplomatic and 
trade relations \'!i th Australia"~ '2·? 
The New Zealand Labour Party felt that it was time New Zealand 
took advantage of changing circumstances. Speaking at the University 
of Auckland in April, Labour's finance spokesman, R.J. Tizard, stated 
categorically that the Labour Party itlOUld recognise Communist China 
if elected the government in 1972, and then went on to say that if 
New Zealand \'Jaited until then to recognise, much valuable time in 
establishing trade arrangements would have been lost. Economic 
imperatives seemed to be uppermost in ~is thoughts. Canada, he said, 
had benefitted in its trade with China by recognising the Maoist 
regime, and more nations would be following suit~ 11Ne\V Zealand just 
can't afford to -....;a.it until 1972 to recognise Communist China because 
iby then \·le will be about seventeenth in the queue 11 , he said. 2 8 
The party's number three-ranker, W.W. Freer, was just as inter-
ested in New Zealand 1 s facing up to changed political realities as 
he was >lith trade opportunities, although he did not ignore the latter. 




"We cannot afford to allow a situation to develop \-vhere the 
United States is p~epared to change its political thinking, 
\'Jhile v1e remain in isolation as the last country prepared 
to face the reality of China's existence" 29 
Fitzgerald, s. "Talking with China: The ALP visit and Peking's 
Foreign Po l.icy" pll 
O.D.T. April 22, 1971, p3 
O.D.T. April 30, 1971, p4 
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At least one senior member of the party believed that Presiden·t 
Nixon's trade relaxation moves meant an end to the contain.."'Tlent of China, 
and that New Zealand v1as now free of one of the largest constraints 
against its acting - the fear of acting against its allies interests. 
In this changed situation Freer did not wish to see New Zealand 
out in the cold. Even at this stage, however, Freer was concerned 
with Taiwan•s position. 
"The Labour Party has long subscribed to ·the view that Peking 
must be recognised and admitted to the United Nations. At 
the same tiine, it is agreed that relationships with Taiwan 
should be continued; in effect, the acceptance of a tr.vo-China 
principle. Whether such a policy will be acceptable in 
either Peking or Taipei is a matter which the government must 
clarify. This cannot- be done without discussion bet\·leen a11· 
parties concerned, nor can it be.left to others to interpret 
the mood of either nation to us"~ 
liational Party spokesmen had justified their inability to 
implement a two-China policy for years by saying that it was known 
to be unacceFtable to both Taipei and Peking, but Freer wanted some 
direct proof. There ought to be some contact with Communist China 
to see just what it would accept in New Zealand's case. Freer did 
not think that the government should rely on the experiences of others. 
Freer did not think that trade prospects could be improved with-
out some political accommodation~ "To a large extent, but not completely, 
trade is affected by politics in China .•. to make any major progress, 
improved political attitudes will be essential". 
In May came the Labour Party conference. The conference 
endorsed a remit that called on the next Labour government to initiate 
negotiations with the People's ReP.ublic of China for the purpose of 
establishing full trade and diplomatic relations, and to support 
China's entry into the United Nations. The conference also called on 
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the Prime Minister to organise irrrnecliately a good\vill visit to the 
People's R8public, and said that if the goveznment declined to act, 
the Labour Party would do so. 30 
The idea of the goodwill mission was probably stimulated by the 
Australian Labur Party's organisation of one. The statement Has 
nmde on behalf of the party by Freer, who said that because of the 
changing tempo of relationships, it was a matter of urgency that 
immediate steps be taken, preferably at governmental level, to improve 
contacts between China and New Zealand. Freer ma.de the point that, 
as the Australian government had agreed to start a dialogue with China, 
it was essential that New Zealand should not continue to ignore her -
both as a Pacific power and a nation w:l~h tremendous trading potenti2l. 
"The potential markets for much of our primary production and fol.· the 
pulp and paper industry are tremendous ..• nor can there be any progress 
without a basis of goodwill and understanding being established between 
the two cotmtries". Freer reassured the conference:. 
11 Let me make it perfectly clear that as soon as the Labour 
Party becomes the government, it v-lill cormnence negotiations 
with Peking with a view to establishing diPlomatic relationships 11 • 31 
Freer assumed that Ne\v Zealand, in its foreign policy, had to 
work in tandem with Australia, if not the United States, and once the 
Australian government had swallowed its hostility to China, New Zealand 
must do the same. 
Despite Freer's rather dramatic ultimatum to the government 
from the conference floor, party leader Kirk rather strangely made no 
30 O.D.T. May 27, 1971, p5 
31 NZLP Report of .55th Conference p34 
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mention of China at all in the External Affairs section of his 
Parliamentary party report to conference. 
On the day after the conference had issued its China state-
ment, the Prime Minister made a lengthy statement of his otm on China 
policy, but nov;here in it did he make any mention of an intention to 
send a goodwill mission. On June 4, then, the Labour Party sent a 
formal letter to the Secretary-General of the Chinese People's 
Institute for Foreign Affairs in Peking, informing him of a request 
made to the New Zealand Government by the Labour Party to send a 
goodwill mission to China. "This letter 11 , Mr Freer revealed later, 
"was prompted by the fact that the Prime Minister had not taken any 
positive action at that time tm.-vards organising such a visit". 32 
The letter was "to ascertain tvhether a small goodvdll mission 
would, in fact, be ~Nelcome". 
In early July the Australian Labor Party delegation arrived 
in China and discussed the terms of diplomatic recognition with the 
Chinese Foreign Minister. The Australians told the Chinese that a 
Labour government would propose to recognise on terms identical to 
those which Canada had negotiated. The Chinese claim to Taiwan 
would be noted, but not endorsed or challenged. Whitlam told Chou 
En-lai that a Labour government would not support 11 two Chinas 11 in 
the United Nations or elsewhere, and that the Australian Embassy on 
Taiwan t.,rould be withdrawn. 3 3 In view of Freer's hope, stated in 
April, that relations with Taiwan could be preserved, the Australian 
Labor Party's position would seem to have been in advance of New 
Zealand's. 
32 N.Z.H. 15 July, 1971, p3 
33 Fitzgerald, Op. Cit., pl9 
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In an important speech to the 1-mckland branch of the Ne-;·; 
Zealand Institute of Int.ernational Affairs in June, 1971, Kirk said 
that changes in Great Power policies in Asia, and the resultant 
changes in the balance of po-;;.;er i·n the region, meant that Net..r Zealand 
had to develop new policies to protect its interests there. The 
United States and Britain were both -.1ithdrawing militarily from South-
east Asia, while the Soviet Union and China were attempting to increase 
their influence there. China was seeking "a more persuasive role" 
in the region, and this, coupled with the Nixon doctrine, probably 
meant that Sino-J'>..merican relations would improve. China was likely 
to be admitted to the United Nations soon. Kirk beliGved that 
New Zealand should welcome ·the changes as "an opportunity for enlight-· 
ened and outward-looking policies", designed to promote regional 
co-operation. 
"We should set about policies designed to show and develop 
in every way that tve are sincerely interested in Asia ... 
that we are not .. a country on the per~ueter of Asia, but 
a countrx that sees its future in association with Asian 
count!:'ies". 34 
When the Leader of the Opposition turned to specific policies, he 
made no mention of future China policy. The theme of his speech, 
however, presaged efforts to develop a relationship with China .. 
In mid-July President Nixon su~rised the world by announcing 
his intention to visit China the followi~g year. Parliament was 
sitting, but there was no move by the Labour P3.rty to urge negotia·tions 
for recognition. Only W .. W. Freer, the perennial chruupion of China 
in the party ranks, made the poi~t that New Zealand was now free of 
the American constraint in its dealings with China .. Referring to 
34 Kirk, N. New Zealand a:nd Its Neighbours plO. 
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the Nixon announcement, Freer said that the Labour Party had tried 
to· get the government to do something about China in Nay, stressing 
"that the matter was urgent because all nations in the: ~·lestern 
Hemisphere had been moving tov.rards a closer dialogue with China" .. 3 5 
Implying that the government had been worried about the effects of 
a China move on the American alliance, Freer stated that if New 
Zealand's point of view had been important in the eyes of the 
Western world, it would have been consulted on the American aGtion. 
The alliance against China was dead, and the American::; did not 
really care what New Zealand did in this area. There was no reason 
now to hold back. 
Kirk called Nixon 1 s acceptance o_f the Chinese invitation a 
uwelcome initiative". He said that it must be regarded as an 
attempt to come to terms with reality; and as such ·was an example 
that every country could follow. The American move endorsed the 
line the Labour Party had been advocating for some time, and he hoped 
that it would prompt the New Zealand government to follow the course 
the Labour Party had urged upon it in May. It was regrettable that 
the Prime Minister had not taken the initiative earlier. 36 
The Labour Party was not interested in rr~king China a party 
political issue, along the lines of the Australian Labor Party. 
True to the New Zealand tradition of bi-partisanship in foreign 
affairs, it wanted the government to take action in the China field. 
When the Chinese replied to the Labour Party's letter, they extended 
an invitation to a party delegation to make the trip, along the lines 
of the Australian Labor Party mis!;ion. 
35 N.Z.P.D. val. 373, p2003, 20 July, 1971 
36 Evening Post 17 July, 1971, pl 
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'J.lhis invitation was d-eclined. 3 7 The party did not want the 
proposed mission to be of their political colour only. It preferred 
that any delegation be dra~.vn from a variety of sources, representing 
New Zealand. The party would not have been un111i!1dful of the fact 
that this would minimise any undesirable political consequences at 
home. The political risks of a Labo:c Party mission to China had 
been thrashed out in Australia before Whitlam went: it is possible 1 
even probable, that New Zealand Labour saw them as too high. The 
Leader of the Opposition said publicly that he felt that any mission 
to China could do more for New Zealand if it had an official character. 
He said this in response to a suggestion that the Chinese were more 
likely to invite a Labour Party team to China than a government-
sponsored mission. 38 
The next significant developrr.ent in the China field was the 
American decision to support the admission of the People's Republic 
' 
to the United Nations. Kirk called this "a major step and a 
courageous one", and said that it underlined the serious intention of 
the Nixon administration to try to improve relationships with China~ 
He predicted that the Chinese >rould be certain now to win membership. 
The Leader of the Opposition saw the decision as Tlcourageousn beca11se 
it involved problems "not only so far as the Government of Taiwan ·is 
concerned, but because of the effect on the relationships between 
some South-east Asian countries". Kirk 'vent on to say that the 
American decision was a reminder to New Zealand that there was some 
scope for independence and initiative in foreign policy, and it seemed 
37 Interview, W.W. Freer, 15.8.75 
38 Ch:t•istchv:J"ch Star 19 July, 1971 
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a pity that New Zealand was going to appear in a'me-too'role again 1 
and "be sv1ept into line by the coat-tails of others". Kirk said he 
thought there would be satisfaction in many people's minds if China 
entered the United Nations and took part in its responsibilities and 
activities. 3 g· 
In October, New Zealand and the United States failed to 
prevent the expulsion of the Tah1an government from the United Nations 
when Peking was admitted. 
The admittance of Peking to the United Nations and the 
expulsion of Taivmn was apparently a turning point for Labour Party 
policy. In party eyes, Peking's acceptance by the world community 
at Taiwan's expense dealt the two-China· policy a fatal blo>J. Kirk 
was to say in February, 1973: 
11 0nce the United Nations had recognised Peking as lhe sole 
legal Government of China .• the time had arrived for a 
clear decision" 40 
The decision vJas to not insist on maintaining relations with Taiwan. 
The United Nations - an institution dear to Labour Party hearts -
had given a sort of moral sanction to the abandonment of Taipeh. 
New Zealand would not be stepping out of line in granting recognition 
on Peking's terms. It would be going with the crowd. 
In a speech to the Invercargill Rotary Club on November l, 
1971, the Leader of the Opposition said that the United Nations 
decision to seat China and as a consequence dislodge Tai1r1an '<'!las an 
endorsement of a One-China policy, and a One-China approach implied 
39 Press, (Christchurch) August 4, 1971 
40 N.Z.P.D. vol. 382, p81, 21 February, 1973 
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an international acceptance that the TaitYan question v1as for China 
a domestic issue. 41 Kirk sc:id tha.t New Zealand had been interested 
in sending a goodwill mission to China prior to the United Nations 
decision, but this policy had been overtaken by events. lfNow the 
larger question of the recognition of tl1e government of China arises 11 • 
Kirk believed that it would be absurd for Ne\'l Zealand to recognise 
the representatives of the People's Revublic at the United Nations 
but not elsewhere 1 as the represen·tatives of China. Recognition was 
now an essential element in improving relationships with China 1 and 
should be done even if 11 other priorities for the establishment of 
posts means that an exchange of representatives would be further on 
into the future 11 • 42 
The Leader of the Opposition still did not publicly advocate 
the cutting of links ltJith Taiwan .. He said that while China might 
not regard Ne\v Zealand's continuing recognition of Taiwan ·with favour: 
that was not an adequate reason for Ne.w Zealand's failing to take early 
action to indicate to China that it was prepared to recognise it. 
11A clear indication that New.zealand is prepared to recognise 
the Government. of China \VOuld be valuable indications [sic] of 
New Zealand's desire to improve relations \'lith other countries. 
The aim to work for better relationships is not just s-omething 
for others. It is for us too. When should we act? l1t least 
early enough to show that the policy proposed is being taken 
as a New Zealand initiative 11 • 
Kirk did recognise that "at this time the policy of China 
towards Taiwan is firm and unchanged". The implication was that it 
might change. 
41 . Labour Party Research Unlt. Transcript of Norman Kirk's speech to 
Invercargill Rotary Club. l Novew.ber, 1971, p3.3 
_, Ibid. p4 
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The Leader of the Opposition had placed his China remarks in 
the context of a plea for a foreign policy of initiative on New 
Zealand's part. Kirk said that the fate of the Asian-Pacific region 
after the end of the war in Vietn.aln depended not only on the changing 
attitudes and policies of the four great powers currently involved 
there, but also on the response and determination of small nations. 
He disavowed the necessity for Ne\v Zealand; s policies to be a by-
product of Great Power policies. The Labour Party leader finished 
up by declaring that 
11 the smallness of a country 'tllas neither an excuse nor a 
reason for failing to develop vigorous constructive and 
successful initiatives aimed at improving relationships 
with neighbours". 
On the China ~uestion, of course, New Zealand governments 
of both colours had for years refused to take initiatives; preferring 
not to move beyond the positions of the country's allies. 
A few days after this speech, a special correspondent for 
the Auckland Star stated that Labcur's China policy was becoming 
"more sharply defined". In the past, the report said, "Mr Kirk 
has lagged far behind the enthusiasm of his Australian opposite 
number, Mr Whitlam - mainly because he did not-want to walk out on 
Taiwan. But new he believes a situation could now be created in 
which China would not take too hard a·line towards Taiwan- or 
countries wishing to maintain links there". 43 
The Star correspondent said that Kirk reasoned that if 
New Zealand was the first small country to approach Peking and show 
4 3 Auckland Stw' 6 November, 1971, p3 "Expect Fireworks in Foreign 
Affairs Soon" by Jack Tresidder 
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positive interest in recognising the Com:munist government, China might 
ilot \Yant tO impose impossible conditions. In any case, New Zealand 
could lose nothing by making the approach. 
Kirk elaborated on his Invercargill remarks 1n a 'Point of View' 
broadcast for the Ne\'1 Zealand Broadcasting Corporation a week later. 
The Leader of the Opposition said that it ,-..,as recognised that China's 
admission to the united Nations meant that a number of nations would 
be reappraising their attitude to the formal recognition of China, and 
11 Since good relationships are vital to Nevr Zealand throughout 
the region, I don't knotv of any reason v.~hy r.ve shouldn't act 
earlier rather than later to make it known that \Ve vmuld be 
prepared as a country to recognise the Government of China". l~~ 
That, he said, did not presuppose an early exchange of representatives, 
but it would establish some contact other than just at the United 
Nations. Kirk asked whether i·t 'VlaS better for Nm.v Zealand ·to ;,"~ai:t:: 
until other countries - presumably meaning the United States, J·apan 
and Australia - had taken this step, then "sort of fall into line and 
look as though ;,ve are being dragged in a backY.Jash of eve:ryone else' s 
action", or whether New Zealand should start to e~press her own national 
interests 11 and see that these lie in the sort of relationships that 
we can build through the Asian region". 
Despite Kirk's concern that New Zealand should act quickly the 
party did not press the issue for the rest of its time in Opposition. 
The Auckland Star reported that Kirk was likely to seek a special debate 
centred on the recognition of China, 45 but this did not happen. 
44 Labour Party Research Unit - Transcript, "Point of Viewn Broadcast, 
Sunday, November 17, 1971, p46. 
'' 5 Auckland Star 6 November, 1971, p3 
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When the Labour Party conference was held in May, 1972r one 
remit made an attempt to.cowmit the party to the protection of Taiwants 
undetermined status. Remit llb suggested that a Labour government 
xecognise "the right of the people of Taiwan to self-determination". 
Although this was completely in line TOvith what had been party policy 
until that point, and had been the basis of the canadian recognitior., 
the relevant committee recorrunended tha·t the remit be rejected because 
of its "vagueness 11 • 46 A new note of practicality seemed to be moving 
into the party's deliberations on China. Vague or not, a cmm:r.i t:ment 
to Taiv.1an would have reduced the party• s room to manoeuvre in negot-
iations for diplomatic recognition, and recent events had shov..rn that 
the Canadian formula was no longer acceptable to the Chinese. In 
March, Britain had been forced to acknowledge that Tai"t;.oan \'las a 
province of the People's Republic in order to upgrade its level of 
representation in Chinaa Since 1954, British representation had 
been at Charg€ d'Affaires level only, because Britain kept a consulate 
I 
on Taiwan. Now the consulate was to be withdrawn~ The rejection 
of the remit signalled that a fundamental change had taken place in 
Labour's policy. Vague or not, impractical or not, the principle of 
the people of Taiwan's right to determine thei~_own future had been 
part of Labour's credo for nearly tl;lQ decades. When the policy 
manifesto carne out, a pledge to recogn;Lse the People • s Republic was 
there again for the first time since 1954, but there was no mention 
of Taiwan. 
China was not a prominent issue in the 1972 election campaign, 
although one other party - the new values Party - also had a pledge 
46 New Zealand Labour Party - Report of the 56th Annual Conference p52 
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to recognise the People's Republic in its manifesto~ The Values 
pledge was specific on the point of Tai'i.van .. The clause stated 
that recognition I·JOuld be pursued, if need be, at the expense of 
severance of diplomatic relations \..,.,ith Taiwan. The Values manifesto 
claimed that the Labour Party's policy on China was obscure, and 
that the last policy statement made by the party Vlas arnbiguous. 47 
On November 25, the Labour Party decisively won the general 
election, taking fifteen seats from Natioil.al to end up with a huge 
majority of 23. 
The new Labour Prime Minister thus had at the beginning one 
definite advantage in decision-making over his Labour counterpart 
of 1957 - a solid mandate at the polls.- Instead of clinging pre-
cariously to power as Na.sh 1 s government had, Kirk's victory had been 
such as to seem to guarantee him a second term .. 
Kirk, as had been expected, not only assumed the Prime 
Minister's office, but became Minister of Foreign Affairs as well. 
Interviewed a few days after the election, Kirk's only mention of 
the China question was to say that the Labour government hoped to 
go on >~ith the goodwill mission to China that had been in train 
under the previous government. 49 
A week after the Labour government was elected, but before 
it had assuw~d office, it gained an ideological ally across the 
Tasman when the Australian Laber Party \!TOn the general e.lection 
in Australia. The Leader of the Australian Labor Party had 
47 Ne-. Zealand Values Party Bluepr-int for New Zealand - An 
Alter1wtive Future p50 
4 8 f{ail'...ato Times, 28 November, 1972, pS 
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proclaimed during the election campaign that recognition of the 
People's Republic of China would be the first act of a Labor 
government in the foreign affairs field. The Australian Labor 
Party's victory meant that.New Zealand would have the active 
support of one of her close allies in making any change in her 
China policy. Any prior recognition of China by Australia would 
be a powerful stimulus for New Zealand t.o follow suit. 
The Prime Minister did not seem to be inclined to rush 
recognition. In an interview conducted some·time in mid-December, 
but not published until December 27, Kirk said that although the 
government was committed to a policy of recognising the People's 
Republic, "we will proceed at a slm;er pace than Australia. 
Obviously, there will have to be preliminaries to. any recognition of 
China. Mr V.Thitlam has been to China, and we will discuss the 
situation when we meet next month 11 • 4 9 
Asked about New Zealand's future relations with Taiwan, 
Kirk said: "This is a difficult problem, but it would be part of 
the task of a goodwill mission to explore what is possible to solve 
it. We don't want to worsen any relations, but to improve them. 
The two Chinas themselves must be thinking and working on their 
o\.m conclusions, and it may not be the problem it now appears. 
We would approach a goodwill visit as a prelude to recognition of 
China and an exploratory look at Taiwan". 5° 
Early in the month, then, Kirk appeared to see recognition 
coming after the goodwill visit to China, which had been tentatively 




scheduled by the previous govern.rn.ent for Feb:r:uary. He did not seem 
to envisage an abrupt parting from Taiwan. 
Yet on December 22, 1972, with surprising suddenness, New 
Zealand's recognition of the People's Republic of China was announced. 
It was only t\'70 weeks after the government had taken office 1 and there 
had been no hint that negot.iations Here under way~ Prime Minister 
Kirk, unlike his Aus·tralian counterpart, had not at any stage declared 
that recognition was a matter of the highest priority, to be negotiated 
and announced as soon as possible. The fact that New Zealand's 
recognition was simultaneous v-Tith Australia'·s suggested tha·t the Ne\'l 
Zealand government had been carried along by the Aus·tralian governmen·t' s 
urgency, although Ministry of Foreign Af_f'airs sources were reported as 
saying that the simultaneous announcement \'las largely co-incidental. 
The sources claimed that rather than tagging along with Australia, 
the Ne\.,r Zealand government had decided on the early move before the 
Australian government was elected. The matter had been taken before 
the first Cabinet meetings and the btlnistry instructed to act. 51 
The Christchurch Star however, reported that the Ministry 
had been instructed to ac·t in the week after the elections - long 
before the time Cabinet could first meet. The New Zealand represent-
ative at the United Nations had immediately contacted the Chinese 
representative and the reply had come back "within a week" that 
Peking would accept the New Zealand initiative. 52 
-51 Waikato Times December 23, 1972, pS 
52 C~ristehureh Star 23 December, 1972 
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In support of the claim that New Zealand had acted independ-
ently of Australia, the Ministry sources had pointed out that New 
Zealand and Australia had not done their negotiating together: 
New Zealand had worked through the Chinese representative at the 
United Nations, while Australia had used the Chinese Embassy in 
Paris~ The negotiations took about a week, the report said. 
S~W. Greif claims, 'tvithout giving any sources, ·that the 
decision to recognise came at Australia 1 s urging, and 'tVithout 
reference to Cabine·t. 53 Sir Keith Holyoake, speaking in Parliament 
in March, 1973, had no doubt that this was so. 
"It made it quite clear to. the world t.'oat New Zealand was 
acting as the jackal to the new ~ustralian government's 
lion .... the Australian Prime Minister was in a hurry and 
the New Zealand Labour government was just dragged along 
willy-nilly". 54 
Kirk himself gave credence to this view saying in his introduction to 
the 1973 Annual Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that 
"we took our decision to recognise China independently, but 
implemented it in close consultation with Australia". 55 
Warren Freer in 1975 said that there was no question of New Zealand's 
having been persuaded to recognise, but there had been agreernen·t on 
timing. 5 6 
In explanation of the suddenness of Ne-v; Zealand's recognition, 
the Prime Minister said that there was "no point in delaying about 
such a fundamental issue". 57 He declined to answer questions on 
53 Greif, s.w. ''The OVerseas Chinese in New Zealand" pl70 
54 N.Z.P.D. vol. 382, p595, 7 Mar9h, 1973 
55 Annual Repol't of the Minist1oy of Foreign Affairs 19?3 p9 
56 Interview, 15.8.75 
5 'l Waikato Times December, 23, 1972, p5 
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the move, declined requests for a Press conference, and refused to 
appear on radio and television about it. These moves \\rere inter-
preted in Wellington as an effort to play do\ .. "11 the decision, one 
paper reported. Kirk did .not v;ish to rub salt into the diplomatic 
wounds of the Nationalist Chinese Ambassa.dor. 58 
The Christchu:Pch Star said that it was known that Hr Kirk was 
unhappy that recognit.ion meant severing ties 1.vi-th Taiwan, but accepted 
that it was inevitable. This unhappiness was shared by some of his 
colleagues, and indeed Greif claims that Kirk's swift, unheralded 
decision was made ·that \vay to avoid intra-party conflict. 11Within 
the Cabinet were many staunch ena~ies of Peking and some friends of 
Taiwan". 59 
The justification for the recognition of China came in a 
policy statement issued the same day as the recognition was announced, 
entitled "New Zealand and the World in the 1970s". The statement 
began by saying that recently there had been a profound change in 
the international situation, particularly in Asia~ Cold war confront-
ation had given way to negotiation. As part of the change, China 
was seeking more normal relations with other countries~ confrontation 
had ended "essentially because the Great Powers are disengaging them-
selves from areas of actual or potential conflict 11 • The four powers 
involved in the affairs of Asia and the Pacific expected their friends 
to look after themselves more than in the past. In this situation, 
New Zealand had to be ready and able to look after her ovm interests~ 
58 Christchurch Star December 23, .1972 
59 Greif, s.w. "The C~Jerseas Ch1:nese in New Zealand." p170 
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"We must in future be more self-reliant11 • 60 In other words, the 
British and Americans were leaving South-east Asia, and it waS 
necessary for Ne\\r Zealand to come to her own terms 'i\l'ith the region 
and the powers that influenced it". Kirk said that in the new 
situation it was "essential" for a small country like Nev; Zealand 
to be in a position to deal with all four powers - that is, China, 
the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Japan. 
"vle must keep ourselves informed of what they are thinking 
and doing. Our national interests also require that we 
have the means of making our views kno'i.m and getting them 
heard by the great powers. T0 do this, we must have effective 
diplo:rnatic representation in all four capitals". 
The statement moved on to a consideration of China in particular~ 
"China has now entered the mainstream of world affairB. 
It is playing an active part in the United Nations. In Asia 
and the Pacific its influence is great and bound to grew. It 
is logical and sensible for Ne\v Zealand to recognise the 
People's Republic of China and [to] enter into normal relations 
with it". 
Finally, there was an assurance that trade with Taiwan would 
not suffer. 
"Recognition of Peking will be accompanied by the tennination 
of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Non-official contacts, 
will, however, be maintained so that our trade with Taiwan will 
continue to expand11 • 
This point was stressed again in February, 1973. 
~~'~i'hat 'tvas done was precisely what was undertaken by Japan. 
Japan removed diplomatic recognition and diplomatic 
relationships were stopped, but [o·ther] relationships were 
not stopped. So long as those relationships are carried 
on by private firms and private individuals, there is nothing 
to prevent thriving trade and a continuing relationship W"ith 
the people of Taiwan". 61 
60 N.Z.F.A.R. December, 1972, pl2 
61 N.Z.P.D. vol. 382, pl21, 21 February, 1973 
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In the communique announcing the establishment of diplomatic 
reilations, New Zealand acknowledged Peking's claim that Taiwan was 
an inalienable part of China and that it V'laS a province of the People's 
Republic of China. This was criticised by the Opposition v;hich felt 
that if recognition were to be afforded, it should at least have been 
on the Canadian basis of making no comment one way or the other on 
the Peking government's claim to Taiwan. On February 27, 1973, 
J.F. Luxton asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Parliament: 
11 In the light of the importance of the principle of self-
determination for small nations like New Zealand, why did 
the Labour government not consider taking note of the 
claim of the People's Republic of China instead of ackno\v-
ledging that claim? 11 6 2 
In reply, the Prime Minister sai,d that, first, the Chinese 
were no longer prepared to accept the Canadian formula, and that 
therefore the government had had no option but to acknovlledge 
Peking's claim if it wanted to recognise China; and that secondly, 
the government saw no objection to acknowledging that claim when 
the authorities in Taiwan themselves considered Taiwan to be part 
of China. 63 
The authorities on Taiwan might have regarded Taiwan as 
Chinese, but they did not see it as part of the People's Republic. 
Labour's policy had always been to deny the Communist claim to 
Taiwan on behalf of the non-communist people of the island. 
During all this time, the Nationalist Chinese government had not 
ceased to say that Taiwan was part of China. In the 1950s, the 
Labour Party had not been concerned with the views of the Nationalist 
62 N.Z.P.D. vol. 382, p246, 27 February, 1973 
63 N.Z.P.D. vol. 382, p246, 27 February, 1973 
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Chinese government on the status of Taiwanr an1~1ay. 'raiwan' s status 
was undefilled, and the Nationalist government not regarded as its 
legitimate government. In the 1960s, the Nationalist governmen·t 
had come to be accepted as the legitimate Government of Taiwan only. 
The Republic of China was not China, just as the German Democratic 
Republic was not the governinent of all Germany. 
Luxton harked back to Labour's previous concern when he asked: 
"Does the Prime Hinister consider that between 15,000,000 and 16,000,000 
people living in Taiwan should have the freedom to choose what their 
future is? 1164 Kirk replied that the question was hardly relevant, 
since 11 the government in Taiwan has never yet been \Villing to give 
the 12,000, 000 native Taiwanese the rig_ht to decide their future .. 6 5 
This was true enough, but had never been mentioned by Labour previously. 
Whether or not the Taiwanese had the freedom to rid themselves of 
the Nationalist government, both New Zealand political parties had 
always defended their right not to come under the sway of the Comrnunist 
government .. In the 1960s Labour seemed to accept the Taiwan gover:n-
ment, and its policy of opposition to the People's Republic, as 
representative of the wishes of the Taiwanese. 
The belief that the future of the non-Communist people of 
Taiwan should not be mortgaged, even in principle, to the mainland 
government had been a major constraint on Nash's desire to recognise 
the People's Republic. 
had no relevance. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
Twelve years later, to Kirk, the belief 
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t"''hen the National Party 1 s P. I. V.lilki.nson asked what the 
Labour goverrunent' s at"ci tude "rould be if Cormnunist China sought 
to assert the claim to Taiwan with force 1 Kirk rather surprisingly 
pointed out that Taiwan still had a mutual security treaty \'lith the 
United States. 66 The Prime Minister thereby implied that New 
Zealand did not, in spiri·t, accept the People's Republic's claim 
to Taiwan, and had been prepared to concede the claim at least 
partly because it could not be enforced. The acknowledgement of 
CoiTIIIlunist China's claim to Taiwan had been an expedient move. 
Kirk could have replied that Peking was en·ti tled to assert her 
rights by any means she saw fit, or that New Zealand had no opinion 
on the matter .. 
In defending himself against charges of callously abandoning 
Taiwan, however, Kirk strongly denied that New Zealand had any 
obligations to Taiwan. 
"At no point un~er a treaty or under any other arrangement 
has New Zealand accepted any obligation whatever to assist 
Taiwan in the event of being attacked" .. G7 
As long as United States troops were stationed on Taiwan, however, 
it could be argued that New Zealand would be obliged to aid them 
under the ANZUS treaty. Kirk's statement, although accurately 
saying there had been no legal abandonment, did indicate a moral 
abandonment. The Prime Minister could well have quoted the 
Palmerstonian doctrine that a nation has no permanent friends or 
enemies, just permanent interests. 
66 N.Z.P.D. vol. 382, p246, 27 February, 1973 
67 N.Z.P.D. vol. 382, pl2l, 21 February, 1973 
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The pragmatic attitude of the Labour governrnent to the Taiwan 
-china issue was expressed by the Associate Minister of -Foreign Jl..ffairs, 
J.A~ Walding, in ¥~rch. 
"Whether or not [the members opposite] talk about 
'acknowledging' or 'taking note of' Tai".V"an, they are only 
playing wit_lo words. It is true that the Canadians made 
an exception. They recognised the People's Republic of 
China and took note of the claims of [sic] Taiwan. However, 
it is a plain fact that every country that has recognised 
Hainland China has followed the procedure of breaking off 
diplomatic relations \>Jith Taiwan 11 • 6 8 
Walding believed that the formula used was irrelevant 
because the end result was the same. The change in formula meant, 
however, that the principle of self-determination for Taiwan 1.'Jas 
being abandoned. 
For the Labour government a link with China in the post-Vietnam 
era was a greater national interest than preserving diplomatic links 
with Taiwan~ Kirk saw New Zealand's move to initiate a dialogue 
with the People's Republic as the forerunr,or, he hoped, of a movernent 
among all Asian nations to come to t.erms \'lith China. New Zealand's 
future role in the region, he believed, was to encourage the nations 
of South-east Asia to enter into relationships with China in order to 
eliminate causes of conflict that might draw other powers into Asia 
on one side or the other. The South-east Asian countries' fear of 
China had been instrumental in involving other powers in the area. 
In his introduction to the Annual Report of the Hinistry of Foreign 
Affairs in 1973, Kirk said: 
68 N.Z.P.D. val. 382, p669, 8 Harch, 1973 
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"It remains our long-·term aim to bring about a 
reconciliation between countries thc:t have been divided 
by the conflicts of the past generation, and especially 
between the countries of South-east Asia on the one hand 
and China on the other. China is so big and important 
a country, so close to South-east Asia, and so deeply 
involved in its affairs that peace can hardly be achieved 
without its co-operation. Its actions have a profound 
influence on the course of events throughout the area". 69 
The role that Kirk proposed for New Zealand was the opposite of the 
one practised by the previous Labour governrnent, which Has to prevent 
the free Asian governments from falling into too close a relationship 
with China. 
Just as Nash had been convinced that New Zealand's recognition 
might ·encourage Asian governments to consider the same course, with 
disastrous results for them and ultimately for New Zealand, so Kirk 
now hoped that a New Zealand recognition would point ·t.'le way for tho 
South-east Asian nations to do likewise - with beneficial results~ 
Writing in the New Zealand supplement of the Far Eastern Economic 
Review in 1973, the Prime Minister said: 
"The countries of the [Asian-Pacific] area must come to terms 
with China, each in its o"~ way and its own time. I hope that 
New Zealand has contributed something to this process by the 
establishment of diplomatic relations". 70 
Kirk was enabled to take the step of establishing diplomatic 
relations with China because his government was free of the constraints 
that inhibited his predecessor. The international political climate 
was favourable, as it had not been to Nash: China >vas actively seek-
ing relationships >rith Western countries, and had establi"Shed them 
with Common>realth and NATO friends of New Zealand. United States policy 
69 ·A.R.M.F.A. 1973 AJHR A-1 p9 
7° Fa::t> Eastern Economic Review August 6, 1973 - New Zealand and Asia 
Focus p3. 
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\.Jas no longer to prevent the establishment of relations 111ith China, 
and the United States was actively seeking its own links there. 
The South-east Asian countries were no longer likely to lose confid-
ence in Western military support against China, since the support 
was no longer there. After the United Nations had rejected a 
Two-chinaspolicy, the protection of Taiwan's status did not have 
the same importance. 
Conclusion 
The Labour Party went into the 1960s as an Opposition party 
once more, believing that China should be recognised and admitted 
to the United Nations as an aid to peace, but conscious now of 
several constraints to the party's impl~mentation of such a policy. 
Nash had found strong American oblections, China's international 
behaviour, and the status of Taiwan, obstacles. The party under 
Nash believed that recognition without some prior agreement would be 
tantamount to acknowledging China's claim to Taiwan. 
Under Nash's successor Nordmeyer, from early 1963 to late 
1965, the party appeared to dispose of two constraints - those of 
China's international behaviour, and of the effect on Taiwan's 
position. China's recognition could not be tied up with questions 
of moral approval, Nordmeyer said, and recognition did not imply 
anything about the People's Republic's claim to Taiwan. Thus it 
seemed that only the American constraint was still operative, as 
well as that of public opinion, which was linked to China's inter-
national behaviour. Labour's election manifesto of 1963 did not 
assert itself on the Chinese issue, and the 1966 manifest.o did not 
mention it at all. 
( 
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In 1969, when the issue of China revived on the international 
scene, the Labour Party, now under Kirk, shov . Ted itself to ·be in favour 
of a t\<ro-China pel icy. The 1969 annual conference refused to pass 
a remit amendQent that said recognition should go ahead even if it 
meant breaking off relations 'i-vith Taiv;an, and the Research Office 
brief for candidates on the issue for the 1969 election indicated 
that Labour favoured separate representation for ~raiwan at the 
United Nations and would not accede to the Fllbanian resolution to 
admit Peking at Taiwan's expense. Kirk, in September 1970, told 
the Oamaru Rotary Club that the Western Korld had to recognise that 
there were two separate Chinese governments. The Labour Party's 
difference with the Nationalists \>laS its eagerness to initiate 
negotiations with the Commun:'-sts despite the knm1ledge of the 
I 
Chinese stand on recognising Taiwan~ This eagerness became more 
apparent after it became evident that the United States policy was 
changing. 
At no time during this period, however, did the Labour Party 
urge the government to recognise Peking: it urged a goodwill mission. 
The entry of China into the United Nations at Taiwan's expense 
was recognised as being a heavy blow to the maintenance of a b.vo-China 
policy, but even V.1hile accepting that diplomatic relations with Taiv1an 
would probably have to be severed to establish them with Peking, the 
Labour Party continued to hope that something might be worked out. 
Kirk indicated at this time that he thought it essential that New 
Zealand established relations wi·th Peking once the Great Powers' 
policies in Asia had changed. Ne>1 Zealand had to establish he.r own 
relationships with countries influential in the region, once her 
powerful friends ceased to look after her interests there~ 
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lfuen the Labour Party won the general election of 1972, the 
Prime Minister initially seemed to regard recognition of Peking as 
something that would be negotiated over a reasonable period of time. 
However, diplomatic recognition of Peking was made surprisingly 
suddenly, two weeks after the party assumed office, and was announced 
in conjunction with Australian recognition. It would seem likely 
that the New Zealand government '"as hurried into recognition by the 
Australian government. In acknowledging Peking's claim to Taiwan, 
Labour sacrificed one of its principles that the People of Taiwan 
were entitled to a separate existence in the service of realpolitik. 
Upholding a right that was not likely to be threatened was now 
considered less important for New Zealand than finally coming to terms 
with a power that greatly influenced an area of importance to New 
Zealand. The future of South-east Asia once more was a detel.'"lilinc{nt 
of China policy. 
PAR'I' II 
THE SHADOW OF CHINA: NEl-l ZEALAND SECURITY 
POLICIES AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA 1949-75 
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NEW ZE.ALAND, S~UTH-EAST ASI.i\ AND SECURITY, 1949-57 
Introduction 
Before 1949, South-east Asia was not a region of great interest 
or importa~ce to New Zealand's policy-makers. After 1949 it began to 
be, and by 1957 it was firmly established as a priority area of New 
Zealand's foreign policy. The key to the change is the advent of 
the People's Republic of China and the threat it was ·thought to pose 
to New zealand through South-east Asia. The National govern..-nent came 
to power in late 1949 with the belief that there was a pressing need 
to ensure that South-east Asia was protected against Cow~unist take-
over. The advent of a Cowmunist government in China, it was thought, 
inevitably foreshadowed a Chinese drive to gain control - directly or 
indirectly - of an area that the Second World l'lar had proved was of 
significance to New Zealand's security. The government wanted to 
involve the Western Great Powers with Ne>~ Zealand and South-east Asia 
in a Pacific pact against Communism. Initially, neither Britain nor 
L~e United States was interested. 
New Zealand's Commonwealth loyalty was such an influential 
factor in her policy-making during this period that the government 
was prepared to continue to involve the countrJ in Britai~'s foreign 
policy priority area - the Middle East - despite its worries about 
the Asian situation. Indeed, >1hen the United States offered New 
Zealand a reciprocal Pacific pact in 1951 as a quid p1'0 C{'--10 for 
acquiescence in a "soft" Japanese Peace Treaty, New Zealand wa.s 
reluctant to assume obligations that would conflict -v1ith her Middle 
' 
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Eastern ones. When Britain and the Unit.ed States shm~yed signs of 
coming together in a South-east F~sia.n pact in 1954, New Zealand v-.1as 
very enthusiastic for the scheme~ Along with Australia, New Zeala~d 
believed that a military alliance involving the United States in South-
east Asia was a necessity* However, New Zealand's Common'ivea 1 th ties 
were still such that it , .. uuld not take on any obligations without 
British agreement, and would no·t ~join a South-eas·t Asian alliance 
that did not include Britain. After the signing cf the SouJch-eas"t 
P .. sia Collective Defence Treaty, Nev,r Zealand and Britain agreed that 
New Zealand's Com1n0nweal th obligations should be transferred to Malaya. 
Beyond that, however, Britain pressed New Zealand for a ground troop 
contribution to a Commom;ealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya. 
New Zealand acquiesced as a Comrnonwealth duty, but also to 
prove to the United States that it was seri.ous about its SEATO 
intentions, a...11d thus to ensure that America..1"1 support VJould be equally 
solid. 
In 1957, New Zealand did not become a formal sig·natory to the 
defence agreement between Britain and independent Malaya, although 
it intended to keep its troops in Malaya. Ne\'1 Zealand preferred to 
rell'ain informally obliged to a Great Power ratl1er than become directly 
committed to a small South-east Asian state* 
Some six months before the National Party took office in 
December, 1949, its spokesman on External P~ffairs, F. w. Doidge, ,.;as 
declaring in Parliru'"Tlent ~"1-_tat Nm-."' Zealand should be especially con-
cerned \·lith the poli·tical situation in south-east Asia. The Soviet 
' 
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danger 1 which had lessened in Europe, was threatening the East 1 because 
Europe could be attacked through Asia. 
"The gravest danger spot in the >mrld today is not Germany, 
not Western Europe, but south-east Asia 11 • 1 
Doidge said that every one of the South-east Asian countries 
was disrupted by violent internal conflict, and in each there were 
forces bent on destroying the existing form of government. On top of 
this, the area "as now directly threatened by the victorious Communist 
armies in China. New Zealand, he said, had to realise that its mm 
fate \Vas involved in South-east Asia's. Communism could sweep right 
through South-east Asia unless a dyke were built, and there were no 
countries more interested in the building of such a dyke than New 
Zealand and Australia. Poverty and destitution were driving the 
people of Asia to desperation: they were hungry for food and territorial 
expansion and were within easy reach of New Zealand's shores. Communist 
elements in Indonesia and Indo-China had to be combated, as well as those 
in Malaya, and Doidge thought that a Pacific Pact embracing the interest-
ed Western powers was the answer. 
At the time, the New Zealand government's strategic concern was 
focussed on Europe and the Middle East, the regions where British 
interests were thought to be most vulnerable to the most likely enemy 
of the commonwealth, the Soviet Union. New Zealand's leaders believed 
that the country's defence was bound up with t.he defence of >~ider 
Corn.\nonweal th interests, and in service of this belief, the Labour 
government had recently agreed that, in the event of global war, New 
1 . N.Z.P.D. vol. 285, pl02, 30 June, 1949 
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zealand should send an augmented infantry division to 2id Bri·tish 
forces in the Middle East. 2 
New Zealand's military eyes were turned to South-east Asia 
only slightly, through the governmer.t's recent involvement, along 
with Australia, in British planning for the defence of Malaya and the 
South-west Pacific. This planning arrangement v12.s kno\vn as ANZAM.. 3 
A month after the National government took office in December 
1949, Doidge, who had become Minister of External Affairs, v1as speak-
ing out again for a Pact among the Pacific powers to halt the spread 
of Communism in Asia: a Pacific equivalent of the North Atlantic 
Treaty. The occasion was his journey to Colombo, Ceylon, for the 
first commonwealth Foreign Ministers' Conference. The Minister said: 
"There must be a pact to stay the Red tide in the East. 
CoiTL-rnunism is sweeping Asia unchecked". 4 
1Doidge said that the conquest of F_sia was the Leninist method of 
1 1L~dermining the strength of the Western powers. He envisaged a union 
of South-east Asian countries with the colonial pm<ers of the Pacific 
- France, the Netherlands and Britain - and Canada and the United 
States. 
At the Colombo Confsrence, ho\'lever, New Zealand fo1.md itself 
the only advocate of the Pact, 5 altho\lgh Australia saw merit in the idea. 
2 Cunninghame, R .. R. "The Development of Nev; Zealand's Foreign Policy 
and Political Alignments", p26 in Larkin, T.C. (ed.) New Zeala-ad'e 
External Relations. 
3 For the history of A..~ZAM, see Millar, T.B .. "Austral ... ia's Defenceu 
pp69-76 
4 New Zealand HeraZ.d (N.Z.H.) January 6, 1950, p6 
5 N.Z.P~D. vel~ 291, p2lt12, S!?.:J7"t.ember 5, 1950 
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Britain and India \'lere not interested. The conference brought forth, 
instead, a programme for fighting the causes of Communism by helping 
to develop the countries of Asia economically the so-called Colombo 
Plan. The Plan was accepted in -principle Dy New Zealand as a sound 
idea, but Doidge still believed that,a wilitary alliance was a necessity 
for the immediate future. In particular, the Minister of External 
.. Affairs \•.ras concerned with the progress of the Corrununist-led insurgency 
against the French colonial authorities .in Indo-China. 
Doidge reported back to Cabinet after Colombo that several of 
the Foreign Ministers had agreed with him that if the Communists were 
to gain power in Indo-China, the results for New Zealand would be 
"catastrophicn.G Siam, Burma, Nalaya~and Indonesia would, almost of 
a certainty, fall in sequence, and bring the menace to the very doors 
of Australia and New Zealand. 7 
In February, 1950, when the French transferred their authority 
in Vietnam to a non-Coll1Jl1unist nationalist gover!h"TTent, the New Zealand 
government, along with Britain and Australia, immediately recognised 
it, in preference to the insurgent governm6nt, \vhich was described by 
the Department of External Affairs as the "so-called Government of Ho 
Chi Minh" . 8 Canada and India, on the other hand, refused to recognise 
the nevJ Associated State of Vietna1n on the grounds that it was not 
truly representative of the Vietnamese people. For them the 
principle of self-determination was paramount. The New Zealand 
government justified its action on the grounds that the previous 
recognition of the insurgent Vietminh government by the Soviet Union 
6 Information supplied by the Research Division, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 
7 Ibid. 
8 .4nnual Report of the Department of ExternaZ Affairs 1950 (A.R.D.E.A.) 
p20 
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and China had given the Indo-China conflict a 'lv1ider significance 11 • 9 
The go\rerning consideration in the Ne\.; Zealand govex:n.m(:lrlt' s app:roa.ch 
to the nationalist movements of South-east Asia was t.he relationship 
between those movements and the Soviet Union. Communist movements 
were ipso facto dominated by the Soviet Unior: and ·thus co11ld not be 
truly nationalist. 
In April, 1950 Doidge v,ras looking forward to the May meeting 
of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee in Canberra as another 
opportunity to raise ·the question of a Pacific pact. 10 In a speech 
at Tauranga that month, the Minister described the absence of such a. 
pact when the Atlantic pact existed as 
"like shutting the front door al)d leaving the back door open. 
We have to do something and we cannot do it too quickly. If 
we don't the tidal wave of Communism will sweep down upon us 11 • 1 1 
An opportunity for New Zealand to do something agains·t 
Comrmmist insurgents in South-east Asia exis·ted in f.!alaya, tvhere 
British colonial authori·ties had been administering a State of Emergency 
since 1948. New Zealand had been slightly involved since 1949, '"hen 
the Labour gove~;unent had acceded to a British request for a flight 
of Dakotas to help with supply dropping. In April, 1950, Opposition 
members of the British Parliament raised the question of approacheE to 
New Zealand and Australia for ground troops for Malaya. Although 
Colonial Secretary Griffiths said that he hoped that Britain's 
military strength in Malaya would be sufficient, the question was 
ta~en up by the press in New Zealand. Asked to comment on the 
possibility of t~ew Zealand forces for r-'.talaya, Doidge avoided ar-swering 
9 Ibid. 
10 O.D.T. April 10, 1950, p7 
11 O.D.T. April 18, 1950, p5 ( 
directly. He said that the upcoming Canberra conference would 
continue Colombo deliberations about how to check the flood of 
Communism in Asia. 12 Prime Minister Holland \'las a little more 
positive when he was asked. He said that it could be taken for 
granted that New Zealand \V"ould play its part in ensuring the security 
of the Pacific. 
"We expect the lead to come from Britain and i.f Britain has 
anything to say to us concerning the part she might. c.sk us 
to play, we \'lill yi ve the most careful consideration to any 
representationsn. 3 
After June, 1950, South-east Asia took some-v1hat less prominence 
in the outlook of the government as the Korean war broke out. The 
Korean War, however, was a powerful reinforcement to the view that 
the Soviet Union was concentrating its attention on Asia, and thus it 
ultimately increased the importance of South-east l'_sia. Nev7 Zealand 
responded quickly to the United Nations appeal for assistance for 
South-Korea. 
Doidge told Parliament on July 12 that it was unthinkable that 
the Communist forces could be allmmd to prevail in Korea. 
"If that happened .•• the consequences could be disastrous 
throughout the Orient, and the still-free countries of Asia 
would be demoralised. The preservation of that ne•1 Republic 
of Korea is of tremendous importance to the rest of the world". 1' 
In a review of foreign affairs two months later, Doidge said 
that it would be ','dangerous complacency 11 to imagine that what w·as 
happening in Korea could not be repeated in Asia. 
12 O.D.T. April 10, 1950, p7 
13 O.D.T. April 19, 1950, pS 
14 N.Z.P.D. val. 289, p341-342, 12 July, 1.950 
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"At present;> P.~sia is in the position of the gieatest danger, 
and the· fate of our neighbours - and they are our neighbours -
is 'a matter of the greatest and gravest concern to this 
COU:.itry". l S 
The Minister went on to say that the countries in Asia most 
vulnerable to the Communists were those which had only recently 
achieved political independence. Six ne\l governments had been 
created since the Second Norld War had ended, and Ne~1 Zealand vmtched 
their progreSS Vli"th COncern and anxieT.y e Doidge pledged that the 
National government, in concert with other membe.r:s of the United 
Nationsr would do all in its power to ensure the integrity of the 
threatened countriese Doidge reminded the House that in fighting 
for the threatened Asian countries, "we are at the same time fighting 
for ourselves". 
Doidge drew ma~bers' attention in his speech specifically to 
Malaya and Indo-China. 'I1he terrorists in Malaya 1 he said, were 
entirely unsupported by the vast majoriLy of the Malayan people, 
yet they were seeking to create conditions of anarchy and the 
opportunity to make the existing administration impossible. 
11 0Ur government is pleased to learn that the anti-terrorist 
campaign is making steady, if not spectacular, progress, 
and we are all glad to know that the transport aircraft ;;e 
have supplied are doing work of the utmost value in that 
area". 16 
On this occasion, Doidge spoke again of the Pacific Pact. 
He recalled that at the Colombo Conference he had emphasised that 
there could be no sense in building up a Pacific security orgru1isation 
unless the united States were associated with it. 
15 N.Z.P.D. vol. 291, p2138, 5 September, 1950 
16 Ibid., p2139 
A pact '"i thcut the 
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United States would have been a source of weakness, rather than one 
of strength, he said. In other words, American participation Yras to 
be the backbone of the pact . Doidge went on to say that his O\'ffi 
. view now, and that of the governni.ent, was that the pact \-Ias not as 
necessary as they had thought it six months previously. 
"It is unnecessary nov1 because of t•1hat is happening in 
Korea. Today the United States of America is in the 
Pacific. I think she is there now as a permanent partner 
in the policing of the Pacific 11 • 17 
The United States had given proof of its intention to resist· 
Cormnunist aggression in the Pacific, and that was what the pact was 
to have been all about. 
However, four months later, on the eve of the Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers' Conference in January, 1951, Prime Minister Holland 
told a Press Conference that New Zealand was still pressing for a 
Pacific pact, and v:anted it to be as wide as possible. 1 8 ·Although 
!New Zealand had announced that it thought the United States indispen.s-
able to a pact, the fact that the government raised the matter at a 
Commonwealth meeting suggests that it considered Britain's presence 
equally necessary. The presence of India and Canada had previously 
been mentioned as desirable. 
Britain under a I.abour government was not interested in 
joining the United states in policing the Asian-Pacific area against 
CommtL~ism, and neither was India4 19 British foreign policy concern 
was concentrated on Europe and the ~addle East, and the British 
government wanted to keep New Zealand involved in that area, too. 
17 N. Z.P. D. vol. 291, p2142-2143, 5 september, 1950 
1s T O.D.'. January 4, 1951, p5 
19 See Spender, P.C. "Exercises in Dipl-omacy", pp68-69, and p92 
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In 1949, the Nevi Zealand Labour goverrunent had pledged to send 
Britain a divisio-n in the Niddle East in the event of global war, and 
nov;r at the 1951 Cormnonweal th Prime Hinisters' Conference, the British 
government \.;as seeking a reaffirmation of that pledge from the 
National goveYnment. fiolland gave it, 2 0 but only after suggesting 
that it no longer seemed realistic for New Zealand to have defence 
commitments in the Middle East, when t.l:ere were likely to be serious 
problems in a region closer to home. 21 The Bri·tish insistedr however, 
that the time ~>'"as not ripe for such a shift, and New Zealand was still 
prepared to fit .in -;·.rith British priorities~ 
However, when Prime Mir..ister Holland visited the United States 
in February, 1951, he "laid emphasis on the need for security for 
New Zealand in the Pacific 11 , 2· 2 in his tal~cs with President Truman .. 
At this stage, the United States was a.nxio'..lG to conclude a peace 
treaty with Japan, and insisting that Japan be permitted under it to 
rearm~ New Zealand was all the more eager for a Pacific pact if Japan 
were to be rearmed. Holland told the President that New Zealand could 
not make a contribution to the defence of the Middle East and at the 
same time defend her o'tm shores·. 2 3 At talks in Canherra on the 
Japanese Peace Treaty with Presidential emissary Dulles in February, 
1951, Doidge supported the efforts of Australian Vrinister of External 
Affairs Spender to get an American guarantee of Australian and New 
Zealand security as compensation for a 11 Soft" Japanese Peace Treaty. 
20 O.D.T. January 11, 1951, p5 (N.Z.P.A. - London) 
21 N.Z.P.D. val. 305, p20, 24 March, 1955 
22 N.Z.P.D. val. 295, pl95, 9 OctOber, 1951 
23 N. Z.P.D. val. 295, p343, 16 October, 1951 
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However, Doidge was not keen on a formal treaty that had 
mutual obligations - a Pacific pact - 'V-7ithout Britain's participat:io:n~ 
Pacific obligations would clash with Ne\'l Zealand's Niddle East commit-
ments, 2 4 and New Zealand's prior interest was in aiding the mot~er 
country in its global role. Both the Austrc.lians and the fu"ttericans 
wanted a formal treaty, ~;-;ith the United States insisting that the 
Australasian countries accept some obl-igations in re·turn for a . .guarantee .2 5 
A compromise was arrived at with recognition of Ne~.v Zealand's prior 
Commonwealth obligations being >Iritten into the preanble of the 
treaty. 
In September, 1951, the Pacific Security Treaty between 
Australia, Ne>< Zealand and the United States >Jas signed. It became 
known as the ANZUS Treaty. The treaty stated that each party recog-
nised that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the parties 
to the treaty would be dangerous to its o~~ peace and safety and 
declared that it would act to meet the com~on danger in accordance 
with its constitutional processes. 26 
The ANZUS Treaty was not the Pacific pact that New Zealund 
had originally wanted. The government had hoped to unite Bri t.ain 
and.the United States in the defence of South-east Asia, and thus 
New Zealand. ANZUS protected New Zealand itself, though not what: 
the government regarded as the countDJ's approaches. ASliliZUS was signed, 
indications were gi-,ren that the ideal of a wider pact was still there. 
24 Spender, Exercises in DipZomacy, pl04 
25 Ibid., pl09 
26 Starke, J .G. The ANZUS Treaty 11Zl.ia:nce pl16 
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All three signatories emphasised that it v1as only one step towards 
building up security in .the Pacific area .. _2 7 As long as Common\\real th 
priori ties remained in the Niddle East, however r Nev;r Zealand 'tvould 
take on no Asian commitments. Indeed, in 1952, the government agreed 
to send an Air Force squadron to Cyprus to bolster Commonwealth forces 
in the Biddle East. 28 
During 1952, New Zealand began to pay more attention to South-
east Asia, as the Indo-China ~·lar intensified, a.~d began to go badly 
for the French and their non-Communist protege governments. The 
British anti-guerilla campaign in Malaya was reaching its height at 
this time, and the Korean War had entered a stalemate .. 
In the House of Representat.ives ln July, Ninister of Defence 
T.L. Hacdonald said that there were t:wo areas in the Far East of 
immediate intE:rest to New Zealand, and these ~1ere Korea and Nalaya. 
';Che defeat of the Corrununist guerillas in Nalaya u~eant. a very great 
heal to the British Commonwealth, and that included Ne.r Zealand, he 
said. 29 However, if Nalaya and Korea were -t:he immediate concerns of 
New Zealand, the situation in Indo-china was assuming greater irr~ortance. 
The outcome of the struggle there was of "the highest irr.portance", to 
countries in the South-west Pacific, Macdonald sa.id, because a Conununist 
success \·;auld influence and affect e. very large proportion of South-east 
Asia. Any movement in a westerly direction would carry on into Burma 
and Siam. "Efforts will be required to prevent that happening". 30 
2 7 Modelski, G. Beato - Six Studies, p54 
26 Annual- Report of the Department of Exte1"'1W.l- Affairs 1952, p27 
29 N.Z.P.D. vel. 297, p365, 16 July, 1952 
30 Ibid., p366 
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Shortly afterwards, New Zealand made a small effort to aid 
the anti-Coromu..llist forces in Indo-China. In September, 1952, ·the 
new Hinister of External Affairs, T.C. Webb, announced that New 
Zealand \\ras to give the French at1thorities in Indo-China a quantity 
of surplus arms and ammunition. Some 13,000 rifles, 600 machine 
guns, and nearly 750,000 rounds of arr~unition were to be sent~ 
The material was American lend-lease equipment~ Webb said that 
the emergence of political stability in Vietnam was a matter of 
j~wediate concern to New Zealand 1 since if the country fell to the 
Communists 1 pressure on other South-east Asian countries t-;ould be 
increased. France, he said1 had long bee.!1 carrying a heav:y burden 
in Indo-China and Ne\'/ Zealand was glaO to be able to do something 
'to help. 31 
By April, 1953, External Affairs f.1inister Webb \..ras saying 
that Indo-China was a matter of more vite..l concern to New Zealand 
i than Korea because of its strategic position. 
"A successful aggression in Indo-China -v1ould probably mean 
that South-east Asia would fall to the aggressors, and a 
very great danger to both Australia and New Zealand •. would 
become fairly im..lllinent .. ~'le are vitally concerned in 1vhat 
happens in that unfortunate country". 32 
The Hinister "ent on to praise the French people for the 
burden they were shouldering in Indo-s:;hina "on behalf of many other 
countries, including New Zealandn. 
In August, 1953, the Chief of General Staff visited Indo-
China to discuss with the French military authorities the possibility 
31 N. Z. Foreign Policy: Statemen·ts and Dcc'l/ments p298, quoting 
E~ternaZ Affairs Review, October, 1952, pp3-4 
32 N.Z.P.D. vol. 299, p354, 29 April, 1953 
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of New Zealand making available to t.hem further items of surplus 
military equipment. A small French military mission subsequently 
visited Ne\-7 Zeala..~d in November; 1953, to discuss the question in 
greater detail, and a shipment _of arms and a:mmuni tion·. was despatched 
to Indo-China early in 1954. 33 
Nineteen fifty-three had seen the installation of a new 
Republican adr:linistration in the United Sta~ces, and the American 
press had speculated early in t...he year that the nevl government was 
interested in a joint arrangement with a number of other powers fer 
the defence of South-east Asia. Asked to conunent on this speculation, 
Prime Minister Holland replied that New Zealand, along with Britain 
and Australia, was keenly interested in any practical measures which 
might serve to deter aggression in South-east Asia. 34 In Februa1-;l, 
Holland announced that Ne\1 Zealand had been invited to join a pro-
posed military agency to deal with defence problems in South-east 
Asia and was anxious to co-operate '"i th other interested powers, bu·t 
particularly the United Kingdom, in dealing with the defence problems 
of the area. 3 5 
At the Comrr~nwealth Prime Ministers• Conference of June, 1953, 
Holland once again raised the question of the transfer of New Zealand's 
wartime obligations from the Niddle East to South-ea.st l'.sia, and once 
again was stalled by the British milit.ary' s vie'I that the forces 
~1ould be more valuable in the Hiddle East. 36 Holland's proposal 
came in the context of discussions between Britain, Australia and 
33 A .R.D.E.A. 1954, p22 
34 E.A.R. January, 1953, p3 
35 E.A.R. February, 1953, p3 
SG 7 N.u.P.D. vol. 305, p20, 24 March, 1955 
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New Zealand on South-east Asian defence. 
By the end of the year, the situation of the anti-Comrnunist 
forces in Indo-China was causing concern among the ·western po\vers. 
Early in 1954, the Vietminh surrounded and laid siege to the import-
ant French fortress of Dienbienphu, whic!1 contained many of the best 
French troops in Indo-China. The French Chief of Staff flew to 
Washington to \'lam the Americans that- only their direct intervention 
could stave off the final defeat of t."1e anti-ColThtmnist forces in 
Indo-China. 37 
The American government \'las only prepared to intervene if its 
allies - particularly Britain - would als0 participate. Secretary 
of State Dulles, in the first move of a C2~paign to get those allies, 
issued a public call at the end of March for "tmited action" by the 
West to avert Communist control of South-east Asia. 38 As a first 
step towards possible intervention, Dulles wanted a collective 
security pact covering south-east Asia~ The British government, 
however, was placing its hopes for a solution of the Indo-China 
problem on the Geneva Conference which was scheduled to begin on 
April 26. The Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, the Soviet 
Union and the United States had agreed in February to hold this 
conference to try and settle the Korean issue and to discuss the 
Indo-China situation. Communist China was scheduled to be a 
participant. Britain was cool to any proposition that might stop 
the conference reaching a solution. 39 
37 Modelski, Beato - Six Studies,. p58 
38 Ibid. 
39 Lerche, C.O. "The United States, Great Britain and SEATO: A 
Case Study in the Fait Accompli", Jou:rraaZ of PoZitios, vol. 18, 
' 
August, 1956, p46l 
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Dulles therefore flew to London on l-!.pril 11 to ·talk to 
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. At the end of their talks, 
a joint communique announced that Britain and the United States were 
ready to take part with other com:.tries 11 in an exarnination of the 
possibility of establishing a. collective defence .... to assure the 
peace, security and freedom of South-east F ... sia and the t·Jestern 
Pacific". 40 
The New Zealand government \·;relcomed the annourJcement. In a 
statement issued on April 13, \'Jebb said that the initiative of Britain 
and the United States would give heart to the French and Vietnamese 
forces who had "for so long borne the brunt of the struggle against 
Conunur:tist expansion in South East P.~sia..t 1 • t~ 1 
Britain, however, showed no inclination, despite its declarat-
ion, to proceed with any negotiat.ions for a pac~.: before the Conference 
at Geneva began, or while it continued to sit. P~erican suggestions 
for immediate talks were rejected by Eden. Eden discussed his vietrs 
with the Commonwealth External Affairs Ministers at Geneva on May 2, 
and recorded in his memoirs 
11 ! was e.ncou.raged to find that we 't,.,~ere all in. agreementn .. 
Eden had told the Common"ealth Ministers: 
My vie-tv is that .•. we must refuse, pending the outcome 
of negotiations here .• •• to allow ourselves to be dra-vm 
into the Indo-China War .•• On the other hand, we can 
continue to assure the Americans -~ that we are eager to 
work ~.vith them in building a collective defence ~ ~ to 
guarantee and support whatever settlement can be achieved 
in Indo-China and to a£:sure the security of the rest of 
the area". 42 
40 Eden, Rt. Hon. Anthony, FuZZ Circle, pp97-98 
41 External Affairs Review, April, 1954, p4 
42 Eden, Op Cit., ppll3-ll4 
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The third meeting of the ANZUS Council was held on the after-
noon of 11ay 2, immediately after the Ne'"' Zealand and Australian 
Hinisters had talked with Eden. At this meeting, the United States 
evidently sounded out Aus·tralia and Ne\<J Zealand on military inter-
vention in Indo-China. R.G. Casey, the Australian Minister of 
External Affairs, recorded in his diary that Australia and the United 
States "were given to understand that_New Zealand would not join in 
any military action without United Nations sanction". 43 
The P~ZAC countries_were, however, anxious to join the United 
States in beginning to take precautionary measures against a failure 
of the Geneva Conference to effect a settlement in Indo-China. 
Sir Alan Watt, then permanent head of Australia's External Affairs 
Department, later described Australia's position as being 
" .• somewhere between [that of] Britain and the United States, 
sharing the forrner' s vie\·J that military intervention in Indo-
China \1ould be ineffective and would arouse strong resent.ment 
in Asia, but mLxious to begin at the earliest possible moment 
the task of creating a defence organisation in South-east Asia 
which might in some degree 'shore up' the Geneva· settlement, 
or act as a barrier to further Communist encroachments in the 
area or both". 44 
New Zealand's viewpoint was similar. The government support.ed 
the Australian suggestion, put forward at the ANZUS meeting, that 
there should be talks between the military staffs of the United States, 
Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand on the problems of defending 
South-east Asia. 45 Britain reluctantly agreed. On May 17, in the 
House of Conunons, Churchill reiterated that Britain was detemined to 
43 casey, R.G. Australian Forei~ Minister, pl47 
44 Watt, A. The E'voZution of Australian Foreign PoUay 1938-65, pl53 
45 Watt, A. Australian Diplomat, p212, quoting casey to Parliament 
August 10, 1954 
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see what came out of Geneva before committing herself to an alliance. '•G 
Only a fel.v days later, however, \-Vebb said that New. Zealand v;as anxious 
to see a South-east Asian alliance formed. 47 
On May 26, ·the Ninister of External Affair.·s enlaiged on Ne\<J 
Zealand!s attitude. He said that the suggestion of a security system 
for South-east Jl ... sia was "of real importance to Net·; Zealand 11 • In 1940, 
he said, the Japanese had moved into Indo-China and used it as a base 
for their thrust southwards. 
"After the capture of i-.he rest of South-east l'.sia, they started 
a drive in v;hich * ••. they almost succeeded in their objective 
of seizing ... Ne\v Zealand and Australia. There is surely a 
lesson in this for us now. If the Communists were to b:r·ing 
under their control the non-Communist peoples of South-east 
Asia and Indonesia, the security of Australia and Nm1 Zealand 
would be gravely threatened". 48 .. 
Webb went on to say that ANZUS had not been designed t.o deal 
with the problem before New Zealand. ANZUS, of course,. operated 
only when the contrac·ting parties themselves .,.,ere attacked. New 
Zealand did not wish to wait until it was attacked before acting 
to stop the threat. Prime Minister Holland in early June said: 
"It is no use waiting until the danger reaches Nev! Zealand's 
shores before doing something about it". 49 
In mid-month, Holland stated explicitly that New Zealand would 
fight for Malaya, if not for Indo-China. Holland said t.loat only 
Siam and Burma [sic] lay between Indo-China and Malaya, and that 
"Malaya is a British country and we could not stand idly_by and 
4 6 House of Commons Debates vol. 527, Col. 1692, 17 May, 1954 
47 New Zealand Herald May 21, 1954, p9 
48 E.A.R.May 1954, p6 
49 Auckland Stal' June 3, 1954, p4 
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see Malaya go 11 • 50 
The Australians were concerned that. if a pact \vere not 
negotiated before the end of the Geneva Conference, it might never 
become reality at all. A quick settla~ent of the Indo-China issue 
might cause t.he American government to lose it.s curren.t. interest in 
participating in a defensive arrangement in South-east Asia. 5 1 For 
Australia, Indo-China itself was not as important as a South-east 
Asian alliance. New Zealand's sense of urgency about an alliance 
was probably based on the smne concern. 
New Zealand's first loyalty to the Comrnonweal th in defence 
matters, however, meant that the government 'Nould not consider the 
radical American suggestion of mid-Nay' that a South-east Asian 
alliance be formed wit.hout Britain. 
Eisenhower made the suggestion at a May 19 Press conference, 
saying that if Australia and New zealand and some Asian states could 
be persuaded to join, Britain's adherence would not be indispensable. 5 2 
The suggestion was more a tactic in a vigorous American drive to get 
Britain to agree to upgrade the forthcoming military staff talks 
into an alliance-forming political conference_than a serious policy 
proposition, but New Zealand and Australia took it at face value and 
reacted accordingly. Both countries' representatives at Geneva 
'\\"ere reported as thinking that the American idea v1as a "mistaken. 53 
The day after Eisenhower's Press conference, New Zealand inforrr£d 
50 O.D.T. Jtme 15, 1954 
51 Watt, EvoZution, pl53; Models:d, Op Cit., p60 
52 Lerche,op. Cit., p46B, quoting Ne'l,) York Times, Nay 21, 1954 
53 Ibid. 
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the United States of its unwillingness to pa.rticipate in a. pact: 
that did not include Great Britain. 5 '' Eager though !·~e\<J Zealand 
was for the creation of a. South-east Asian alliance, the goverrunent 
was not prepared to act without Britain in the area. Pill Arnerican-
dominated alliance would increase the risk of Ne\<r Zealand 1 s being 
involved in Indo-China. 
The military staff talks began in early J1..me, as purel~{ military 
talks. They were described in the AnnuaZ Repor-t; of tl?e Departmerrt 
of External Affairs as "examining measures t<hich could be taken 
concerning the proposed defensive alliance for the region11 ~ 55 
As the Geneva discussions on Indo-China reached an impasse 
during June, 1954, Britain becarne more- interested in the formation 
of a South-east Asia pact. However, the interest was in a context 
that did not appeal to the United States or the lli,ZAC countries. 
On June 23 Eden made a major policy address in the House of Comrr.ons 
in which he called for a Collective Defence Organisation for South-
east Asia along the lines of the North Atlm1tic Treaty. However, 
he made it clear that this defensive alliance was to be supplementary 
to a larger non-aggression pact embracing all the countries of the 
area - Communist and non-Communist alike. This \•las to be a Far 
Eden Eastern version of the ill-fated Locarno Treaty of 1~ 
einphasised the key role to be played by the non-aggression pact in 
the stabilisation of the region, and played down the iwmediate 
significance of the military alliance, saying: "It could be a future 
safeguard, but it is not. a present panacea". 55 
54 Lerche, p469, quoting New York Times, !1ay 21, 1954 
55 A.R.D.E.A. 1955, p24 
56 House of Commons Debates vol. 529, Ool~n 433, 23 June, 1954 
311. 
The Americans reacted with shock: the idea of r.ton-aggTession 
pacts with Commtmist nations,was anathema to them. The Ne\•l Zealand 
goverr~ent, too, was suspicious of the idea. 
In Parliament in July, the ~linister of External Affairs 
reiterated New zealand's concern for an early defence treaty and 
expressed distrust of Eden's proposed non-aggression pact. 
none thing \IJe do "''"a.."'lt to make clea.r;: an Eastern Locarno 
Pact, if it were arranged, '\-7ould not be a substitute for 
a South-East Asian alliance. I am not sure it would be 
compatible \·lith it. \'Je in New Zealand, and I kno~w I can 
say the same for Australia, regard the fo:rmation of a 
South-East Asia alliance as a matter of extreme urgency 11 .. 57 
The Minister went on to say explicitly: 
u •• we regard the formation of a South-East Asia alliance 
as more urgent than our friends~ in the United King dora do 11 • 
On June 26 Churchill and Eden had flm-m to the United stat:es 
to try and hamtonise policy •<ith the United Sta·tes government. J',t 
the talks, Britain had finally agreed not to v>ait for the end of 
the Geneva Conference before beginning planning for a Collective 
Defence Treaty. At the end of the British visit, a further ANZUS 
Council meeting had been held, and it had both expressed satisfaction 
\vith the British change of mind and stressed the urgency of getting 
ru1 alliance toge~~er. 
11The Australian and New Zealand representatives expressed 
satisfaction with the statement by President Eisenhm;er 
and Sir Winston Churchill that plans for Collective Defence 
in South-east Asia be pressed forward ••• All three represent-
atives at the ru~zus meeting agreed on the need for immediate 
action to bring about the early establishment of collective 
defence in South-east Asia 11 ,. 58 
57 N.Z.P.D. vel. 303, p2ll, 6 July, 1954 
58 Department of State Bulletin J'.lly 12, 1954, p50 
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Vlebb said in Parlia..'11ent in early July tha·t the Churchill-
Eisenhower agreement to press forv.rard v1i th plans for the collective 
defence system v;as very !:'eassuring for New Zealand. He said he 
knew that New Zealand, supporting her 11 hig sister across the Tasman~> 
would be able to exert an influence in efforts to bring about a South-
east Asian alliance, and he was convinced that New Zealand would be 
able to play 
11 quite a part in reconciling any differences that. might arise 
between these two great nations on whom our security so rightly 
depends". 59 
It seemed, then, that Webb felt confident t.'oat New,zealand and 
Australia, working toget.her, could push Britair.. in the right. direction 
- towards the United States. 
The New Zealand government, perhaps because of its perceived 
geographical closeness to the area in ques·tion, was much more pessjm-
istic tha11 Britain of the chances of achieving sta,bility in the 
region through diplomatic mea~s. 
"Whatever comes out of Geneva, whether a settlement is arranged 
or not, there is no doubt that the menace· of Communism will be 
greater for us and for Australia than it is today, not to mention 
those countries nearer, such as Indo-China 11 , 
Webb told the House. 60 
Defence ~tinister Macdonald was convinced that even if Vietnam 
were to be partitioned and the southern portion left to the non-
Cormnunist Associated State of Vietnam, this t.,roulO. be but a temporaX17 
solution. The Communists would soon renew the assault, and if 
frustrated in Vietnam >10uld divert their energies to Thailand ins·tead. 
59 N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, p212, 6 July, 1954 
60 N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, p2ll, 6 July, 1954 
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Unrest in Thailand would invariably upset the favourable situation 
in ~lalaya. A Collective Security arrangement to deter furt~er 
assaults was necessarya 61 
In early July, an lmglo-American working party got down to 
drafting a Collective Defence Treaty 1 and its first report \.;as 
released on July 20. 62 A fundamental difference between the two 
major participants was revealed: Britain wanted the \·Jidest possible 
Asian membership of the pact, \-~d.th the particular inclusion of India, 
whereas the Americans were prepared to settle for just the 'aligned' 
Asian states. New Zealand went along with Britain only to the 
extent that she thought the membership of the South Asian states 
was desirable. As with the United States and Australia, the 
government did not believe that the Colombo Powers' presence was 
essential. As Webb told the House on July 8: "I would not go to 
the length of saying that their inclusion in any alliance is an 
i indispensable condition". 6 3 The existence of the Pact was more 
important than its wide membership, and the Puct's existence was 
important because it bound the United States to the defence of 
South-east Asia. 
On July 21, the Indo-China issue was resolved by an agreement 
at Geneva which, in effect, temporarily partitioned Vietnam~ New 
Zealand, unlike the United States, was willing to formally accept 
this practical solution to the problem. At the end of the month 
Webb told Parliament, "I think we can regard the settlement that 
has been arranged as a very reasonable one 11 • 6 4 The government, 
6 1 N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, pp272-74, 7 July, 1954 
62 
Le~che, p473 
6 3 N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, p301, July 8, 1954 
64 N. Z.P.D. vol. 303' p838, 30 ,July, 1954 
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hov;ever 1 had its doubts that the settlement v.rould last. The 
Vietminh, it 'tV" as believed, '\riOUld soon try to take over the southe:c:n 
zone either militarily or politically. This was not thought to be 
in Ne\<7 Zealand! s interests and accounted for the p11blic statement 
issued by the Prime Minister immediately after the'settlement. 
Holland said that the maintenance of the territorial und political 
integrity of the Associated States _of Indo-China was essential for 
the consolidation of peace in South-east Asia~ 
11For this rea. son, the New Zealand government . . . would 
regard a violation cf the Indo-China. settlement as a 
threat to the securi·ty of the South-east Asian area, 
and a dan9er to international peace and security generally 11 r 65 
The fear that the settlement would be violated made Ne\< 
Zealand and Jl .. ustralia anxious to create defence machine~y ·to deter 
such an occurrence. Webb said that the end of ·the fighting did 
not mean that the need to press on \Vith Collective defence meas"U.res 
'tV"as now less urgent. 
"Unfortunately, I do not think that we cun deny that the 
settlement in Indo-China has increased the prospects of 
Corrununism advancing still further ~.~~. 66 
Presumably he was thinking of the fact that the Communists had been 
"given11 a territorial plum and 't<JOuld thus be en-couraged to try again. 
Dean Eyre reiterated this line of thought in t.he House on 
August 5, when he said that the armistice in South-east Asia vias 
a "political Dunkirk", despite its being a diplomatic victory, and 
the Annual Report of the Department of External Affairs for 1955 
stated that the favourable position secured by the Vietminh had 
;;s E,A,R, July, 1954, pp27-28 
66 N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, p838, 30 July, 1954 
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increased the long-term threat from the North to the smaller: count~ies 
of South-east Asia. 67 
Webb said on Ju.ly 30 that New Zealand hoped for an arrangement 
like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which would be designed 
to deter the Comamnists. On August 10, Macdonald, too, spoke of a 
South-east Asia Treaty Organisation "on the lines of NATO", and said 
that New Zealand 1 s future might depend en its success. 68 Hacdonald 
also reminded the House that Br:itain had achieved a diplomatic success 
at Geneva only because it was backed by P...m.erican military power. 6 9 
The implication was that this military power was the only real 
guarantee of security for New Zealand in South-east Asia. 
During August, the final form o"f the South-east Asia Collect:;_ve 
Defence Treaty was hilllli~ered out. The North Atlantic Treaty o~ganis-
ation arrangement that l' ... ustralia and Ne\<J Zealand favoured would have 
involved specific comrnitment.s of troops to a standing army, and 
Australia at least was prepared to pledge these. A Press Association 
report claimed that Australia was more definite in its views about 
this than New Zealand. 
11 l'~ Menzies is prepared to make firm commitments of manpower 
and materials tO'!:oJ"ards a standing defenCe force to be st.ationed 
permanently in South-east Asia". 70 
Y~cdonald had told Parliament that participation by New Zealand in 
the new organisation might involve the country in some additional 
commitments for defence, but he did not indicate that New Zealand 
was pressing for troop commitments. 
67 A.R.D.E.A. 1955, p5; Eyre N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, pp980-82, 5 August, 1954 
66 N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, pl047, 10 August, 1954 
69 N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, pl049, 10 August, 1954 
70 >laikato 1'imes (N.Z.P.A.) September 1, 1954, plO 
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Britain had accepted the fact that India 'tvould not join any 
sort of defensive alliance 1 and the final signatories included only 
three Asian states - Pakistan, Thailo.nd and the Philippines. The 
treaty was signed in Hanila on September 8, 1954. · In reporting on 
it to Parliament at the end of the month, l'lebb revealed that it had 
satisfied a long-standing government conce::::n. 
11 We regard this treaty as a useful means of associating 
the United King-dom and the United States in the defence 
of ·this area". 71 
Once having signed the South-east Asian Collective Defence 
Treaty, New Zealand found itself formally pledged to the defence of 
countries in South-east Asia, while still having forces in the 
Middle East, and being pledged to send troops there in the event 
of a general war. Article Four of the treaty declared that each 
party recognised that aggression by means of armed attack in the 
treaty area against any of the parties, or any state that the 
parties might designate, 11Would endanger its own peace and safety", 
and that it would, in that event, "act to meet the common da11ger 
in accordance with its constitutional processes•~. 72 Accordingly, 
the government believed that New Zealand's Commom1eal th military 
obligations should be changed to apply to the South-east Asian area. 
In his 1955 New Year message to the na.tion, Prime Minister 
Holland said: 
71 
"New Zealand cannot be blind to the shift in emphasis in 
international dangers from Europe and the Middle East to 
the Pacific, much nearer to us geographically. The Korean 
and Indo-China wars gave New Zealand a much greater awareness 
of tt'1e threats that menace us in the modern v;orld 11 • 7 e 
N.Z.P.D. vol. 304, p2103, 30 September, 1954 
72 
N. Z. Foreign Policy: Statements a:nd Documents No. 96, p364 
73 
O.D.T. Decerr~er 31, 1954, pl 
317 '· 
In a brpadcast to the nation on January l8, 1955, prior to 
leaving for the Ccnunont'iealth Prime l".dnisters 1 Confer-ence in London, 
Holland declared that New Zealand was well aware that the change in 
emphasis would mean increased responsibilities for·Neu Zealand. 
"From time to time •.. I have strongly questioned the 
wisdom of dividing our forces by having some in the 
Middle East and some in the Pacific". 74 
The Pacific forces referred to were those in Korea. The PrL.11e 
Minister went on to say that \vha·tever New Zealand's defence effort, 
it must have strong friends, willing and able to help it. Ne~·l 
Zealand must do what it could in the common defence effort. 
Holland was sure that New Zealanders ,.ere willing to accept any 
larger responsibilities >Jhich the discl)arge of New Zealand's dut.ies 
might entail. 
"The w·recks of many countries a!:'e a stern warning of what 
happens to nations that are careless or indifferent or both 11 • 
The Prime Minister said that he was leaving for the London conference 
"quite clear in my mind as to ~'lhat we should do". 
Although Holland >Jas seeking a transfer of New Zealand's 
Commonwealth military obligations for a general war to South-east 
Asia, and also the return of the air force unit from the Middle East, 
the British government had requests of its O>lll. A report in the 
Otago Dail-y :rimes said that it was believed that Britain would press 
strongly for both New Zealand and Australia to supply ground troops 
for a propo~ed Common~'lealth Strategic Reserve to be stationed in ~lalaya? 5 
74 O.D.T. J2nuary 19, 1955, pl 
75 O.D.T. January 9, 1955, p4 
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The report noted ·that it was no simple matter for Holland to agree 
to any British proposal to provide g·round troops. New Zealand 
already maintained more than a thousand volunteers in Korea, and 
might find difficulty in raising them for Malaya. 
At the beginning of February, another report claimed that 
"insistent pressure" has been exerted on Holland by the British 
government since his arrival in London for New Zealand to provide 
troops for the area. The possibility of the provision of at 
least one infantLy battalion had been discussed. 76 
All the New Zealand Prime Hinister agreed to immediately was 
the transfer of New Zealand's air units from the Hiddle East to 
Halaya. It was announced lt7hile the cOnference was still proceeding 
that New Zealand's fighter-bomber squadron, and half a transport 
squadron, would move from Cyprus to Malaya. Holland, announcing 
the transfer, said: 
"It has become increasingly clear that the security of South-
east Asia, and, as part of it, the security of Malaya, are of 
special significance to Ne>·7 Zealand, and further, that the 
United Kingdom has been bearing a disproportionate share of 
the defence burden there, and indeed, all over the globe". 77 
The Prime ~unister continued: 
"I am sure that New Zealand would wish in her own interests, 
and in the interests of the Commonwealth and of the free 
peoples of South-east Asia, to contribute towards the main--
tenance of security in the area". 
Holland returned to New Zealand by way of Halaya, and at Ipoh 
he took the opportunity of reiterating that New Zealand regarded 
1-ialaya as 11 a very strategic point in the security of the Pacific area 11 .' 8 
76 O.D.T. Februar.f 14, 1955, p4; see also Review of Defence Policy 
1957' p9 
77 O.D. T. February 8, 1955, p5 f 
78 O.D. T. March 1, 1955, p3 
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The Prime Hinister announced that the government was to 
recommend to Parliament the sending of a ground force to Malaya~ 
External Affairs Minister Macdonald said that this would be a step 
towards implementation of the ANZAH rmderstanding between Australia, 
New zealand and the United Kingdom. The goveFnment, however$ was 
not very enthusiastic about the decision. A press report indicated 
that the government believed that the sending of troops overseas in 
peace-time would be a delicate issue in Ne't.'i' Zealand, and that the 
Labour Opposition <lould oppose the move. The possibility of sending 
national servicemen to Malaya ~would have to be exru·nined. 79 Later .. 
Macdonald was to write that it was a 
11 new and by no means pleasa!lt tp.ing for New Zealand to send 
forces abroad in peacetime ... We have always disliked the 
idea of a standing army in time of peace, but the days are 
passing when countries can have a free ride in terms of 
security; Britain now has heavy, almost insupportable 
burdens, and we believe that 't'le must help to carry them 11 .. 6 0 
A substantial army unit was evidently a different proposition 
in political terms froin the air force units hitherto stationed abroad. 
This was especially so if the unit was not dra\m from existing pro-
" fessional forces. 
On reaching New Zealand, the Prime Minister said of the 
London conference that it had resulted in a complete revision of 
New Zealand's military obligations, a revision that had been under-
taken as a complement to the reassessment of Coll~onwe~lth strategy. 81 
New Zealand would no longer be bound to commit a division to the 
79 O.D.T. March 2, 1955, p2 
80 E.A.R. July, 1955, p53 
61 O.D.T. February 25, 1955, p4 
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Middle East in ·the event of global \'lar; it would go instead to 
Malaya. As to the plan for the establishment of a strategic 
reserve, Holland said he had been heartened by the United Kingdom's 
continuing build-up of forces in South-east Asia, a.nC: that he 
believed CoiTmonwealth participation would be a valuable insurance 
of American support in the future. 
"The Commonwealth countries themselves ,,.Jill, I feel, also 
ga.in much by pushing on with cons·tructive plans which will 
do more than anything else to demo::1s·trate to our Arnerican 
allies our determination to help ourselves against the 
menace of Communist expansion in the South-west Pacific 11 • 82 
New Zealand, then, was not concerned solely with B~itish wishes. 
The willingness to station troops in South-east Asia was also an 
attempt to engage America:r. support - t:o ensure that the South-east 
Asia Collective Defence Treaty would be made effective by American 
public opinion. 
In late March, Prime Minis~er Holland put th?. question of 
stationing New Zealand. troops in Halaya to the House of RepresentatiYes~ 
Holland justified the stationing of forces abroad in peace-
time first in terms of aiding Britain in her global role - New 
Zealand's traditional function. The time was past 1 he said, when 
NeVI Zealand could operate as though it were an observer of the world 
situation, ready to come ·to Britain 1 q aid only after war had broken 
out, and in the meantime leaving to Britain the burden of maintaining 
the peace. 
"Today •.• Britain is hard-pressed. She has her forces spread 
around the v10rld, and I believe we must lend a hand and play 
our part • . • I believe every honourable Member would S1..1pport 
me when I say that New Ze~land is willing and anxious to play 
her part a~d to relieve the disproportionate share of the burden 
that Britain is bearing11 • 8 3 
82 E.A.R. March, 1955, p2 
83 N.Z.P.D. vol. 305, p2l, 24 March, 1955 
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Holland made it clear that the govenL~ent's decision had been 
made in response to a specific request from the United Kingdom. 
"Britain has spoken to us ••. and she has given us a plan 
that I believe is within our reach and capacity 11 • 84 
New Zealand \-las anxious to respond for two rea.sons. First, 
there was a necessity to "earn the support and help of other people 11 
in order to ensure the security of the country, and secondly, Nevr 
Zealand • s 0\1!1 defence t.V"as involved in that of Nalaya. If New 
Zealand did not do its bit when and whe:r·e it was wanted it could 
not complain if its allies did not: make allowances for its interesi:s 
in their planning. 
"We must earn the support of Britain by pulling our weight 
in the British boat". 65 
The same argument applied with reference to the United States, 
since the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve was to be part of the South-
east Asia Treaty Organisation's standing forces. Although Holland 
did not mention the SEATO connection, he said: 
"Also we must earn the active support of the United States 
by demonstrating to her that we are prepared to play our 
part in our own defence". 86 
Holland noted that the troubled areas of the world seemed ~o 
form a series of steps in the direction of New Zealand, and 
"about the last place we can make a stand without coming 
into our ovm territory is l1alayatt. 8 7 
So, the Prime Hinister >lent on, New Zealand was going to help Britain 
form a 'Cold War front' in Halaya, to ensure that any enemy was "going 






87 N.Z.P.D. val. 305, p21, 24 March, 1955 
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The Hinister of External Affairs put the matter succinctly: 
"In strengthening Britain 1 s effort, New Zealand will at the 
same time be strengthening her own position n. 8 8 
Nev-7 Zealand had not done more for Malaya before because the 
country had done so much in Korea~ the Prime Hinister said on l·larch 
31. "We have had a large force there and it has cost us a great 
deal of money". 89 
Government ministers made no mention. of the fact that the 
Commonwealth Strategic Reserve was in pa~t designed as a striking 
force for the South-east Asia Treaty Organisation, and that New 
zealand troops \vould be on stand--by to resist aggression outside 
Malaya. The commitment was presented, only as an aid to Britain 
in suppressing t.he guerillas in Malaya. T.L. Macdonald, for instance, 
said: 
11Halaya is important to the Comrnono,.,real th, and successful 
Co~munist advances there would make it difficult to resist 
Communist advances in other parts of South-East Asia. 
Over the years Britain has carried a heavy load in connection 
with the destructive t'lork of Communist terrorists, and New 
Zealand ..• '"ill be doing the right thing in giving Britain 
a helping hand" . 9 0 
Only E.H. Halstead, the Minister for Social Security, linked 
the Reserve to SEATO. On 31 March he said: 
"Malaya is the cornerstone of·any defence system inSouth-east 
Asia". 
He went on to say that it was also a Commonwealth commitment, giving 
the wider strategic purpose front ranking. 
88 N.Z.P.D. vol. 305, p56, 29 March, 1955 
89 N.Z.P.D. val. 305, pl53, 31 March, 1955 
90 N.Z.P.D. val. 305, p56, 29 March, 1955 
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strategic purpose, he said: "If Nalaya wer-t, there tfould be little 
hope of holding anything until \·le got to t.he shores of Australia 11 • 91 
Australia's Prima Minister Menzies, when he announced his 
country's commitment to Malaya on April 1, seemed to stress Holland's 
February 8 point of the necessity of demonstrating to the Americans 
that the ANZAC countries were serious about the defence of South-east 
Asia and worthy of support. Australia's troops he said, would be 
11 Some proof of the seriousness with tvhich we take the Communist threat 11 • 92 
Menzies also said that the conunitment '\llOuld serve as "some guarantee 
to the people of Malaya that their present orderly progress towards 
democratic self-government, a progress which enjoys the deeply sympathetic 
interest of Australia, will not be interfered with by dictatorial 
Corrununist aggression". 
A mention of helping the ~lalayan peoples to>~ards self-government 
had been absent from the New Zealand Prime Minister 1 s argu..rnents for 
the decision. 
On April 4, New Zealand' s Cabinet approved the proposed New 
Zealand role in Malaya. Prime Ninister Holland seemed eager to re-
assure the country that this was not a risky move in a new direction, 
but one strictly in accord "ith New Zealand's foreign policy tradition 
as spear-carrier for Britain. As Jackson remarks, Malaya itself 
seemed almost irrelevant. 93 
11 I cannot emphasise too often that this is a Commonwealth 
undertaking, to which members of the Common.,ealth are 
contributing under an agreed plan". 9 4 
91 N.Z.P.D.vol. 305, plOB, 30 11arch, 1955 
92 O.D.T. April 2, 1955, p2 (N.Z.P.A. - Canberra) 
9 3 Jackson, W.K* 11 Because iJcs theren, JnZ of Sth-east Asian Studies 
March, 1971, p23 
94 W.T. April 4, 1955, p6 
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Nev.r Zealand was not doing anything by itself, but fitting in to 
a British-initiated scheme. Explainir .. g the change in New Zeala..ll.d 1 s 
co:mm..i. tment to the Dominion Council of the Returned Servicemen's 
Association ir .. June, the Prime Minister st.ill hammered the Corr.rnon-
wealth theme. 
"We must address ourselves to the security of the CoiTLrnonvJealth 
countries, that they are strong and ready", 
he said. 
After mentioning the 11 ·teeming millions right at New Zealand 1 s 
front door", Holland declared that Ner11 Zealand is security depended 
to a large extent on its ability to make friends. 
11 l..Ze have always been with Great- Britain and we \'lil)_ always 
stu.nd with her". 9 5 
The Prime l"'..inister' s statemen.t was another indicat:ion that 
in defence mat·ters, New Zealand's foremost concern \\ras still to 
co-operate with Great Britain. 
New Zealand's ground force contribution to the Reserve \ias 
very small - a company of corr~andoes. The United Kingdom had 
originally asked for a battalion of infantrJ, but the goverr~ent 
had been unable to supply it. 96 The British kept the pressure on, 
however, for in 1956 Holland revealed that the government had been 
asked by the United Kingdom if Nev1 Zealand would substantially 
increase its contribution. The Prime Minster expressed doubt: 
11 We can do what is satisfactory_, although ·we cannot perhaps, go 
as far as the United Kingdom would like us to go". 97 
95 0 .D.T.Jtme 15, 1955, plO 
96 Review of Defence Policy 1957 p9, A.J.H.R. 1957 A-14 
97 O.D.T. August, B, 1956, p5 
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seem as if the government had been more concerned to make a token 
gesture to British calls than to really get. involved in- South-east 
Asian defe!lce. 
Commenting on the British request to Net.l1 Zealand, the nev;ly-
elected Chief !'J.nister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, revealed that 
Britain wanted more New Zealand troops in Malaya so that she could 
withdraw some of her o\m. Any increaSe in New Zealand's forces in 
the Federation would be counter-balanced by a corresponding reduction 
of British troops. The Chief Hinister said that the I~alayan govern-
ment \vanted. the current troop numbers maintained. 
"We need the present armed strength to keep Communist 
terrorism under control and to bring the Emergency to an end. 
If any of the United Kingdom t~:oops are to be withdrawn, we 
~1ould welcome New Zealand troops to make np the nuwbe:r and 
strength of the forces at present engaged. I '\vould not risk 
relaxing any efforts against the Conrrnunist terrorists at this 
present jlmcture". 9 8 
The Tunku said that the recent conference of Com.rnon-vlealth 
Prime Ministers had discussed the possibility of New Zealand's making-
a "slightly increased" contribution to the Commonwealth forces in 
Nalaya. 
New zealand's fealty to Britain was still very strong, as 
was demonstrated in November by the Suez Canal crisis. Although an 
issue in which Ne~ zealand had no direct interest, aside from the 
preservation of a route of communication \'lith Britain, Ne'\<7 Zealand 
lined up with B:ritain and Australia in the United Nations to defend 
the British invasion of Egypt against most of the rest of the ~mrld, 
including the United States. On November 2, 1956, the General 
Assembly resolution asking all nations to refrain from intervention 
98 O.D.T. August 13, 1956, pl ' 
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by force was passed by 64 votes to 5, New Zeal~~d being one of the 
five. The Common\o7ealth 1 it had been demonstrated, came before 
United Nations principles. In August, 1956, "'hen t.he crisis had 
first broken, Holland had assured Eden that New Zeale~d approved of 
Britain's military preparations and that it Hould stand by the 
Hother Country through thick and thin. Holland info~med the House 
of Representatives that because the S.uez Canal Vias vital to Britain, 
a..ll.d Britain "'as vital to New zealand, NelJ..T Zealand was prepared to 
support British policy if necessary "ith force, he hinted. 99 
However, there was no iw.mediate action by New Zealand on the 
British request for more forces in Malaya. Britain's Secretary of 
State for Common\o7eal th Relations, Lord Home, visited New Zealand 
early in 1957, and said in Auckland that Britain would appreciate 
more Hew Zealand aid in the battle with the Malayan Communists. 
"The more men you can send to Halaya the better. We, of 
course, would like to see you with more ·there, but that 
is up to you". 100 
In April, the British government published a White Paper on 
Defence that announced a 45 percent reduction in the Army's man-
power over the next five years, and substantial cuts in the garrisons 
overseas, including Malaya. In the future, reliance tvould be 
placed on mobile reinforcements in Britain, able to be flown to 
overseas bases in an emergency. 101 In New Zealand and Australia, 
this caused considerable uneasiness, although it does not seem to 
have been expressed publicly in New zealand. 102 
99 Kennawo.y, R.N. New Zealand Fore-ign FoZiay p48 
1000.D.T. Narch 23, 1957, pl 
10 1Bartlett, c. J. '!'he Long Retreat ppl28-142 
The British ffi1ite 
10211acGibbon, I.C. "The Defence of Ne-fl Zealand 1945-1957" pl74 in 
New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Nezu Zealand in 
rlorZd Affairs, vol. 1. 
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Paper was quickly followed by a New Zealand Hhite Paper on Defence, 
wh .ch announced a change in army organisation to provide a standing 
force and quickly-available mobile reinforce.'lllent .. 
10 3 The standing 
force would be an infantry battalion which would be made available 
for immediate service in Malaya to replace a British battalion.
104 
In the following debate in Parliament, T.P. Shand, the Post-
master General, declared that this move was to prove again to Bri·tain 
and the united States that New Zealand really was concerned with the 
defence of Sou"b~-east Asia and was prepared to help them with it, 
rather than just sheltering behing her Great Povmr guarantees. 
"This \.vill provide for the first time clear evidence to 
our allies that we are going to be there ;d.th them at 
the beginning; that, if there .. is Communist aggression 




Later, on July 23, Shand made the point again. 
11 \·Je were making a lot of promises, and v-1e beca."Ue parties 
to various treaties, but it has not been clear that v1e 
were prepared to make a practical cont:::ibution. Now, 
set out in the .White Paper is a practical contribution 
which, I believe, will meet our obligations".
106 
The battalion, then \<as a demonstration that SEATO meant something 
to New Zealand. 
When one of the Labour members of Parliament, W.W. Freer,_ 
criticised the increasing emphasis on the rnilita~y approach in 
Malaya, the Minister of Defence insisted that the Halayan government 
should have help in its efforts to main<::ain internal security. 
103 Review of Defence PoZiay 1957, A.J.H.R. 1957 A-14, esp. p7. 
104 . Ibl.d., p9 
105 1o7 z "• .P.D. vol. 311, p32, 12 June, 1957 
106 N.Z.P.D. vol. 312, pl086, 23 July, 1956 
11 the merrber for Haunt Albert would leave it to the Malayan 
goverrunent to use its ovm troops Nithout stiffening by troops 
from New Zealcnd, Australia or Great Britain. He wo~~9. throw 
the responsibility on the Nalayan government".
107 
Macdonald did not seem to think it unusual that the Malayan 
government should not take responsibility for its own internal 
order. The over-riding factor V1as that Nmv Zealand national interest 
required that !1alaya remain non-cormm1nist. 
!!~~ [Freer] kno\'lS quite v.~ell that the defence of Nev1 Zealand 
and Australia may also have to be undertaken in that area. 
Does he not \\1ant us to have any responsibility for secu:city 
in that area? He k..l"l.O\-vs that unless friendly forces are 
provided a tremendous advantage would be given to the Comrnunist.s 11 • 
The appreciation that New zealand had a regional role to play 
in South-east Asia beyond her Commonwealth obligations ·was expressed 
by D.M.. Rae in July. Rae's appreciation extended to the recognition 
that Britain ~muld not always be in the area in strength. 
':without any 'l.veakening of Commonwealth loyalty v.Je are beginning 
to understand that we have a role to play ourselves in an area 
that affects us very closely indeed ....... It has been said 
very properly that no nat.ion can contract out of its geograph-
ical region, and there is no doubt that our geographical region 
is South-East Asia. With the gradual \<ithdralval of Britain 
from her positions in South-east Asia, it seems there will be 
a vacutu"ll there unless Australia· and New Zealand particularly 
undertake very much heavier commitments than in the past". 
1 0 8 
Malaya ~<as due to become independent in August, 1957, and 
Britain agreed to continue to aid the Federation in its external 
defence aft.er independence. This involved continuing to station 
military forces in Nalaya. The legal basis for this 1vas to be t.'J.e 
Anglo~Nalayan Defence Agreement. 
107 N.Z.P.D. val. 311, p84, 13 june, 1957 
loa N • Z.P.D. val. 312, pl09l, 23 July, 1957 
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Ne~:.r Zealand, although willing to continue to Y:.eep its forces 
in Nalaya as part of ·the St.rategic Rese:rve 1 did not become a signa tor~/' 
to the Defence Agreement 1vhen it \Vas signed in october, 1957. Rather 
New Zealand decided to associate itself with the provisions.. In 
this \vay, Nev.r Zealand did not become legally obliged to the govern-
ment of Halaya, but remained informally obliged to Britain. Britain 
lvould continue to take all the formal. responsibility for the defence 
of independent Halaya. New Zealand apparently was not prepared to 
become a partner of Britain in the defence of Malaya. The government 
preferred to duck this responsibility - evidence of true commitment 
to South-east Asia in its own right, one might think - and remain as 
a backgrou.11d supporter of Bri-tain. ~artnership would not come until 
1971. The decision to associate itself with A.M.D.A. epitomised the 
fact tha.t New Zealand saw its intere'st as being in helping Britain 
to stay in South-east Asia, as reinforcing British strength~ Remove 
the British presence and New Zealand was free of Malaya. Joining 
the Agreement might have been the thin end of the •1edge as far as 
taking over British obligations in South-east Asia was concerned. 
As a partner, New Zealand, along with Australia, might have been 
expected to make more nearly equal contributions to the defence of 
the area. 
Caird quotes External Affairs sources to the effect t.~at 
"associate" status was in keeping with Nm1 Zealand's post-Second 
World War policy of undertaking binding defence obligations only 
in conjunction with a multi-lateral guarantee. 109 
1 og • ; · Calrd, R.J. "New Zealand's Foreign Policy and Halaya Malays:ta 
1955-65", Unpub. M.A. Thesis, University of Canterbury, 1970, 
p75 
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New zealand was only interested in reciprocal defence agreement-s and 
,..,i·th more than one power~ A bi-lateral ~~arantee to Malaya 1 even if 
in conjunction with Britain and Australia, ,;·auld be going out on a 
limb. It is possible that policy-planners ~emembered that Britain 
had been singularly ineffective in defending Malaya from the Japanese 
in World 1•/ar Two. 
Caird further says that New Zealand's policy with regard to 
formal obligations to Malaya was identical to Australia's. Aust.ralia is 
Prime Minister Menzies regarded any binding defence conuuitments in 
South-east Asia wit-hout a United States guarantee as most imprudent. 110 
When the National government - led by K.J. Holyoake since 
Holland's retirement in September, 1957 - lost the Noverrber, 1957 
election and went out of office, Nevy Zeal211d was not linked in any 
way with the Defence Agreement. A letter of association with the 
agreement \vas not to be sent by the succeeding Labour g·overnment until 
March, 1959. 
ConaZ.usion 
South-east Asia first became of interest to New Zealand's 
policy-makers after the Communist assumption-Of power in China in 
1949. It was believed that China would be a hostile and expansionist 
power, and that it would pose a threat to New Zealand's security if 
it were able to gain control of the weak and unstable south-east 
Asian states that formed a chain do~~ to the border of Kustralia. 
New Zealand's first objective in South-east Asia was thus to 




The National government•s first policy to this end was an attempt to 
form a Pacific Security Pact which would link the United States and 
the European states with interests 1n the region in the defence of 
South-east Asia. The Pact 'las to be like the North Atlantic Treaty: 
a deterrent to Co~~nist advance~ However, neith6r the UniteU States 
nor the British Labour govcrn.'tlent vJas interested in such a pact in 1950~ 
Britain's greater concern '\vas for the Middle East, and the British 
government w~~ted New Zealand help there rather than in the Pacific. 
New Zealand's support for Britain's global defence role led her to 
agree to provide troops for the Hiddle East in the event of global 
war despite her concern for her security in the Pacifica 
New Zealand shmved its continuing concern with the deteriorating 
situation of the non-Corcununist forces in Indo-China \Vith shipments in 
1952 and 1953 of surplus arms and arn..rnunition to the French Union forces 
there. It \Vas accepted that Communist insurgencies in the region \'o7ere 
sustained and controlled by China and the Soviet Union for those po,.,Ters 1 
ends, and it was not believed that the insurgencies were in any \<.~ay 
spontaneous responses to local conditions. 
When the United States proposed a Collective Defence System for 
South-east Asia in early 1954, Ne\'l Zealand was naturally very welcoming 
of it, especially since Britain had shown an interest. New Zeal~~d 
and Australia supported the United St.ates against Britain in its 
eagerness to have the Security system set up immediately, but at the 
same time t.l>ey supported Britain against the United States in its 
unwillingness to use the proposed alliance for immediate military inter-
vention in the Indo-China. Vlar. New Zealand wanted the security system 
to deter the Co:rnmunist forces from advancing further, and to commit the 
United States to the defence of South-east Asia. Again, flowever, l'iew 
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Zealand's support for Britain 1 s global defence role made it unv..rilling 
to enter a South-east P~sian alliance that Britain HaG not party to~ 
VJhen the South-east Asian Collective Defence Treaty was negotiated 
after an Indo-China settlement, New Zealand sav1 its major virtue in 
the uniting of Britain and the United States in the defence of the 
area. Thus, in the period 1950 to 1954, Britain w~as a constraint on 
·New Zealand's South-east Asian policy. New Zealand. follm,-;ed Common~-
'"ealth priorities rather than its own. 
New Zealand's first major military involvement in Soutb-east 
P.~.sia - the contribution of troops to the Commonwealth s·trategic Reserve 
in !1alaya - carne in 1955 as the result of British urging, and i·t was 
justified by the New Zealand governrne'lt- in terms of aiding Bri·tain in 
its global role. The contrib".ltion hovJever, served two other objectives 
as well: the cementing of the American commitment to South-east Asia 
and New zealand, and the defence of non-Communist governrnents in the 
' 
\::egion. 
The increase in New Zealand's troop contribution to the Reserve 
in 1957 was likewise the result of British pressure. 
When Britain signed a defence egreernent.with !1alaya in October, 
1957, New Zealand did not become a signatory to it, but associated 
herself with it by letter. In this way, the government did not become 
obliged to Malaya, but remained informally obliged to Britain. New 
Zealand's commitment was to the Great Powers, and not to South-east 
Asia. New Zealand would stay involved with Malaya as long as Britain 
was involved. 
CHAPTER 9 
THE LABOUR PARTY AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA, 1950-1960: 




The Labour Party entered the nineteen-fifties committed to 
the strengthening of the British CollUUonwealth and the upholding of 
the principles of the United Nations, including resistance to 
aggression and independence for dependent peoples. These objectives 
formed the context of the party's policy-making as it was forced to 
·turn its attention to South-east Asia. In office before 1950, it 
had upheld the right of the Indonesians to self-determination from 
the Dutch, but had refused to grant recognition to the Communist-led 
Vietminh in Indo-China, preferring the non-CollUUunist administration 
of Bao Dai. This ambivalence with regard to nationalist movements 
meant that Labour Party policy in the 1950s towards South-east Asia 
did not differ significantly from National's. Labour parliamentar-
ians were prepared to concede publicly by 1953 that the Communist-led 
Vietminh ;.1ere more representative of the will of the Vietnamese 
people than the government headed by·Bao Dai, and hence to oppose 
any suggestion of military involvement on the latter's behalf. At 
the same time, however, they shared the strategic assw~ptions of 
their National Party opponents - that Communist regimes in South-east 
Asia were threats to New Zealand's security because they represented 
extensions of the power of China and could be instr~~ents for the 
further extension of that power. The Labour Part.y' s support of 
the South-east Asia Collective Defence Treaty was based partly on a 
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fear of Chinese c.ggression in the area, and partly on a desire ·to 
see Britain and the United States associated in Pacific defence. 
Reflecting its perception of the support for Corr~~nist insurgency in 
Vietnam, t.'le Labour govermnent that came to power in 1957 showed by 
its reaction to the Laotian crisis of 1959 that it did not regard 
SEATO as an instrument to suppress internal rebellion, Communist 
or not. Prime Vrinister Nash wanted proof of overt aggression from 
the outside, plus a United Nations resolution, before taking any 
action. 
In 1955 the party was prepared to acquiesce in New Zealand 
troops aiding Britain against insurgents in Malaya, and later it 
was prepared to permit them to aid the Malayan government to crush 
Communist insurgents. In the former case, a strong fealty to 
Britain combined happily with an appreciation that the insurgents 
did not have the wide support of the people of Malaya, and that 
their elirr~nation would speed the progress of self-rule. Once 
self-rule bad come, the continuing use -of New Zealand troops on 
internal security duties was justifiedinterms of preserving the 
democratic system from attack from within. The Commonwealth 
Strategic Reserve's continuL~g existence was Supported on the same 
grounds that the National government supported it - that New Zealand 
had an interest in preserving non-Communist governments in Asia 
from external attack. The bipartisan interest in Malaya as a base 
for British pm<er was not mentioned, although Nash had considered 
it in 1955. 
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'.rhe coming of the Korean War in 1950 shot-.red that the Labour 
Party 1 s c~~~itment to resisting aggression in a collective context 
was still ver'J strong. Some Labour members at times seemed more 
enthusiastic for New Zealand's participation in the war than were 
members of the government. F. Hackett, for instance, criticised 
the government in the House on July 11, 1950 for a.11 inadequate 
response to the united Nation's call for assistance. 
11 lt is not enough for the Minister of Defence to say we 
have sent two ships. We do not know when we will be 
sending contingents of troops. lfuy would we do that? 
We would do it because "'e must redeem our pledge, and 
are willing to redeem our pledge of security for those 
smaller nations against wanton aggression". 1 
~~o days later Labour's former Minister of Defence, F. Jones, was 
calling for New Zealand to do all it possibly could to build up 
the defence forces "to assist the British Commom1ealth Forces and 
also the Forces of the United Nations". 2 When T.C. Webb, the 
Minister of Justice, asked in evident surprise if the Labour me.'Uber 
was suggesting that New Zealand send ground troops to Korea, Jones 
said that it was something that might have to be faced up to in 
the future. 
The Labour Party's continuing fierce devotion to the Common-
wealth connection was shown up in its attitude to the Pacific 
Security Treaty concluded in Septerr~er, 1951. While sharing the 
National Party's desire for a Pacific Pact, the Labour Party objected 
to the form that it had emerged in. The ANZUS Treaty seemed to it 
to move New Zealand away from the traditional connection with the 
United Kingdom towards the United States. 
1 N.Z.P.D. vol. 289, p303, 11 July, 1950 
2 N.Z.P.D. Yol. 289, p370, 13 July, 1950 
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When t.lLe treaty was being discussed in Parlia..·nent in October, 
1951, Party leader Nash wanted to know why New Zealand had not insisted 
on bringing the United Kingdom into ANZUS. 
"I would have been happy if L'le United Kingdom had been 
brought into the Pacific Security Pact because that >rould 
have maintained to the full our attaclliuent to the United 
Kingdom and her attachment to us •• ". 3 
Nash went on to declare that New Zealand should "stress to the limit" 
that it would continue to practise the principle laid down by Savage 
in 1939 that where Britain went, New Zealand went. 
"I feel that everything we do ... without being slavish in 
following the United Kingdom, ought to be done after the 
fullest and closest discussion with Britain". 
Nordmeyer concurred with his leader•s sentiments. He told the 
House: 
ut"i'e recognise .. the British Commont-V"ealth of Nations as an 
entity, in which our destiny, our future and our welfare 
is indissolubly linked". 
Nordmeyer said that Savage's declaration applied with just as much 
force at that time as it did when it was uttered. 
"It expressed the sentiment of the whole of the people of 
this country. It certainly expresses the sentiments of 
honourable members on this side of the House" . 4 
Nordmeyer worried that a time might come when a government came to 
power in the United States that was not friendly to the Commonwealth. 
This would, he thought, put New Zealand in a very aw~ward position. 
"For that reason I would hope we would not identify ourselves too 
closely with American practice and American policy". 
a N.Z.P.D. vol. 295, p205, 9 October, 1951 
4 N.Z.P.D. vol. 295, p273, 11 October, 1951 
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J. Mathison condemned the Tripartite Pact on the grounds that 
its narrow membership would inevitably lead to the dorrQnation of 
New Zealand policy by American policy that Nordmeyer feared. 
Mathison said that the mmnbership of the United Kingdom and Canada 
would have ensured that New Zealand's Cow~onwealth interests continued 
to receive due consideration. 5 
In 1952, the Opposition pressed the government to raise the 
question of British membership of A)'!ZUS at the first Council meeting 
in Honolulu. Nash asked the Minister of External Affairs in October 
\<hether he would initiate discussions with a view to making arrange-
ments for the association of representatives of the United Kingdom 
in political and military conferences that might be held under the 
ANZUS pact. In explanation, the Labour leader said that unless 
this were done, the general agreement between New Zealand and Britain 
regarding their responsibilities for the defence of the British 
Commonwealth might be jeopardised. The United Kingdom needed to be 
fully informed through its own representatives of all New Zealand 
commitments. 6 It was as if Nash were suggesting that the govern-
ment arrange for the United Kingdom to have a v1atching brief over 
New Zealand's actions. 
Despite Labour's desire to see Britain in the Pact, the 
leadership accepted that American objections could not be overridden, 
and like the goverr~ent, preferred a Pact wi~~out Britain to no 
Pact at all. The strength of the fear of Asia was such that the 
party did not want to do without a Pacific Pact. 
5 N.Z.P.D. vol. 295, p288, 11 October, 1951 
6 N.Z.P.D. vol. 298, p2122, 16 October, 1952 
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When the party begru> to take public notice of the ever more 
intrusive events in South-east Asia, it recognised from --the first 1 
unlike the government, that there was a strong nationalist impulse 
under some of the Communist insurgencies in the region. 
Nash, speaking in 1952 of the war in French Indo-China, put 
the matter beyond doubt in Labour eyes. 
"I would say that the trouble in Indo-China appears to arise 
from a revolt against colonialism11 • 7 
On the other hand, the party seemd to accept that Communist 
control of South-east Asia was undesirable. In 1949, Fraser's 
government had sponsored Bao Dai's Vietnamese government for member-
ship of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East at the 
expense of Ho Chi Minh's government. Nash now said that if one 
disregarded the political rights ~~d wrongs, and considered the 
Indo-China problem from a military angle, then there could be a 
i threat to Malaya 11 and other areasn if Indo-China went Communist 
and allied itself to the Chinese. 8 The Labour Party t.hus faced a 
contradiction in its South-east Asian policy right from the start. 
It recognised that the peoples of South-east Asian were often freely 
choosing Communism as a vehicle for their nationalist aspirations, 
but saw Communist governments as a threat to other governments in 
Sou~~-east Asia by virtue of their being inevitably willing instru-
ments of aggressive great powers. 
By the early fifties, in spite of the Fraser government's 
support for Bao Dai, Nash and the Labour Party felt that the French 
7 
8 
N.Z.P.D. vol. 297, p361, 16 July, 1952 
Ibid. 
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effort ·to deny the Vir-=tmin11 pcrt.·mr a.nd t.o bu:Lld up c_n alternative:. 
non-Corn.""Uui1ist go·,rernment had been a. failure. Nash told Parlian~ent 
in August, 1953r that. he did not think it \·las possible to get the 
Vietnamese to oppose the Vietmin.h. 
"They are not people of different areas. They are two bodies 
of people \•,ri th slightly different ideas .. ~ They are people 
who want their freedom and tva.nt to fight the French11 • 9 
The Labour leader said that the problem could not be solved by 
Fra.Tl.ce 1 s, or anyone else's, trying to put dovrn the Vietminh by force~ 
"To say tha.t. they a.re all Communists v.d.ll no·t solve the problern11 • 
Combs, for one, concurred. He said that a book he had read had 
made it clear to him that people v1ith political ideas poles apao::t 
- Communists and anti-Communists - v1ere fighting v1ith the Vietmi.nh. 
He called for another look at the side New Zealand tack Lefore getting 
involved in such quarrels. 10 No Labour member, however, ~as pr2-
pared to take these vie\-vs to their logical conclusion and call for 
the recognition of Ho Chi Minh 1 s govern.."Tlent or the suspension of 
help - albiet small - to the Associated state of Vietnam. 
W.T. Anderton denounced the idea of a monoli~~ic, Russian-
directed Comnunism that was plotting to take over all of South-east 
Asia. He told Parliament that Westerners had become so obsessed 
\'lith Russian communism that they believed that Communism in Asian 
countries must be of the same sort. They did not take into account 
the fact that Asian peoples were for the first time in their history 
beginning to think for themselves and to demand a way of life similar 
to that which New Zealand had enjoyed for some time. Anderton ~<.·ent 
so far as to say: "There is no f?UCh thing as Asian Communism11 e 11 
9 N.Z.P.D.vol. 299, p413, 12 1\ugust, 1953 
10 
N. Z.P.D. vol. 299, p420-2l, 12 August, 1953 
ll N. Z.P.D. val. 299, p461, 13 August, 1953 
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In October, 1953, M. Moohan made essentially the same point. 
He said that it was not good enough to say that ~1e fighting in 
South-east Asia "as just part of a Co!TI!llunist plot, for anyone who 
knew me history of iliose countries knew that at the base of the 
troubles were pride of race and desire for self-deterwination. 12 
In his parliamentary report to the 1954 Labour Party 
Conference in Hay, Nash said that it was agreed among the party that 
the major factor in the Asian area was the desire of the peoples for 
self-rule and freedom from foreign domination. 
"It cannot be denied that the peoples of Asia, in their quest 
for self-determination, are often actively supported and 
assisted by local Communists and the Soviet bloc, and that 
Communists have gained control of some of the independence 
movements. This does not detract from the fact, hm<ever, 
that the pre-eminent motive behind much of the stirring of 
the peoples of Asia is the desire for national unity and 
national independence". 13 
When the Indo-China crisis came in the second quarter of 
1954, the Labour Party was very firmly against intervention by the 
Western powers. In May, Nordmeyer, the Party President, said: 
"Most people in New Zealand will not agree to intervention. 
Many people in New Zealand feel that the country is being 
stampeded into a situation which is dangerous". 14 
In J1.me, he publicly repeated his support for the British government's 
position and condemned what he believed to be the American inter-
ventionist line. Nordmeyer accused the government of servilely 
agreeing with the United States, a policy which he claimed was 
leading New zealand into grave dru1ger of being involved in a war 
in Indo-China. Nordmeyer said that he could see nothing in the 
12 N.Z.P.D. vol. 300, pl890, 20 October, 1953 
13 New zealand Labour Party, Report of the 38th Annual. Conference, 
pl3 
14 N.Z.H. May 26, 1954, p8 
f 
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current situation in Indo-Chir..a which would justify Ne~v Zealand 1 s 
going to war there. He pointed out that the British government, in 
contrast, was refusing to be led by the nose by the United States. 15 
Looking back the next year on the developments of 1954 in 
Indo-China, Nash was to say: 
"While the leadership of the insurgent Vietrninh was clearly 
Communist, it must have obvious to the most prejudiced that 
they enjoyed, and enjoy, a vast amount of popular support 
which is nourished by the aspirations of Asi~, peoples for 
freedom. All policies concerning Asia must take account of 
the powerful force of nationalism, not run blindly counter 
to it •••.. it certainly cannot be cn1shed. Nor should it 
be. We must have sympathy for the legitimate aims and 
aspirations of Asians, peoples whose countries have for 
centuries been little more than bargaining counters and 
spheres of influence for European powers". 16 
Nash said in Parliament in July 1954 that intervention by 
outside nations in Indo~China could not succeed because the Indo-
Chinese people ".<'ere giving their strength to the Vietrninh in the 
fight for independence. While the movement was organised and armed 
from the outside, its basic strength carne from""t.'he Vietnamese people. 
He said that t~e Vietrninh leaders were capable of governing well for 
the advantage of the people, and the people obviously wanted them to 
do that. The only solution to the Indo-China problem lay in the 
people of Indo-China governing themselves. Nash went on to say 
t.~at he believed that Indo-China could govern itself without there 
being any danger of Communist expansion further south and west. 17 
Strangely, though, he had preceded these remarks with a reminder of 
Indo-China's strategic position for t.~e West. The Japanese, he said, 
15 See N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, p863, ~August, 1954 
16 New Zealand Labour Party; Report of 39th AnnuaZ Confe1'enae, plS 
17 N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, p216, 6 July, 1954 
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had attacked Malaya from Indo-China. 
11Whoever is in charge of Indo-China a.'l.d controls it 
completely, if evil and powerful 1 menaces Burma, Thailand, 
Malaya, Singapore,. and China itself". 18 
This seeming contradiction has its explanation in the qualification 
!I if evil and po\verful" .. The uncertainty, in Nash • s eyes, v1ould 
appear to have been the degree of friendliness between the Vietminh 
and Russia and China, and the extent of the latter's ambitions. 
The Labour Party• s natural inclinations \Vere to some extent con-
strained by the suspicions and fears of the Cold Vlar. 
These uncertainties would seem to have been behind the 
Party's decision not to oppose the proposed South-east Asia Treaty 
Organisation. In a note probably ma~e on June 28, 1954, Nash asked 
himself what the attitude of the party to a. Pact should be. 
11 If we believe that we are in imminent danger of Conununist 
military aggression, then >~e must ally ourselves with all 
anti-Communists 1 however unsavoury 11 • 
19 
This aggression was likely to be carried out by China. Nash admitted 
that the Pact could be a fatal error if China were not, in fact, 
contemplating aggression, but was mctivated mainly by a deep suspicion 
of the motives of the ~lest. A Pact would only increase that suspicion. 
Mathison, speaking in Parliament in July, said that the only exception 
he could take to Webb's July 6 speech was to the question of the 
urgent necessity of a South-east Asi~ pact. "VIe vmuld urge that 
more care be exercised there in case v1e get ourselves and other 
people into trouble 11 • 20 
18 Ibid., p215 
19 Nash Papers, Bundle 69 
20 p N.Z •• D. vol. 303, p224, 6 J·uly, 1954. 
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Nordmeyer ,,as worried by the fact that most of ·the non-
Communist Asian states regarded the Indo-China War as one for 
national independence rather than one of Communist aggression 1 and 
not something that needed to be dealt ><ith by a military alliance. 
If a south-east Asian alliance of at1y sort "ere to be established, 
then it could only be useful if the currently sceptical countries 
India, Pakist~~. Ceylon and Burma - were included. 
"If they refrain from joining in, or are hostile to it, 
then a very unfortunate situation \>Jill be created in the 
whole of that area, because the impression will be that 
what is known as Western imperialism is imposing its will 
upon a people who are asserting their national independence, 
and military arguments that it is not desirable that 
Communism should be allm1ed to come any further southwards 
><ill carry very little weight". 
_Nordmeyer stated that it was his view that New zealand needed the 
good><ill of India and others of her view more than it needed any 
South-east Asian alliance. 
"I think that if there is to be an allia.""1ce •.• the reasons 
for its establisl:"unent should be more clearly demons·tr<>.ted 
to this House and to the country than has been done up to 
the presentn. 21 
Nordmeyer concluded by observing that raising the living standards 
of the people of South-east Asia would do far more for the defence 
of New zealand in the long run than any Pact. 
W.T. Anderton considered that ~hina's presence in Indo-China 
had been brought about by Western policy in the area rather than 
by any Chinese desire to embark on aggression throughout Asia. 
"Had France accepted realistically her responsibilities in 
Indo-China and granted independence to that country, the 
struggle would not have taken place". 
21 N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, p262, 6 July, 1954 
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In other words, China intervened to help the Vietnamese because 
the French had t~·:Led to hang on. 
"Those people v.rho tall<: of the Communist. danger are bLinded 
to the realities of the s~.tuation ..• We must never forget 
that the problems of Asia_ ca.nnot be solved in a \vay that 
runs counter to the will of the people of Asia". 22 
c.s. Stewart said that American policy had been more against 
Communism than for Asian independence. 
11 These people require s:y·n-.pathy in their aspirations and 
their struggles for independence, not the threat of armed 
strength and the alignment of all the forces of the Western 
powers against them. It is their country". 23 
The party's deputy-leader, C,F. Skinner, told the House that 
many people confused the upsurge of nationalism in the East with the 
·Spread of Communism. 
"I have no doubt that Communists have exploited the position 
on every occasion, but just because the people of some cotmtry 
have decided to rebel against their government •.• we should 
not condemn them . • • by saying they are just a crowd of 
Communists". 
Skinner went on to cite the case of the Huk rebellion in the 
Philippines, '"hich he said was basically a moverr.ent for agrarian 
reform, but condemned as a communist movement. "I have no doubt 
that the Huk movement was exploited by the Communists but in general 
it 'IN'as not a Conununist movement" c The situation in Burma \Vas similar 
to that in the Philippines, he said. · 
"We should not brush these things aside and call them 
Communist uprisings. They may be Communist-inspired 
and supported •. " • 
With this attitude Skinner ,.,as suspicious of the proposed South-east 
22 N.Z.P.D. val. 303, p277, 8 July, 1954 
23 N.Z.P.D. val. 303, p289, 8 July, 1954 
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Asian alliance. He suspected any arrangement which would pit some 
South-east Asian nations against ot.hers on an ideological basis, and 
much preferrred Eden's Eastern Locarno proposal. The alliance, he 
said, was not feasible unless India were a member, and Skinner could 
not see India willing to become a member unless Indonesia, Indo-China 
and China were members, too. Any alliance that did not include these 
principal countries of Asia would break down. 24 
Nevertheless, there was in the minds of party members an 
evident conflict between fealty to the ideal of self-determination for 
peoples, and the demands of New Zealand's security as they saw them. 
P.G. Connolly's remarks epitomised this conflict as had his leader's. 
Connolly believed that responsibility for the Indo-China War 
could be laid "fairly and squarely" at the feet of the French govern-
ment for rejecting the proposals put forward in 1946 by Ho Chi Hinh. 
"There is no doubt that the situation developed from a 
colonial dispute and unrest among the people". 25 
The leadership of the Vietminh might be Communistic, but the v;ar was 
only partly an ideological and international one. However, Connolly 
foresaw "great difficulties" in South-east Asia if there should be a 
complete change of regime in Vietnam. He believed that Halaya would 
eventually come under increased Communist pressure. 
After the cease-fire in Indo-China on July 21, 1954, Labour 
members did not oppose the creation of the South-east Asia Collective 
Defence Treaty. Hembers who spoke on the subject confined their 
comments to advocating a greater emphasis in its provisions on 
economic development. !1. Moohan, said in Parliament on August 24 
24 N.Z.P.D. val. 303, pp298-299, 8 July, 1954 
25 N.Z.P.D. vol. 303, p283, 8 July, 19S4 
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that the people of New Zealand would be very sceptical of any organ-
isation that tried to make New Zealand take the part that France had 
tried to maintain for eight years, or meant that Ne'\--7 Zealand would be 
a party to keeping Indo-China in the position it had been under French 
domination, but he did not call for New Zealand's non-participation 
in the Treaty's drafting. 26 
The published draft of the treaty did place the Associated State 
of Vietnam under the protective cover of the si~oatories, but Labour 
members did not object. After the treaty's signing and its very 
hasty presenting to Parliament, Nash welcomed it as the extended 
Pacific Pact including Britain that Labour had always wanted. 
"I consider it is really an extension of the ANZUS Pact, with 
the advantage on this occasion that we have in it 'cr,e United 
Kingdom and Pakistan ... It is a great improvement on the 
ANZUS Pactn. 27 
Nash regretted that India, Burma and Ceylon were not associated 
with the Pact. He justified its utility after the ·settlement of the 
Indo-China War by saying that there were still "many difficulties" 
to be faced in the Pacific area and that they could be faced the better 
because of SEATO. Defencescould not be let down against a menace 
he considered "real and certain", unless the West could find some way 
of reconciling its way of life with that of the Communist powers. 
Despite his belief that the Vietminh were entitled to Vietnam, Nash 
still distrusted communist ambitions. 
26 N.Z.P.D. vol. 304, pl360, 24 August, 1954 
27 N.Z.P.D. val. 304, p2104, 30 September, 1954 
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At the opening of the next Parliru~ent, in March, 1955, the 
National government announced its proposal to contribute troops to 
a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya. These troops were to 
take part in counter-insurgency operations there. The Labour Party 
offered no objection in principle to the use of New Zealand troops to 
help suppress Co~~unist insurgents in a British colony, and in this 
its attitude differed from that which it had adopted in respect to 
suppressing a Communist-led insurgency in a French colony less than 
a year previously. The Labour Party questioned only the necessity 
for the move, since it was known that the terrorist situation was 
well in hand. 
Holland announced the government proposal in Parliament on 
the evening of Thursday, March 24, 1955. Only Nash on the Labour 
side had an opportunity to speak in reply t~at night, and he kept 
his speech to other matters of external affairs. Parliament was 
due to sit again on Tuesday, March 29, in the evening, and the 
parliamentary Labour Party decided to consider its reaction to the 
government move that day. 28 On March 28 it was reported from 
Kuala Lumpur that the Malayan Labour Party had issued a statement 
protesting against the sending of New Zealand and Australian troops 
to Halaya. The statement had said: 
"We hope it is not the intention of the New Zealand and 
Australian governments to help prolong the colonial rule 
in t:.'1is country". 2 9 
Nash, on reading this, decided to consult the other Labour 
Party of the region - that of Singapore. On Barch 29, Nash cabled 
28 Nash telegram to Marshall 29.3.55. Nash Papers, Bundle 69 
29 Waikato Times, March 29, 19S5, p7 (N.Z.P.A. - Kuala Lumpur) 
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David Marshall, the leader of the Singapore Labour Party, saying that 
he would much appreciate the opinion of the I,abour Party of Singapore 
on the New Zealand decision,in view of the reported protest of the 
Labour Party of Malaya. Nash told Marshall that the subject of 
sending troops was under consideration that day. 30 Marshall's 
telegram came back the same day. It said: 
"The suggestion that New Zealand should send token troops 
has been received with disquiet. We know New Zealand for 
a friendly, modest country, and we do not like the implication 
that it is getting into the business of imperialism. The 
suggestion may be unjust, but it is difficult to understand 
what legitimate reasons there are for Ne~1 Zealand to involve 
herself in this territory". 31 
That evening, Parliament resumed the External Affairs debate 
for three hours. On the Labour side, only Nash and Deputy-leader 
Skinner had time to speak. Nash was finishing off the speech he had 
started on March 24, and in relation to 11alaya asked only if the Malayan 
contribution was primarily to do with SEATO or to do with terrorist 
control. It was not until Skinner spoke that there was some indicat-
ion of the line that the party was developing. 
There was no objection in principle to use of New Zealand 
troops on internal security duties in a British colony, but Skinner 
questioned the necessity of the move. 
" the Prime Minister told us on Thursday night that 
the situation in Malaya is well in hand. The terrorists 
have been driven out of seven of the states, ~~d only two 
states remain to be cleared. Yet we have all this secrecy 
and a special session of Parliament". 
Skinner felt that the Prime Minister was making a case for not send-
ing a force to Malaya rather than strengthening his case for sending 
one. 




11If we have so far overcome this difficulty as to have 
terrorists remaining in only two states now, then surely 
there is a less urgent need for sending troops today than 
there was a few years ago 11 • 3 2 
However, if the redeployment of forces were part of overall 
Commonwealth defence strategy - that is, if New Zealand forces were 
for the external defence of Malaya - then the deputy-leader of the 
Opposition was quite prepared to go along with the proposal. 
"New Zealand's future is irrevocably linked with the British 
Commonwealth of Nations ••. New Zealand is quite prepared to 
put her whole weight behind the Commom;ealth at any time". 
When the debate resumed on the afternoon of March 30, the 
next Labour speaker, the new member Holloway, reiterated Skinner 1 s 
themes. He said: 
"From the point of view of principle I do not think many 
people in New Zealand could rightly object to the basing 
of New Zealand personnel in Malaya " 33 
He went on to question, as Skinner had done, the necessity 
for troops to deal with the insurgency. 
"I feel there is plenty of room for doubt about the need 
to raise a ground force for police action in Malaya". 
He also questioned any larger SEATO role for the proposed force. 
"If it is to be used for tactical purposes under SEATO, 
there is room for further discussion •• If we are supposed 
to defend Thaila~d or the Indo-Chinese states, we are being 
asked to do something that is rnilitarily impossible, so 
much so that the United States has refused to comrrdt herself 
to any military undertaking in 'the area". 
32 N.Z.P.D. vol. 305, p62, 29 !4arch, 1955 
33 N.Z.P.D. vol. 305, p86, 30 March, 1955 
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P.G .. Connolly was principally concerned \'lith New Zealand's 
Commonwealth duty. 
nwe function as an independent nation ·within the Corn .. L1l.OUt>J"ealth, 
and as a full partner must play our part in Cormnonv7eal th 
defence ••••• I am all for strengthening Haiaya". 34 
Later he said: 
"I believe that the new strategy for the Cmmnonwealth is to 
save Malaya and to keep the Communist forces further from 
the shores of Australia a..TJ.d New Zealand .. 11 • 
J. Mathison, however, returned to the theme of the utility of 
sending troops to overkill an already dying insurgency. He could 
not understand why it was suddenly necessary for New Zealand to take 
part in the anti-terrorist campaign in Malaya. 
"I would remind the government that this Nalaya trouble has 
been going on since 1948 ••• Why has [the gover~~ent] not 
done something before this to relieve the burden of the 
United Kingdom?.. Why the urgency of the matter now? Has 
the situation in Nalaya deteriorated? Vie are given to 
understand that it has not •.. ". 35 
Mathison went on to say, though, that if the situ";·tion had 
deteriorated, then the Net1 Zealand contribution was far too small. 
Like Holloway, Mathison had obviously no objection in principle to 
the sending of New Zealand troops to Malaya. He said: "This is a 
British possession", and that he was satisfied that it was being 
subject to a Ccmrnunist-controlled effort to take it over. 
M. Noohan, the last Labour speaker of the day, also questioned 
the utility of sending Ne>; Zealand troops, but he objected on different 
grounds from his colleagues. First, he did not accept that the 
34 N.Z.P.D. vol. 305, p97, 30 Narch, 1955 
35 N.Z.P.D. val. 305, pl04, 30 Harch, 1955 
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defence of !IJ.alaya \Vas a. national interest of New Zealand, and 
secondly, he did not think that troops of any nationality could 
solve the insurgency problem in Nalaya. He asked the House: 
"Does the position in Nalaya affect the security and 
peace of this Dominion?" 
and answered himself: 
" There are some who say it does. I can only say I 
entirely disagree V"lith them 11 • 3 6 
Moohan referred to the apathy of some people in Malaya towards 
the terrorists and said that New Zealand should understand it. 
"To sc.y that 375,000 trained men could not dispose of 
5000 terrorists is just an insult to P':oople 's intelligence. 
The terrorists must be ge·tting support from some part of 
the population". 
Moohan quoted Woodrm1 Wyatt, the British Labour Parliamentarian, to 
the effect that the war against the Commm1ists was not Britainls but 
Malaya's, and the Malayans had to be convinced, through economic and 
political reform, that this was true. Moohan noted that three Malayan 
political organisations - the United Malayan National Organisation, 
the Malayan Chinese Organisation, and the Malayan Labour Party - had 
been reported as viewing with concern the sending of troops from 
Australia and New Zealand to Malaya. Because of this, Noohan suggested, 
New Zealc:nd should wait until a Malayan government was elected, and 
discuss the matter with it. 
On March 31, the party caucus apparently met again. for a 
further consideration of the issue. Nash made some brief notes for 
the occasion. 3 7 His first observation was that Singapore was the 
36 N.Z.P.D. vol. 305, pll3, 30 !1arch, 1955 
37 Nash papers, ~undle 132 
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base from which the South Pacific would be defended. A little 
further do,·m the pa.ge, he asked: 
"If Malaya is to be defended, should we leave the full cost 
and responsibility to the United Kingdom?" 
A further note elaborated: 
"Can we say, send the British, the Gurkhas, but we want to 
be out? 1138 
As if in answer to David Marshall's charge of New zealand's propping 
up imperialism, Nash observed that even when Malaya was self-governing, 
the United Kingdom would still be responsible for the country's 
external defence. A further point, however, was that New Zealand 
would be helping to establish the conditions for self-government. 
Nash recorded his opinion that the co!mnitment of the commando unit 
was really to the South-east Asia Treaty Organisation. Interspersed 
with these lines of thought were some basic political considerations. 
Nash noted that Prime Minister Holland was "fishing for opposition 
from the Labour Party", 3 9 and he concluded that the party v1ould lose 
support if opposition was the sole policy. 
In these notes, considerations of realpolitik predominated. 
Nash recognised that New Zealand had an interest in the retention of 
British military power in the Pacific, and that that power ·was based 
on continuing control of Singapore and its st.rategic hinterland, Malaya. 
It followed that if New Zealand wanted British protection, it was in 
its interest to help Britain retain control of Malaya. In this 
instance, Nash reached the same conclusions about New zeal~~d's 




In the debate that day, R. Boord gave primary emphasis in his 
speech on' t.l}e issue to New Zealand's Commonwealth duty. Boord 
stated his belief that 
" our defence, arld our existence as a sovereign nation, 
is wholely tied up with the existence and defence of the 
British Connnon\'leal th of Nations, and the Nestern world ... 
It is therefore our bounden duty, in peace or in war, to 
make a full contribution to t.l}at defence .. ". 4 0 
A.H. Nordmeyer refused to toe the Nash line when he spoke. 
He continued to question the necessity and wisdom of sending the 
troops. He said that many people thought that the sending of New 
Zealand forces to Malaya would provoke a resentment among the 
Malayan people that would far outweigh any advantage to be gained 
from sending them. Nordmeyer believed that the decision to pro-
teet New Zealand's security in Malaya made no strategic sense. 
What, he asked, if Indonesia were to turn co~~unist? What woulr1 
be the value of a "Cold War front" in Malaya then?l!.l 
When Nash wrote to Chief Minister Marshall to tell him of the 
party's decision on April 4, the Labour leader's justification of 
the decision was in terms of New Zealand's obligations to Britain, 
not in terms of the Malayan people. 
"The major ground upon which the Labour Party in New Zealand 
acquiesced in the proposed new arrangement was exclusively 
on the basis of assisting the United Kingdom to meet the 
commitments she has in that part of the world". 42 
40 N.Z.P.D. vel. 305, pl31, 31 March, 1955 
41 N.Z.P.D. vel. 305, pl47, 31 March, 1955 
42 Nash papers, Bundle 132 
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At the Labour Party's annual conference in Nay, Nash told b~e 
delegates that the government had been extremely vague about t.lc!e 
relationship of the Malayan proposals to SEATO, and that no definite 
information had been given that the forces were to be used exclusively 
to deal with terrorists. 
"In these circumstances, the party '"as placed in a particularly 
difficult position. No objection can logically be raised 
against our assisting Britain to remove the Co~uunist terrorist 
activity which is the biggest stu111bling block to Halaya' s pro-
gress tm . .rards self-government and development - and qualified 
approval was therefore given . .. ". 4 3 
Nash said that the party's parliamentarians had also stressed 
the fact that the Malayan peoples had been exploited in the past and 
that they should receive far more benefit from the wealth that their 
·country produced. 
"It was urged that progress tovrards self-·government .... 
should be accelerated. It is a greater mistake to be 
too late than too early in granting self-government". 
The conference unanimously endorsed the despatch of the 
Commando force to Malaya as part of New Zealand's responsibility for 
Commonwealth defence. The endorsement was qualified only by the 
condition that steps be taken to give self-government to the Halayan 
people as soon as possible. 44 The conference did not pass Hithout 
a few dissenting voices being sounded on the subject, however. Party 
President Nordmeyer in his opening address had derided the idea of 
Malaya's being New zealand's front-line of defence. 
43 
44 
New Zealand Labour Party, Report of the 39th Annual Conference, 
pp21-22 
O.D.T. May 19, 1955, pl3 
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"To talk of defending New Zealand in terms of the last \var' s 
"appropriate strategy is to demonstrate a complete failure 
to face up to reality". 
At the end of the month, Nash drafted a formal statement of L~e 
Labour Party's Malayan policy. This statement r however I \-laS devoted 
entirely to the moral aspect of sending troops to help put down a 
rebellion in a colony. This aspect had been virtually ignored during 
the debates, but Nash apparently now felt the need for the Labour Party 
to put forward a rationale for a policy \1hich might seem to run in 
conflict with some of its principles. 
"The New Zealand Labour Party supports New Zealand assistance 
to the United Kingdom in the eradication of the terrorist 
activity in Malaya. It is not felt that such support ••• in 
any way contravenes Labour•s principles of maximum encourage-
ment of development among all peoples - rather, I believe, 
it is conducive to those ends". 
The draft went on to justify this last assertion by saying that terror-
ist activity was "the greatest sturnbling block" to the legitimate 
aspirations of the people of Malaya being realised. It quoted Anthony 
Eden to this effect. The party had decided L~at the terrorist activity 
in Malaya did not - as it did in Vietnam - constitute a legitimate 
expression of Malayan desire for self-determination. 
"Plainly, no real progress towards genuine self-government on 
a stable and progressive basis can be achieved while terrorism 
and guerilla warfare exists. There are grounds for hope that 
indigenous political parties democratic in outlook and grounded 
on popular support are developing in Halaya . • to the stage where 
the successful fulfilment of self-government is within their 
capabilities. This is the avenue which should and must be 
pursued". 46 
There was, then, a valid indigenous alternative t~ the guerilla 
movement in the party•s eyes. The draft noted that Britain was pre-
pared to grant }!alaya internal self-government as soon as it seemed 
possible that. a democratic system. of government could be established. 
45 O.D.T. May 17, 1955, p9 
' 46 Nash papers, Bu.~dle 69 
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As yet, terrorism prevented that possibility. The draft did not 
mention the fun.ction of the CommonHealth Strategic Reserve. 
In con·trast to the attitude of the New Zealand Labour Party, 
the Australian Labor Party strongly opposed G~e Australian govern-
ment's despatch of troops to Halaya. The Australian Labor Party 
believed that a settlement of the Halayan problem should be 
achieved by negotiating with tl1e guerillas rather than by suppress-
ing them. 47 Australian troops, it claimed, \>JOuld encourage rather 
than subdue strife. 
At the New Zealand Labour Party's 1956 conference, in May of 
that year, a remit calling for the recall of troops from both Malaya 
and Korea was re.commended for rejection by the committee considering 
it. 48 
When, in 1957, an announcement ~;as made by the Prime Minister 
that New Zealand was increasing its ground force contribution to the 
Cornrnonweal·th Strategic Reserve, only a few Labour parliw-nentarians 
spoke out against the move. In general, naturally enough, they were 
those who had opposed the stationing of New Zealand troops in Halaya 
in the first place. P.G. Connolly, however, -"'ho had been all for 
strengthening Halaya in 1955, now said that it would be far better 
to spend hundreds of thousands of pounds on economic and technical 
assistance to Malaya than it would be to send some nine hundred 
infantrymen there. 49 
4 7 Albinski, H.S. "Australian At·titudes and Pol-icies Towards China", 
pl79 
48 New Zealand Labour Party: Report of the Fortieth Annual Conference, 
p38 
49 N.Z.P.D. val. 311, p45, 13 June, 195q 
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W.W. Freer agreed. The problem in Nalaya was economic and 
social, not military, he said~ New Zealand could not succeed if 
she accepted the militarist argument of meeting ideology with force. 
It would be better to keep the force within New Zealand and to use 
the funds saved to improve economic conditions in }mlaya. 
"Unless dernocratic governments in South-east Asia can rapidly 
develop their economies, the Communist advance there will be 
inevitable". 50 
Freer also thought that no matter what the Malayan government's 
attitude to the presence of foreign troops was, New Zealand would do 
better to wonder what the attitude of the Malayan people would be. 
11 although in our own minds we may possibly justify the 
existence of such forces, in the minds of the Asian people 
the forces are not justified". 
Freer pointed to two recent examples of incidents in Asian countries 
involving foreign troops: rio~s in Japan and Formosa. 
A.H. Nordmeyer, speaking during a Parliamentary defence debate 
the next month, was unsure whether even the Malayan government would 
remain content for very long with a foreign force stationed within 
its shores. 51 C.R. Carr asked the Prime Y~nister in this debate 
whether he would postpone arrangements for sending more troops and 
11 concentrate rather on economic assistance". Holland replied that 
the government believed that the despatch of a battalion of troops 
to Malaya was an important contributiOn to the maintenance of upeace, 
stability and political freedom in the area". 5 2 
50 N.Z.P.D. vel. 311, p64, 13 June, 1957 
51 N.Z.P.D. vol. 312, pll4l, 24 July, 1957 
52 N.Z.P.D. vel. 312, p905-6, 16 July, 1957 
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Host members of the Labour Party were, howeverr in favour of 
a continuing military co1~~tment to Malaya because they were collh~itted 
to the idea of Ne .., Zealand 1 s doing its part for Commont,realth defence .. 
Party leader !lash stated in May, 1957, that Commonwealth defence 
should be shared more equitably, with a larger contribution coming 
from New Zealand. 5 3 If defence were going to be a matter for the 
Commonwealth, he said, the cost should be shared among those countries 
receiving the benefit. This statement was made shortly before the 
Prime Minister 's announcement that a battalion of infantry would 
replace the commando force in Malaya. After calling for a greater 
contribution, Nash was hardly likely to object when it was made. 
1957 was election year, and in July, R.T. Boord was saying 
that the Labour Party would promote the effective defence of New 
Zeal~~d, and that this policy included meeting New Zealand's 
obligations to her fellow members of the Commonwealth. "From our 
obligations, of course, come our commitments; that is, our share 
in the defence of the Commonwealth". 54 
At the 1957 general election, the Labour Party returned to 
power in New Zealand. Its policy towards the Malayan commitment 
had been fixed two years before, and most of the Cabinet were 
supporters of the commitment. Nash became Minister of External 
Affairs as well as Prime Minister, while Skinner \vas Minister of 
Agriculture, Boord Minister of Customs, and Hathison Minister of 
Transport. P.G. Connolly, who had suggested increased technical 
aid j~stead of troops in the defence debate, became the ~inister 
of Defence. Two doubters held Cabinet rank - Moohan as Minister 
53 O.D.T. May 23, 1957, p5 
54 N.Z.P.D. val. 312, pl090, 23 July, 1§57 
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of RailHays, and Nordmeyer as Hinister of Finance. Freer 't•,.ras not 
elected to Cabinet. 
On Net.v Year • s Day, the new Prime Hinister outlined some of 
the foreign policy goals the new administration intended to pursue. 
Apart from the usual commitments to full support for the United 
Nations and to strengthening the Commonwealth, Nash pledged to 
"continue assistance to the less developed countries, especially 
in Asia, principally through the Colorr.bo Plan", and also that New 
Zealand would fully honour its treaty obligations under SEATO and 
ANZUS and its defence commitments in Malaya. 55 Indeed, Nash 
considered military aid an indirect form of economic assistance in 
that it ensured the conditions for grov~h. 
11The economic development of l>.sian countries depends largely 
on their political stability and we have done 
our best through our membership of SEATO to assist nations 
who have asked for assistance in protecting themselves 
against the twin threats of external aggression and internal 
subversion. Malaya is not a member of SEATO, but we are 
helping her by c.ontributing forces to the Commonwealth 
contingents stationed there". 56 
When the new government released a defence review in mid-1958, 
it was revealed that Labour had taken over the strategic assumptions 
and policies of its predecessor. 
The Review began by reiterating the government's determination 
to fulfil all obligations and undertakings accepted by New Zealand, 5
7 
and then went on to say t.loat the government attached the "greatest 
importance" to the maintenance of the Commonwealth partnership. 
55 External. Affairs Revie1v, January, 1958, pl5 
56 Dominion, January 2, 1958 
57 Review of Defence PoZiay 1958, A.J.H.R. A-12 1958, p3 
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In wha.t amounted to an informal guarantee of Halaya, the Review said 
that despite the absence of formal agreements, 
11 a mernber of the Commonwealth attacked by an aggressor 
would not look in Vain for -'che support of f~llO"w members 11 • 58 
After the expression of fealty to the Commonwealth, the Review 
turned to South-east Asia. It declared that New Zealand 
"recognised the importance to her O\m security of assisting 
the free democracies of South-east Asia to maintain the 
independence achieved since World \'Jar T-wo". 59 
New Zealand's security would be threatened if ~~e independence of 
South-east Asian countries were under threat. The reference to 
maintaining the independence of the South-east Asian democracies 
assumed that there was a threat to that independence. Some para-
graphs further on, China and the Soviet Union were portrayed as the 
threat: 
" the forces of the Sino··Soviet bloc facing South-east 
Asia remain very powerful indeed .• " . 
The Review stated that although the government believed that 
the danger of overt aggression in South-east Asia was not an immediate 
one, this situation of non-danger was related directly to the military 
strength of the free countries in the area. 
"The need for the free countries of Sout..'"I-east Asia and those 
countries which, like New Zealand, share a concern for the 
security of this vital area, to maintain defensive capacity 
to deter any would-be aggressor •.• continues to be a basic 
condition for the maintenance of peace and stability". 5° 
58 Ibid, paragraph 5. 
59 Review of Defence Policy p5, paragraph l3 
6 0 Defence Review, p5, paragraph 12 
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The RevieVI said that the 1955 decision to set up the 
Commonwealth Strategic Reserve 
"recognised the essential need for ... forces stationed in 
the danger area able to react immediately to the threat of 
aggression". 
It went on to say that the Labour government believed that the 
stationing of troops in Malaya as part of the Reserve would continue 
to serve two purposes - to act as a deterrent to any potential 
aggressor, and to ensure that in the event of aggression the aggressor 
could be repelled. 
The Reviev1 made no mention of the Reserve 1 s use for internal 
security purposes in Malaya. However, it did say that in the previous 
decade the free nations of South-east Asia had been confronted ,.;ri th a 
series of conflicts ranging from armed insurrection to limited war on 
the scale of the Indo-Chinese and Korean l'lars, and that 
"willingness to meet these threats as soon as, and wherever 
they arise, must be an integral part of any co-ordinated 
plan to ensure peace and stability in South-East Asia". 61 
The reference to armed insurrection would seem to indicate a 
willingness on New Zealand's part to be involved in co-operative efforts 
to counter insurgency, as well as to resist external aggression. 
When Nash made his first trip to Malaya, in March, 1958, and 
spoke of the role of the New Zealand forces, the emphasis seemed less 
on external dangers than on preserving democratic government from over-
throw from within. In a radio broadcast from Kuala Lumpur, Nash told 
the Malayans that New Zealand had a "positive concern" to see that 
Singapore and Malaya remained free. He said that the countries of 
61 Op Cit, p6, paragraph 18 
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South-east Asia should, like New Zealcu1d, be able to choose freely 
the goverriment. that they wanted. 
The Prime V~nister went on to say: 
"The security of this part of the world is of special interest 
to us ... We do not take refuge in our.remoteness because we 
believe that our security is closely bound with yours. We 
believe, too, that we must be prepared to back t<ith deeds our 
faith in the virtue and dignity of democracy. That was \<hy 
New Zealand had forces in the area fighting the Communist 
terrorists''. 62 
At a press conference held on his arrival in Singapore, Nash 
pledged: 
"So long as the Malayan people want us, we will stay. 
We only want to help Halaya and foster the British way 
of life 11 • 63 
The New Zealand Prime ilinister seemed willing to equate the Malayan 
government vli th the Malayan people, and be quite open about New 
Zealand's forces being there to defend the system that had brought 
the Malayan government to power. 
When Nash revisited Malaya in June, 1960, he again intimated 
that New Zealand forces were in the com1try to defend the people of 
Malaya against an enemy in their midst. Addressing the New Zealand 
battalion, Nash said: 
"Your presence here is a guarantee to the Malayan people. 
that terror won•t win. You can't maintain a good govern-
ment against a background of fear and terrorism". 
He then moved on from concern for the rights of Malayans to the self-
interest New Zealand had in keeping forces in Halaya. 
62 O.D.T. March 5, 1958, p3 (N.Z.P.A. Singapore) 
63 O.D.T. Harch 4, 1958, p3 (N.Z.P.A. Singapore) 
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"By helping to keep this country free, you are helping to 
keep our country.free. Unless the cotL~tries in this part 
of the world remain democratic, \'lith governments of the 
people~s choice, our 0\\111 country is endangered 71 • 64 
Govermnents that «ere not of the people's choice posed a threat to 
Ne'\v Zealand. 
In October, 1958, tl1e goverriment established a separate 
High Comroission in Malaya, and Nash said that the creation of a 
separate diplomatic post was an indication of the special importance 
which New Zealand attached to the development of closer relations 
with Malaya. 6 5 
In March, 1959, the government became fo~~ally associated with 
the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement. Although New Zealand's actual 
·obligations were not spelled out in the letter of association, the 
~1alayan government interpreted the association as meaning that New 
Zealand was pledged to defend Nalaya. The Malayan Prime Minister, 
1
Tunku Abdul Rahman, said in Wellington in January, 1960: "We have a 
defence agreement with Britain, New Zealand and Australia, and they 
would help us if we were attacked". 66 
Labour in Opposition had supported the National government's 
proposal to send troops to Malaya primarily because the r.abour 
Party's sense of Commom•ealth duty was as strong as that of its 
opponents. It had justified the use'of these troops for internal 
security duties in terms of helping to bring about conditions for 
self-government, believing that the guerilla movement did not. represent 
64 Nash papers, Bundle 201 (Press releases, south-east Asia) Press 
statement , Kuala Lumpur, 6 June, 1960 
65 O.D.T. October 16, 1958, p5 
66 O.D.T. January 21, 1960, p4 (N.Z.P.A. Wellington) 
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a substantial section of the Halayan population., In office, tt:e 
party def8nded a continuing corw:nitment to .Malaya ·~ .. lith reference to 
Nev; Zealand 1 s security interest in seeing that Halaya remained free 
of Cornmlli~ist control. That control, it was believed, meant sub-
servience tO a Great Power hostile to New Zealand, and thus was 
strategically undesirable. 
The Labour government's announced concern to preserve the 
governments of South-east Asia agains·t Sino-Soviet aggression gave 
it an interest in continuing to support the South-east Asia Treaty 
Organisation. The Prime Minister said of SEATO. in 1958 that there 
was no doubting the role it was playing as a stabilising force iu 
encouraging the development and preservai:ion of freedom in South-
east Asia. 67 However, the Laotian crisis, which broke out in 1959, 
seemed to demonstrate that the Labour government did not intend that 
SEATO should be used to help suppress internal rebellion - even if 
Communist inspired, - in member or protected states. In this attitude, 
the party denied the substance of its Malayan-policy. 
War between t.'>e Royal Lao government and Cormnunist guerillas 
broke out in July, 1959, and it was suspected that the Comm1mist 
activity was directed by North Vietnam, which had been agitating 
for the reinstatement of the authority of the International Control 
Commission over Laos. 
67 s·taternents by Ministers of the Crm;n 1958, p8, 27 February 1958 
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The Nev1 Zealand govern..'Tlent' s first conm1ent on the crisis ca.rne 
on August 3. Nash said that if the Laotian crisis were to require 
any international action, the situation should be referred to the 
United Nations, but this was a matter primarily for the Laotia.'l. 
govenu~ent to decide. 68 
The United States goverrcment was in favour of a Laotian 
appeal to the South-east Asia Treaty Organisation, and military inter-
vention by merr>l:lers of the latter. On August 6, indeed, the Deputy-
Prime Minister of Thailand offered to make Thai troops available for 
any SEATO military action. 69 New Zealand, hovvever, besides wishing 
to act only in a United Nations context, wanted definite proof of 
aggression against Laos by North Vietnam before favouring a military 
solution by any international body. 
On September 3, Nash made a further statement on Laos, saying 
,that the extreme difficulty in ascertaining the facts, especially as 
i 
· regards the degree of external intervention, was one of the most 
disturbing features of the situation. 70 
"I am more than ever convinced that the present situation 
calls for some fact-finding body which could report on the 
nature and extent of the emergency". 
Nash repeated his August assertion that the United Nations was the 
body to deal with the crisis. Four pays later, the Prime Minister 
said that neither the United Nations nor SEATO were likely to take 
positive action in Laos without more information on the extent of 
external interference. 71 
68 E.A.R.August, 1959, pl3 
69 Ibid. p21 
70 E.A.R.September, 1959, pl7 
71 Ibid., pl7 
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On September 8, Nash made a special statement to Parliament 
on Laos, in the light of the Laotian government's request to the 
United Nations to despatch an Emergency Force. He said that New 
Zealand would support any United Nations action which might be 
considered appropriate. 
Nash reminded his audience that Nm< Zealand '07as a member of 
the South-east Asia Treaty Organisation, which was interested in any 
developments which could affect the security and stability of the 
South-east Asian region, and which could be appealed to by the Laotian 
government. The Prime Minister expressed the hope tl1at the United 
Nations would be capable of dealing with the situation. Nash said 
that he thought that it would be justifiable to assume that the anti-
government forces in Laos were Laotian, but supplied from the outside. 
"As I see it, there is no evidence of aggression from ou·tside, 
and as a government tve felt that it was right to ascertain 
the facts". 
The government on this basis supported a United Nations fact-finding 
group being sent to Laos. After the report of this body, New Zealand 
would consider whether it was necessary to afford protection to Laos 
in terms of New Zealand's treaty obligations. 72 
It was a somewhat defensive statement, a~d the tone reflected 
the heavy Arr~rican pressure New Zealand had been under to join with 
the United States in military inter:ention. Nash himself was to 
hint at this pressure in his Hew Year 1 s Eve message to tl:e nation in 
1960, just after his government had been defeated at the General Election. 
"We have taken, certainly, an independent line on many current 
problems, particularly Laos and Seato .•. " 73 
72 N.Z.P.D. val. 320, ppl707-l708, 8 September, 1959 
73 O.D.T. December 31, 1960, p4 f 
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A .. H .. Nordmeyer, Minister of Finance in the Nash government, 
recalled in 1974 that there was 
nfairly considerable American pressure to get Ne\v Zealand 
involved militarily in Laqs.. Secretary of State Dulles 
[sic] in particular was most anxious that New Zealand 
participate in military intervention that the Americans 
thought justified. Mr Nash very firmly opposed any 
suggestion that New Zealand as a part of SEATO should 
become involved there" .. 74 
Nash's Permanent Secretary of External Affairs, A.D. Mcintosh, 
wrote in 1962 that in Laos in 1959, 
uGreat Power attention was concentrated on a military solution. 
To the government of the day it seemed unwise to concentrate 
on military planning and manoeuvres". 75 
New Zealand's stand was, however, not taken alone. On this 
.occasion, as in Indo-China in 1954, all of New Zealand's other 
significant allies were opposed to military action, too. Britain 
and Australia, joined this time by France, urged the United States 
not to seek a military solution. An officer of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, W.B. Harland, wrote in 1970: 
"Once the United States had committed itself to the defence 
of South-east Asia, we became concerned that it might go too 
far. In 1959 and 1960 we joined the British and the French 
in trying to restrain the Americans from pressing the 
Communists in Laos". 76 
Australia's Hinister of External Affairs, R. G. Casey, recorded in 
his diary that Australia, too, was not in favour of a military 
74 Nordmeyer, Interview, 30.5.74. Dulles had died in May, 1959. 
The Secretary of State in September was Christi~~ A. Herter. 
75 Mcintosh, "Administration of an Independent New Zealand Foreign 
Policy" in Larkin, T.C. New Zealand's External. Relations p59. 
76 Harland, W.B. "New Zealand's Relations \•lith the U.S.A." in 
New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review May 1970, p9 
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solu·tion in Laos. 7 7 
wnen Nash attended the ANZUS Council meeting for 1959 in 
October: he was outspoken against American views on Laos. Nash 
told the American Secretary of State, Herter, that the United States 
was trying to maintain the type of government that it wanted in Laos; 
and not the type the Laotians wanted. He asked whether the West had 
any right to interfere in the internal politics of Laos, and ~hy 
American aid to the Laotian government was right, \'lhile Vietnamese 
aid to the Pathet Lao was wrong. 78 Apparently, Nash accepted that 
the Pathet Lao were a legitimate claimant to governmental power in 
Laos, while the Laotian government was of dubious legitimacy. Nash 
told the Americru's that an intervention by SEATO would be seen not 
as saving Laos from outside aggression but as interference in Laotian 
internal affairs. If the Vietnamese or Chinese intervened, then 
New Zealand would live up to her SEATO obligations. He was worried 
that SEATO military planners were planning for armed intervention 
before there was any political agreement. Sinclair claims that Casey 
did not support Nash, but is not clear about whether the non-support 
was on the planning issue, American aid to the Laotian . government, 
or the wider issue of military intervention. 
~llien the United Nations investigating committee reported that 
the problems of Laos stemmed primarily from internal weaknesses and 
could best be solved by economic aid, the Labour government was only 
too willing to make a gesture of support. In December, 1959, it 
informed the Secretary-General that New zealand would support United 
77 Casey, R. G. Australian Foreign Minister: The Diaries of 
R.G. Casey p323 
78 Sinclair, K. Walter Nash p323-324 ' 
Nations plan for aid to Laos, and early the next year a plan was c!oosen. 
The Secretary of External Affairs later coln.Trtented that Ne'iv Zealand's 
airlift of educational supplies to Laos in 1960 
"showed our friends that while we might make difficulties 
over military measures from which it \'las felt that the results 
would be doubtful, New Zealand "'as prepared to do something -
that objections to one course did not simply mean that we wanted 
to do nothing n • 7 9 
The government was not willing ·to see SE..Z\.TO used as an instru·-
ment for suppressing insurrection in Laos, even if that insurrection 
were stimulated by a foreign, Communist power. In Malaya, however, 
\'lhere a similar situation was presumed to prevail, the Labour govern-
ment was prepared to let its troops on the spot take part in internal 
security duties. The conclusion is hard to escape that the Commonwealth 
context accounted for the difference. In Halaya, the government ~.vas 
honouring a corrmitment made by its predecessor, whereas an intervention 
in Laos was a fresh decision, but the party had not objected to the 
Malayan commitment when in Opposition. 
Conclusion 
The Labour Party's approach to policy decisions involving 
Malaya and-Indo China in the 1950s did not dif!er significantly 
from the approach of the National Party. For both parties, 
Commonwealth loyalty was a major determinant of action, as was the 
assumption that Communist regimes in South-east Asia would inevitably 
be agents of a hostile China and thus a threat to the sec?rity of 
New Zealand. Labour parliamentarians had an appreciation that their 
opponents seemed to lack, of the strong nationalist elements that often 
79 Hcintosh, Op Cit. p60 
' 
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lay at the back of Communist insurgency, but this did not prevent 
them from being concerned at the spread of Co~~unist influence in 
Asia. Although recognising that the popular support in Vietnam was 
being given to the Communist Vietminh, Labour as· a party did not come 
out against the South-east Asia Treaty Organisation, which extended 
protective cover to the Associated State of.Vietnam, the creation of 
the Vietminh's opponents. The Laotian crisis of 1959, which came 
about during Labour's term of office, showed that the party, however, 
regarded SEATO as an instrument for dealing with clear, overt aggression 
within a United Nations context, and not as a body to legitirrQse 
military intervention against an internal Communist-led rebellion. 
The Labour Party acquiesced in the sending of New zealand 
troops to Malaya in 1955 on the grounds that the·country had to stand 
by her Commonwealth obligations, and that the troops were a necessary 
deterrent to overt aggression. In the Commomvealth context, the 
party had no objection to the troops being used on internal security 
duties. In the Malayan case, the suppression of the insurgency was 
regarded initially as advancing the conditions necessary for the grant 
of self-rule, and later as the legitimate preservation of democratic 
government in Malaya. Behind these rationalisations, however, was a 
belief that New Zealand had a direct security interest in a non-
Communist ~~laya. The interest was stronger in Malaya than in Indo-
China because in Malaya-Singapore were the bases of British military 
power in the Far East - a power that New Zealand needed. 
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CHA?TER 10 
NEt~ ZEALAND, MALAYSil'. AHD CONFRONTATION 1961-65: 
BRITAIN VERSUS AUSTRALIA IN NEW ZEALAND POLICl 
Introduction 
In 1955 New Zealand had become ir.volved in the defence of 
Malaya primarily because the government felt that the country had 
an obligation to help Britain in her global defence role, although 
there 'Ylas also an appreciation that New Zealand's own strategic 
interests were directly involved. The Confrontation crisis con-
sequent upon the formation of Malaysia showed New Zealand o~ly 
eight years later following a policy in Malaya at variance "lith that 
of Britain, and that the era of New Zealand as the mostly unquestion-
ing spear-carrier for Britain in her crises was finally over. New 
i 
Zealand's policy, however, does not appear to have been a separate 
one of her ovm making. Rather does it seem that New Zealand adopted 
Australia's line towards committing troops to Borneo because Australia 
had constrained her from following her traditi()Ilal instincts. Nev1 
Zealand's declarations of solidarity with Malaysia and of willingness 
to put troops into Borneo were more re.adily forthcoming than Australia's 
through the period, though they V~ere not followed up until Australia 
moved. On the other hand, the positive aspect of Australian policy 
toV~ards Indonesia - negotiation - seems to have been adopted with more 
enthusiasm. Although under the Anglo-Malaysian Defer.ce Agreement, 
New zealand was committed to aiding Britain to defend Malaysia, New 
Zealand in t:he sixties did not see her role, even rhetorically, as 
assisting Britain in the fulfilment of her Commonwealth defence 
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obligations. The commitment was now on a regional basis, to Malaysia, 
albeit as a nember of the Common~ealth. 
Underneath the rhetoric of Coromom1ealth fratexnity with Halaysia 
the fundamental basis of policy was strategic - the necessity to 
preserve the bases of British military pov1er in South-east Asia aguinE't 
threat. British power in South-east Asia was seen as necessary· to 
combat Communist advance in the area, and Indonesia was not condemned 
as a dangerous aggressor L~ her own right, but as a threat to the 
British presence which alone could deter 'real aggressors'. In the 
Malaysian crisis, New Zealand \<las confronted with a situation she had 
not anticipated - a non-Communist challenge to Halaysia. The nature 
of the challenge immediately introduced qualifications into New 
Zealand's response, supposedly predetermined by her commitment to 
resisting all aggression and shov7ing solidarity with Commonwealth 
partners. New Zealand felt threat~'ed only by a Corr~unist challenge 
in Asia, not by Indonesian aggression. Indonesia had to be resisted 
in so far as it challenged the British presence, but it ought, too, 
to be conciliated to save it from the Communist revolution that 
would likely be its lot following a disastrous war with British power. 
In Hay 1961, the Prime Hinister of Halaya, Tunku Abdul Ra~~an, 
publicly proposed for the first time the merging of Halaya with the 
British colonies and protectorates of Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei and 
North Borneo, in a new Federation of Nalaysia. In November of that 
year the British goverlli~ent agreed to investigate the feasibility of 
the concept. It v1as at this time that the Nev7 Zealand government 
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- by now a National Party one again - rnade its first comment on the 
issue. 
Prime Hinister and External Affairs Hinister Holyoake declared 
that Ne>~ Zealand >~as "sympathetic" to proposals to form Halaysia, 
"both from the standpoint of general stability in the area, and in 
the interests of the countries concerned". 1 The Prime Minister, 
significantly, >~ent on to note that there had been a >~elcome measure 
of agreement between Britain and Malaya on the future use of bases in 
Malaya and Singapore, and he reaffirmed Ne« Zealand's interest in any 
arrangemen·ts bearing en the country's capacity to discharge her treaty 
obligations in the South-east Asian area. 
Ne>~ Zealand >~as sympathetic to the cause of Malaysia in the 
first instance because of its interest in Britain's retaining control 
of the Singapore base. The scheme for Halaysia provided the ideal 
solution, as far as Ne>~ Zealand >~as concerned, to the vital problem 
of the decolonisation of Singapore. 
Britain's continuing military role in the Far East depended 
by the 'sixties on its retention of the military and naval base at 
Singapore. Since Communist influence >~as str~ng among Singapore's 
predominantly Chinese population, there >~as no guarantee that a future 
government of independent Singapore might not order Britain out, or, 
if that >~ere made constitutionally impossible, might not at least 
make the security situation so difficult as to make the base untenable. 
A merger >~ith Malaya, by putting the Singaporean Chinese in a political 
1 E.A.R. November, 1961, p20 
( 
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minority, would mean that the base would remain in control of reliable 
friendly hands. The Annual Report of the DepartwEnt of External 
Affairs for 1963 stated: 
"The New Zealand Government is convinced that the formation of 
the Federation of Malaysia is the best, indeed the only, 
practicable solution to the problems of ensuring the security 
of Singapore 11 • 2 
The government also sato..r Malaysia as the best vehicle for pro-
viding independence to the British Borneo territories 1 o:;.;hich, it said, 
could have no political or economic viability by themselves. 
In March, 1962, Defence Minister Eyre flew to Singapore to 
confer with the visiting British Minister of Defence. It was evident 
from the statement he made on his return that the Ne>v Zealand government 
had been concerned that watertight provisions for the future of Singapore 
base be built into any Malaysia agreement. Eyre reiterated Ne\>T 
Zealand's prime interest in the matter: 
"I am more than ever convinced that the continuation of 
Singapore as a British base is essential for the security 
and stability of the whole region, and for defence purposes, 
this includes New Zealand and Australia". 3 
The Minister went on to say: 
" ... It was very heartening to me, and I • m sure it will be to all 
New Zealanders, that in all the discussions in \Vhich I took part/ 
there was not the slightest suggestion that Singapore would not 
continue as a British base". 
Eyre ended with an expression of faith in Commonwealth unity as a 
practical means of guaranteeing New Zealand's security. 
2 A.R.D.E.A. 1963, p31 
3 E.A.R. Ma.rch, 1962, pplS-16 
( 
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"My discussions i!1 Singapore have reinforced my firm belief 
that the best defence of New Zeo.land and Australia as ~·Jell 
as the best defence of the South-East Asian area depends 
upon the fullest possible co-ordination among the three 
Cornmom.vealth countries, the United Kingdom, Australia and 
New Zealand 11 • 
In mid-1962 it had become clear that there was regional 
opposition to the proposed ne'" state of Halaysia. Both the Philippines 
and Indonesia objected ·to the Borneo territories' joining 11alaysia. 
In this situation, New Zealand's support for the -ooncept of 11alaysia 
was reaffirmed by the Prime Hinister. In August, 1962 he said: 
uThis imaginative desig·n is, I feel, an example to the world, 
v:hich in recent years hc:.s too often seen disruption and dis-
union instead of unity and co-operation". 
Holyoake went on to say that New Zealand looked forward "with anticip-
ation" to the closest friendship and coo-operation with the ne\v state. 4 
In Parliament in October, 1962, Minister of Defence Eyre said: 
" •• most people will have viewed with satisfaction the pro-
jected establishment next year of Malaysia ••• It should 
increase greatly, we believe, the stability of that part of 
South-east Asia, and indeed, should prove advantageous in 
every way". 5 
By 'stability', Eyre meant that the proposed new state would be a means 
of ensuring that its constituent parts would be less susceptible to 
Communist influence. The Malayans had made no secret of the fact 
that the incorporat.ion of the Borneo territories was designed to offset 
the political influence of the Singaporean Chinese in the new Feder-
ation. Eyre went on to say: 
"As a member of the Commonwealth, we in New Zealand should be 
particularly concerned that the establishment of Malaysia is 
successful, and I believe we must be ready to come to her help 
as and when we can" . 
4 A.R.D.E.A. 1963, p32, A.J.H.R. 1963 A-1 
5 N.Z.P.D. vel. 332, p2359, 25 October, 1962 
' 
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New Zealand, then, applauded the advent of Halaysia as a means 
by which British milita~y power could stay in South-east Asia in an 
era of self-determination. By this 'imaginative' plan, ideals could 
be reconciled with strategic necessity. 
In the Prime Minister's in·troduction to the External Affairs 
Department's Annual Report in 1963, the ideals were ·.<ell to the fore 
and the strategic interest not mentioned. He described the Malaysim1 
concept again as 11desirable and imaginative 11 , a plan ">'lhereby racie.l 
animosities could be allayed, economic opportunities created, and 
foundations of political and social stability extended. Because of 
this, the Prime Minister greatly regretted the opposition to Malaysia 
offered by the governments of Indonesia and the Philippines. 
"I am convinced that there is no substance in suggestions 
that Malaysia will provide a centre of hostility to 
neighbouring countries, and I earnestly trust that deliberate 
efforts to prevent or impair formation of the new State will 
be abandoned". 6 
In April, 1963, Indonesia's hostility to Malaysia led.to 
border incidents in Borneo. New Zealand was quick off the mark in 
'I<Tarning that it would respond to any aggression against the nev; 
state. In May, 1963 - four months before Malaysia came into being 
- Defence Minister Eyre declared: 
6 
7 
"While our association with the Defence Agreement creates 
no formal treaty obligation, the New zealand Government 
would deal promptly with any request for assistance in the 
event of aggression against the area. In doing so, it 
would be conscious of the vital importance of the security 
of Malaya to New Zealand itself and our long tradition of 
assisting friendly countries that are the victims of 
aggression". 7 
A.R.D.E.A. 1963, p5, A.J.H.R. 1963 A-1 
E.A.R. Hay, 1963, p32 
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Eyre noted t..~at talks between Britain a..'ld Malaya on the final 
arrangements for Malaysia, 11 \\~hich ~:ill presumably include defence" 1 
would take place shortly, and that New Zealand >1ould then be able to 
give formal consideration to its position in the light. of agreement 
reached. 
"There is no reason to expect that there will be any 
significant change in our position11 • 
Prime Minister Holyoake stated in t.'1e House on July 30 that 
the new Federation appeared to the New Zealand government to be a 
"constructive contribution to the security and stability of South-
east Asia, and will have this government 1 s fullest support11 .. This 
support was to include the transference of the provisions of the 
1959 defence agreement to the territories of Malaysia. 
"The Government expects to ccntinue to maintain forces in the 
federation and to be associated >Jith the modified agreement 
just as we have up till now been associated with the original 
agreement". 8 
The Labour Opposition had showed itself as eager to support 
Malaysia as the government. The new Leader of the Opposition, 
A.H. Nordmeyer, who had taken over from Nash in January, 1963, said 
in early July: 
"What the Prime Minister has said about the concept of 
Malaysia we wholeheartedly support. We believe that 
this ideal is deserving of support. 1-!e believe the 
Federation will make for a stro~ger group of nations in 
the area". 9 
Nash had gone further: 
8 N.Z.P.D. vel. 335, p902, 30 July, 1963 
9 N.Z.P.D. vol. 335, pp408-409, 9 July, 1963 
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"I hope our obligation in COP ..nection with the Corru:nontvealth 
Strategic Reserve 1 al~chough not necessarily "'ilritten into a 
treaty, will be continued to l4alaysia in ,the same way it 
has been to Malaya". 10 
On September 14, the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
reported that there was no doubt about tl1e wishes of a sizeable 
majority of the people of Borneo to join the Federation of Malaysia. 
This report put the seal of United Nations approval on the Halaysia 
project. In a statement the next day, Prime Minister Holyoake 
welcomed the Secretary-General's finding, and observed that it opened 
the way for a full and unqualified acceptance of Malaysia by all 
concerned. 11 
Speaking to the House of Rep:.:-esentatives on September 17, 
Holyoake stated that New Zealru."'ld • s interest in the \'lelfare, defence 
and development of Malaysia was as "compelling 11
 as it had been for 
the Federation of Malaya. 
"Our association with the defence agreement is being adjusted 
to conform with the new boundaries .. 
1112 
~ne exchange of Letters of Association with the revised Anglo-Malayan 
Defence Agreement was completed the next day, and the Prime Minister 
made a further statement on Malaysia two days ~ater. He pointed out 
that New Zealand was not legally co~~utted to Malaysia, but said that 
Malaysia•s survival was so crucial to .New Zealand's security that 
this country could not afford to be indifferent to Malaysia's fate. 
10 N.Z.P.D. val. 335, p420, 9 July, 1963 
11 E.A.R. September, 1963, pl8 
12 N.Z.P.D. val. 336, pl923, 17 september, 1963 
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"Nernbers will note . . . t.hat [the 1--ett.ers] impose no legal 
obligation on Ne"t-7. Zealand to maintain· forces in Nalaysia or 
to follow specific courses of action for its external - I 
repeat, external - defence. Ne\·1 Zealand has, nevertheless, 
more than once emphasised the importance of the peace and 
security of Malaysia - and other governments have also done 
so - to our own defence and "\felfare 11 • 1 3 
Any power that could successfully threaten Malaysia's security was 
thus regarded as a threat to New Zealand. 
The Prime Minister went on to make clear the government's 
likely response to any attack on Halaysia. 
11As a Commonwealth country, firmly linked in so many ways 
with !-ialaysia, New Zeala.L'1d has alo;;.,rays given cause, I think, 
to believe that she would not stand idly aside in the event 
of an armed attack on Halaysia. This reflects the quality 
of the relationship bet-.;veen our two countries. In the 
event of any armed threat against Malaysia, the New Zealand 
Government -.;vould promptly consult with the Malaysian and 
ether Common-.;vealth Governments concerned on any measures 
that might be taken". 
Holyoake had stressed the Comrnom1ealth link as the motivating factor 
pehind New Zealand's solidarity with Halaysia, but he ended his 
btatement with a reference to New Zealand's strategic interest in 
Malaysia. 
11 In considering •• what steps might be necessary, including the 
possible employment of New Zealand forces in the area, the 
New Zealand government would have fully in mind the importance 
of the security of Malaysia to New Zealalld' s own security".:·~ 
Holyoake could only have been referring to the security of 
Malaysia as a base for British power in the region, since in pur.ely 
geographical terms, the defence of Halaysia against a southern enemy 
made no strategic sense for New Zealand. As the new Leader of the 
Opposition, Nordmeyer, had pointed out in 1955, enemy control of 
13 N.Z.P.D. vol. 336, p2015, 20 September, 1963 
14 Ibid. 
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Indonesia made defence of the Malayan peninsula irrelevant to New 
Zealand. Halayci's geographic importance had al;·rays been the fact 
that it was a jumping off spot for the invasion of Indonesia and 
thence Australia. 
Holyoake's whole statement was so strong that, according to 
an anonymous External Affairs Department officer quoted by Caird, it 
had almost the status of a treaty guarantee. 15 
New Zealand's pledge of support had followed almost immediately 
on a declaration by the British government that it would defend 
Malaysia. Australia's declaration along similar lines did not come 
until five days after the New Zealand statement. 
The question of Malaysian defence did not figure in the general 
election campaign of November, 1963, at which the ~ational government 
was returned with minimal loss of support. 
Indonesian pressure on the new Malaysian F'ederation began to 
escalate in the last months of the year, with the sending of guerillas 
into Malaysia's Borneo territories. New Zealand's response was to 
give more assurances to Malaysia. The Prime Minister's review of the 
international situation on the last day of 1963 included them. 
"Ne\< Zealand has a natural anxiety to see that there is 
no further deterioration in th~ situation; it has, ho'\>rever, 
left no doubt of its attitude towards Halaysia. New Zealand 
already enjoys the closest relations with Malaysia. It.is 
a stable and progressive member of the Commonwealth; as such 
it deserves, and will have, New Zealand 1 s full support".
16 
During December and early January, there were press reports in 
both Britain and Australia that the British were very anxious to make 
I 5 Caird, Op. Cit. pl08 
16 E.A.H. December, 1963, p25 
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use of the Australian and Ne\V Zealand units of the Commonwealth 
Strategic Reserve on the Borneo border against Indonesian infiltrators. 
Early in January, 1964, the poli ti-ca"l \vri ter of the Melbourne Sw7-News 
PictoriaZ claimed that Britain was putting strong pressure on Malaysia 
to ask for Australian troops, and implied that it was not the first 
occasion that the United Kingdom had done so. 17 An article in the 
Eeonomist at the same time, claimed that the British government had 
been urging Australian Prime Minister Menzies to put Australian troops 
into Borneo ever since the Australian government had been returned 
to office in the November 1963 elections. 18 
Officially, however, the British government maintained that it 
was not its place to ask for troops: it wz.s Halaysia's. It would 
make no comment on whether or not it was nudging Malaysia to ask. 
On December 5, 1963, in the House of Commons, the Secretary of State 
for Com.'non\.;realth Relations, Duncan Sandys, was asked by a Conservative 
Party Member of Parliament whet..'"ler he would give "further encouragement" 
to other Commom1ealth countries to take part in the defence of Malaysia. 
Sandys replied: 
"I imagine that my honourable friend has in mind Australia 
and New Zealand in particular. Both these countries have 
expressed their full support for Malaysia in unmistakable 
terms. Their active participation in defence operations 
is, of course, a matter for decision between the Australian 
and New Zealand Governments and the Government of Malaysia". 19
 
Asked two weeks later what approaches he had made to the 
governments of Australia and New Zealand to provide military forces 
for Sarawak and Sabah, and what had been the results of the approaches, 
17 O.D.T. January 4, 1964, p3 (N.Z.P.A. - Melbourne) 
18 Eeonomist, January 4, 1964, p4 
19 Hov~e of Commons Debates Volume 685, No. 18, Column 1335, 
5 December, 1963 
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Sandys merely said that he had nothing to add to his answer of 
December 5. 20 
A noted Australian academic specialising in defence questions, 
however, states that both Australia and New Zealand resisted British 
pressure to move combat troops to Borneo. 21 
Britain wanted Commonweal·th help in Borneo because crises 
in Cyprus and Aden on top of the necessity of keeping up troop 
strength in Germany were straining the army 1 s resources, the Ne\'1 
zealand Press Association reported from London.
22 
On January 6, however, Malaysia's Prime Minister eased the 
pressure on the ANZAC countries by stating that he did not plan to 
seek Australian and New Zealond military help unless open war broke 
out. 23 When Bi::itain 1 s Defence Minister, Peter Thorneycroft, arrived 
in Malaysia on January 7, he said that Britain had adequate forces 
in the Borneo territories to meet the situation. 
I 
The Econom·ist, 
however, commented that.Thorneycroft•s statement looked 11 0dd" after 
the British government's attempts to get Australia and New Zealand to 
commit troops to Borneo. 2 ~ The London Times observed on the same day 
as Thorneycroft's statement: 
"None of this can conceal the fact that British troops car.not 
continue for much longer to defend Halaysia without reinforce-
rnent11, 
and went on to say that while Britain had not officially asked Australia 
and New Zealand for help, she should not have to. The Common"\.,real th 
20 llouse of Commons Debates Volume 686 No. 28, Written Answers to Questions, 
Column 251, 19 Decewber, 1963 
21 ~ullar, T.B. Australia's Defence, p75 
22 
Waikato Ti.mes, January 4, 1964, p1 
23 
f11aikato Times, January 6, 1964, pl (Jesselton - N.Z.P.A.) 
2~ 
Economist, ,January 11, 1964, p94 
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countries should offer it. 
11 It is reasonable to expect that Britain should not have to 
go cap in hand to two members of the Cmmnomveal th to seek 
support for another against attack"~ 25 
Holyoake and Henzies were in touch on the issue of involva'Tlent 
in Borneo, 2 6 and would appear to have come to agreement on the necessity 
for holding off, even though New Zealand's interest in avoiding conflict 
~lith Indonesia was not as compelling as Australia's. The logic of 
geography made Australia naturally anxious to avoid conflict with its 
larger neighbour. Since 1962, Australia and Indonesia had shared a 
border in New Guinea, and there was the possibility of repercussions 
in Papua of any long-term war with Indonesia. New Zealand could 
appreciate this fear, since under the ANZUS Treaty, it could find 
itself involved in any fighting in Papua. 
Apart from its interest in avoiding conflict with Indonesia, 
New Zealand's major concern in making its decision was almost certainly 
its relationships with Australia and the United St.ates. Britain's 
1961 announcement that it intended to seek membership of the European 
Economic Comrnunity gave New Zealand an interest in the short term in 
retaining British goodwill to ensure safeguards__ for the access of New 
Zealand produce to the British market, but it also pointed the way to 
strengthened relationships with Australia and the United States in both 
the defen~e and trade fields. Britain's move to join Europe was the 
harbinger of eventual withdrawal from South-eas·t Asia, and New Zealand 
25 Quoted by J.D.B. Hiller, "Problems of Australian Foreign Policy 
July-December 1963", pl4, in Australian Jou:mal of PoZitics a-ad 
History val. X No. 1, April, 1964 
26 Waikato Times, January 9, 1964, pl 
( 
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had been atvare of t.his trend in British thinking- since the initial 
consultations over Ivlalaysia.
27 In 1963, New Zealand had initiated 
disucssions 'i·lith .:~ustralia for a Free Trade Agre8J.-r.ent, designed to find 
places for more NevJ Zealand exports in the Australiru1 market .. In this 
matter, Australi2-11 goodwill was needed .. A Neiol Zealand decision to 
respond to a British request for aid unilaterally would have been 
embarrassing to Australia, which had the same commitment to Halaysia. 
rrhe American gove1.nment was anxious that the war not be escalated, 
for two reasons. First, the State Department wished to avoid the 
increase of currnnunist influence in Indonesia, and was concerned that 
war could push Sukarno into the power of the Communist Party of 
Indonesia, or lead to his replacement by it. 28 Second, the United 
States feared being dratvn into an escalated conflict at a time when it 
was becoming increasingly involved in the anti-co~unist war in SouL~ 
Vietnam. A Congressional study mission to South-east Asia in late 
11.963 expressed its concern that the United States could be drawn into 
an escalated war through the ANZUS Treaty.
29 The United States thus 
had an interest in seeing that Australian and Ne\·l Zealand troops did 
not enter the war before it was absolutely necessary. 
The United States was mL~ious, in early January, to promote· a 
negotiated solution to the problem, so1nething that the British govern-
ment no longer believed possible or even desirable.
30 On January 11.3, 
27 Brown, B. New Zealand Foreign Policy in Retrospect, p32 
2 8 Leifer, !1. "Anglo-American Differences over Halaysia", in ~lorld Today, 
April, 1964, pl61 
29 Reese, T.R. Australia> New Zealand «~n the United States, p220 
30 Hackie, J.A.C. Konfrontasi, p223; also, Greenwood, G. "Australian 
Foreign Policy in Actionn, plOl in Greenv:rood and Harper (eds*) 
Australia in World Affairs 1961-6.5 
385. 
it wa.s announced in Washington that the Americc.n PAttorney-General, 
Robert Kennedy, ,;auld hold talks wit_l-:t President Sukarno in Tokyo in 
the later part of the mont.h. 
Apart from its. O'WTI reluctance to get involved in a war with 
Indonesia, the Australian government t-Jas motivated by a detennination 
not to move ahead of American policy, and not to move without American 
backing. New Zealand, according to J .. D.B. Miller, was of a similar 
mind. 
"It was an axiom with both Australia and Ne\v Zealand that no 
decisive military step should be taken without the acquiescence 
and, if possible, the guaranteed support of the United sta·tes. 
Some time elapsed before the two governments were satisfied 
that the American guarantee under ANZUS might be applied to 
conflict in Borneo if the situation there deteriorated. Until 
then, and until the United States was no Z.onger trying to 
persuade Indonesia by diplomatic pressure, it was not politic 
to send their troops to fight Indonesians!! 
31 
At least one member of the New Zealand Cabinet >Vas in favour of 
'a more positive effort in Malaysia by New Zealand. On January 11, 
I 
the Minister of Defence; Eyre, said that he believed that New Zealand 
"could and should do more to help Malaysia in its border 
struggle with Indonesia". 
New Zealand had its head in the sand and its tail in the air over 
Indonesian t_nreats, he said, and pointed out that the security and 
peaceful development of South-east Asia were of much greater concern 
to New Zealand and Australia tha.'"l to the people of Britain. 
"It's about time that we pulled our heads out of the sand and 
understood the realities of the situation".
32 
31 Miller, J.D.B. Survey of Commonweal-th Affairs - PmbZ-ems of 
Ex:pansion. and Att:Pition 195:3-1969 pp93-94, emphasis added. 
32 Waikato Times, January 11, 1964, pS 
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Eyre said that it was possible that Ne1< Zealand and Australia could 
reinforce their garrison in Nalaya, but that this suggestion had not 
yet been examined officially. 
The official Australian statanent on further aid to Malaysia 
was made by Menzies on January 16. The Prime Hinister said that 
the government's military advisers had thoroughly exarr~ned the militaL7 
situation, and that after considering their assessment the Australian 
govermnent still concluded that there was no inur.ediate need for further 
Australian assistance. Menzies also stated definitely that Australia's 
assessment was shared by Malaysian and British authorities. 
In a very defensive corollary, the Australian Prime ~tinister 
pointed out that Malaysia's defence involved peninsular Malaya as well 
as Sabah and Sarawak and that Australian troops were already available 
for this task. The glaringly obvious factr however, was thai.: it was 
Sabah and Sarawak that were threatened and in need of defence. The 
Australian government's real reason for holding back \lias not its 
military assessment but its political one. 
"The Government believes that there has been and is considerable 
scope in the diplomatic field to tr¥ to end border incidents 
and to maintain peace in the area", 3 
Menzies said. 
It was the day after Menzies made his statement that Australians 
would not be going to Borneo that Holyoake ruu;ounced that New Zealand 
forces also would not be going to Borneo. 
3 3 Current Notes on International Affairs, January, 1964, pp61-62 
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11It is our assessment, UJh1:ch avvea1"S to be accevted bu OUI1 
al-Zi-es, ·that the existing lev~l of Malaysia...l"l a~d British 
forCes in Sarav7ak and Sabah is fully capable of containing 
the present scale of military activity, and the introduction 
of our ground forces into the Borneo States for active 
operations has not, ~~erefore, been necessar1 11 • 34 
The Prime Minister went on to say that if circumstances changed, then 
New Zealand would do all that was necessary. 
It \'laS a very significant development in New Zealand 1 s foreign 
policy in the Halayan region that the Prime Hinister had said that 
the decision had been based on New· Zealand's own assessment of the 
military situation and not on Britain's. In 1955 and again in 1957, 
the New Zealand government had acknowledged publicly that it was 
responding to British assessments of British needs in the area. 
Although the government had proclaimed that it was acting on its own 
assessment, the timing of the announcement indicated that New Zealand's 
assessment ,.,.as heavily influenced by Australia's. The Prime Minister 
did not claim, as Henzies had, that New Zealand's other allies 
-presumably Britain and Malaysia- agreed ~'lith Ne\V' Zealand's assess--
ment: merely that they appeared to accept it. By emphasising that 
the assessment has been a New Zealand one, Holyoake left open the 
question of whether the British assessment differed from it. New 
Zealand was acting now not so much in defence of Commonwealth interests, 
as in defence of Australia's and her own. Technically, under the Anglo-
Halaysian Defence Treaty she was supposed to act as an adjunct to 
British power in defence of Commonwealth interests, but now when 
Britain wanted to use that power, New Zealand \V'as reluctant to com.it 
it. The New Zealand government preferred Britain - which had less 
34 External Affairs Review, January, 1964, p20 
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to lose - to defend Nalaysia from Indonesia, rather than to become 
unnecessarily involved itself. Caird goes as far as ·to claim that 
a vital facet of New Zealand's foreign policy in South-east Asia at 
this time was to 11 drag the chainu on ·comm:i_tments there so as to keep 
British power in the area. 35 
While a New Zealand contribution to the Borneo front may not 
have been strictly necessary in terms of the local military situation, 
it was highly desirable in British eyes in terms of Britaints overall 
global military situation. What >~as necessary to deal with Indonesia 
was being adequately provided in Borneo by Britain, but at a price: -
the stretching of British reserves. A decade before, the duty of New 
Zealand to help pay that price had been widely trumpeted as a justific-
ation for a New Zealand commitment. New Zealand's concept of the 
extent of that duty now seemed limited; the troops remained to defend 
peninsular Nalaya, but the old role of unquestioning spear carrier for 
Britain in her global role seemed to have gone. The interest in 
relieving British defence burdens '"as no>1 less than that in co-operating 
>lith Australia, and, seemiP-gly, in preserving good relations with 
Indonesia. 
There was a considerable disparity between the firm declarations 
of support for Halaysia and the Commom<ealth in September, 1963, and 
the cautious policy actually followed in January, 1964. There could 
have been no greater declaration of support for Malaysia ~han the 
transfer of New Zealand troops to Borneo. Several explanations present 
themselves for the caution. The rhetoric of Septel!'ber could have been 
35 Caird, Op. Cit. pll8 
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meant for deterrence only and not as an expression of concrete policy; 
or the government could have believed that military aid was not necessary; 
or New Zealand was being constrained by Australia. The last seems most 
likely. 
The fact that both Britain and Malaysia were seeking 
Australasian help at this time was revealed at the end of the month by 
the ru1nouncement in New Zealand of the ·implementation of a compromise 
plan for the use of New Zealand troops. This plan enabled New Zealand 
and Australia to aid Malaysia without confronting Indonesia. Early 
in January, the Canberra correspondent of the Melbourne Sun had 
reported that Australasian troops might take over internal security 
duties in the Halay peninsula again, so that more Malaysian troops 
could concentrate in Borneo. Commonwealth troops had been off 
internal security duties since the end of the sta·te of emergency in 
Nalaya in 1960, but the Sun reported that Australia and Ne'" Zealand 
considered this more satisfactory than committing their troops to 
active service along the Indonesia border.
36 Sure enough, at the 
end of January it was announced that New Zealand had agreed to ~~e 
employment of the New Zealand battalion stationed at l1alacca against 
terrorists in northern Malaya, so as to assist the Halaysian govern-
ment in 
"preparing and making available additional Malaysian forces 
>~hich may be required to deal >~ith the security problems in 
the Borneo States 11 .. 3 7 
It seemed, then, that additional troops in Borneo Wel'e needed, and 
New Zeala~d troops were to be employed on internal security duties so 
36 Wail-'..ato Times January 9, 1964, pl (N.Z.P.A. - Helbourne) 
37 E.A.R. January 1964, p21 (29 January, 1964) 
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that Halaysia could provide them. Yet the declared purpose of the 
New Zealand force in Malaysia was to defend that country from external 
attack and logically it should have been New Zealand forces that were 
on stand-by for Borneo. Internal security duties were much more 
properly the function of Halaysian troops. 
At the same time that these decisions were being taken, the 
New Zealand Prime Minister had written· a note to Indonesia's Foreign 
Minister, Dr Subandrio. In this note, Holyoake stated that the 
reason fer the New Zealand government•s reluctance to commit troops 
to Borneo was its concern for the effect it could have on relations 
between Indonesia and New Zealand. 
It is more likely that New Zealand's concern for relations 
with Indonesia - established diplomatically only in 1960 - VTas 
secondary to her desire to co-operate with Australia. 
The note read: 
"I feel I should let you know with what deep concern the 
New Zealand Government and people have viewed recent 
developments in the Borneo States. We are most anxious 
to maintain friendly relations with Indonesia, a country 
which is destined to play such an important part in the 
immediate and long-term future of this area of the world 
in which we live. I should personally-deeply regret it 
if relations between us . . . were now· to be impaired as a 
result of the policy of confrontation against Malaysia •• 
••• Up to the present we have not felt it necessary to 
commit forces to operations in the Borneo States alongside 
Malaysian and British units. This is a step >1e have been 
most reluctant to take because >1e realise the effect that 
it could have upon relations between Indonesia and- New 
Zealand. It is, nevertheless, a step from which we would 
not shrink if a further serious deterioration in the situation 
in the Borneo States should [develop]". 38 
38 E.A.R. April, 1964, p24 
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The government, while demurring at sending troops to Bor:1eo, 
\~as determined to aici Nalaysia in other ways. The government ag2~eed 
that the Prime Ninister should go to Halaysia to discuss with the 
Halaysian government a programme Of defence aid that v;ould include the 
secondment of New Zealand armed forces personnel to the Malaysian forces, 
the training of Malaysian servicemen in New Zealand, and the outright 
gift of equipment and munitions. 39 
In April, 1964, by releasing his letter t.o Subandrio to the press 
Holyoake publicly pledged for the first time that New Zealand troops 
"'auld go to Borneo if the situation there \.rorsened. In Kuala Lumpur 
he reiterated that if the situation deteriorated as a result of 
military aggression then New Zealand would be prepared to join with the 
Commonwealth partners in making New Zealand forces available.' 0 
In making this pledge, New Zealand policy edged slightly ahead 
of Australia's. The Australia."l government made no declaration vri th 
1regard to Borneo, although it, too, \<tas quietly increasing its defence 
aid to Malaysia. In April, the Australians decided to send a detach-
ment of engineers to Borneo. 41 
After discussions on defence aid with the Malaysians in April, 
New Zealand's Prime Minister continued the dual-approach policy, 
which had been initiated in January with the letter to Subandrio, by 
paying a surprise visit to Djakarta. At the conclusion of the·short 
visit, Holyoake said that Indonesia was now very clear as to New 
Zealand's position on Confrontation. He announced, too, that he had 
39 A.R.D.E.A. 1964, p3l, A.J.H.R. ·1964 A-1 
40 E.A.R. April, 1964, p29 
41 i M llar, T.B. 'Australian Defence 1945-1965' p289 in Greem,•ood and 
Harper (eds.} 'Australia in World Affairs 1961-65' 
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invited President Sukarno to visit Ne-"t'l Zealand~ 42 
The policy of simultaneously negotiating with Indonesia while 
gradually increasing support for Halaysia was basically the same as 
Australia's, although New Zealand had shown a tendency to be more 
quickly off the mark in registering support of Malaysia. New Zealand 
did not have the same conflicting interests to balance as Australia 
- a traditional neighbourly relationship with Indonesia with the 
equally traditional Commonwealth commitment - but New Zealand took 
the Australian course anyway. New Zealand's relationship with 
Indonesia could never claim the same at.tention from the government 
that the relationship with Malaysia could. New Zealand did, however, 
have an interest in normalising relations \'Tith Indonesia because 
Indonesia was seen as a potential ally rather than a natural enemy. 
Any non-Co~~unist state in the regjon, and particularly one in 
Indonesia's geographic positiOn, should net be made a.n enemy. 
The annual report of the Department of External Affairs for 
1964 acknowledged that the Indonesian challenge had posed 
nspecial ... problems for New Zealand ... 
situation involving Malaysia, .. there was 
identity with the familiar and ever-present 
Communist expansion". 43 
In the new 
no ready 
problem of 
It was the strategic demands of that problem in the first 
instance that forced New Zealand to be closely involved with the 
new situation involving Indonesia: 
42 Christchurch Press April 20, 1964, quoted by Caird plll 
43 A.R.D.E.A. 1964 p30 
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" there was a close and po'centially substantial threat to 
the very bases (in peninsular Halaysia and Singapore) on 
which the Com.mon\'Jeal th partners t ability to maintain their 
peaceful a11d stabilising influence in the area depended11 • 44 
In order to defend the bases which were necessary to aid anti-Commu..~ist 
forces in South-east Asia, Malaysia had to be defended against Indonesia. 
There was no mention in this assessrr.ent of the necessity to resist 
aggression for its ~wn sake, or of upholding the principle of self-
determination r or even of Comrnonwea.l th · solidarity .. Indonesia had to 
be resisted because it was threatening the base of British military 
po\1-Jer in Asia. 
The primary necessity of defending the bases was to be again 
stressed in the following year's deparbnsntal report. 
"The purpose of the Strategic Reserve is to assist in the 
defence of South-East Asia, but a first task must be to 
preser..:re the security of its base arean, 
it said.tts That report went on to make it clear that Malaysia's 
Commonwealth membership was a secondary consideration in New Zealand's 
taking its part in the quarrel with Indonesia. 
"In this case there was an additional consideration: 
Malaysia, as a fellow member of the Commonwealth, has 
a strong claim on other members for assistance in the event 
of aggression. It was inevitable, therefore, that Ne\< 
Zealand forces should become increasingly associated with 
Malaysia's defence as Confrontation intensified". 
The fact that the threat to the bases had come from a country 
with which New Zealand was anxious to have friendly relations, however, 
had made the problem difficult, the department admitted •. 
4 " A.R.D.E.A. 1964, p30, A.J.H.R. 1964 A-1 
45 A.R.D.E.A. 1965, p34, A.J.H.R. 1965 A-1 
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1'The response to Indonesian pressure from the supporters of 
l,\-1alaysia .. 4 had to be firm enough to preserve Malaysia. • s 
integrity \'lithout provoking a disastrous intensification of 
the conflictn.'+G 
An intensification of the conflict held the risk of defeats 
for the Indonesians serious enough to break up the regime and allow 
the powerful Communist Party to come to power. If that happened, 
Indonesia could become a threat to Australia and New Zealand in her 
own right. The Australians recognised an interest in preserving 
the existing structure in Indonesia. 47 
Although trying to dissuade Indonesia by a graduated response, 
New Zealand, at least, made it clear that in the last resort it would 
fight for Malaysia. 
The department reported that 
"It has .. been the government's concern, \':hile looking for 
a peaceful resolution of Indonesian hostility and Philippine 
misgivings tow·ards Malaysia, to leave no room for dangerOLlS 
doubt that New Zealand's support for the federation was in 
any way qualified".4 8 
The substance of the Prime Minister's talk with Sukarno was 
brought out by a parliamentary question put to him in June, 1964, by 
a member of his own party. H.E.L. Pickering asked Holyoake whether 
in his discussions with Sukarno in Djakarta in April he had given 
11 full support to Malaysia" and whether he had indicated New Zealand's 
willingness to assist Malaysia "in whatever manner might be necessary11 • 
The Prime Minister replied affirmatively. 
46 A.R.D.E.A. 1964, p30, A.J.H.R. A-1 1964 
47 Greenwood and Harper (eds.) Op, Cit., plll 
48 A.R.D.E.A. 1964, p25 
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11 ! said tha.t New Zealand had enjoyed friendly diplomatic 
relations with Indonesia and wanted to see these continue, 
but that we also had the closest relations \•dth Halaysia, 
to which we had defence obligations; and Malaysia, of 
course is a member of the Co~nonwealth. I pointed out 
•.• that it would be tragic if the situation were to develop 
to the point where New Zealand and Indonesian forces came 
into direct conflict. I said, further, that Ne\v Zealand 
v~as determined, nevertheless, to meet its obligations to 
Malaysia, and I recalled my public statement that if there 
should be a further deterioration in the security situation 
in the Borneo States of Halaysia, the Nm• Zealand battalion 
serving in the ComEonwealth Strategic Reserve would be made 
available for operations in the Borneo States alongside the 
forces of our allies. I am t~erefore quite certain the 
Indonesian leaders understand the measure of our support for 
Malaysia". 49 
Members of the government in statements on the Malaysian issue 
always gave emphasis to Malaysia's Commonwealth membership as a 
motivating factor in New Zealand's actions. In August, 1964, L~e 
Minister of Defence, Eyre, told Parliament: 
"I believe .. that, as a member of the Corr.mon1tJealth, \Ve have 
a moral duty, apart from other duties, to assist Malaysia, 
especially in countering outside interference 11 • 
50 
The same month the Prime Minister gave the impression in the 
House that Malaysia's cause was more important than South Vietnam's 
to New Zealand because of Malaysia's Commonwealth membership. 
Holyoake said that of the two threats in South-east Asia - Comntunist 
China's in the north, and Indonesia 1 s in the South - there \vas no 
point in asking which was the more important to New Zealand because 
11 our first duty is to our Commonwealth ally, Malaysia 11 •
51 
The Confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia escalated on 
August 17 when Indonesian infiltrators were landed from the sea on the 
49 N.Z.P.D. vol. 338, pl79, 19 June, 1964 
50 N.Z.P.D. vol.339, pl65l, 27 August, 1964 
51 Ibid. , pl66l 
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l.W.lay peninsula, extending the scope of the \·Jar from the disputed 
Boi'TleO territories to the heart of the Federation itself. The 
landing was followed on September 2 by a dramatic dropping of 
Indonesian paratroops near Labis, also in peninsular Halaysia .. 
These Indonesian actions called forth a strong reaction from the 
New Zealand government. Again, the reaction 1·1as in terms of 
Commonwealth solidarity. Holyoake declared on September· 4 that 
New Zealand could not stand by while one of its closest friends and 
partners in the Commonwealth was being subjected to attack. The 
government, he said, was now considering \;hat further help might be 
given to Malaysia, either fina.11cially, or, if needed, through the 
employment of New Zealand troops now stationed in Malaysia. 52 On 
the same day that Holyoake made this statement, the Malaysian govern-
ment sought permission from New Zealand for New Zealand troops to be 
used in the hunt for infiltrators, and after this was agreed to, the 
Prime Minister made a statement to Parliament on the matter. 
"The situation in the area has .. recently become more 
serious as a result of the Indonesian decision to expand 
its activities to Malaya and Singapore 11 • 
The Prime Minister agreed that responsibility for dealing wi~~ the 
infiltrators lay in the first instance with the-·!1alaysian government's 
own military forces, but he said that he felt sure that he was re-
fleeting the feeling of the House and the country when he declared 
that if assistance was needed, New Zealand was ready to give it. 
The need for assistance, he pointed out, was highlighted ~y the 
unfortunately simultaneous disturbances in Singapore, which had placed 
a burden on Malaysia's own forces. 
52 E.A.R. September, 1964, pl8 
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nAt the req·u.est of the Nalaysian GovernrJent .... I conveyed our 
agreement to the use of the Ne\v Zealand bat·talion, as did the 
British government to the use of a battalion of its for·ces a .... 
The decision to accede to the Halaysian request was fully in 
accord with the objectives under which the Commom1ealth 
Strategic Reserve is st.ationed in Malaysia 11 • 53 
Finally, then, New Zealand troops were committed to action against 
the Indonesians, although still not in Borneo. They did this ahead 
of the Australians, who were not called upon by the Malaysian government. 
Holyoake had noted in passing that the Australian battalion was "committed 
on the Thai border against the Communist terrorists and was not available 11 , 
implying that if it had been at the Reserve's base camp in Malacca it 
would have been used. This may well have been true {and indeed, 
Australian troops were to be used the next month, when they were back 
in Malacca) but it is also true that the Australian government had not 
matched the New Zealand government's ;;tatement of readiness to act. 
The Australian government's public reaction to the Indonesian landings 
had been non-existent. 
In his statement to Parliament on September 8, Holyoake said 
that the government's decision to make the troops available had been 
made before the Malaysian request for them. The gover~~ent had ta~en 
the decision after the first sea-landings had occurred - that is, after 
August 17. 54 The ~slaysian request of September 4 was thus probably 
based not on the September 4 New Zealand statement, but on a prior 
New Zealand offer. 
It would seem that in making this decision in late'August, 
New Zealand had broken partly free from Australian-induced restraint 
on the ANZ.i\.C countries fighting Indonesians, and reverted Ne>J Zealand 
53 N.Z.P.D. val. 339, pl940, 8 September, 1964 
54 Ibid. 
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policy to its traditional lines of ·the fullest possible support fer 
the Ccl!L>nom;eal th. However, New Zealand \Vas still not prepared to 
step seriously out of line with Australian policy by making its battalion 
available for Borneo before the Australians made this step. 
Australia itself moved fcn;ard in its Confrontation policy in 
October when more Indonesian infiltrators landed very close to the 
Corrrrnonwealth Strategic Reserve's base in Malacca. This time Australian 
troops were present at the ba3e and the Australian government was asked 
for their use in mopping up operations. The government acquiescedc 
After the landings, Malaysia lodged a protest with the 
Security Council of the United Nations at Indonesia's aggression, and 
the Council voted overwhelmingly to condemn the Indonesian actions. 
A Soviet veto prevented the Council's resolution from being adopted. 
At the end of the year, New Zealand took up Malaysia's cause in 
the General debate in the United Nations. Once again, her support 
for Malaysia was more forthright than Australia's in that New Zealand's 
delegates did not hesitate to condemn Indonesia by name. Australia's 
Minister of External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, spoke in the General Debate 
five days before New Zealand's Justice Minister J.R. Hanan, and his 
only mention of Confrontation was an indirect one: he called for all 
members to recognise their obligation to settle disputes peacefully, 
but did not mention Indonesia by name. 55 
New Zealand's Minister of Justice, J.R. Hanan, devoted a part 
of his speech to deploring the fact that a member of the United Nations 
geographically close to New zealartd was violating the fundamental 
precepts of the United Nations Charter. Hanan said that respect for 
55 CU.l'rent Notes on Internationa~ Affairs December, 1964, p30 
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National sovere.ignty an.d the territorial integrity of member states 
v1as a corner-stone of the United Nations system a The Charter laid 
down a code of international behaviour 'i'ihich Nev; Zeala.1d regarded as 
the best prescription the world had for the preservation of peace. 
It was therefore a matter of deep concern to New Zealand that the 
Charter was being "flouted, openly 11 by Indonesia. The Iv"rinister said 
that New Zealand found it disturbing that Indonesia should act as if 
Article Two of the Charter was an obligation that could be waived at 
"When we consider the principles on which the United Nations 
is based, there are very serious implications for all nations, 
particularly all smaller nations, in the policy of Confrontation 11 • 56 
Indonesia 1 s attack, then, was, in Ne'i\7 Zealand 1 s eyes, not merely 
an attack upon Malaysia, which was strategically important to New Zealand, 
but an attack on the United Nations and the principles it represented 
- principles that New Zealand was trying very hard to get established 
as ruling all conduct in foreign affairs. New Zealand not only supported 
Malaysia in the dispute; it condemned Indonesia's methods of achieving 
its objectives. 
Hanan called for Indonesia to withdraw her forces from Malaysian 
territory, saying that this call was nothing more than a call for Indonesia 
to "return to the observance of the obligations of the Charter". 
Two days after Hanan's speech, the Indonesian representative 
replied to his call. He argued that Indonesian troops could not be 
condemned for being on Malaysian territory because Indonesia did not 
recognise Malaysia. A dernfu<d for their withdrawal was tantamount to 
a demand that Indonesia recognise Malaysia. 
56 E.A.R. December, 1964, p40 
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This cl~im brought an intervention into ~~e debate by New 
Zealand's permanent representative to the United Nations, F.H. Corner. 
Corner declared that the Indonesian argurrent that lack of recognition 
was a sufficient justification for hostile action was incompatible 
with the paragraphs of the Charter ••hich stated that disputes between 
nations should be settled peacefully, and that all states should refrain 
from the use of force against the territorial integrity and political 
independence of any other state. Corner expressed New Zealand's 
concern that what he termed Indonesia's la>;less doctrine was being 
used by a large nation against a small one. 57 
on December 21 the Indonesian representative attacked New 
Zealand as a supporter of British neo-colonialism and being against 
self-determination. Corner's reply was in terms of small nation 
solidarity against large bullying nations: a theme from the 1940s. 
New Zealand troops were in Malaysia to "help a small Commonwealth 
ally of New Zealand". Corner pointed out that New Zealand was the 
smallest of the older members of the Commonwealth, and that Malaysia 
was the smallest Asian member. Malaysia, he said, was being bullied 
by an extremely large and potentially powerful country of 100 million 
people. New Zealand's aid to her in the face-of this might be small, 
but it was a mark of the fact that one small country would stand by 
anotl1er. 
uNew Zealand will always, I hope, come down decisively on 
the side of the small country \•Ihich is threatened and bullied". 
56 
It could be argued that New Zealand's acceptance of Australian 
constraint on the sending of troops to Borneo \vas not the mark of one 
small country coming down decisively in support of another. 
57 E.A.R. December, 1964, p52 
58 E.A~R. Dece~ber, 1964, pSO 
401. 
During the year, American rela·tions with Indonesia had 
deteriorated seriously. The Johnson Administration had had no 
success in its attempts to negotiate a solution to Confrontation, and 
policy towards Indonesia began to harden. In July, the turning point 
was reached v.1hen Malaysian Prime Minister 'l'u:nku Abdul Rah..1t1an came to 
washington, 59 and in a joint communique >·lith Johnson it was announced 
that t".he United States was willing to help Malaysia \vi.th its defence. 
In November, an American military mission had visited Kuala Llh~pur 
to talk about Malaysian needs. From Australia 1 s and Ne'\>1 Zealand's 
point of view, American support for the policy of military resistance 
to Indonesia was more likely. 
At the end of the year, President Sukarno withdrew Indonesia 
from the United Nations, and simultaneously began a build-up of 
military forces in Borneo. Britain, in turn, began to increase its 
military strength in the region. 
' 
Finally, in February, 1965, New Zealand offered its battalion 
for service in Borneo, and this was announced in the \<lake of an 
Australian offer. 
On February 3, while Holyoake and Austr~lian Prime Minister 
Menzies were in London for Churchill's funeral, the Acting Prime 
Minister of Australia, McEwen, aqnounced that Australia had decided 
to make its infantry battalion in Malaya available for use in Borneo. 
When New Zealand's acting Prime Minister, J.R. Marshall, was asked 
to comment on McEwen's announcement, he in turn, announced that New 
Zealand too would give additional military assistance to Malaysia, 
59 Hackie, J.A.C. Konfrontasi p223 
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although he did not say that this would take the form of offering the 
battalion for service in Borneo~ Marshall said that the Cabinet had 
made the decision to offer further militc.ry assistance at its first 
meeting for the year on January 26 - before Holyoake had left for 
London. The offer, Marshall said, was currently under discussion by 
the Malaysian government. 60 On his return from Britain two days later, 
Prime Minister Holyoake confirmed that.New Zealand troops would go to 
Borneo. Aside from the battalion, the services of an S.A~S. detachment 
had been offered, as \'Tell as the crews for tv10 minesv.mepers. 6 1 
The Prime lv!..inister said that the government~ s decision was a 
result of the concern it had felt during the previous weeks about the 
considerable build-up of Indonesian regular forces in Sumatra and 
Indonesian Borneo. 
"Those countries assisting Halaysia are obliged to take account 
of this increased military th:t:ust and ensure that Halaysia, wit:h 
its friends, is in a position to cope adequately with any increase 
in the number or scale of incursions. It will be recalled that 
the British government has recently deployed additional forces 
in the area 11 • 62 
The Prime Minister said that Cabinet had made its decision on 
additional aid at Malaysian request, but the British Prime Minister, 
Harold Wilson, later said that the Borneo deciSlon of the Commonwealth 
countries had been taken after consultations in London with him. 63 
Certainly Holyoake said in his February 5 statement that he and 
Menzies had discussed the l-lalaysian situation with Wilson at lunch on 
February 1. 
60 E.A.R. February, 1965, pl9 
61 E.A.R. February, 1965, pl9 
62 Ibid., p20 
63 Millar, T.B. "Australia's Defenoe", p76 
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c:e.B. Mi~lar says that the ne'\·l British Labour GoverP ..ment ha.d 
11 long canvassed the idea of a greater physical contribution by 
Australia .. ,. towards Halaysia116•4 
If so, then the British governro.ent must have been p:ressing for aid from 
the time it came into office in October, 1964, and it is very likely 
that the Malaysian request to Ne1..r Zealand carne as a result of British 
urging. The delay in Netv Zealand's announcement of her decision to 
offer additional aid may be attributed to a desire to wait upon a 
positive Australian response to the British-Malaysian request, or even 
to a necessity to lobby for that positive response. Harshall said 
that New Zealand's decision had been made at the January 26 Cabinet 
meeting; Australia•s seems to have been made at a Cabinet meeting on 
~'ebruary 3 • 6 5 McEwen announced the decision after a Cabinet meeting. 
Caird says that it is 11 likelyu that New Zealand exerted some influence 
on Australia to commit forces to Borneo. 66 Caird bases this likelihood 
on the fact that New Zealand did not have the same degree of reluctance 
to defend Eastern Halaysia as Australia seernd to. The New Zealand 
Government had made it plain several times from April, 1964, onwards 
that New Zealand forces would go to Borneo should they be required 
there. The Australian Government had never g~ven such a definite pledge. 
The commitment of troops to Borneo did not result in New Zealand's 
abandoning entirely the two-pronged nature of her policy towards 
Indonesia. In his introduction to the 1965 Annual Report of the 
Department of External Affairs the Prime Hinister said that New Zealand 
64 Millar, T.B. "Problems in Australian Foreign Policy, January-June, 1965 11 , 
in AustraUan Journal of PoUtics and Histor-y, vol. XI No.3, December, 
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intended to continue training Indonesians in Ne\<T Zealand under the 
Colombo Plan 
"as evidence of our wish to help the Indonesians in their 
task of national development, aTJ.d as a basis up~>n v:hich, 
in more propitious circumstances, more varied forms of 2id 
can be resumed". 
The Prime rt.dnister \.,.ent on to express his belief that Confrontation 
was really an aberration in the Indonesian government's policy, rather 
than a deep-seated national aspiration·. 67 
In May, 1965, New Zealand found itself in receipt of a 
competing demand for military aid - from the United States for South 
Vietnam. In justifying the despatch of an artillery unit to Vietnam 
in May, Holyoal<e made the point that while Malaysia was still Nevi 
Zealand's prior commitment, the greater danger was in South Vietnam. 
The artillery battery, he said, could be provided 
"without weakening in any lj.,7ay our military effort in 
Malaya [sicl which still, of course, remains our first 
priori ty11 • 6 
In August, 1965, Singapore seceded from the Federation of 
Malaysia and became an independent state - a move that took the 
British, Australian and New Zealand governments by surprise. The 
secession had been forced upon the Singapore government by the 
Malaysian goverr~ent, which was responding to the concern felt by 
Malay nationalist groups about the influence of the Singaporeans on 
the internal policies of the Federation. 69 
67 A.R.D.E.A. 1965, p4 A.J.H.R. 1965 A-1 
68 N.Z.P.D. vel. 342, p8, 28 May, 1965 
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With Singapore gone, the major reason for defending the concept of 
Malaysia c6ased to exist .. However, the Nev1 Zeala..?ld goverrnnent, along 
with those of Britain and Australia, declared that it \.-rould continue 
to support the aspirations of the people of Malaysia. 70 The Anglo-
Malaysian Treaty was to continue to apply to both Singapore and 
Malaysia in the future. 
In October, 1965, Indonesia 1 s Confrontation policy \"las dealt 
a fatal blow by an internal upheaval in that country which led to 
the Indonesian' s army taking p011er away from Sukarno. In the next 
six months, Confrontation was quietly phase<'! out, to be ended fonnally 
in August, 1966. 
ConeZusion 
In the period of Confrontation, Ne~< Zealand's policy in South-
east Asia followed more closely the policy of Australia than that of 
Britain. This was by no means the first time that this had happened, 
but the divergence from Britain was greater thru1 during the Indo-China 
crisis, and it occurred in a British sphere of influence. The dual 
policy towards Indonesia, as Caird says, was developed by Australia 
and adopted by NeVI Zealand, but not, it seems, to the same extent. 
While concerned to preserve relations with a non-Communist Indonesia 
because the latter V~as seen as no threat in itself to NeVI Zealand, 
New Zealand could not be as concerned as Australia with preserving 
those relations. New Zealand's early public declarations of her 
70 N.Z.P.D. 'TOl. 343, pl759-60, 10 August, 1965 
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willingness to send troops to Borneo contrasted \·,dth l..._"Ust.ralia:l 
reticence on the issue .. New Zealand was more willing to castigate 
Indonesia in public, as her response to the August, 1964 invasion of 
Malaya and her performance in the United Nations in Decerr~er bear 
witness. 
Caird postulates that New Zealand's policy was somewhere 
between that of Australia and Britain,· counterbalancing the caution 
of the one while not being eager to com.rni t forces as the other would 
>~ish. After hypothesising a middle position, Caird goes on to say 
that Ne>l Zealand was shackled to the Australian vie~o.'Point until early 
1965, since it was "unthinkable that New Zealand should deploy troops 
to the Borneo territories without Australia making a similar move". 71 
New Zealand's being shackled to Australian policy seems inconsist.ent 
«ith its having a middle position. It implies that Ne~1 Zealand • s 
preference wa.s for the British position, but that the government was 
forced to follow the Australian line as long as the Australians 
persisted in it. If this was so, then the dual policy to>lards 
Indonesia sprang less from a shared identity of outlook with Australia 
than deference to Australian views. 
The fact is that strong New Zealand support for Malaysia, as 
evidenced by the statement of September 20, 1963, and the declared 
interest in securing the base area of the Commonwealth Strategic 
Reserve, was not translated into military involv~~ent in Borneo in 
January, 1964, despite British desire that it should be. It seems 
probable that Australian unwillingness t? be militarily involved with 
Indonesia was the major influence. in this decision, since it is 
71 Caird, Op. Cit., pl34 
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unlikely that Ne\"1 Zealand's concern for its weak relationship with 
Indonesia ,..;auld have otherwise prevailed over B.:citish needs~ Netv 
zealand policy announcements in 1964 showed a desire to give full 
support for Malaysia, but New Zealand did not move fundamentally 
beyond the Australian position. 
Confrontation saw many strands of Ne\ol Zealand's foreign policy 
emphasised. The government's strategic concer-n for the preservation 
of British military power in South-east Asia so as to combat Comrnunist 
aggression and subversion was overlain by her sense of Commonwealth 
solidarity with Malaysia, her moral horror at acts of aggression and 
her empathy with small nations in general when bullied by large ones. 
New elements were also present. The::.-e \•.'ere no public expressions of 
Ne\v Zealand's having to do her military bit by Britain. New Zealand 
apparently no longer saw her function as aiding Britain in her global 
role. There was also the influence of Australia pitted to some degree 
9gainst the traditional impulses. 
to counter the latter. 
This proved powerful enough in 1964 
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~TE\\f ZEALAND AND THE VIETNAN WAR, 'l"'HE RELUCTANT ALLY 
Introduction 
New Zealand's military commitment to South Vietnam in the 1960s 
was the ultimate e>:pressicn of its loyalty to the protector syndrome, 
and may be compared with the uneasy solidarity with Britain in the 
Suez crisis. As the decade had changed, so had the loyalty shifted 
from one protector to another. New Zealand was reluctant to be 
involved militarily in South Vietnam, as it had been in 1954 and again 
in 1959, and for related reasons: that the domestic situation in 
Vietnam was such that a military solution 'V-las not practicable and that 
direct Western involvement could only worsen the situation. Neverthe-
less, New Zealand was under indirect pressure by 1965 from its two 
closest allies - the United States and Australia - to contribute to 
the common effort, and the need to preserve the alliance, as al\-Jays, 
came before any reservations about alliance policy (see China chapters) . 
In 1954 and 1959, New Zealand's attitude had been supported by Australia 
and Britain, and these allies had enabled New Zealand to resist American 
wishes respectably. As show~ by the Confrontation crisis, Britain's 
attitude had ceased t.o be as important for New Zealand in the nineteen-
sixties as Australia's, so that when Australia's attitude swung closer 
to the American approach over Vietnam New Zealand felt that it had no 
choice but to fall in line. 
New Zealand's military aid to South Vietnam remained at the token 
level, even compared with Australia's or its otvn Korean War effort, 
and was at decided variance with its rhetorical level, which was high 
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in ter~s of small nation solidarity against an aggressor. 'l'hrough-
out the course of the \'Jar, New Zealand promoted a negGtiated settlement 
with more vigour than Australia. 
l'ihen the Geneva Agreement of July 20, 1954 ended the first 
Indo-China War, New Zealand issued a declaration that it \'Jould regard 
a violation of that settlement as a threat to the security of South-: 
east Asia and a danger to international peace generally. 
It was during the time of the 1957-60 Labour government that 
the first difficulties appeared, and they were confined to Laos. 
lt was not until the beginni,-,g of the Second National govern.ment' s 
term in office that the Geneva set.tlement \·lith regard to South 
Vietnam began to appear to be seriously threatened. 
One of the first New Zealand comments on the guerilla wa~ in 
South Vietnam and its significance for New Zealand came in November, 
1961, on the occasion of the government's offering monetary assistance 
for the relief of flood victims. Prime Minister Holyoake said that 
New Zealand \Va_s distressed to learn of the natural disaster, which 
came at a time \vhen South Vietnam was already suffering from the 
social and economic disruption caused by the operation of Commu.~ist 
guerilla bands "from North Vietnam". The future of South Vietnam 
and its brave people was of deep concern to New Zealand, the Prime 
Minister stated: 
"Anything >~e can do to help them . • • is in our own interests 
as well as theirs". 1 
1 E.A.R. November, 1961, pl7 
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Vietnam was thus declared a New Zealand interest. That same montbj' the 
United States concluded a military assista~ce agreement with South Vietnam, 
in technical violation of the Geneva. Accords. 
Reese says that by the beginning of 1962 the United States was 
moving to associate New Zealand and Australia \Vith the anti-Cormnunist 
struggle in South Vietnam. 2 In May, 1962 the first ANZUS Council in 
two years was held, and for the first time at Canberra. The final 
communique admitted that there had been "more than usually extensive 
discussions on matters of common interest". It went on to say that 
the participating Ministers "noted in particular" the resolution with 
which the Government of Sout.'l Vietnam was defending itself against 
insurgB:ncy fermented and directed by North Vietnam and expressed their 
full support of measures to assist that government combat that threat. 3 
American Secretary of State Rusk, according to reports, requested 
assistance from the other two to help make the large defence budget 
~ore palatable at home. 4 In a public speech he said that Australians 
and New Zeala~ders were helping in Vietnam in significant and growing 
ways, but that there was "more for us all to do in that situation 11 • 5 
Holyoake was evidently happy to agree. In a statement in May 
New Zealand offered to send a teclmical mission to ·South Vietnam while 
Australia promised to send a team of army instructors. In his intra-
duction to the 1962 Annual Report of the Departwent of External .Affairs, 





"It is clear .•. that the struggle in South Vietnam will be 
long, tense and bitter; accordingly, I think it necessary 
Reese, T.R. Austl'"'alia, New Zealand and the United States p303 
E.A.R. May, 1962, p38 
Reese, Op. Cit. p303 
Ibid., pp303-304 
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that countries friendly to Vietnam consider urgently ways 
in ";hich they might help the Republic in meeting its 
difficulties. New Zealand should, I think, examine the 
possibi.li ty of further assistance under the Colombo Plan 11 • 6 
The government • s first instincts ,,7ere for a non-military approach, 
and the offer materialised as a surgical tea.t"Tl. 
All the Ministers at the Al'lZUS meeting had reaffirmed the 
intentions of their governments to 11 honour to the full -'(:heir individual 
and collective obligations under the SEATO Treaty". 7 In these words, 
New Zealand and Australia accepted the new American position that 
the signatories of the Manila Treaty had individual obligations to 
the countries covered by it, as well as collective ones. The way was 
now open for some SEATO countries to take military action without the 
approval of all. The unanimous clause had meant that brakes were 
placed on the more impulsive merr~ers. This statement 'ivas an inun.ediate 
prelude to the commitment of troops to Thailand by most of the SEATO 
allies. 
The breakdown of the cease-fire between rightist, neutralist 
and Corrmunist forces in Laos, and the subsequent advance of the 
Communist forces,was the occasion for a Thai call for help and the 
swift despatch of American troops to the Thai ~order. On May 16, the 
Prime 1-iiniste.i announced that the situation was a matter of "profound 
concern" for New Zealand and that the government fully supported the 
precautionary measures which President Kennedy had taken. 8 The New 
Zealand governrr~nt was fully conscious of its own responsibilities and 
obligations and was consulting urgently with its allies on the ways and 
means by which it could join with them in remedying the situation. ~'he 
6 A.R.D.E.A. 1962, p6 A.J.H.R. 1962 A-1 
7 E.A.R. ~lliy, 1962, p38 
8 E.A.R. Nay, 1962, p25 
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next day Holyo?tke said that New Zealand was considering sending a 
small contingent to Thailand in support of the action taken by the 
A..tnericans. It was most important, he thought, that New Zealand 
should join her allies in demonstrating solidarity with Thailand.
9 
The Prime Minister did not say \<Jhy it was important, but it seemed 
evident that New Zealand felt it ought to be seen to be a worthy 
ally. The government seemed afraid of being left behind. It was 
eager to spur on American action on behalf of South-east Asian 
countries. 
If the government were to send troops to a non-British 
country without New Zealand's being at war, it would be doing it in 
a traditional context. The British and Australian governments were 
prepared to send contingents, too. When, five days later, Holyoake 
announced that New zealand was offering to send a military force ~o 
Thailand, he said it would provide visible proof that New Zealand 
was fully prepared to honour its obligations under the l1anila Treaty 
to preserve peace and security in South-east Asia.
10 The Prime 
Minister did not say to whom the proof «as being made. Obviously it 
was more important to convince the Americans than the Pathet Lao, as 
the Communist Laotians were called. Holyoake wanted to prove that 
Collective Defence had meaning. He said that all nations of that 
part of the world had to support each other militarily and economically 
if they were to withstand aggression and the threat of aggression. 
Despite New Zealand's eagerness to stand ~P and be counted, the Prime 
Minister admitted that the troops of the Special Air Service were a token 
force, and were for deterrence on_ly. 
9 E.A.R. May, 1962, p25 
10 A E •• R. Hay, 1962, p27 
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The next month, June, a special report of the Geneva Conf-
erence 1 s International Control Cow.roission on Vietnam was released in 
London. It found that both Vietnams had violated the agreement, but 
that South Vietnam's, in regard to forming an alliance with the United 
States, were consequent on North Vietnam's in regard to supporting 
guerillas in the South. 
The Ne\Y Zealand Prime Minister hailed the report as 
11 an important landmark in the international consideration 
which has been given to the problem of Vietnam •.• The 
recognition by an impartial authority of North Vietnam's 
responsibility in the terrorist campaign in the South 
should appreciably strengthen the position of South Vietnam 
and i·ts allies". 11 
In September, 1962, New Zealand and the Republic of Vietnam 
established full diplomatic relations. New Zealand had recognised 
the Republic's predecessor in 1950, but, as Acting Minister of Extemal 
Affairs Seath said, the establishment of full relations would allow the 
two governments to explore more fully opportunities for co-operation. 
"I do not need to emphasise that New Zealand feels a strong 
sympathy for the government and people of ·south Vietnam in 
their struggle to preserve the independence and integrity of 
their country and is anxious to give them moral and practical 
assistance in overcoming their present difficulties". 
Seath said. 12 
Late in the year, New Zealand was visited by the South Vietnfu~ese 
Foreign Minister, who indicated that his government would greatly 
appreciate a New Zealand military contribution along the lines of 
Australia's [an army training team]. 13 'I'he plea was made again by the 
South Vietnamese Ambassador when he visited New Zealand from Australia 
11 E.A.R. June, 1962, p26 
12 E.A.R. September, 1962, p3l-32 
13 E.A.R. June, 1963, p27 
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in late May 1 1963a As Holyoake said in June, New Zealand had merely 
11 kept the possibility of meeting this request under review11 .. Perhaps 
a rather tepid response from a country to an ally supposedly under 
attack,but 1963 was an election year. 
The decision to grant the request seems to have been made only 
in the ,;ake of the Jutle, 1963 ANZUS Council meeting. In the final 
communique, on the subject of aid to Vietnam, the Ministers had agreed 
that the road to peace and stability ,;auld be a long one calling for 
'vigorous and unremitting efforts' on the part of the South Vietnarnese 
government and its friends in the free world. On the same day that 
the meeting ended, Holyoake announced that New Zeal~~d would probably 
send a small team of service personnel to South Vietnam to give assist-
ance in a non-combatant role to the South Vietnamese forces. The 
Prime Ninster was careful to spell out his belief that the struggle in 
Vietnam remained 
"essentially a struggle to be fought and won by the Vie·tnamese 
people themselves .•.• In this struggle we are not to undertake 
combat duties; this has not been asked. And it would not be 
appropriaten. 14 
L"ater Holyoake was to concede that it was "the need for allied 
solidarity in supporting the people of South Vietnam in their struggle" 
that had prompted the government to offer assistance in the form of a 
small military team. 15 It >Jas not the need of the south Vietnamese 
for the team so much as the need of the ~mericans for political 
support for their aid that Ne>T Zealand had assuaged. 
14 Ibid., p27-28 
15 A.R.D.E.A. 1964, A.J.H.R. 1964 A-1, p30 
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In July, 1963, Holyoake had to defend the decision-in-principle 
in the House of Representatives. The Prime Minister stressed that 
threats to the peace and security of South-east Asia wex·e threats to 
New Zealand, and that the government believed that New Zealand h~d to 
play its full part in meeting them. The insurgency in South Vietnam 
was not a local disturbance, he said, bu·t an attack by one government 
on anothera New Zealand was willing to "fly the flag of New Zealand 
beside the flag of other free countries in the fight against Co~E>unist 
aggressionu, and regarded its proposed action as some\<7hat similar to 
that it had made in Korea in 1950. 16 
Other government speakers were also concerned to establish the 
link between South Vietnam's security and New Zealand's. D. Macintyre, 
in his Address-in-Reply contribution, stated that· South Vietnam was 
New Zealand's north-west border and that those who felt that wha1: was 
happening there could not touch New Zealand lacked foresight "like a man 
who skimps on his fire or car insurance". 17 Defence ~li~ister Eyre stated: 
11 0Ur treaties are obviously designed firstly to preserve New 
Zealand's peace, but a prerequisite of that is to preserve 
the peace of South-east Asia 11 • 18 
R.D. Muldoon agreed. "I believe our front line is in South-east Asia, 
that Vietnam and Laos today are fighting our battle, and that they need 
our help". 19 Another backbencher, R.E. Jack, thought that the gaining 






" we shall be welcomed by the United States, which is doing 
so much in the area a.'ld naturally likes to feel and have it 
seen that its allies, however small, are with it". 20 
N.Z.P.D. vol. 335, p404-405, July 0 ., 1963 
N.Z.P.D. vol. 335, p26, 25 June, 1963 
N.Z.P.D. val. 335, p415, 9 July, 1963 
Ibid., p470 
N. Z.P.D. val. 335, p46l, 10 July, 1963 
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Jack believed that Ne\'l Zealand's role was to act as a psychological 
prop for its protector. 
By August, three months had gone by since the announcement of 
the decision-in-principle and no moves seemed to have been made to 
implement it. At the end of the month a government backbencher asked 
the Prime ~unister in Parliament what was happening. Holyoake replied 
·that the government was still considering the possible roles that a 
New Zealand service team could be given. The Prime Minister said 1 
hm•ever, that it might well not be the time to reach such a decision. 21 
This was a reference to a Buddhist campaign of opposition to the South 
VieL~amese government which was attracting world-wide attention. A 
month later, Indonesia's confrontation of Malaysia began, and the 
Prime Minister was, in 1964, to cite the "aggravation of t.he military 
threat to Malaysia" as another factor in the non-implementation of the 
decision. 22 
Some months later, in the early part of 1964, however, the 
American government put pressure on to its allies for further 
contributions to South Vietnam by circulating an aide-memoire indicat-
ing directions in which additional assistance would be welcomed. 
These included military aid short of combat units. 23 
In March, 1964, Prime Minister Holyoake visited Vietnam and 
conferred with the new Prime Minister, General Khanh. Khanh and 
Holyoake discussed the question of New Zealand aid, and the South 
Vietnamese leader stated that his government would like to have help 
21 N.Z.P.D. vol. 336, ppl522-23, 29 August, 1963 
22 A.R.D.E.A. 1964, p30, A.J.H.R. A-1 1964 
23 Hc.rper, NvH. 11Australia and the United States" p354 in Greenwood 
and Harper {eds.) 'Austratia in Wortd Affairs 1961-65' 
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with the rebuilding of roads and bridges, as this ~vould assist in 
restoring the economy. 
The announcement of a Ne;; Zealand military con·tribution to 
South Vietnam came finally in May, 1964. The Prime Minister said 
that the internal situation in Vietnam was more serious at that time 
than at any other time since the Vietcong had begun their c~~paign cf 
terrorism. New Zealand, he said, waS: already giving economic and 
technical assistance, 11 but we must do rnore 11 • 24 It >Jas evident that 
Vietnam faced a great reconstruction need, and that there was scope 
for militar'l assistance to this end. Ne;; Zealand, he said, strongly 
supported the United States in the extensive effort it was making to 
help prevent the absorption of South Vietnam by the Communist North, 
and the government was determined to do what it could to help the 
people of South Vietnam. Accordingly, New Zealand would send a team 
of army engineers to that country. T\-..70 years later, the Prime Minister 
was to say that New Zealand had made the contribution at the request 
of the SEATO Council in the first instance, which meant the United 
States. South Vietnam's request was a secondary consideration 
because it was prompted by the United States. Holyoake said in June, 
1966: 
"In April, 1964, the Council agreed that members should do 
more to help South Vietnam. In response to that call, and 
in response also to the request from South Vietnam, New 
Zealand sent a detachment of army er..gineers .. 1125 
At the ANZUS Council meeting held in July, the Arr~ericans gave 
New Zealand a pat on the head for its contribution. 'l'he final 
24 E.A.R. Hay,l964, p22 
25 E.A.R. July,l966, p32 
' 
corr~wlique said that the co~lcil 
nnoted with satisfaction that the Inernbers of ANZUS had 
increased their assistance to the Republic of Vietnam 
since the SEATO Council meeting in April". 26 
418. 
The ANZUS Council members agreed that they would remain prepared to 
take further steps within their respect.ive capabilities to assure the 
defeat of the aggressors. 
The sending of the engineers was taken up in Parliament, with 
the government evidently feeling a necessity to emphasise the non-
combatant nature of the unit. The Minister of Defence told the 
House that the unit's tasks would be allotted to it by the South 
Vietnamese Ministry of Works, and that these tasks were very far 
removed from the tasks of combat engineers. 27 
The government 1 s defensiveness indicated tha·t it continuud to 
share with the Opposition the belief Holyoake had articulated in 1963 
that a New Zealand combat role would not be appropriate aid to Vietnrun. 
The government's attitude was thrown into relief by one of its 
own backbenchers, the veteran diplomat Sir Leslie Munro, who made it 
clear that he did not think that the question of combat status was 
relevant. The government evidently did. Munro probably put his 
finger on the government attitude >.'hen he said: "It is often said that 
one cannot fight for people who are unwilling to fight for themselves". 
Munro took the opposite tack: if a country's vital interests >~ere 
involved, then it had to get involved to the fullest extent. 
26 E.A.R. July, 1964, p54 
27 N.Z.P.D. vel. 338, pp201-2,19 June, 1964 
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He went on to _say that he thought New Zealand should, even if in the 
smallest degree, share the burden of the United States "in a joint 
effort to establish peace and security in an area vital to this 
country 11 • 28 
If the govern111ent had reservations about how vital it was to 
sustain a government that could not resist effectively by itself, it 
shared Munro's conviction that- it 1r1as vi tal to live up to American 
expectations. In the international affairs debate, Munro said that 
he was not so much concerned with the strict terms of the ANZUS and 
SEATO Treaties in determining New Zealand's obligations as he was 
with the reality behind them: "Our ultimate dependence on the United 
States 11 • 29 It was evident from the Prime Minister's contribution to 
the same debate that he appreciated Munro's point. 
"The people of New Zealand are deeply conscious of the great 
burden of defence which is borne by the United States of 
America especially in the South-east Asian area, and indeed, 
in the whole Pacific region. With other countries of the 
region, Nev; Zealand benefits very greatly from American 
defensive strength and from American efforts to •.• ensure 
that Communist aggression does not succeed in engulfing 
those countries which wish to preserve their independence and 
freedorn 11 • 30 
At the end of the year, according to the Pentagon Papers, 
United States President Johnson made a decision "in principle" to 
initiate a bombing war against North Vietnam. At a White House 
meeting on December l, 1964, it was decided that preparations for such 
a war - Phase One - would begin immediately, with the actual war -
Phase Two - waiting upon events. Special envoys were to brief the 
28 N.Z.P.D. vol. 338, plSl, 18 June, 1964 
29 N.Z.P.D. vol. 339, pll57' 6 August, 1964 
30 N.Z.P.D. vol. 339, pll40, 6 August, 1964 
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key allies on American intentions, and Johnson said that he wanted 
"new, dramatic and effective" forms of assistance from several of 
these allies, specifically mentioning Australia, New Zealand, Canada 
and the Philippines. In each ca·se, the envoy was to explain the 
American p-lan and "request additional contributions by way of forces 
in the event the second phase of United States actions were entered". 31 
Thus, if the systematic bombing of North Vietnam were begun, the 
Americans wanted to escalate the visible support for their actions. 
The Papers do not spell out the nature of the forces w~~ted. The 
draft position paper presented to the decision-makers says only: 
"Australia and New Zealand will be pressed through their A_'Tibassadors, 
not only for support but for additional contributions". 32 However, 
a memorandum sent to the Chief of Staff of the United States Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam, (l1ACV), as part of the implementation of 
the December 1 White House decision,stated: 
"Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines should be encouraged 
to provide combat advisory personnel now and, in the event of 
U.S. troop deployment in R\~ [Republic of Vietnam] to provide 
combatant units to reinforce DMZ [Demilitarised Zone] Defense". 33 
According to the United States Army, the usual procedure for soliciting 
allied support during the Vietnam War involved MACV sending the govern·· 
ments concerned a list of required forces, after political sou.~dings of 
the governments had been made. The ~overnments then chose from the 
31 Sheehan, N. et al., New York Times, The Pentagon Papers, Bantam Books, 
p334 
32 Ibid.' p376 
33 Larsen, S.R. ~~d Collins, J.L.,United States Department of the Army, 
Allied Participation in Vietnam, p3. Emphasis added by Larsen ~~d 
Collins. 
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list what they 1;.;ished to send, and South Vietnam made a formal request 
for it. 34 
vlilliam P. Bundy left for Australia and New Zealand on Decewber 
4 to brief their governments on both phases of the borrbing plan, while 
Britain '\Vas informed during Harold Wilson's state visit betw·een December 
7 and 9. The Ne"• Zealand government expressed to Bundy grave doubts 
that the bombing would break Hanoi's will, and predicted that it might 
lead to an increase in North Vietnam 1 s infiltration into South Vietnam. 3 5 
New Zealand seems to have been the only ally to express any reservations. 
According to the Gravel edition of the Pentagon Papers, both New Zealand 
and Australia supported the American policy decision as probably necess-
ary, but neither was willing at the time to make a commitment to send 
troop units to Vietnam. 36 The New Zealand government expressed doubts 
about the advisability of sending allied ground forces into South 
Vietnam. 37 The Gravel edition of the Pentagon Papers includes a set 
of notes compiled by Assistant Secretary of State Bundy for a meeting 
between the President and the Secretary of State on January 6, 1965. 
Bundy mentioned that the idea of introducing limited American ground 
forces into the northern area of South Vietnam concurrent with the 
first air attacks on North Vietnam still had great appeal for many of 
the decision-makers. 
"For your information, the Australians have clearly 
indicated (most recently yesterday) that they might be 
disposed to participate in such an operation. The New 
ZealwJ.ders are more negative .. n 38 
34 • 
Ib~d., pS 
3 5 • Sheehan, N. Op. C~t., p335 
3 6 Senator Gravel Edition, The Pen.tagon Papers, Beacon Press, Boston, 
Volume III, p257 
37 Senator Gravel Edition, The Pentagon Papers, Vol. III, p257 
38 Ibid., pp297 and 686 
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Whereas both governments had been unwilling to make any commitment 
in early December, the Australian government by early January \Vas 
becoming more positive about further aid. 
In February, 1965, the Americans staged a retaliatory bombing 
raid of North Vietnam. As Reese notes 1 _the Australian reaction to 
this was enthusiastic, while New Zealand•s was more cautious. 39 The 
Prime Minister's statement on the incident sought more to explain the 
American action than to applaud i-t. Holyoake said that the situation 
in Vietnam had "become much graver in the last few monthS 11 , and that 
the purpose of the raid was clearly to warn Hanoi of the dangers of 
its policies. ~to 
The beginning of the continuous air war against North Vietnam 
was publicly announced on February 28, and the first attacks were 
launched on March 2. New Zealand was now under request for the 
,"dramaticu expression of support tJ.1.at Johnson had wanted to coincide 
I 
with the air war. 
The nature of the war, however, \vas rapidly changing. In 
February, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff had recomnended that 
American ground troops be sent to guard the ai~ base at Da Nang when 
the air war against North Vietnam began. On March 8, two battalions 
of marines were landed at Da Nang, although they were not permitted to 
engage in offensive operations. When· a month's sustained bombing of 
North Vietnam did not produce the desired results, President Jorillson 
on April 1 decided to commit American ground troops to active operations 
in the Vietnam Nar. 
3 9 • Reese, Op. C~t., p321 
" 0 E.A.R. February, 1965, p21 
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As a concomitant, forces from the allies were requirede 
National Security Action Memorandum 328, dated April 6, l96S,records 
that on April 1, 
11 the President approved the urgent exploration, with the 
Korean, l'.ustralian and New Zealand governments, of the possibility 
of rapid deplo}~ent of significant ccmbat elements of their armed 
forces in parallel \vith additional Marine deployments". 41 
Informal soundings of ~~e governments concerned were evidently 
made immediately after the decision, for the Army Department's researchers 
record that both Australia and South Korea indicated informally on April 
3, 1965, that they were willing to send combat troops. 42 Significantly, 
there is no mention of the attitude of the third government concerned -
New Zealand. It can probably be assumed that at this stage New Zealand 
was still hesitating. 
The formal exploration of Australian and New Zealand views \-Jas 
apparently undertaken by Henry Cabot Lodge, who arrived in New Zealand 
on April 19 and flew out for Australia on April 21. · On arrival he 
was quoted in the press as saying: "I am not going to ask New zealand for 
military assistance- they know what to do". 43 The American government 
already had a very accurate idea of what New Zealand could and would· 
send. A cablegram sent by American Ambassador- in Saigon, Taylor, to 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk on April 17 - two days before Lodge arrived 
L> New Zealand - suggested the approach that the American goverrcrnent 
1night make to the Vietnamese government on the subject of Third Country 
forces. Taylor said that if the Vietnamese government would make urgent 
41 Sheehan, N. et aZ., New York Times, The Pentagon Papers, p442 
42 Larsen, S.R. and Collins, J.L. AZZied Participation in Vietnam p9 
4 3 Kennaway, R. Neu! Zealand Fm'eign PoZiay, pp75-76, quoting The Press, 
April 20, 1965, pl 
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representations to the governments concerned, 
11 We believe it entirely possible to obtain the following 
contributions; ... Australla, one infantry battalion; 
Ne\·7 Zealand, one battery and a company of tanks". 44 
This message suggests that New Zeala.'1d had gone as far as to 
discuss with the Americans the forces it could provide if it did 
decide to make a contribution; perhaps even that it had decided, 
since a South Vietnamese request was the last step in the chain. 
Although Lodge visited New Zealand before he went to Australia, 
the AustraliB.J."1 government '\'las first, by a considerable margin, to 
announce a decision to send combat troops to Vietnam. Prime Ninister 
Nenzies announced the decision to send an infantry battalion to Vietnam 
on April 29. This was just prior to the annual SEATO meeting held in 
London. According to Menzies, a decision-in-principle had been taken 
some \veeks before. 
One newspaper reported that the Australian decision ~;as not 
warmly received in either New Zealand or Britain. In Wellington 
there was reportedly anger that the Australian action might force New 
Zealand to send troops to South Vietnam when the military situation did 
not demand it. 45 
The New Zealand government in 1965, according to R.M. Mullins, 
the Head of L~e Department of External Affairs' Defence Section in 1972, 
was acutely conscious of the limitations on what external assistance 
could achieve. The government appreciated that the situation in 
44 Sheehan, N. et al., The Pentagon Papers, p445 
45 Elder, J .A. "The New Zealand Labcur Party and the Vietnam War", 
un published M.A. thesis, University of Auckland, 1974, pl40, 
quoting N~ Zealand Herald, May 1, 1965. 
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South Vietnam was partly due to the failure of the Saigon governnent 
1 . 46 to win the allegiance of the popu at:Lon~ 
11 The prospect in the South was for con'l:inued instability a.r,d, 
until more stability was achieved, external assistance could 
prevent a collapse bu·t not lead to a significant improvement 
in the security situation~-· We recognised that the most 
external assistance could do Hould be to buy time for t.ha 
South Vietnamese themselves to shovT better results 11 • 
Mullins said that ·the government was under r.o illusions that 
air attacks in the North would lead to a significant reduction of 
support from North Vietnam for operations in the South or incline 
Hanoi towards negotiation. 
11 We were therefore extremely cautious about \Vhat could be 
achieved by the introduction of allied ground combat forces 1 
believing that this could change the nature of L~e war and 
must lead on to the committal of very considerable forces ... 
1147 
The government thought that the introduction of foreign troops 
would provoke a counter-escalation by the North Viet..""lamese, \•lho would 
introduce their own troops, instead of being conten~ to supply and 
reinforce the Vietcong. However, 
"as evidence accumulated that North Vietnamese combat units 
- as distinct from personnel and supplies for Viet Cong units 
- were being introduced into the South, and that the nature 
of the war had thus actually changed, the case became much 
stronger". 
Jackson says that once Australia had committed trcops, New 
Zealand's position became politically embarrassing. Refusal might 
have complicated relations not only with the United states, but "'ith 
Australia. 48 
tt 6 Mullins, R.M. 11 New Zealand 1 s Defence Policy", in New Zealand 
Foreign Affairs Review, July, 1972, pl7 
47 Ibid., plB 
48 Jackson, W.K. "New Zealand and south-east Asia", Journal of 
Commonwealth Political Studies, val. IX No. l, 1971, p7 
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The Australian government felt strongly that a contribution 
to Vietnfu~ was a necessary means of retaining AIT.eric~~ support against 
Indonesia should heavy fighting break out in New Guinea. Albin ski 
says: 
"If the Australian government hoped that under certain 
contingencies the United States \"lOuld not remain indifferent 
during an escalated war in Borneo~ or during possible Indonesian 
forays into Australian Ne\'l Guinea - intimate concerns of Aust::'.:'alia 
- Australia had to demonstrate, in Vie·tnam, -which was America 
1 s 
intirrate concern, that it did not apply a double standard to 
ANZUS and other obligations".
49 
Australia would be naturally anxious that New Zea.land, also 
participating in ANZUS cover in Borneo, should not spoil the "loyal 
partners" image to Australia 1 s detriment. 
The New Zealand governmen~ howeve~ did not need reminding by 
Australia that its own Borneo forces needed American cover. Reflecting 
in 1970 on Ne>T Zealand's relations with the United States, External. 
'Affairs officer W.B. Harland linked New Zealand's Vietnam response to 
I 
its appreciation during Confrontation of the need for American support. 
He told the Otago University Foreign Policy School that in the 'fifties 
New Zealand had been concerned that the United States might go too far 
in its defence of south-east Asia - citing l95j and 1959 as examples -
and had tried to restrain the United States. In resisting Indonesian 
pressure, 
11 Vle • • • realised anew our need for An".erican support.. The 
wheel[of alternatively trying to co~~it the A.~ericans to the 
defence of South-east Asia and urging restraint on them] came 
full circle [from 1959] with the sending of Australian ru1d Ne>T 
Zealand forces to Vietnam in 1965".
50 
49 Albinski, H .. A. 11Australia 1 s Foreign Policy: The Lessons of Vietnam
11
, 
p370 in Preston, R. (ed.) "ContempOl'ary Australia" 
50 Harland, W.B. "Ne~< Zealand's Relations >Tith the U.S.A.", N.Z.F.A.R. 
May, 1970, p9 
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If New Zealand had been of a mind to decline a contribution ·to 
South-east Asia, as in 1959, it 'f..'lOUld have had to hi.tve done so without 
the Australian support it had had in 1959. 
At the SEATO meeting for 1965, which .:as held in London a day 
after the Australian announcement, New Zealand's representa·tive, 
Defence Minister Eyre, expressed his approval of the American decision 
to enter the ground war in Vietnam. 5 1 The final communique of the 
meeting stated that the member governments had agreed to increase 
their assistance to soutl1 Vietnam, "consistent with their cormnitments 
elsewhere". 5 2 Nm.; Zealand's announcement that it would send troops 
to VieL~am, did not come, however, until late in May - a full month 
after Australia's. A formal request for troops came from South 
Vietnam on Hay 10. 5 3 This request follm•ed the pattern for Vietnamese 
requests of appearing immediately after a SEATO meeting. 
On May 13, the Prime Minister made a major policy statement on 
the Vietnam situation, in which he acknowledged that the issue which 
~las of deepest concern for New Zealand was "whether we should give 
military assistance to South Vietnam". The question, to all appear-
ances, was still open. Holyoake said that the government had made 
no decision at that stage about how it might best give further help. 5
4 
If the Prime Minister were to be believed, New Zealand was prepared to 
m~e an additional contribution of aid to Vietn2.m, but had given no 
assurance to Cabot Lodge or anyone at the SEATO meeting that it would 
make an offer of military asssistance. 
51 E .. 4.R. May, 1965, p20 
52 Ibid., p25 
53 N.Z.P.D. vol. 342. pl, 27 May, 1965 
Sit E A . • R. May, 1965, pll 
The delay of New Zealand's 
( 
4.28. 
announcement after the Australian one is some evidence for the pro-
position that ~~e government was concerned about having to make a 
military cornmitmenta In his May 13 statements the Prime Vdnister 
characterised the forthcoming decision as one of the llL~ost importance 
and consequence, and said that the government had been giving it 
"the most anxious and earnest consideration for many months"a
55 
A clue to the way the decision would go - if any were needed 
after contextual considerations were taken into account was Holyoake's 
declaration that although the government had not yet made its decision, 
the Net< Zealand government fully supported the action taken by the 
United States at the request of the Government of Vietnam 
11 and more 
recently the support announced by the Australian government". 5
6 
The unilateral action by the United States of putting troops 
into Vietnam gave New Zealand little choice if it wishGd to preserve 
the A-~ZUS relationship. During previous South-east Asian crises 
(in 1954 and 1959), New Zealand had had a chance to object to military 
intervention before it had taken place, and had acted as a constraint 
to such intervention. Once intervention had taken place, the situation 
was different. As I'I.B. Harland noted in 1970, New Zealand had learned 
from her experience in 1944 with the ANZAC Pact that the United States 
"did not like being lectured by small allies on ho>1 to use 
its own pO\<ier and it was prepa.1..·ed to underwrite our security 
only if we co-operated with it in the Pacific area generallyu.
57 
In his Hay 13 statement, the Prime Minister had listed the factors 
the government would have to take into account in making the decision. 
55 E.A,R. Hay, 1965, pll 
56 Ibid. 
57 Harland, W.B. "New Zealand's Relations with the U.S.A." N.Z.F.A.R. 
Hay, 1970, p9 
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The first point;., s:i.gnificantlyr was that the government~s concern 
for New Zealand's security had involved Ne\<l Zealand in defence 
treaties whose provisions had to be honoured.
58 The implication 
was that if New Zealand did not live up to her obligations, the 
value of the treaties for her '\Vould be non-existentw Holyoake's 
use of the plural indicated that he was thinking of ANZUS as well as 
SEATO, alL~ough technically the conditions to bring ANZUS into play 
did not exist. Another point was that ~"le war in Vietnam '\rlas the 
result of Norti1 Vietnamese aggression, and that this aggression 
concerned New Zealand because it could lead to a threat to Ne,·J 
Zealand's security. 
If South Vietnam fell, it would eventually be the turn of 
every other smaller country in the region. The Prime Minister asked: 
"if we are not prepared to play our part now, can Ne in good conss:i.ence 
expect our allies to help later on?"
59 
The Prime ~..inister moved on from reasons of self-interest to 
ti1ose concerned with morality. Should North Vietnam be allowed to 
impose its will by force on South Vietnam? The lesson of history 
was clear that New Zealand should stand firm in support of smaller 
nations like South Vietnam. 
In an article on Vietnamese policy written for otago University's 
student paper, the Prime Hinister's main accent was on New Zealand's 
interest, as a small count~J, in the rule of international law~ 
58 E.A.R. May, 1965, pl2 
59 Ibid. 
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11 If we want security, we must establish now that armed 
assistance across international borders, both provisional 
and fixed, to susta-in 11 wars of liberation 11 must be checked 
The government believes both in terms of its treaties and 
of the United Nations Charter that New Zealand must assist 
• • • • n6 0 J.n resJ..stJ..ng aggressJ.on .. 
Holyoake said that the idea that North VieL~am's aggression was 
excusable because South Vietnam was not a democracy would have prevented 
a stand against Hitler over Poland and in present-day circumstances 
would be completely destructive of world order. 
The Prime Minister also returned to New Zealand's interest in 
keeping the alliance system viable or 'oiled'. Failure to act in 
Vietnam by New Zealand, the Prime Minister said, would be to rnake a 
mockery of the foreign policy New Zealand had followed over the previous 
.thirty years. While New Zealand's military aid would have to be small, 
"it will have political value out of proportion to its size. 
It will show we are not fair-weather friends. It will show 
we value our treaty obligations and intend to meet them". 5
1 
This show of determination was for the benefit of the United 
States. Once the United states had 'decided it had obligations under 
the alliance, New Zealand felt bound to follow suit. 
The Prime Minister's announcement of the offer of an artillery 
battery to Vietnam was made in Parliament on ~fay 27. In speaking of 
the reasons for the decision, Holyoake said the government had borne 
in mind New Zealand's record as a staa~ch supporter of the rights of 
small states to live free from external interference and aggression. 
He said that the example of czechoslovakia's vain call for aid ru~d 
the um1ise faith of appeasement was before them all. He then went en 
s·o E.A.R.May, 1965, pp6-7. 
61 E.A.R. May, 1965, plO 
431~ 
to outline three significan·t developments in .the Vietnam situation 
\~hich \>JGre the impliad stimuli to the Ne'i'l Zealand corr.mi t:.uent. They 
were the worsening situation in Vietnam and the resultant stepping 
up of American military assistance to the government of South Vietnam; 
the Australian decision to make available a battalion of infantry; 
and thirdly, the May 10 request from the South Vietnamese governmer.:.t. 
62 
This last, however, can probably be discounted, as it would not have 
been made without prior New Zealand acquiescence, and, as we have seen, 
American prompting. The order of priority is interesting: the request 
from the South Vietnamese government is a poor third to the stepped up 
American military aid, and secondly, Australian military commib11ent. 
Holyoake again made the point that the war in Vietnam was a 
war of aggression and a vote in favour of the motion to approve 
committal_ of troops meant that "quite apart from our own New Zealand 
interests, •.• we are still concerned about tl1e fate of small countries 
I threatened by aggression". 6 3 While this may have been so, the concern 
would not have been expressed other than verbally had tne aggression not 
been in South-east Asia, tl1us directly affecting what New Zealand saw 
as her interests,and being resisted by the Americans. As Riddiford 
was to say in Parliament in July, 1966: 
"It would be ridiculous to suggest tl1at New Zealand should 
send forces to any quarter of tl1e world wherever aggression 
take place, but we are definitely concerned with the area to 
our north in south Vietnam" ~ 6 4 · 
The abstract principle of blanket resistance to acts of aggression 
wherever tl1ey occurred was given lip service to, but the Prime Minister 
62 N.Z.P.D. vol. 342, p8, 28 May, 1965 
63 Ibid., pll 
64 N.Z.P.D. vol. 347, pll87, 6 July, 1966 
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also had to anchor the government 1 s case solidly in short-ternt 
national interest. He told Parliament that if Vietn~~ were lost, 
then the task of defending Malaysia - an accepted national interest -
could become impossible, because after Vietr~am, Malaysia's neighbour 
Thailand would be affected. 65 Deputy Prime Minister Marshall drove 
home the point: 
nThe crux of the matter for us is that Conununist aggression 
in Vietnam is a threat to us. If South Vietnam is overrun 
and becomes a Communist State it becomes the base for the 
next move in the Communist plan for world revolution 
Our security and our way of life are at stake and we cannot 
stand aside':. 6 6 
This sort of rhetoric would seem to have justified a much 
greater New Zealand effort. But New Zealand's effort was not. directed 
towards physically stopping the North Vietnamese herself, but towards 
spurring the Americans on to do it. Marshall said that while New 
Zealand's contribution was small, its main value was in its moral 
"It shows where we stand". The action was primarily symbolic~ 
No Minister suggested that New Zealand should throw itself into the 
conflict more deeply. 
J.R. Hanan, the Minister of Justice, argued the necessity to 
support the United States as a matter of self-interest. He said: 
" the ultimate security of the peoples of this part of the 
South Pacific and in Australia.and New Zealand lies only in 
the power, the support and the goodwill of the United States".
67 
Hanan went on to say that a section of the American public would have 
the United States abandon its Pacific commitments, and in that event 
the whole of the South-east Asia would fall to the Communists: 
65 N.Z.P.D. vel. 342, p9, 28 May, 1965 
66 N.Z.P.D. val. 342, pl7, 28 May, 1965 
67 N.Z.P.D. vel. 342, p23, 28 May, 1965 
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11 should t.his movement come south ·without opposition being 
offered by our friend the Uni·ted Stat~es, New Zealand 'i.·lould be 
overv;helmed by sheer weight of numbers, with no effective help 
from an}T\\7here 11 • 
Hanan declared: 
11Never was there a more obvious time for us to stand by the 
United States if we are to rely on the United States for 
support should we face aggression 
11 ~ 6 8 
Eyre, the Minister for Defence, was equally keen to stress the 
point of New Zealand's keeping American goodwill. 
11 Let us remeiP.ber .. 
that while our ally, the United States, continues its efforts in Vietnam, 
and Great Britain continues her effort in Malaysia, the contribution 
that we make now - I repeat, now - will influence their goodwill in 
helping us if help is needed in tt.~.e ye<5..rs to come n. 
6 9 
The backbenchers echoed the need to support the A.'llericans. 
R.D. Muldoon mentioned the •rital part the Americans were playing in 
1New Zealand 1 s interests. 11 1 believe it is no exagg-=ration to say 
' ' that today one man and his resolution stands between New Zealand and 
. ' ' '" d h ' L d - lu u
70 
an As~at1c Commun1st t1ac, an tJ: at man 1s yn on dO nson ... 
R.E. Jack said that New Zealand's duty and interest demanded that it 
stood alongside its American allies. "If we are to expect the support 
of our allies, we must justify it".
71 
Of the other Ministers to speak, Shand was concerned to point 
out that New Zealand was not defending the Government of South Vietnam 
but territorial integrity of South Vietnam. He said that the situation 
was similar to that of Ethiopia before the Second vlorld war when it was 
68 Ibid. 
69 N.Z.P.D. val. 342, p238, 8 June, 1965 
70 N.Z.P.D. vol. 342, pl45, 3 June, 1965 
71 N.Z.P.D. vol. 342, p272, 9 June, 1965 
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invaded by Italy: the Ethiopian government may have been corrupt 
and medieval, but that was irrelevant to the principle at stake. 
Any championing of Ethiopia was not for the sake of the government 
"but to remind aggressors that freedom-loving people were prepared 
to stand together". n The Minister was also concerned to defend 
the government's action in the light of the British government's 
inaction in Vietnam. He pointed out that Britain had indicated 
full moral support for what was being done in Vietnam, but its reasons 
for not sending troops ·· the British position as co-chairman of the 
Geneva Conference and the heavy commitment in Malaysia - were "good 
and understandable". 
Even if Britain had opposed the American commitment of troops, 
and thus New Zealand's commitment, it would probably have made little 
difference. Britain was no longer New Zealand's prime protector and 
her influence was less accordingly. The New Zealand government was 
aware at this time - as it was to admit later - that the British 
government was contemplating a cut-back of its forces in South-east 
Asia, and that New Zealand would correspondingly become more dependent 
than ever on A.~erican protection. 
In June, Shand was to make the point that the government and 
its advisers had felt that New Zealand had very little option in terncs 
of its objectives than to act as it had. 
11The course we are following has been expressed to us a.s 
the unanimous view of our advisers in this field. They 
are firmly of the view that >1hat the government is doing 
is right and that there is no alternative course".
73 
72 N.Z.P.D. vol. 342, p30, 28 May, 1965 
73 N.Z.P.D. vol. 342, p300, 9 June, 1965 
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In 1967, Holyo?.ke himself reiterated that the Secretary of External 
Affairs had advised the government strongly to send a contingent of 
troops. 
ur am .... absolutely certain, because I \\~as ·so close to him, 
that there was no man in New Zealand stronger in the belief 
that New Zealand had an obligation that we must make a 
military commitment in aid of South Vietnam than Alister 
Mcint.osh 11 • 7 4 
Even so, the government had been hesitant about a milita.r.Y 
corr~ibnent, probably up until the Australian move. J.R. Marshallr 
the Deputy Prime Minister, told Parliament in 1966 that the decision 
to send combat troops to Vietnam 11 Was not easy to make 11 , and that it 
could easily have been side-stepped. 11 We could have pleaded that 
our commitments elsewhere precluded our waking a military contribution". 75 
The government's decisj_on to send combat troops to Vietnam was 
immediately opposed by the Labour Party. The Leader of the 
Opposition since 1963, Arnold Nordmeyer, told Parliament on May 28 that 
the Labour Party had "grave doubts about the wisdom of military inter-
vention in South Vietnam'=. 76 The main objection, according to 
Nordmeyer, "as t.'lat New Zealand had a prier obligation to Halaysia, and 
the country should not dissipate its military resources in other areas 
~;hen the future demands of the Malaysian theatre were unkno~m. 
Nordrrteyer also, however, questioned the legitimacy of L~e gove~~ent 
of South Vietnam which had invited the New Zealand contribution. 
"Does it really represent the people of South Vietna;u?" 77 
The Labour leader said that the party preferred economic aid to South 
Vietnam rather than military aid. 
74 N.Z.P.D. vol. 353, p3716, 26 October, 1967 
75 N.Z.P.D. vol. 349, p3346, 13 October, 1966 
76 N.Z.P.D. vol. 342, pl2, 28 May, 1965 
77 Ibid. 
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The Lab::mr Pa.r·ty 1 s second speaker in the deba t.e on the corr.ru.i tmen·t r 
N.E. Kirk, added further· objections~ "Ke feel that any military 
intervention by New Zealand in this area should be. part. of a peacekeeping 
unit through some international organisation
11
1
78 he said. Kirk went 
on to decry military intervention to solve a problem that was not 
conducive to a military solution. Escalation of the conflict by foreign 
m.i.litary units only lessened the chance of a negotiated settlement and 
increased the risk of a general 'iflar. There was also the undeniable 
fact that the Vietnamese Communists could not have made the progress 
. v· t 79 they had without signif1cant support from the South :.t.e· names·~ peasantry. 
The containment of Communism could be achieved best by changing the 
economic circumstances which confronted the mass of the people. 
Other Labour Party speakers reiterated these basic points, 
pointing out that the conflict was essentially a civil V~ar between 
South Vietnamese and that Communism could not be contained militarily. 
The response of the party had much in common with its response to the 
Laotian situation in 1959. 
There were the same doubts about the degree of external inter-
vention, and about the efficacy of a military solution to a problem 
whose origins were economic. There was the same desire to become 
involved only in a United Nations framework. 
It was evident that the New Zealand government, too, was not 
enthusiastic about a military commitment, and much more keen on pro-
rooting a negotiated settlement. Prime l1inister Holyoake, at the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in June, 1965, offered to 
postpone the sending of New Zealand's artillery battery to South 
78 N.Z.P.D. vol. 342, pl8, 28 Hay, 1965 
790p. Cit. ppl9-20 
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Vietnam if the North Vietna-nese \·muld receive, and begin negotiations 
\·lith, the Peace Mission established by the conference~ 0 At a press 
conference in London, Holyoake also proposed that the National 
Liberation Front (the tunbrella organisation of the Vietnamese Conrrnunists) 
should be involved in the negotiations. This was far enough in front 
of the American position to force the government to issue a clarificat-
ion to the effect that the Prime Minister had not suggested at any time 
that the Vietcong (Vietnamese Communists) be recognised as a party to 
the negotiations, but rather as a part of the North Vietnamese delega1:-
ion. 81 The New Zealand Prime Minister's view resulted naturally from 
the government's recognition that the Vietcong was an indigenous move-
ment encouraged by the weaknesses of the South Vietnamese government 
as well as by the arms and reinforcements of North Vietnam. The 
Pu~erican government in mid-1965 did not acknowledge that there were 
any indigenous elements in the Vietcong. It purported to believe that 
the bulk of the personnel were North Vietnamese. 82 According to one 
scholar, Holyoake pressed the United States at the ANZUS Council at 
the end of June to order a bombing pause while the Commonwealth mission 
got underway. 8 3 The Americans, however, did not cease the bombing, 
and North Vietnam did not receive the Commonwealth mission. 
80 Reese, Op. Cit., p321. The Cornwnnwealth Peace Mission, a proposal 
of British Prime Minister Harold vlilson, was to consist of the 
Prime l~nisters of Britain, Nigeria, Ghana and Trinidad. The 
refusal of the governments of China, the Soviet Union ahd North 
Vietnam to receive it effectively ended its life. 
The Labour Government 1964-?0 ppll0-114; pl22-23 
81 E.A.R. June, 1965, p34 
See l'lilson, J .H. 
82 E.A.R. July, 1965, pl8. Secretary of State Dean Rusk's replies 
at Press Conference, 18 June, 1965 
83 Reese, T.R. Op. Cit., p322 
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In July, the government published a Hhite Paper to explain its 
decision on Vietnam. The paper concentrated on the rights and wrongs 
of the situation in Vietnam, and rather less on the context of New 
Zealand's foreign policy: the d9mands of the alliance system, which 
had been given expression to in the Parliamentary debates. 
That these demands were still operating after the sending of 
the artillery battery was shown by the visit of United States Vice-
President Humphrey to New Zealand in February, 1966. Hu..rnphre y, in 
a speech to Cabinet, reminded the government that New Zealand's stake 
in Vietnam was greater than that of the United States. 
"This battle is over the right of small nations to survive. 
Big nations, powerful nations, may well survive ... [bu·t] 
every small nation in size has a stake in the outcome of the 
struggle in Vietnam". 
The Vice-President went on to point out that a continuing 
military co1nmi tment to South Vietnam on Ne\'1 Zealand's part would be 
!regarded first and foremost as a commi~~ent to the United States: 
a proof of her reliability as an ally, in the same way as the 
commitment of the United States to Vietnam could be taken as an 
earnest of her willingness to defend New Zealand. 
"My government did make a commitment and we are keeping it. 
and I want you to know that if we can keep it there, '\\'e '\Vill 
keep it here, and I want you to know that if you keep it 
there we know that you will keep it with us, and that is what 
is important, contract, reliability, honour •.• n 84 
Commitment to Vietnam in Humphrey's eyes was a test of the 
ANZUS alliance. The Vice-President emphasised that treaties retained 
their validity only as long as they were seen to be given continuing 
practical expression to. He apparently felt bound to remind the 
S4 E.A.R. February, 1966, p29. emphasis added. 
New Zealand governmant of the truisr.1 that the ultimate success or 
failure of an alliance depends on the way it is maintained. This 
maintenance, Rothstein asserts, involves the translating of conunon 
interests a~d aims into effective operational policies. 85 The 
United States had decided that military intervention was the best 
way of upholding the common defence interests of New Zealand and the 
United States in Vietnam -and it ·v-ias up to New Ze-aland to support that 
policy. 
"I must say to you that you would feel surely less than 
secure here in New Zealand .. if the _treaty that we have 
with you was only something to be recorded in the history 
books and not to be honoured by men in our timen ~ 8 6 
Humphrey may well have been trying to get another military 
contribution from New Zealand. It would seem from the evidence, however, 
that the New Zealand gover~~ent had emphasised to him that New Zealand 
'•as fully stretched militarily in Halaysia. In a statement issued on 
the discussions between the Vice-President and the government, Holyoake 
emphasised that Humphrey, on behalf of the American government, had 
recognised that New Zealand's primary efforts in both defence and 
economic aid should be concentrated on Malaysia, other Commonwealth 
Asian countries, and allies such as Thailand. 8~ 
Just prior to Humphrey's visit to New Zealand, the American 
Army Commander in Vietnam, General Westmoreland, had approached 
New Zealand's Ambassador to South Vietnam over the possibility of 
increased military aid from New.zealand. Specifically, ·westmoreland 
wanted a battalion of infantry for a proposed ANZAC brigade of three 
8 5 Rothstein, R.C. AUicmce.s and SmaU Powers, p55 
86 E.A.R. February, 1966, p29 
87 E.A.R. February, 1966, p3l 
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battal.i..ons. 88 A Sl~cond battalion would come from .r .... ustralia. At 
the end of February a representative from New Zealand 1 s Department 
of External Affairs met Westmoreland and offered to increase the 
strength of New Zealand's artillery battery from four to six guns: 
a rather feeble substitute, but all the government believed it could 
do. This increase was announced in March. The Australians, in the 
meantime, had come through with the extra battalion Westmoreland 
wanted. It seems that the gover~~ent's main reason for the non-
response \Vas political f although it had reasonable military grounds 
for its attitude. New Zealand had only one regular infantry battalion, 
and it was in Malaysia. Confrontation was not yet officially over. 
Larsen and Collins state that the March increase was made "despite 
election year pressure", and when the Chief of the New Ze?land Army 
General Staff met Wes~~oreland in Vietnam later in the year, he told 
him that New Zealand might respond to further requests for aid after 
the November elections. 89 
On the domestic political scene, the governmen·t' s Vietnam 
policy was becoming more sharply opposed by the Labour Opposition. 
Until May, 1966, the Labour Party, while critical of the government's 
military contribution, had been uncertain of its policy in regard to 
withdrawing the troops. The new Leader of the Opposition (since 
December, 1965), N.E. Kirk, was reported in April as saying that the 
party had made no conunitrnent to "ithdraw the troops if it became the 
government. 90 That same month, however, the Joint Council of Labour 
88 Larsen, S.R. and Collins, J.L. Op. Cit., plOS 
89 Larsen, S.R. and Collins, J.L. Op. Cit., pplOS-106 
90 Elder, J.A. uThe Nev1 Zealand Labour Party and the Vietnam War", pl53 
441. 
(the combined executives of the Labour Party and the Federation of 
Labour) called u.'lequivocally for the ~lithdrawal of the troops. This 
t·las endorsed in May by the Labour Party conference. Vietnam policy 
was shaping up as a major issue for the general election due in Nover..ber 9 
In Parliament, National members defended the government's 
policy by emphasising that New Zealand had to support American efforts 
once the United States had decided on a line of action. The govern-
ment \~hip, J .E. Harrison, stated that now that New Zealand 'i-V"as losing 
the British presence in South-east Asia, it was more than ever dependent 
upon the United States and must act accordingly. New Zealand must 
"recognise its friends and stick close to them". 91 t.;talsh asked: 
"What does ANZUS mean if 1•Ie intend to disregard entirely what America 
is asking for?" 92 Defence Minister Eyre was perhaps the bluntest 
exponent of this 'loyalty to pot."lerful friends 1 viet,;. He said: 
"We should support the United States [not, significantly, South 
Vietnam] so that we, in turn, may expect support at some time 
in the future when we need it ••• What we do now will form a 
pattern for the future. If we do not do our share now in 
protecting the small and the weak, then we must face the like-
lihood that in the years ahead, when we may need help, it 
might not be so generously forthcoming". 
Eyre went on to quote the Deputy Prime Minister of Australia to the 
effect that it was of the utmost importance that Australia so act as 
to be entitled to expect the certainty of America~ protective action 
if its security were under attack. l'We are there'-, McEwen had said, 
~o make clear that the substance of our alliance with the United 
States is not one-sided'. Eyre said that the same applied to Ne>: 
Zealand. 93 The alliance was a living thing that had to be serviced 
or it might die. 
91 N.Z.P.D. vol. 346, pl88, 3 June, 1966 
92 N.Z.P.D. vol. 346, p207, 3 June, 1966 
93 N.Z.P.D. vol. 346, p250, 7 June, 1966 
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At this timef the government reiterated its viewr first put 
out in the Defence Review of 1961, that the alliance system demanded 
that Ne\\7 Zealand be prepared to support her allies in all their serious 
initiatives 1 whether or not these directly concerned New ZealaJ.J.d 
1 s 
interests. 'l'he 1966 Defence Review in its list of "the more sub-
stantial" objectives of New Zealand's National Security policy, put 
in fourth place the objective of establishing a claim upon New Zealand's 
major allies for military assistance and protection in time of need. 
The establishment of the claim required New Zealand to demonstrate 
willingness and ability to assist her allies in matters affecting 
their national interests - l·lith the "their" italicised. 94 
Sir Guy Powles, the ombudsman a~d former diplomat, was even 
blunter than the Defence Review in supplying a rationale for New 
Zeal~~d's participation in the Vietne~ conflict. Powles told a 
school audience in Dunedin that Ne11 Zealand knew that it was not of 
fundamental importance . to the United States, and it was in its. interests 
to show the Uni·ted States that it was useful. 95 Sir Guy showed in 
his speech that he believed that the government was aware that the 
ANZUS alliance had no strategic validity for the United States, and 
that New Zealand could therefore never sit back and take the alliance 
for granted. 
Even if the argument were accepted that an attack on New 
Zealand would only come in the context of a general war in which the 
United States wuuld inevitably be involved, the government apparently 
still thought that New Zealand had a reason for playing the American 
94 Review of Defence Policy 1966 p6; A.J.H.R. 1966 A-8 
95 O.D.T. June 16, 1966, p9 
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D.M. Riddiford, speaking in Parliament in July 1 1966, said: 
11 I think that if we maintain our sense of obliga·tion .... 
we can be confident that, because of the \•;ray in ·which \-,!e 
have stood by our obligations in the past, the F~ericans 
will regard New Zealand, in the unthinkable event. of a 
general v-1ar, as being a cOun·tr_y whose terri tory should be 
protected rather than liberated in due coursen. 96 
In October, 1966, President Jor~son visited New Zealand. 
The Prime Minister said in a stateme~t issued after discussions 
between the two that he welcomed the President's affirmation of his 
country• s determination to continue to play a role in Ne¥7 Zealand 1 s. 
part of the world commensurate with,its position as a major Pacific 
power. 
11 We agreed that there \Vas a continuing need for our two 
countries, and other like-minde.d countries, to work together 
to help maintain regional stability and encourage orderly 
change •• We ••• recognise that there was a continuing 
need for joint endeavours in the defence field in order to 
provide that shield behind which social and political 
advancement could take place • ~. Naturally we affirmed our 
determination to continue giving South Vie·tnam such military 
assistance as was necessary until the North Vietnamese 
stopped their aggression". 97 
Even under the admitted necessity of supporting the United 
States, New Zealand continued to show that it was unenthusiastic 
about aspects of the Vietnam policy. The government had never been 
happy with L~e bombing campaign against North Vietnam, and when the 
United States made a decision to bomq oil installations around the 
metropolitan areas of North Vietnam, the statement issued by New 
Zealand was less one of support than one in explanation. Acting 
Prime Minister Hanan said that the American decision had to be seen 
96 N.Z.P.D. vol. 347, pll88, 6 July, 1966 
97 E.A.R. October, 1966, p24 
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nwithin t.he context of Hanoi's protracted refusal to have 
the; problem of Vietnam settled a.t the conference table n. 
The possible effects of the decision on the character of the '\•Iar and 
on prospects for a peaceful settlement had been, he was sure, carefully 
weighed. Tl).e New Zealand government 11 fully unc1erstood 11 the circumstances 
which had led the United s·tates to its action. 9 6 New Zealand's rather 
tepid statement stood in the middle of British and Australian reactions. 
New Zealand would not go along with the British Labour government's 
dissociation of itself from the American action, but neither did it 
publicly express the enthusiasm for it that the Australian government 
did. 
In the official communique issued by the ANZUS Council in 
July, 1966, New Zealand joined with the Australians and l'.mericans in 
recognising "the military necessity for the recent bombing of fuel 
installations in the Hanoi-Haiphong area \'lhich played an important role 
in sustaining the aggression against the Republic of Vietnam11 • 99 
With the official ending of Confrontation in August, 1966, 
New Zealand's active commitment to Malaysia resufued a passive status, 
and New Zealand no longer had the excuse of a war elsewhere to ward 
off American desire for greater participation- in the Vietnam conflict .. 
After November, 1966, too, the government could feel .:ith 
justification that it had a political mandate for aiding Vietnam. 
In an election fought to a considerable extent around the Vietnam 
issue, the government had a comfortable victory, although it lost 
votes and one seat. After the election, the Prime ~~nister instructed 
the new Defence Minister (Thomson) to revievl the entire military aid 
98 E.A.R. June, 1966, p29 
99 E.A.R. July, 1966, p34 
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situation and in doing so to consider the use of all or part of the 
New Zealand battalion in Nalaysia in Vietnam. 100 The possibility 
of the redeploying of troops from Nalaysia to Viet.nam ~vas announced 
publicly on December 20. 101 The New Zealand government listed its 
military aid options as: an S~A.S. company; ful a1:moured personnel 
carrier troop; the infantry battalion in Halaysia; and part of the 
infantry battalion in Halaysia. These choices were passed to the 
American Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, which indicated a 
preference for the full battalion, with part of the battalion as 
second choice and the S.A.S company as third choice. 102 Neverthe-
less, the New Zealand government decided to send only one company of 
the battalion to Vietnam. This may have been due to British or 
Halaysian wishes that some forces be kept with the Strategic Reserve. 
An announcement of a decision to increase the number of troops 
in South Vietnam v-las made on March 8, 1967. 
"After the most careful consideration, the government has 
decided that, now that it is in a position to do so, New 
Zealand ought to make a further contribution to the allied 
military effort in the defence of South Vietnam. Until 
recently our armed forces have been heavily committed •• in 
helpin9 Malaysia and Singapore .• " 
The Prime Minister said that whereas previously there had been two 
centres of active military operations in South-east Asia, there was 
now only one - in Vietnam. 
"We could not escape the conclusion that, in the li9ht of 
this country's obligations woder the Hanila Treaty, and 
consistent with our firm adherence to the principles of 
collective defence and our support for the rights of small 
nations, a further effort by New Zealand was called for". 1 0 3 
100 Larsen, s.R. and Collins, J.L. Allied Pa:t>tiaipation in Vietnam, pl06 
101 See N.Z.P.D. vol. 350, p686, 18 Hay, 1967 
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It \1as at this ·time that the Permanent Secretary for External 
Affairs, G.R. Laking, in t\VO public addresses, stressed the political 
necessity of keeping Ne~; Zealand 1 s vi tal allia.."l.ces oiled in order to 
keep the United States involved in the defence of South-east Asia. 
Addressing the Rotary Club of \'lellingon, Laking said that New Zealand, 
in approaching Asian problems 1 had to take into account 
11 the continuing 
role of the United States in the Asian area". It \1a.s worth remember-
ing, he said, that the United States was not inevitably involved in 
Asia: that this was a very recent develcpment. During President 
Kennedy's time, for example, it was quite clear that Europe, not Asia, 
was the main focus of regional attention. 
Laking said that even Johnson had not committed the United 
States to the proposition that Asia was as important to the national 
interests of the American people as was Europe 1 unt.il 1966. "This 
promise of a continuing American involver.1ent in Asia presents a 
challenge to all of us". The essential consideration for New Zealand 
was that it should be clear about what it wanted to achieve by Amer!.can 
involvement in Asia. Laking said that he believed that Ne10 Zealand 
wanted to use the presence of American pm-'ler not only as a means of 
containing Communist China but as a shield behind which countries 
could consolidate their independence. 104 It was neither in New 
Zealand's interest nor in that of Asia itself that the concern of the 
Great Powers for Asia's stability should be diminished. Speaking 
to the Political Science Society of Victoria University of \'/ellington 
early the next month, Laking returned to the point, and made it more 
explicit that New Zealand's actio_ns were designed to keep an American 
interest in Asia. 
104 E.A.R. March, 1967, pl8 
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11 
•• we \Vould be vlise to remember that there is nothing inevitable 
about a· continuin'] and major cormnitment on the part of t..~e 
United S·tates .. . [and] .... I think there is no question that 
a continuing ~~erican military presence is of the utmost 
importance in underpinning the security of the area, and \·le 
in Ne'l.·;r Zealand must do what we can to ensure that it is 
rnaintained11 • 105 
The External Affairs Secretary made it plain that New Zealand's 
foreign policy in Asia was based on a hard realism. 
11 We have learned the hard lesson that no one O't'les us a living, 
that sentiment and custom alone will not ensure that others 
look after our security, and that if we \-vant to maintain the 
continued well-being of our people we have to pay our way in 
an international community that has no special interest in 
seeing that New Zealand continues to survive as a stable and 
prosperous nation on the fr·inges of an unstable and desperately 
poor Asian continent11 • 
Because New Zealand could not protect itself, it had to engage 
a protector, and this meant paying a price. 
uour military strength is not sufficient to ensure our defence 
if we were ever confronted by this necessity". 
The Secretary admitted that the prospect of having to ensure 
New Zealand's defence was a remote one at that time, but he said 
that it could not be excluded for all time. 
"This again suggests that we cannot expect in the future to 
call on the assistance of our friends if we have not, in 
the meantime .•• been pulling our weight in collective defence 
arrangements". 
Laking therefore backed up the government's assertion tl1at 
New Zealand • s foreign policy in south-east P.sia must necessarily be 
one of insurance. 
105 E.A.R. May, 1967, p20. Laking, G.R. "Problems of N.Z's Foreign 
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11 If we do not, by our O\'<"Tl efforts, make our contribution to 
wider inten1atio~al stability, no one is going to give much 
thought to helping us preserve our continuing independence ..... 
If we do not take .. steps to enhance our usefulness in the 
international community our value as a friend and partner 
would soon be overlooked" .. 106 
Apart from her ineffective military capacity, New Zealand was further 
handicapped in the matter of protection by her lack of strategic 
importance to any potential protector. Not only did she need a 
protector, but New Zealand had little to offer the protector for the 
protection. Laking said: 
11 to put it bluntly we are one of the few countries 
which could be regarded as expendable". 
This tvas a further impetus to·~-.;ards policies of insurance on New Zealand 1 s 
part. 
In July, 1967, there were reports in the press that American 
governmental and military leaders had met in Saigon and had discussed 
the possibility of calling on New Zealand for more troops for the 
Vietnam War. The Prime Ninister, asked to comment, chose to say that 
New Zealand troops were in Vietnam at the request of the South 
Vietnamese government and not at the request of any of New Zealand's 
other allies. More to the point, perhaps, Holyoake said that New 
Zealand kept the situation under constant review, and would not 
shrink, if the situation called for it, from strengthening the Vietnam 
force. 107 At the end of the month the government was visited by two 
members of L~e American administration - Clark Clifford and General 
Ma.xwell Taylor. The two had talks >~ith Cabinet. 
106 E.A.R. May, 1967, ppl6-17 
107 E.A.R. July, 1967, p23 
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In a statement issued for the occasion, Holyoake said that 
the purpose of the Americans• visit \Vas 
"to consult the New Zealand Government on the situation in 
Vietnam and the prospects for the future".
108 
The Prime Minister said that there was no question of any decisions 
being taken, although there had been no mention of the necessity for 
any decision, or what the decisions were about~ In the Supply 
Debate in Parliament a fe\< days after\<ards, Labour's A.H. Finlay 
~mnted to knm< what had happened at the meeting with Taylor and 
Clifford. He said that a respected col~~ist, Ian Templeton, had 
reported that the New Zealand government had thro~m its ~;eight behind 
efforts to restrain American hawks seeking to escalate t-he Vietnam 
War. N.V. Douglas referred to a New Zealand Herald report on 
August 2 that reported Holyoake saying that he had 
"put fo=ard quite strongly to General Taylor and Mr Clark 
Clifford that the ability of New Zealand to play a larger 
milita.ry role abroad was limited by overseas .funds 11 • 
Holyoake had also reportedly said that a bigger New Zealand force in 
Vietnam had not been specifically mentioned, although the subject had 
underlain the conversation. 109 
Clifford was to admit in 1969, after the American administration 
had changed and he was out of office, that the purpose of his mission 
had been to elicit further troops from the ~~ZAC countries. 
In Australia, Clifford recorded, Prime l1inister Holt presented 
him with a long list of reasons why lmstralia was already close to 
its maximum effort. In New Zealand, the reaction was similar. 
1oe E A • • R. August, 1967, p?4 
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11 ln Ne1..; Zealand, \'le spent the better part of a day conferring 
with the Prime Hinister and his Cabinet ... These officials 
were courteous and sympathetic •.. but they made it clear that 
any appreciable increase \:-'las out of the question. Ne1.-;r Zealand 
at one time had 70,000 troops overseas in the various theatres 
of \'lorld l-iar Two. They had 500 men in Vietnam. I naturally 
wondered if this was their evaluation of the respective dangers 
of the t\>lO conflicts n. 11 0 
~fuatever the degree of the American administration's belief 
in its own rhetoric about the danger to southern areas posed by a 
Communist takeover in Vietnam, it \Vas quite evident. that the New 
Zealand government did not believe it at all. It was, however, 
necessary, New Zealand thought, to continue making gestures. The 
next month it was announced that Holyoake would travel to Canberra 
to confer with Australian Prime ~linister Holt. Asked .at a press 
conference before he left if the forthcoming talks would include the 
possibility of sending the rest of the New Zealand battalion in 
Malaysia to Vietnam, the Prime Hinister replied that the idea was 
bound to be studied. 111 On his arrival in Canberra, he said that 
New Zealand would not flinch from increasing its Vietnam force, b'-lt 
stressed that there was no proposal to do this before the government 
at that time. 112 When Holyoake left Canberra he was still denying 
the existence of any proposal to send troops ~ Vietnam. On October 
18,- however, the Prime Minister announced that in response to a request 
from the South Vietnamese government, the Nm< Zealand government had 
decided on an increase in its military assistance. 113 Holyoake said 
11° Clifford, Clark M. "A Vietnam Reappraisal", Forei,gn Affair•s 
vel. 47 No. 4, July 1969, p607 
111 N.Z.P.D. vel. 353, p3681, 26 October, 1967 
112 Ibid. 
113 E.A.R. October, 1967, p29 
that he had discussed the Vietnam situation \>lith Holt in Canberra and 
that 1.:hey had considered tbf~ possibility of a joint increase in the 
ANZAC force in Vie·tnam. It is possible, then, that the formal So~th 
Vietnamese request had arrived some time in September and that the 
journey to Canberra had been to discuss a response to it~ It may 
well have been that the New Zeale.nd Prime r.!inister was not very keen 
on responding to the South Vietnamese-American request (in line v1i·th 
his reported attitude on escalation as expressed to Clifford), but 
had discovered that the Australia."1 Prime Ninister was, and thus had 
acquiesced. There are some further clues to such an interpretc.tion. 
First, the New Zealand decision was rushed to conform t.o an Aust:talia.n 
timetable. Holyoake admitted that, because the Australian government 
did not want to delay the announcement of a decision beyond October 
18, and because the New Zealand govern.TTient believed it "almost es.:::entiar1 
that New Zealand and Australia should ma}ce a joint statement "as a 
demonstration .•. to the world, that Australia and New Zealand stand 
together", the announcement of the New Zealand decision had not been 
delayed until the House of Representatives convened the following 
week. 114 Marshall, in his contribution to the debate, said that the 
proposal for the increase had been put first before Cabinet on the 
Monday after October 4 (that is, October 9) ill1d a decision had been 
made on October 16. 115 Evidently the Australians, since they had 
wanted to announce before October 18, had made their decision earlier 
and were waiting for New Zealand to make up its mind. 
114 N.Z.P.D. vol. 353, p3669, 26 October, 1967 
115 N.Z.P.D. val. 353, p368l, 26 October, 1967 
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The Depu·ty Prime Hinister ad.ded substance to the thesis that 
NeV1 Zealand was levered into a. further commitment by Australia by 
quoting in Parliament a Dominion article that speculated that Holyoake 
was a dove on the Vietnam War and Holt a hawk. The article said that 
Australian journalists were wondering this after Holyoake had given 
qualified support for a further paus.~ in the bombir.g of North Vietnam, 
and had reitera·ted his statement that a purely military solution to 
the war was not possible. By quoting the article, the Deputy 
Prime Minister implied that it was accurate. 116 Labour 1 s N.R~ King 
cited an Auckland Sta:r editorial on the October 18 announcement, to 
the effect that Clifford and Taylor had appealed for stronger support 
from Australia and New Zealand, and that Australia had decided almost 
immediately to respond. New Zealand, King said, was tag<cing along 
behind the Australian decision. 117 Another I,abour member, J-. Hathison, 
quoted the Otago Daily Times editorial of October 19, which said that 
New Zealand has "obviously been under not only American but Australian 
pressure to increase military aid". 118 The Otago paper had deplored 
the absence of convincing reasons for the increase, but the nex·t 
month Holyoake, in a review of Vietnam policy, claimed that Hanoi's 
attitude had clearly hardened in the previous-few months.
119 Holyoake 
also said that the joint increase with Australia reflected "certain of 
the realities of our international position - the closeness ·of ties 
between us, the increasing need for us to be associated in practical 
ways, and our growing sense of cowmen purpose in the search for 
international peace and security". 
116 N.Z.P.D. vel. 353, p3681, 26 October, 1967 
117 Ibid., p3704 
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Just before President Johnson unilaterally suspended the 
bombing of the sout.hern half of North Vietnam on !1arch 31, 1968, the 
Australian Minister of External Affairs, Hasluck, had made a speech 
saying that such a suspension would shake the faith of the South 
Vietnamese i~ their alliese 120 The New Zealand Minister of 
External Affair:s, in contrast, ·was enthusiastic about the American 
move. Holyoake said: 
"I welcome unreservedly President Johnson's decision to 
suspend the bombing .. u 121 
He went on to say that the partial suspension cam2 after a series 
of statements by the North Vietnamese indicating that if the bombing 
\Vere halted, negotiations would take place. In fact, the North 
Vietnamese had only been reiterating their position of the previous 
year, \-,•hich had been interpreted by the fuuericans as that negotiations 
might take place if the bombings stopped. Holyoake \.'las willing to 
take a more positive viev1 of North VietnalUese intentions than the 
Americans. 
As a result of the bombing pause, peace talks began in Paris 
in May, 1968. 
In February, the New zealand ~~assador-to the United States 
had conceded to an American audience that the New Zealand presence 
in South Vietnam was designed to take some of ~~e domestic and inter-
national heat off the american goverrJnent for its ~ctions there. 
120 Bull, H. "Australia and the Great Powers in Asia", p347, in 
Greenwood, G. and Harper, N. {eds.) Austra~ia in World Affa·irs 
1966-?0 
121 E.A.R. April, 1968, p37 
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.F. Corner admitted that the United States provided ::he only effect:ive 
strength for t,.he preaervation of the governments of South-east .flsia, 
but he said that Australian and New Zealand conting-ents \-'lere necessary 
C-:>mestic aids for the American piesence~ 
11 A day will come, '\'ie hope, when the countries of South-East 
can cope wi'ch pressures to the north. But until that day 
comes, they depend on some backing from outside their immediate 
region. At present, only the United States, Australia ~~d 
Nev1 Zealand can provide that backing. There are certain 
objections, both domestic and international, to the United 
States act,ing alone. 11122 
In October, 1968, the Prime ~tinister went to the United States, 
and while there he urged the American President to hal'c complet.ely 
the bombing of North Vietnmn, as an aid to the success of the 
negotiations. In early November, oa the eve of the American Presirl-
ential elections, Johnson did this. Holyoake welcomed the decision 
11 unreservedly11 , saying that he regarded it as a major step towards 
1 peace. 
"I have al<~ays acknowledged that a total suspension of the 
bowbing could be a critical elemen·t in bringing about 
negotiations. I reaffirmed this in my conversations \!lith 
the United States and South Vie·tnamese leaders, and suggested 
that the time could well have come for such a gesf:ure".
123 
The North Vietnamese, however, did not xespond sufficiently 
for allied purposes to American and South Vietnamese peace proposals 
put forward in the first part of 1969·. 
In June, 1969, the ne'\v American President, Nixoa, announced 
the first withdrawal of American combat troops from South Vietnam. 
122 Corner, F. 11 New Zealand and the United Statestt in E.A.R. 
February, 1968, p26 
123 E.A.R. November, 1968, p22 
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On his '\..Yay to the 1969 ANZUS Council meeting
 in Canberra 1 
Holyoake said he would emphasise at the me
eting that New Zealand was 
anxious that tho situation in South Vietnam sho
uld be improved 
sufficiently to allow New Zealand to be abl
e to reduce its military 
conunitment as soon as practicable, but that
 the government had no 
proposal for any change regarding New Zealand's
 forces in Vietnam.
124 
The Prime Minister· said that the government 'l
.vould consider the question 
in the light of its own assessment of the take
over capacity of the 
South Vietnamese and the level of fighting in S
outh Vietnam, and 
would discuss it especially with Australia.· 
There was no mention of 
the most important factor: the wishes of the A
merican government. 
The Str>aits J'imes suggested that month, that there w
ere indications 
that the Americans wanted Australia and Ne>~ Ze
aland to stay in 
Vietnam even after large-scale American wit
hdrawals, as a symbolic 
ges·ture towards regional co-operation. 
125 
At a press conference in Washington in Septemb
er, Holyoake 
was prepared to say that the Australian a·tti tud
e to New Zealand's 
withdra"ral would be a factor in when it ><as do
ne. 
" we could determine [to withdraw] unilat
erally, of course. 
But we would never think of taking unilater
al action and it. 




During the election campai~1 of November 1969, 
Holyoake said L~at 
New Zealand hoped to be able to withdraw some o
f its forces t.he next 
year. At this s·tage, the United States had ju
st announced the 
124 E A . . R. August, 1969, p45 
125 Quoted · J ' W K "B 't' t' 1.:r- acKson, .. . ecau.se 1. s nere " Jour
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second Hithdrawal of its troops from Vietnam. 
On December 15, l'.ustralian Prime l>'linister Gorton an_l'loU.."'lced 
that Australian units Hould be included in the next substantial 
Hi thdra>:al of A.'llerican troops. Holyoake in a statement made on the 
same day, said that the government was not considering any change in 
the nature of New Zealand 1 s military assistance to Vietn&'11. This 
seemed to indicate that NeH Zealand forces would not leave Hith the 
first Australia!~ units. The continuin9 American desire for an allied 
presence may have been a factor. 
When United States Vice-President AgneH visited New Zealand in 
January, 1970, he was asked how much importance he attached to the 
ncontinuing presence 11 in Vietnam of New Zealand troops, and his reply 
"'as that he thought it was "very important" that New Zealand felt 
strongly enough about Vietnam to "exhibit and to continue to display 
this presence there 11 • 127 The United States, then continued to 
value a New Zealand presence while there were still substantial 
numbers of American troops in Vietnam. Holyoake said on this 
occasion that he had discussed a New Zealand withdrawal with Agnew, 
and they had agreed that the United States should be able to make 
substantial withdrawals before other allied troops were moved. In 
line with this, Holyoake said that if there \>!ere further withdra"m.ls 
after the one scheduled to end in April, then New Zealand would 
consider Hhether it should take part of its contingent home. 
In April, Nixon announced a fourth withdrawal, to end in the 
spring of 1971. 
127 N.Z.F.A.R. January, 1970, pll 
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In August, plans for a Ne'iv Zeu.la:n.d 'i';ithdra~.val V;rere announced 
-··simultaneously with Australia's. Half of Ne\•.r Zealand's infantry 
force would be out by the end of the year. The Prime J:J!inister said 
that the government was considering iiJays in ·which training assistance 
could be provided for the South Vietnamese. 120 In November, 1970, 
the Minister of Defence announce(! that a 25-man training tea."11 would 
leave for South Vietnam at the beginning cf 1971. The training 
team was regarded by the government as 
11 helping to maintain a continuing New Zealand presence, 
and at the same time assisting in ·the development of 
South Vietna:nese capa.bili ty", 
the meeting of Vietnam troop contributing countries was told by the 
New Zealand representative in April, 1971. 129 The primary purpose 
was less training the South Vietnamese than keeping a physical 
presence as a symbolic commitment to South Vietnam's continued military 
resistance. 
In March, 1971, the artillery battery that bad gone to Vietnrun 
in 1965 was withdrm•n, and in August, liolyoake announced that the 
withdrawal of remaining combat forces would be completed at the end 
of the year. 
In late March, 1972, the North Vietnamese launched a major 
offensive across the Demilitarised Zone, between North and South 
Vietnam. The American response was to resume air attacks on North 
Vietnam. New Zealand's government had changed the month before, 
with Holyoake giving up the Prime Ministership to Marshall and re-
taining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 130 Holyoake's reaction 
12e N.Z.F.A.R. August, 1970, p6 
129 N.Z.F.A.R. April, 1971 1 p53 
!a o The Department of External Affairs had become the Minist.ry of 
Foreign Affairs at the beginning of 1970. 
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to the American move was, as always, subdued. 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs said: 
11 In the circumstances it is not hard to see why President Nixon 
has ordered sea and air attacks on North Vietna...-rn itself" .. 131 
At the same time, Holyoake applauded the American decision to return 
its envoys to the Paris Peace Talks, from which it had vithdrawn them 
in protest at the lack of progress. 
With the North Vietnamese offensive continuing, the American 
government took a new step in May by mining Haiphong harbour a.nd 
bombing that city. These actions called forth an emotional condem-
nation from the New Zealand Labour Party, but the Marshall government 
issued a statement in support. Marshall himself seemed rather more 
enthusiastic for American military policies than Holyoake had ever 
been. The new Prime Minister said on May 10 that Preside!'.t Nixon 
had adopted a "bold plan to end the war", and that the new policy 
had New Zealand's "understanding and support". 132 At the Annual 
Conference of the Returned Servicemen's Association in June, 
Marshall reaffirmed the government's support. 
"I make no apology for saying that the New Zealand government 
supports the decisive action now being -·taken by the United 
States to stop the Communist invasion of South Vietnam ~.d to 
force an acceptable settlement of outstanding issues 11 • 133 
In October, 1972, on the occasion of Kissinger's apparent 
agreement with the North Vietnamese, Holyoake reiterated the 
government's acceptance of any peace settlement negotiated between 
131 N.Z.F.A.R. April, 1972, p39 
132 Press, !4ay 10, 1972, pl 
1 3 3 N.Z.P.A.R. June, 1972, p57 
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the United Stat.es and North Vietnam that included the withdra·wal of 
foreign forces allied YJit.h the Government of South Vietnam. The 
¥.d.nister of Foreign Affairs conceded that this was despite the fact 
that the New Zealand military training teams in South Vietnam •vcre 
there under an agreement with the South Vietnamese rather than ~.vith 
the United States. Holyoake said that a review of the presence of 
the training teams had been due by the end of the year, anyway. 1 3 4 
By the time the National government v;ent out of office on 
December 5, 1972, no peace settlement had been arrived at in Vietnam, 
and New Zealand's army training teams were still there. 
Conclusion 
NeVI Zealand became deeply involved in the fate of the 
Republic of Vietn?Jn during the nineteen-sixties because her premier 
ally, the United States, had chosen to m~ce its major commiL~ent in 
South-east Asia there. 
In 1950 New Zealand had recognised the Associated State of 
Vietnam as a sovereign entity, and in 1954 had declared itself interest.ed 
in the preservation of the Geneva settlement on Indo-China, which 
divided the territory of Vietnan1 de facto into-Communist and non-
Communist states. When the North Vietnamese stimulated and assisted 
an insurgency in the south after 1960, New Zealand expressed concern, 
but showed little enthusiasm for any military involvement, true to 
her traditional approach to Indo-Chinese n~tters. In 1962, when 
Australia offered to send a team of Army instructors to South Vietnam 
to complement the American mili tart assistance program."TT.e there, New 
13 ' N.Z.F.A.R. October, 1972, p66 
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Zealand's Prime Minister thought first in terms o£ increased Colombo 
Plan aid as a New Zealand contribution. VVhen the Sot!th Vietna111cse 
specifically asked fer army instructors from New Zealand in late 1962, 
the government was cool to the idea. It \'.~as not until after ·t.he 
M<ZUS Co~~cil of 1963 that New zealand, under American pressure, 
agreed to provide some military a.id. On this occasion, the Prime 
Hinister emphasised that the South Vietnamese had to win the conflict 
themselves. Later he wa.s to virtually admit that New Zealand's 
offer sprang from a need to express allied solidarity rather than 
from any understa<ding response to a South Vietnamese request. 
New Zealand delayed implementing its decision for a year, excusing 
itself by reference to the priority of Halaysian aid and the 
instability of South Vietnam. Additional American pressure in early 
1964 lad to a commitment of engineers that year, bu·t in a non-combatant 
role. The government \-las careful to stress this status. Once again, 
the Prime Minister admitted that it was the SEATO meeting's decision, 
and not the request of the South Vietnamese which had followed ~~e 
meeting, that had been the main prompt to action. 
Late in 1964 and early in 1965 the American government proposed 
a dramatic escalation of the war, first by a bombing campaign over 
North Vietnam and then by the commitment of combat troops to South 
Vietnam. New Zealand was not keen on either step. The government 
believed that the introduction of ground forces could not retrieve 
the situation in Vietna~ by itself, since part of the problem was 
in the South Vietnamese government's ineffectiveness. Further, it 
believed that the introduction would change the nature of the war 
and thereby intensify it. 
New Zealand Has first requested to provide troops in December, 
1964 and agonised over the decision for five months. Despite the 
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government's preference for a political solution to the \\rar, the needs 
of the alliance had priority .• The die v1as pi·obably finally cast 1:Jhen 
Australia offered to send troops in April, 1965. New Zealru!d' s 
disloyalty would be spotlighted if it held out after that, and relations 
\<ith Australia, too, would have been impaired, as Australia believed 
that it was prot.ecting some vital national interests by being in 
Vietnam. 
In their defence of the small military commitment in Parliame!lt, 
government Ministers err1phasised the belief that New Zealand v.1as paying 
an insurance premium on American protection by its cont-ribution. 
Ne>~ Zealand had to show that she was no·t just a consumer of security, 
but a contributor to international security. The constant theme 
from the 1950s was reiterated: that New Zealand had to earn her 
protection, by acquiescence in the major policy lines of its great 
allies. New Zealand policy-makers bad a fear that unless the United 
:States >~ere encouraged in its defence of the South-Western Pacific 
by the loyalty of its allies, it might return to a sort of isolation-
ism that would leave New Zealand prey to the perils the Pacific waE 
heir to. The government seemed acutely aware of New Zealand's 
>~eakness and of her lack of strategic value tc>her ally, which meant 
that loyalty was all it had to offer to ensure survival. The feelir.g 
was made sharper by the perception of· a threat from China in South-
east Asia. 
In its justification of aid to South Vietnam, the government 
cited many times its concern for resisting an aggressor and upholding 
a small country's right to self-determination, and its determination 
to prevent a chain reaction of aggression from destroying its South-
eas·t Asian allies. On the other hand, its military contribution 
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belied the claim that it \'las making a serious effor-t at Collective 
Defence, on the scale it had done in Korea. 
It was quite evident that the token force sent to South 
Vietnam was meant to_express sywbolic support of the.American 
effort, rather than to help them or South Vietna~ in a serious 
manner. Australia, on the other hand, by introducing conscription 
for overseas service, was able to send a brigade-sized force to 
Vietnam (similar in nurnbers to the force New Zealand had sent to 
Korea) and r:take a substantial contribution. New Zealand did not 
even send the whole of its regular infantry battalion once it was 
freed from active service in Malaysia. 
During the course of the Vietnam War, New Zealand sho·wed that 
it clung more strongly than Australia and the United States to the 
idea that the Vietnamese conflict. must be settled by a political 
~solution. The government consistently showed P-O enthusiasm for 
i • 
Amer1can initiation or.resumption of programmes of boniliing North 
Vietnam, which it believed would make Hanoi more intransigent, and 
was constantly urging bombing pauses and halts on the 1\mericans. 
In June, 1965, Prime Minister Holyoake offered to delay the sending 
of the artillery battery to Vietnam if the North Vietnamese were 
prepared to negotiate. At the same time he moved beyond the 
United States in advocating the presence of the National Liberation 
Front at any peace talks. During all of 1967, ,the United States 
was not willing to make a unilateral suspension of the bombing, while 
New Zealand believed it should in order to get talks going. 
New Zealand's Vietnam pclicy was the classic example, in the 
period under review, of the influence of the defiendence syndrome on 
policy-making. It was classic because, a~like the case of recognition 
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of China, New Zealand was not in gr.:eat agreement ~-.rith United States 
policy, but acquiesced into it nevertheless. 
CHAPTER 12 
NEW ZEJl.LAND, HALAYSIA li_ND 'rHE BRITISH MILITARY 
IVITHDRAWAL FROH SOUTH-EAST ASIA, 1966-72 
Introduction 
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New Zealand's military involvement in South-et..:).st Asia prior 
to 1969 had been a function of Great PO'Vler conunitrnent to the area. 
Ne>~ Zealand's role had not been one determined by its direct 
relationships with the countries of South-east Asia, but by Great 
Power policies in the region. In 1955 New Zealand had sent troops 
to Malaya as part of a commitment to Britain; in 1965 it had been 
the demands of the American alliance that had forced a conunitment to 
South Vietna;u. In 1968, when Britain gave notice that it would 
withdraw militarily from the region by 1971, New Zealand was faced 
with the problem of redefining its role in l~alaysia. The government 
was asked to continue to support the Malaysian and Singaporean govern-
ments militarily after Britain had left. Previously, New Zealand 
had avoided commitments that were not shared by Great Powers and which 
did not involve reciprocal guarantees. In 1957, it would not join 
Britain in a formal guarantee of Malaya. 
In 1969, after a considerable delay, New Zealand, together ·.;ith 
Australia, decided to keep forces in l~laysia indefinitely after the 
British withdrawal. In this decision, the government showed that 
Nev1 Zealand's policy of contributing militarily to the maintenance of 
stability in South-east Asia was rio longer completely an adjunct of 
Great Power policy; that New Zealand now considered that it had a 
responsibility to contribute militarily in its own right. This >~as 
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a decision based purely on New Zealand 1 s regional interest: there 
was no mention of Commom<ealth factors. It is probably going too far 
to say, as one com..TUentator does: 11 Unlike Vietnam, this \Vas one policy 
decision in \<7hich New Zealand took an importa.11t initiative". 1 
Although desirous of giving help to Halaysia, the Ne" Zealand 
government did not care to commit itself without Australian participat-
ioon, and the assurance of American backing. Its final decision was 
m<1de in the kriowledge that New Zealand forces would be subject to 
continuing cover by British power after 1971, even if British forces 
would not be physically stationed in Halaysia after that date. It 
is possible that New Zealand's decision "'as influenced to a degree by 
the desire to insure itself once again with its major protector, the 
United States. The New Zealand commitment continued to be a limited 
one: the government still shm;ed itself reluctant. to enter into any 
firm regional defence treaty >lith Halaysia and Singapore. Ne" 
lzealand was \1ary of departing from its old policy of entering into no 
formal commitments without Great Power participation. Although New 
Zealand seemed to enter a new role in South-east Asia, it did not move 
very far from its previous South-east Asian security policies. 
The Wilson Labour government that came to power in Britain at 
the end of 1964 was determined to reduce defence costs, and late in 
1965 the New Zealand government was invited to send a delegation to 
1 Jackson, W.K. "New Zealand and South-east Asia", Jov.rn.al of 
Commonweal--th PoZitieal Studies, vol. IX, No. 1, 1971, p9. 
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Canberra in February, 1966, to meet the ne~,~ British Defence Minister, 
Healey, and to discuss future British defence corrunitments~ Holyoa..~e 
said at the time of the meeting that New Zealand felt it appropriate 
to send "a very strong delegation" to CaP..berra: Defence Ninister 
Eyre; Secretary of External l'.ffairs Mcintosh; and Chief of the 
Defence Staff Thornton. 2 The reason for the strong delegation 'tvas 
the belief that Ne" Zealand's vital interests were in potential 
danger a11d that they "auld need to be fought for. The New: Zealand 
goverrunent knew that the British government intended to reduce 
British defence commitments abroad, but had not decided where the 
cuts would come. The task of the New Zealand delegation was to 
ensure that significant reductions were not made in the South-east 
Asia forces. 3 
On the return of the delegation from the talks, the Prime 
Minister said that it ~~~as clear that a new situation \'IUS emerging 
in which Britain would not be able to police so much of the world, 
and closer co-operation between Britain, Australia, Nev; Zealand and 
the United States vrould be necessary. The Australian and New Zealand 
delegations had argued, however, that a continuing British presence 
in the region was essential because the threat to world peace '•as 
centred there. They had been reassured that Britain had no intention 
of withdrawing from its commitments in South-east Asia. 4 
In February, 1966, the British government published a White 
Paper on defence. It envisaged some reductions in British forces 
2 External Affairs Review, February., 1966, pl5 
3 Ibid., p20 
• Ibid., p20 
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in Halaysia af"!:er ·the end of Confrontation, but no major 1vithdrawal. 
Holyoake conunent.ed: 
" we particularly.welcome confirmation of the fact that 
the British government has no intention of t-.Tithdrawing 
its military facilities from Malaysia and Singapore for so 
long as the Governments of those. ... countries were willing 
to have those bases on their territories 11 • 5 
Holyo~~e added that it was basic to New Zealand's thinking that the 
bases 1.·1ere not there for narrov; national [British] reasons, but as 
part of the wider defence of the free world and more especially of 
the free cotmtries of Asia. 
In July, 1966, New Zealand's Prime Minister repeated to the 
House of Representatives further assurances that he had had from 
the British Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, that Britain would 
keep substantial forces in Malaysia. The New Zealand govern~ent 
re.garded Britain 1 s continuing presence as not only promoting stability 
in Asia, but as an indication that it \vas able to come to New Zealand, s 
defence if need be. 
"Mr Stewart also made it clear that there ·can never be any 
doubt of Britain's readiness ... to help defend Australia 
and New Zealand if the need arises at any time in the future 11 a 6 
Nevertheless, the government continued to be worried about the British 
government's intentions. When Holyoake met the new British Foreign 




"took the opportunity to stress .•• the vital contribution 
the British forces are making towards peace and stability, 
particularly in the south-·west part of South-East Asia .• I 
left Mr Brown in no doubt of the importance that we, the 
government and people of New Zealand, attach to the military 
presence of Britain in that area, and to her continuing to 
play her traditional part •.. " 7 
E.A.R. February, 1966, p32 
N.Z.P.D. vol. 347, pll66,. 6 July, 1966 
N.Z.P.D. vol. 350, p667, 18 May, 1967. 
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The gov~rnmBnt 's senior }\lflip, J .R. Harrison, told Parliament 
in Hay that he had seen a report by the defence cor::::espondent of the 
Obse1~er that Britain was planning to withd.ra\v al1 its troops from 
r1alaysia by 1976, and that if this w·ere true, 
"a far greater effort in manpower and material \'lill be required 
of New Zealo.nd and Australia in defending this area of South-
east Asia and ourselves". a 
Harrison immediately assumed that Ne\v Zealand would continue to 
participate in the defence of Malaysia - Britain or no Britain. 
Two months later, in July, 1967, New Zealand • s anxiety was proven 
justified with the release of a further British 'iihite Paper on defence. 
In it, the British government announced plans to withdraw "altogether" 
from its bases in SouL~-east Asia in the mid-1970s. The precise ·ciming 
of the wi·t.hdrawal would depend "upon progress made in achieving a new 
basis for stability in Sou·th-east Asia and in resolving other problems 
in the Far East11 • 9 
Commenting on the White Paper, Holyoake said he felt regret 
that Britain had found it necessary to restrict :its historic role in 
the defence of the Malaysian area, and that he would have preferred 
that British plans had been based on the conti!)uation of a British 
presence "for an indefinite period11 • He professed to find some 
comfort in the fact that Britain had pegged the timing of withdrawal 
to the degree of stability in SouL~-east Asia. Holyoake said that 
the Strategic Rese::::ve had a valuable role in providing "an atmosphere 
of confidence" in which countries of the region had an opportunity to 
grow and develop. New Zealand's objective in the area, like Britain's 
8 N.Z.P.D. val. 350, p737, 23 May, 1967 
9 Wilson, J. Harold, The Labov.:t' Government 1964-1970, p422 
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was to t,r•;ork to\\'ards a South-east Asia of independent, viable and stable 
states and the Common'ivealth presence had been designed solely to serve 
that end. 
11 1 con~ess to some doubts that by t.hc mid-1970s the free 
countries of South-East P,sia will have ceased to feel. the 
need for a friendly military presence, or that Communist 
China will have ceased to exert a major disruptive influence 
in the region 11 e 1 0 
The Prime Minister believed that as long as China continued to 
support insurgents in South-east Asia, a Western military presence 
would be necessary to insure a.gains·t the effects. Holyoake acknow-
ledged that British plans would present Australia and New Zealand with 
problems, since British logistic support was an important element in 
their capacity to contribute to the clefence of the arei'l .• There t1as 
no assumption by the Prime Minister that New Zealand and Australia 
should follow Britain in withdrawing. 
Within six months, the situation altered againa Early in 
January, 1968, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations, George Thomson, came to New Zealand and Australia with 
advance warning of the fact that the British withdra,<al would now be 
made sooner - by the end of 1971. Holyoake warned him of the "marked 
concern" New Zealand v..:rould feel if there were to be "any significant 
acceleration" of the British timetable as announced in July, 1967. 
The New Zealand Prime Minister stressed to the British Minister the 
importan.ce that the New Zealand government attached to the "existing 
arrangements 11 for Connuonwealth defence co-ope~ation in South-eas·t Asia, 
10 E.A.R. July, 1967, p24 
and 
470. 
"the particular problerns ~. [an acceleration] Hould create for 
New Zealand and Australia in our efforts to ensure the maint.enance 
and logistic support of the forces v-;re have contribuJced to the 
Com..TTlontvealth Strategic Reserve" . 11 
Holyoake told the press on January 12 that Thomson had not asked New 
Zealand either to maintain its ez:isting force in South-east Asia after 
the British withdra~.,ral, or to increaSe its commitment 
"but I think he is aware that New Zealcmd will maintain its 
contribution11 • 12 
Seemingly casually, the Pri111e Minister had indicated Netv Zealand~ s 
willingness to maintain a military presence in Malaysia beyond 1971 
in the absence of Great Power support. 
Despite the government's concern about the proposed British 
moves, it declined the invitation of Singapore's Prime Minister, 
Lee Kuan Yew, to send a Cabinet Member to London tc plead the Corr.won-
wealth case personally >rith Wilson. 
llolyoake said in explanation that no purpose would be ser,-ed 
by a visit to Britain at short notice. He told Lee that the New 
Zealand government would be "illing to take part in a conference of 
the five countries concerned to consider the implications of Britain's 
withdra>ral and to "see in what way we could contribute to the main-
tenance of the security of _south-East Asia in the new circu."tlStan':es" ~ 13 
Some days later, on January 16, 1968, the British Prime Minister 
publicly announced the speeded-up withdrawal of Britain's forces from 
South-east Asia. The next day Holyoake called ·the decision "a great 
11 E.A.R. January, 1968, pl7 
12 Dominion, January 12, 1968, pl 
13 E.A.R. January, 1968, plS 
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disappointment_ for New Zealand 11 • lJ.1he New Zealand Prime Hinister said 
that there was a vast difference bett1een reducing the size of a contri-
bution of forces and eliminating it altogether. New Zealand had been 
looking forward to a lengthy ru.-1.-dO'iim of the British presence. ll+ 
In a February statement on defence policy, Holyoake said that 
the 1966 British White Paper had promised that base facilities would 
be maintained in Malaysia and Singapore, and with that situation 
changed, 
"we ... need to assure ourselves that adequate facilities for 
support, maintenance and supply will be available in the future 
for such forces as we might have to deploy in the area". 15 
There seemed to be no political question about \ohether New Zealand's 
military role was now an inappropriate one, only a technical one oi 
whether that role could be sustained. 
The political aspect of leaving a force in South-east Asia 
without British backup did have to be considered, however. In 
February, the government consulted with Australia and several Asian 
countries about ways and means to preserve the region's stability and 
security. In particular, New Zealand's Defence Minister, David 
Thomson [who had replaced Eyre in the portfolip after the 1966 election] 
consulted, apart from Malaysia and Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and 
South Vietnam. 
Thomson's consultation took the form of a personal tour of the 
countries involved, and the visit to Indonesia was apparently to sound 
out Indonesia's post-Confrontation attitude to the retention of Western 
14 E.A.R. January, 1968, pl9 
15 E.A.R. February, 1968, p36 
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fcxces in Hala}·sia. Thomson told Parliament in July that he had 
ascertained in Djakarta. that InConesia had no objections to a 
. . , 6 
cont~nulng ~~ZAC presence.- Neither NE:\':r Zea.land nor Australia 
wanted to have to defend Malaysia against regional rivals again, but 
they did want to keep their forces there both as an aid to stability 
in Halaysia and so as to have a forward base for possible operations 
against Comm~~ists further afield in South-east Asia. Indonesia's 
positive attitude eliminated one possible constraint to remaining. 
Initially, the Australian government 1 s views were also tov.rards 
keeping the Reserve as an ANZAC force. Australian Ninister of Exte:;:-nal 
Affairs Hasluck said in Kuala Lumpur on February 7 that an Australian 
presence would continue after 1971, 17 a.'1d at the opening of the 1968 
session of the Australian Parliament, the Governor:-General, in his 
speech outlining government policy for the session, said: 
11 
..... it has been made clear to us that the Governments of 
Malaysia and Singapore wish Australia to contribute towards 
the stability of the region by maintaining some military 
presence. Therefore ••• my government .•. will be prepared 
to discuss the size and role of an Australia11 contribution 
to combined defence arrangements which embrace a joint 
Singapore-Malaysia Defence effort". 18 
Another political incentive to>mrds retention was the 
encouragement of New Zealand's protector, the United States. In a 
speech in New York as early as December 6, 1967 (before the announce-
ment of the accelerated British withdrawalj, Secretary of State Rusk 
had said: 
/ 
16 N.Z.P.D. vol. 3;s, pp573-74, 17 July, 1968 
17 'rhomson, G.G. "Britain's Plan to Leave Asia- An Uncertain Future 
for Singa.pore", Round Table, April, 1968, pl24 
18 Commonwealth Pcn'Ua;nental'Y Debates (House of Representatives) 
Ma.rch 12, 1968, p8 
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11 Both Aus·tralia and New Zealand are assuming growing rolr.:;s 
in the Easi: Asian and Pacific co::nn1u."'1i ty . . .. P ..nd t-le look to 
them to take on greater responsibilities when the British 
withdra\\T from Malaysia and Singapore sometime in the 
nineteen seventies 11 • 19 
On February 2, 1968, Robert McNamax-a, the American Secretary 
of Defence, told the United States Senate that the American government 
would 
11 encourage a prominent Australian and New Zealand role and 
continuing Australian efforts to consult the cotuttries of 
the region about arrangements that will compensate for the 
British vli thdrawal" . 2 0 
McNamara's talk of "compensation" for the British withdrawal suggested 
that the American government might be interes·ted in New Zealand and 
Australia boosting their troop strength in Malaysia. 
Minister of Defence Thomson, speaking in Christchurch on 
April 30, 1968, stated that in strategic terms, the British withdra;.;al 
would suggest that New Zealand, like Australia, might have to consider 
some expansion of defence expenditure. 21 
By April, 1968, new external factors had begun to appear that 
constrained New Zealand's first inclinations to leave a force in 
Halaysia. The chief amongst these was the sudden uncertainty over 
the future presence of the United States in Asia that followed 
President J"ohnson' s announcement on March 31 that he would not contest 
the Presidency again in the election of that year. Johnson~s with-
drawal was due to a recognition that he was likely to be rejected by 
the American electorate because of his Vietnam policies. Johnson's 
19 Depcu~tment of State Bulletin January l, 1968, p4. 
20 Quoted in Thomson, G.G. "Britain's Plan to Leave Asia - A11 Uncertain 
Future for Singapore", Round Table, April 1968, pl25 
21 O.D.T. May 1, 1968, p3 
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withdrawal was coupled with a partial bombing pause that led to the 
beginning of peace talks v1ith the North Vietnamese in Nay. If the 
Americans t.;ere to withdraw militarily from South-east Asia, then an 
ANZAC military presence in Nalaysia would be a greater risk and lose 
some of its validity. 
Policies of concerned countries in the wake of the British 
withdrawal were discussed at the ANZUS and SEATO Conferences in 
April, and it was probably at these that the United Sta·tes indicated 
that it was not interested in guar~~teeL~g the security of Malaysia 
and Singapore. William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, testified before the Foreign Operations 
Sub-Committee of the American House of Representatives' Appropriations 
Committee in Nay that 
" \<e do not intend • • • to underta'<:.e any new cornrni tments 
in regard to Nalaysia or Singapore to replace any activities 
U..Tldertaken by the British ••• we have made it veJcy clear 
that Australia and Ne\v Zealand must play the external role 
there and that we do not propose to do so". 2 2 
In mid-June, Holyoake told a Wellington press conference that 
he had raised the question of American backing for Malaysia and 
Singapore in Kuala Lumpur, 
"as we've realised that any contribution made by us is only 
credible if in support of a larger power". 23 
The military complex that New Zealand had contributed to in the past 
had been made credible by the power of Britain. 
22 Quoted in McDougall, D. "The Evolution of Australia's Defence Policy 
in relation to I~alaysia-Singapore 1964-71", Journal. of Southeast 
Asian Studies, March, 1972, pl05 fooL~ote 58. 
23 O.D.T. June 17, 1968, pl (Wgtn-P.A.) 
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uNow with Britain retiring as a physical presence it 'VJould 
be well if we had another major pm . ;er - and in ·this respect 
I am talking of the Uni·ted states" Q 24 
The Prime Ninister indicated that he did not think much of the pros-
pects of an American guarantee of Malaysia, and said that 
11 in the meantime, Nev-; Zealand would have to keep i·ts options 
open in an endeavour to ensure that the strongest power in 
Asia - t.J-,e United States - would have a continued and perhaps 
expanding interest in ensuring security and stability right 
across the South of Asia, instead of just the South-eastern 
corner"., 25 
New Zealand's prime concern, it seemed,. was to use its military 
forces in Sou·th-east Asia in such a -v1ay as tO secure an American 
commitment to the whole region, rather than just to Vietnam. This 
might or might not involve a continued stationing in }!alaysia. 
The dilemma over the degree of American support that the ANZ.f'.C 
countries could expect if they tried to help Malaysia beyond 1971 
may have been responsible for the serious doubts that the Australian 
Prime Minister revealed at this stage about the whole concept of 
forward defence. At a meeting of the Australian government parties 
on May 8, Gorton told the Parliamentarians that the established 
Australian concept of forward defence, "legitimate in its day" might 
have to be abandoned. In its place, Australia might develop an 
"Israeli-type defence scheme" of mobile armed forces in Australia 
supplemented by a large civilian reserve. 26 
The New Zealand government, in contrast, seemed to have no 
doubts about forward defence: it was only a question of where the 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Reid, A. "The COl' ton Experiment", p55. 
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military effort. ;;ould go. In his introduction to the 1968 Annual 
Report of t..he Department of External Affairs, Eolyoake had said that 
Ne;; Zealand ;;as prepared to participate in further studies of the 
defence problem in South-east Asia in order to determine ho;; best 
to make use of Ne" Zealand's military resources in the context both 
of regional security and the cow1try' s close relationship v;i·th Nalaysia 
and Singapore.Z 7 
After the first day of the Five-Power talks at Kuala Lumpur, 
Holyoake said that New Zealand's decision on a long-term commitment 
could only be taken in the light of 
"further discussions and other circumstances, including our 
conunitment in Vietnam and the impossibility of prophesying 
what "ill be the shape of things in Vietnam in t"elve or 
eighteen months". 26 
The government seemed to be thinking that its ability to contribute 
forces in direct Stlpport of the United States in Vietn= might be 
1mDre important than maintaining a garrison in Malaysia. 
i 
In a clash 
of in·terest between Malaysia's wishes and these of the United States, 
the latter's demands would win. Holyoruce told the Five-Power 
conference t.l1at any defence contribution to Malaysia and Singapore 
had to be related to the security and stability of other countries in 
the region. 
"It must therefore be recognised that there has to be 
flexibility- that there has to_be freedom to move forces 
within the region depending on the security needs of the 
region". 29 
27 Annual Report of the Department of External AfYairs 1968, p5, 
A.J.H.R. A-1 
26 Otago DaiZy T~~es, June 12, 1968, pl 
29 Otago Daily Times, June 13, 1968, p6 
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The government wanted to avoid a defence agreement with !-~laysia 
and Singapore t.hat \<Jould tie Nev.T Zealand forces to tbose countries at 
the expense of the vlider interests of t.l,e region and New Zealand's 
foremost ally .. 
Education Mil1ister Kinsella, filling in for Defence Hinister 
Thomson at an ex-prisoners of war conference in early June, said that 
in approaching the problem of continued commitment to Malaysia the 
government had to keep in mind mm1y important considerations, 
"Including continued active participation in regional 
cooperative arrangements for which there would be no 
lessening of need". 30 
The government was um•illing to make a bi-lateral conunitment 
to Malaysia: its il1stincts were to keep New Zealand forces co~~itted 
to a multi-lateral organisation supported by a Great Power - The South-
east Asia Treaty Organisation. 
The Conunonwealth link that had given Malaysia first priority 
il1 New Zealand's regional commitments duril1g the first half of the 
decade was no longer, apparently, very influential as a factor in 
New Zealand's South-east Asian policy. The wider interests of the 
region were seen as more important in New Zealand policy now than 
traditional ties. 
The New Zealand government apparently continued until June to 
cling to the hope that it could persuade the British government to 
~edify its January decision. The Kuala Lumpur Correspondent of the 
Far Eastern Eaonomia Review noted a contrast between the Australian 
30 O.D.T. June 7, 1968 
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delegation, which, along 'f.Vith the SiEgc_pcrean one, seemed Y'esigned 
to t.he new situcxtion, and the N'e\..r zeala.nd and Halaysien contingents, 
which "still seemed unwillin.g to accept ·the fait ac:acrr:pli as accompZin .. 31 
Holyoake reminded the delegates at Kuala LuiT~ur that the 1966 
British Defence vlhite Paper had agreed that the principal danger to 
world peace lay in the Far East, and said that he hoped that exercises 
apart, 11 a more continuous Wid ta.."'lgible demonstration. of concern might 
be possible, even if on a reduced and token scale 11 • 32 
Commonwealth Relations Secretary 'rhomson in his speech stressed 
that the absence of British-based land forces would not weaken the 
area's security: Malaysia and Singapore would still be protected by 
Britain's mobile capacity. Obviously directing the point at Holyoake, 
the British Minister compars:'lthe British move to the >lithdratval of 
British regiments from New Zealand in the Eighteen-seventies, v;hich, 
he said, had not left New Zealand any the less secure, since Britain 
still had her naval pmqer in the area. 3 3 
The New Zealand Prime Minister did not accept this reasoning 
and counter-attacked on June 11 with an analogy of h.is own: the 
accelerated Roman withdrawal from Britain. H~lyoake quoted the 
Venerable Bede to the effect that once the Romans had shown they wen• 
not coming back to aid the Britons, the Picts and Scots speedily 
returned and, more confident than before, had occupied all the northern 
and eastern part of Britain. 34 The visible exit of Britain, in other 
words, might encourage disruptive forces - insurgents - to launch new 
offensives. 
31 Far Eastern Eeonomio Review, July 11, 1968, pll7 




Holyoake reported his stance to the House of Representatives 
in July: 
"One of my central themes '"as to urge upon the British not 
only a continuing interes·t· in the defence of the are.a, which 
I knew they had, but also a demonstration that they have a 
continuing interest". 3 5 
The Prime ~!inistcr had argued for retention of a visible British presence. 
The Prime Minister did not tell the House explicitly that he 
had failed in his mission; that the conference had, if nothing else, 
made it clear that the British government >·ras deterrnined to go through 
with ·the withdrawal, but he did say that he had been reassured that 
a British defence umbrella would continue to be held over the region. 
"I am bound to say that I was impressed ••• by the fact that 
the British >Jill retain what they call a significani: capability 
which can be deployed in South-east Asia". 
After speaking of the naval and air capacity of Britain in the region, 
Holyoake referred to the ear-marked land force "of a.t least brigade-
' 
\,roup size" which he had been assured could be moved out from Britain 
to Malaysia "at short notice and with considerable speed", and to the 
promise that Britain would demonstrate this in 1970. 36 
If, then, New Zealand were to retain a presence in Malaysia it 
would still be under British protection, albeit at longer range. 
Holyoake noted that New Zealand and Australia had been criticised 
for not having made any commitments for the period after 1971, and 
said that it was as yet too soon for them to do so. The ANZAC govern-
ments wanted to know more about the policies of Malaysia and Singapore 
for their own defence. 
35 N.Z.P.D. vel. 355, p552, 17 July, 1968 
36 N.Z.P.D. vel. 355, p552, 17 July, 1968 
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11 \\'"e made it clear that i·t ~ms a prerequisit•a for us, in 
con.sidering future aid, th2t they should join together 
and sho\v that: they Her9 determined to have a good substantial 
defence force of their 0\>."11 11 • 
The t1vo governments concerne"d haC! 1 hO'\<Jever 1 . requested a 
continuing NE\<-7 Zealand presence, Eolyoake said. 
"We are being asked to assist with the defence burden .• and 
I believe that we should". 37 
The reason New Zealand's government felt that it should contribute, 
was that Malaysia and Singapore presented 
nan outstandi;;J.g example of stability and order, and of 
economic, social and political progress in a very much 
threatened and very troubled and diYided part of the VJorld, 
and we believe that their continued development along the 
lines that they are following is vital to that part of the 
world, to democracy generally, and to us here in. New Zealand". 
Any coi'fu-nitment was no longer to be justified in Conunon\'ll'ealth 
terms, but in tenriS of stability in Asia. The values of the 
Malaysian government were, in the government's opinion, L~ose that 
best served New Zealand's interests, and New Zealand should therefore 
defend that government. 
"Viable, prosperous, progressive and democratic countries 
are important • . • t.o our defence and integrity". 
Although no long-term commitments had been made by Net< Zealand, 
some decisiors had been taken for the future. 
"Specifically I told the conference that New Zealand would 
continue to maintain roughly the size and shape of the force 
we have in that part of the world at present; this of course, 
could be affected by the Vietnam War. I said New Zealand 
would do this up to 1971 a~d Australia has said almost exactly 
the same". 
37 N.Z.P.D. vol. 355, p554, 17 July, 1968 
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On tfds point, the Prime Iv~inister was a little inaccurate. 
Australia had promised to leave only her tv.~o aircraft squadrons in 
Malaysia until 1971: there had been no mention of the fa.te of the 
grormd force. 
In his statement, Holyoake had firmly corr.mitted Nev.1 Zealand 
to leaving its forces in the area until 1971 - a step that Australia 
still hesitated to make - and gave a strong indication that the 
government wanted to continue the presence beyond 1971. 
In his contribution to the Defence debate, the Defence Minister 
told Parlimaent that he believed that an ANZAC military presence in 
Malaysia 11 for the time being 11 would assist those countries in the 
build-up of their own forces and contribute to the stability of the 
\1hole region. Thomson went on to say: 
11 It has certainly been made quite clear that our military 
support is an essential ingredient at this stage in main-
taining a strong and stable society". 38 
If New Zealand were sincere in its desire to contribute to 
maintaining strong and stable societies in South~east Asia, then 
the decision for after 1971 had been virtually made for it. 
When new backbencher E.S.F. Holland had touched on the subject 
of British withdrawal in the Address-in-Reply Debate in June, he had 
said that New Zealand had to fill the vacuum caused by Britain's 
withdrawal, because of her debt to Britain. ANZAM provided Ne•v 
Zealand ~lith a protective urrebrella, so New Zealand had responsibilities 
to it which would be increased by the withdrawal. 39 
38 p N.Z .. D. vol. 355, p336, 10 July, 1968 
39 N.Z.P.D. vol. 355, p84, 2 July, 1968 
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One way of ensuring Britain's continued ability to defend 
Malaysia was to have a continued ANZAC force guarding the n
ecessary 
bases for reinforcement. 
Later, in the defence debate, Holland alluded to New Zealand's 
acting as a proxy of sorts for an American commitment. 
"We ~1ant to give these people the security they want, and I 
think in this way small nations like New Zealand and Australi
a 
can play a significant role and probably be more acceptable to 
these people tha'1. perhaps larger nations like the United Stat
es 11 • 40 
In August, New Zealand's policy-makers were presented with a 
further incentive to keep the presence in Malaysia and Singapore
: 
a declaration by Britain's Leader of the Opposition ·that a Con
servative 
governinent would reconsider the whole question of '1ithdrawal fro
in the 
Far East. Heath said this while in Australia, and repeated it 
at the 
Conservative Party's Annual Conference in October.
41 
It was known that elections in Bri·tain vlould have to be held 
before April, 1971 - eight months before the withdra,·lal was sche
duled 
to be completed - and also that the Labour government was at tha
t tiine 
ve1:y unpopular. There was a good chance that the Conservatives
 might 
be returned to power, and some chance that it_might happen in ti
me for 
the withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia to be reversed. 
In October, 1968, the New Zealand Prime Minister visited the 
United States and Asia. Holyoake told Parliament on the ev
e of his 
departure that one of the subjects he would discuss with Preside
nt 
Johnson 11ould be New zealand's reactions and likely intentions i
n the 
light of Britain • s impending military vlithdrawal. In an ad
dress to 
40 N.Z.P.D. vol. 355, p568, 11 J"uly, 1968 
~ 1 Far- Eastern Economic Revi.ew, Sept.eiP~er 26, 1968, p629 
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the .P-.ustralia-America Association in Ne\f.r York, Holyoake implied that 
New Zealand forces 't'lould stay on af-'ce.r 1971 in Malaysia. The Prime 
Minister said that the British withdrawal posed a practical problem ::"or 
New Zealand of 
11 finding a nev..~ basis for our operations in the area in 
co-operation with our friends from Malaysia, Singapore and 
Australia". 42 
It also pose6 a political problem, "for a stabilising influence is 
being removed together with important reserves of understandir,g and 
experience". Later in his speech, the Prime Minister stated that 
a turning away by those who had already contributed greatly to the 
welfare of the people of Asia could plunge the region back into 
confusion and despair. "The need now is for a sustained effort in 
aid, support and partnership". 
The communique issued at the conclusion of the Prime Minister 1 s 
meeting with the President stated that the two "recognised that the 
decision of the United Kingdom to withdraw its military forces increases 
the need for co-operation among the countries of the area". 43 The 
countries of the area included New Zealandand Australia. 
Calling at Hong Kong on his way back to_New Zealand, the Prime 
Minister stressed that, irrespective of Ne\'1 Zealand • s future cormnitments 
to the American effort in South-east Asia, there would be a "lessening 
of milita.ry capacity" rather than an increase of burden for New Zealand 
.in the Singapore-Malaysia region after the withdrawal of British troops 
in 1971. 44 
42 E.A.R. October, 1968, p25 
43 Ibid. , p41 
44 Fa:!' Eastern Economic Review, October 31, 1968, p228. 
In this statement the Prime Ninister indirectly indicated that, hci•fG\ter 
small, Ne;r,r Zealand would have a military force in Nalaysia after 1971 ~ 
Holyoake seemed to be envisaging a gradual rundovm in New Zealand! s 
rr.ilitary presence to complement. an increasing Malaysian capacity for 
self-defence. 
Although it seemed that New Zealand wanted to keep some forces 
in l·1alaysia after 1971, the decision in Canberra was of vital import-
ance in this. 
The Australia.,.,_ government was still equivocating in late 1968 
-or at least Gorton, the Australian Prime Minister, was. It was not 
until November that Gorton announced that Australian ground forces 
\1ould st.ay in Malaysia until 1971, and even then, it was a cautious, 
qualified decision. The Gorton decision v1as "in principle", and ·the 
Prime Minister explained that it was that way "because before that 
decision is made \v-ith finality, we need to know what assistance and 
support l'lill be forthcoming from the countries in that area themseleves 11 • 4 5 
New Zealand had never quibbled about its mm intentions up until 
1971. Ever since the Kuala Lumpur Conference in June, the government 
had said that New Zealand forces would stay at least to 1971. 'I'he 
New .Zealand Prime .Hinister felt, however, that the Gorton announcement 
needed to be followed by a restatement of the New Zealand position. 
"New Zealand has decided to maintain in Malaysia forces at 
about the present level up to the end of 1971". 4 6 
While still insisting that it was not yet appropriate for New zealand 
to make any long-term commitments, the Prime Minister said that New 
45 CommomMalth Parliamenta:t>y Debates (House of Representatives) 
19 November, 1968, p2983 
46 N.Z.P.D. vol. 358, p3218, 20 November, 1968 
Zealand's 1:-asic approach \\1aS clear. 
uwe have a continuing interest in the stability, security and 
defence of the South-east Asian a.rea after 1971~ There is 
time enough yet for us to make longer term decisions about the 
manner in which that interest can best be expressed"~ 
Considering that Holyoake had told the British in June that the best 
way in which continuing interest could be expressed was by a visible 
military presence, it was clear wha·t he thought the New Zealand's 
post-1971 decision should be. 
The Prime Minister continued: 
"We shall take our decision after a continuing process of 
consultation \·lith other governments conce!.ned ... Discussions 
with other governments have continued since the June talks in 
Kuala Lumpur. We have kept in close touch with Australia ••. " 47 
Holyoake' s statement had given no clue to the government's 
attitude towards Australia'·s caution ·about making a long-term 
commitment. '!'hat attitude >1as brought out, however, by Opposition 
Leader Kirk's reply to the Prime 11inister' s statement. Kirk said: 
"I .•. wish to make it clear that, while there has been some 
delay in ma~ing this announcement, we concede that the 
responsibility for this delay does not rest on the Government 
of New· Zealand" . 4 8 
By stressing that responsibility did not lie with the Governreent 
of New Zealand, Kirk strongly implied that it lay with the government 
of some ob~er country. 
Prime Minister Holyoake shortly afterwards said that he was 
grateful to the Leader of the Opposition for stating that it was 
~ 7 N.Z.P.D. vol. 358, p3219, 20 N9vember, 1968 
~ 8 Ibid. 
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"certai!llY no fault of the New Zealand governme~"':. that t:here 
haq been even an apparent delay or hold-l~l.p .in making these 
forward decisions 11 • 49 
Ne'" Zealand, then, had no doubts to resolve. It already k!1ev.r 
what it wanted to do. It wanted to make a post-1971 commitment, but 
did not \vant to do it felt it could not do it - without Australia, 
and the Australian governmen·t v1as taking its time making up its mind. 
In his end of the year review of international affairs on 
December 28, 1968, Holyoake was still saying: 
"We have not so far found it practicable to make specific 
decisions about the longer term, after 1971. We shall 
obviously need to take account of the situation in South-
east Asia as a whole. This could be affected by the out-
come of the ><ar in Vietnam and by the progress made in 
South-east Asia towards regional cooperation". 50 
The Prime Minister's linking of the New zealand decision to 
the end of the Vietnam War - t\rhich had shotv'!l little sign of ending, 
despite peace talks being in progress - suggested that he believed 
the decision \<ould not be made in the immediate future. 
In the latter portion of his statement, however, the Prime 
Minster clearly indicated which way New Zealand inclined. For the 
first time in public, he considered and answer~d the question of 





"Do we feel that we were in Malaysia a."ld Singapore just 
because the British were there a.nd that we automatically 
leave when they leave? Or do we feel that we have a 
genuine national role to play and a national interest in 
the security of South-east Asia?" 51 
Ibid., p3220 
E.A.R. December, 1968, p30 
Ibid. 
'Ihe Prime Minister then anS1.\1e:':.~e.d himself unequivocally: 
11 I believe \'!e have a role to play that we cannot fail 
to accept" . 
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The natural corollary to this conclusion was left unstated: 
that New Zealand would not leave automatically when the British did. 
Holyoake continued: 
11 0ur long-term national security can be affect,ed by what 
happens in South-east l1sia. It is right, and in our 
interest, to do what we can to help promote security there". 
The Australian government had made it clear that it \vas waiting 
for an expression of attitude from tl1e new American administration 
·before making its de·cision. The Australian Hinister of Defence, 
Fairhall, had said in the House of Representatives in November: 
"lfuo can doubt that we depend heavily on what the programme 
and policy of the United States are likely to be? Who would 
want to move ru1ead of the clarification by the United States 
of its attitudes towards the end of the war in Vietnam, the 
likely peace that will follow, and the conditions that will 
prevail throughout South-east l'.sia and the \•!estern Pacific 
after the end of the war in Vietnam? These are matters that 
are quite vital to any consideration of what we •.• should do 
in the South Pacific area. Until these r.1atters are further 
clarified, we will not in decency be able to sum up the 
strategic situation ••• [and] develop ••• a defence policy of 
real value". 52 
The Republican candidate, Nixon, had been elected President 
early in November, but was not due to.take office until JanuarJ 20. 
The shape of his administration's policy was not likely to be known 
for some time after that. However, other pressures conspired to push 
the Australian government into a decision before it had consulted the 
52 Commonwealth Pm'Ziamentary Debates (House of Representatives) 
19 November, 1968, p2953 
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AmericailS. The internal political situation 'ltJas forcing Gorton in 
the direction of a commitment ·to Malaysia: his government "tvas 
dependent on the support of the Democratic Labor Party, which was 
vociferously in favour of continued forward defence .. 53 Then there 
were pressures from the Malaysians and Singaporeans themselves .. 
1'he latter were getting very· impatient-. wi t-.h the delay in the a!1r-ounce-
ment of ANZAC intentions. On January 23, 1969, the Malaysian Defence 
Minister called openly for an explicit declaration of intent after 
1971 by Ne•1 Zealand and Australia. 
11 l4alaysia would like to know Australia's and New Zealand's 
real position on their commitment (to Malaysia] in case of 
trouble 11 , 
said Tun Abdul Razak. 54 
A further·pressure could well have been tha.t of the view of 
the New Zealru1d goverrLment. Having made up its mind long since -
without the benefit of knowing American intentions - the New Zealand 
government was likely to have urged its favoured course on t.'le 
Australian government. Both the BuUetin and the Eaonomist were later 
to claim that Prime Minister Holyoake was one of those who urged Gorton 
in January to retain forces in Malaysia and Singapore .. 55 
It was·not until February 25, 1969, that the Australian govern-
ment finally announced its decision on a post-1971 military stance in 
Malaysia. rrhe decision was for a continuing commitment. A New 
Zealand announcement in the same vein was made by Holyoake the same day. 
53 Reid, A. The Gorton Experiment pplSS-191 
54 Ibid., pl9l; see also F.E.E.R; March 13, 1969, p444 
55 BuU.etin, March 8, 1969, pl6; Economist, March 1, 1969, p28 
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In a statement to the Australian House of Representatives 
explaining the Australian governmentrs motives for its decision, 
Gorton sa:i.d that Australia could have withdrawn its troops, but if 
it had done this, 
nwe could scarcely expect smaller countries in the region 
to be encouraged to protect themselves or larger countries 
outside the region not to be affected in any future decision 
they might have to make, should the region be endangered". 5 6 
The Australian government thus admitted that its decision was in 
part yet another premium on the American insurance policy: an 
Australian presence in Malaysia would make more certain an A.rnerican 
involvement if a threat arose that neither Malaysia nor Australia 
could deal 1-1i th. 
Holyoake in his statement stressed New Zea_).and' s ir:terest in 
playing a part in ensuring regional security. 
"It is obvious that a fundamental change in the frame"t>Jork 
of our operations in South-east Asia is taking place. 
Nevertheless, the Government believes that we· should continue 
to seek our security with like-minded nations and play our 
part in collective defence. This is the impulse that has 
dominated our review of the defence problem". 5 7 
Holyoake went on to say that New Zealand had had an interest in the 
security of L~e Malaysian area since before th~ Second World War, 
but up until 1969 "our role has •• so far been expressed within a 
larger British military presence". Henceforth, New Zealand would 
have to accept a more independent stance and one that would bring 
her more directly into cooperation with the countries of South-east 
Asia. 
56 Current Notes on International Affairs February, 1969, p42 
57 E.A.R.February, 1969, p3l 
Holyoakt?- was careful to point out that new Zealand was no~c 
attempting to play ·the British role - that is, overall guarantor and 
protec·tor of l"'.calaysia and Singapore: nour interests and our capacities 
are different11 • New Zealand was playing its own role. This role 
>ras that of partner of Malaysia, whereas previously New Zealand had 
been the junior partner of Britain. Holyoa.ke said that New Zealand 
felt it should play "a part 11 in i:he search for regional security in 
South-east l\.sia. 
The New Zealand Prime Ministe:r did not m€mtion the American 
attitude as a factor in the decision-making process, as Gorton had, 
but it was present. The New York Times reported that American 
officials had worked in close consultation with Australia and Ne>.' 
Zealand over the security arrangemen·ts that were announced on 
February 25, but had been careful not to appear to be pressuring the 
two governments into the decision that had been announced. 58 The 
Economist reported that officials in Wellington (presi.unably from the 
l1inistries of Foreign Affairs and Defence) had asserted that New 
Zealand had "made up its own mind on the issue without direction from 
Washington" .. 59 However, their need to make the assertion showed that 
they \Vere well aware of what Washington vJa.nted. The United States 
government saw a continued Australasian presence as lessening the need 
for a possible unilateral American cmr.rnitment to the area. 60 The 
State Department, co~~enting on the ANZAC decision, said: 
58 J·ackson, W.K. "Because its there "Jnl-. of S.E. Asian Studies, 
!1arch, 1971, p29 
59 Eoonomist, l Harch, 1969, p28 
6 0 Jackson, Op. Cit., p29, quoting New Yol'k Times, February 25, 1969 
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"The United Sta.tes welcomes this move as a healthy development 
in regional defence efforts and one that will s-trengthen the 
stability of the area 11 • 61 
In a major review of New Zealand's defence policies made before 
the Institute of Int~r!lational Affairs in March, 1969, Holyoake denied 
ti.Lat New Zealand's interest in Halaysia and Singapore arose out of the 
British military presence, or the Commonwealth link with Britain: it 
arose, he claimed, solely from New Zealand's concern with the security 
of South-east Asia as a whole. 62 The form in which the interest was 
expressed was less important than the fact of it. 
The Prime Minister's claim is belied by tioe evidence (see 
Chapters Eight and Ten), but apparently he felt that he had to make 
it to justify the decision to remain. Without the British military 
presence or Commonwealth links, Ne''' Zealand's interest in Malaysia could 
be no more or less than its interest in South Vietnam or Indonesia. 
The Prime Minister said that after Britain's withdrawal it was 
hoped that truly regional defence groupings could be created. New 
Zealand could contribute to the ernergence of these by accepting a 
positive role in Malaysia for itself. The government did not see any 
wisdom in trying to huddle down in Fortress New zealand and ignoring 
the rest of the world. It made greater sense to take a part in help-
ing to shape events. 
"In our judgement, the logic of our position points to a policy 
of defence cooperation and of a readiness to play a part in 
South-east Asia •.• We are not writing a blank cheque guar~~tee 
for other people's security, but we are prepared to make a 
contribution to regional securityn. 
61 BuZZetin, March 8, 1969, pl5 
62 E.A.R. March, 1969, p9 
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Having claimed that New Zealand coul-d play a. role in south-east l,sia 




it may have made sense to say, 1 'i·7hereBritain goes, 'hie 
Now, as Britain withdraws from Soui:h-:-e:ast Asia, it 
no sense to say, '\>lhen Britain leaves, we leave' 11 • 53 
The United St.ates, hm<ever, was still in South-east J',sia, and 
up to this time had given no indication tha.t under the new Nixon 
Administration it intended to leave. Ne>.v Zealand had an in~cerest in 
a continuing American military presence in South-east Asia, and the 
government had sho~n L~ Vie~~am that it was anxious to show the United 
States that the American policy of involvement was not ll!1supported. 
The Halaysian commitment could well have been made less from a genuine 
desire to play a role in regional security than to satisfy American 
desire for continuing participation. 
Af·ter July, 1969, it seemed even more important toNe,·; Zealand 
to consider American needs in Asia. In that month, at Guartl, President 
Nixon enunciated new guiding principles for America.~ foreign policy in 
Asia, and they indicated that the United States was tiring of its role 
of militarily containing Communism on that continent. These principles, 
quickly labelled the 'Nixon Doctrine', were th~t the United States in 
the future would seek to avoid direct military involvement in the 
conflicts of Asia, and would expect threatened countries to provide 
substantially for their own defence. 64 
It seemed that. in the future exposed allies would have to "earn" 
American support. 'rhe Nixon Doctrine gave New Zealand some cause for 
63 E.A.R. March, 1969, pl4 
64 See United States FOl'eign Pol-icy 1969-70: A Report of the Searetal'y 
of State , p35 and pp36-37 
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concern .. At the ANZUS meeting of August, 1969, Ne'" Zealand ;;as 
apparently seeking assurances that the Nixon Doctrine would not affect 
the ANZUS Treaty protection for New Zealand. 
Holyoake said after the meeting >Ti·th American Secretary of 
State Rogers that Ne>l Zealand 
11particularly welcomed the assurances of Secretary Rogers 
that the policies of the new Administration in relation to 
the Pacific region include a finn commitment to mainta.in its 
Treaty obligatior::.s towards Australia and New Zeala.••1dn. 6 5 
When the Prime Minister journeyed to the United States in 
September to see Nixon, he was asked whether he saw ru1y role for the 
United States in the Malaysia-Singapore area. Holyoake's reply 
indicated that the New Zealand government saw its own presence in 
Malaysia as predicated on united States involvement. 
"ANZUS ••... applies to the whole of the Pacific area and it 
has been agreed that Malaysia/Singapore is part of the Pacific 
areau.GG 
In Parliament in the year following the commitment, there were 
indications from several National members that the Malaysian commitment 
was linked in some degree with the desire to influence American policy. 
In the international affairs debate early in 1970, Government Whip 
Harrison postulated an insurance premium element in New Zealand's 
actions in Malaysia. 
"The alternatives are either to stay in South-east Asia or 
withdraw. A withdrawal >lould hand over that area and South 
Asia to Communist control. It would also undermine the 
confidence not only of South-east -".sia, but also of Australia 
and of the United States in New Zealand". 5 7 
65 E.A.R. August, 1969, p47 
66 B.A.R. September, 1969, p17 
67 N.Z.P.D. vol. 365, p513, 16 April, 1970 
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I·t v,ras thus not only Nalaysia' s confidence that had to be assulTd, 
but that of the United States - the ultimate protector. Har:rison v;ent 
on to say that it Has nessential" in vie\v of the British withdrawal and 
the Nixon Doctrine that New Zealand should strengthen her ties with her 
"remaining si.:rong friends in the South-west Pacific - the United States 
and Australia~~~ 
The basic insecurity that New Zealand governments have always 
felt about the American alliance seemed to have been increased by 
lmowledge of the domestic pressures that the American government v;as 
being subjected to on its Asian foreign policy. Gair said in the 
House on April 17: 
nwe must do nothing v;hich encourages the tendency towards 
isolationism in some sectors of Arnerican society. t-.Je mus·t 
do nothing in this country to allow the New zealand people 
to imagine that they can step back from the mainstream of 
>~orld affairs and protect themselves behind some F'or-tress 
New Zealand or Fortress Australia policy". 6 8 
New Zealand, then, had to be seen to be pulling its weight. to 
earn support: New Zealanders could not delude themselves that tl1ey 
could opt out of the need for protection. H.J. Templeton, a new 
government backbencher who had recently been an officer in the Depart-
ment of External Affairs, made a particularly revealing cormnent in 
October, 1970: 
". • • In a period of change like. the present, the willingness 
of Australia and New Zealand to maintain forces in the area 
Malaysia-Singapore could have an influence on the policies of 
friendly powers out of proportion to the size of the forces".
69 
68 N.Z.P.D. vol. 365, p560, 17 April, 1970 
69 N.Z.P.D. vol. 36g, p4158, 20 October, 1970 
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In an address to the University of Otago's Foreign Policy School 
in f-1ay . on the subject of New Zcala.J.d' s relations v-1ith the Uni·'c.ed States 1 
W.B. Harla1"1d, the head of the Ministry of Foreign 1-if:!:airs' Research 
Division, indirectly confirmed that the decision t6 keep troops in 
Singapore after 1971 was taken with an eye to keeping the goodwill of 
the United States. 
nThe decision is one -'chat has been warmly \Velcorned in 
jqashington ••. The decision has thus helped to cement our 
relations \'lith the United States, and to maintain our 
standing in the eyes of the Administration. So long as 
we continue to play our part in South-east Asia there is 
every chance that it will :r:emain sympathetic to our needs 
and willing to help us 'VJhere it ca.q" a 70 
One scholar, W.K. Jackson, seems inclined to see New Zealand's 
major allies as the main factor in the decision. Jackson says that 
New Zealand's interest in Singapore-Malaysia has to be viewed in t.erms 
of its relationships with Australia, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, Japan, Thailand ~~d other countries. 71 He goes on to say: 
11 It is ••. arguable ••• that a particular action in a 
particular country may appear to be against New Zealand's 
interest when viewed as an isolated phenomenon, but yet 
may be considered by decision-makers in a different light 
when set in perspective of New Zealand's wider international 
ties and obligations11 • 72 
There does not seem to be any evidence that in the case of the 
Malaysian decision the government saw disadvantages to the commitment: 
throughout 1968 it had shown itself eager to continue a presence, if 
70 Harland, W.B. "New Zealand's Relations with the U.S.A.". N.Z.F.A.R. 
·May, 1970, pl4. 
71 Jackson, W.K. " .• Because it's there •• " Journal of South-east Asian 
Studies, ~arc~ 1971, p26 
72 Ibid. 
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possible~ 'rh;is does not, however, necessarily invalidate the point 
that whatever the government's views in local terms, its policy could 
vmll have been determined purely by the perceived demands of the 
American alliance. 
Jackson offers one incident to support the suggestion that 
Ne'\V Zealand may have been reluctant to continue the commitment: the 
an..'louncement in early January, 1969, that the ANZAC force would move 
its base from r.~alacca, on the Malaysian peninsula, to Singapore .. 
This move, Jackson says, could be seen as a possible indicator of a 
fear of entanglement in Malaysia's racial problems, and of readiness 
to make a quick getaway if it should become necessary. The COITl!lLi t-
ment, he says, thus had the hallmark of a half-decision, a comproinise. 73 
In fact, however, the move to Singapore was opposed by the New 
Zealand government. It was made at the insistence of the A.ust.ralia.TJ. 
government and the motive appears to have been purely financial. 74 
The vast Terendak ca."1lp near Malacca v1as not considered economically 
viable after the departure of the British, and cheaper barracks were 
available in Singapore. 
Jackson's suggestion seems, on the sur~~ce, to be given some 
substance by the fact tha·t Australia and New Zealand were unwilling to 
enter into any binding, automatic commitment to the defence of Malaysia 
and Singapore. The subject surfaced at the Five-Power Defence talks 
at Canberra in J~'le, 1969. These talks, a continuation of those of 
1968 between Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and Britain, 
7 3 Jackson, w ~K. II •• Because it Is there •. n p28 
74 See, for instance, Hawkins, D. The Defence of Malw.;sia o:ad Singa:po1'e 
from AMDA to ANZUK, p36; Josey, A. Lee Kuan Yez.v a:n.d the Com11omJeal.th, 
pp77-78; Fairhall in Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (House of 
Representatives) 27 February, 1969, p282 
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were preparing the gro·!.lild for a substitute for the Anglo-Halaysian 
Defence Agreement, involving i:J.~e f:Lvs concerned cou..11t.ries equally b 
Australian ~1inister of External Affairs Freeth said after the talks 
that the Malaysians 
"would prefer to have us more \'lidely cormni tted than we have 
been prepared at any time to ccrnmit ourselves", 
but he felt that the Jl.ustralian position was well understood and that 
there was no conflict such as to jeopardise the new security arrange-
mentso; 75 There was certainly some conflict, though~ In his opening_ 
speech to the Conference, Australian Prime Minister Gorton ha<i seemed 
to rule out an Australian commitment to the defence of Sabah, as 
distinct from peninsular ~lalaysia. 76 The Malaysian and Singaporean 
.governments, in turn, stated that they could not accept anything less 
from their allies thilii full commit.w.ent to thGir defence in case of 
need. As a result of these attitudes, the decision on a. fu·ture defence 
~arrangement was postponed until the follot·dng year. 77 
I 
A month after the conclusion of the talks in Canberra, the 
Malaysian Prime Minister declared publicly that .l\ustralia and Nev1 
Zealand had shovm little interest in taking up a significant role in 
the protection of the nations to the north. ~unku Abdul Raru-nan said 
that the Five-Power alliance [of Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New 
Zeala.TJ.d and the United Kingdom] was "useless" from Malaysia 1 s vie\ .. -point. 78 
On August 14, 1969, Malaysian Defence Minister Razak, speaking in 
Singapore, sc.id: 11 We want a finn, unequivocal statement, preferably a 
7 5 Cu:rrent Notes on International Affairs, June, 1969, p307 
76 Reid, A. The Gorton Experiment, pp290-292 
7 7 F= Easte1'n Econom·i.e Review, July 3, 1969, p5 
1a F .E.E.R. lmgust 7, 1969, p3ll 
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\'lritten c.greerr~ent, to allay our doubts. 79 
New Zealand 1 s reaction was one of indignation .. Holyoake told 
newsmen in Canberra that he could not understand the Tunkuts reference 
to New Zeala.nd' s and Australia's half-hearte0 ... ~'1.ess ~ New Zealand and 
Australia, he said, had made solid regicnal. COTIL."'Il.itments for the period 
before and after Britain's East of Suez v1i thdrawal. 8 0 
The trouble was, of course, a difference over vJhat a 'solid' 
commitment \Vas in each party's tenns~ For New Zealand, the leaving of 
troops on the Asia11 m2.inland, physically unsupported by a Great Power, 
was a daring enough initiative >lithout a binding formal defence treaty .. 
New Zealand ar..d Australia were·still not prepared to commit themselves 
bi-laterally to Asian countries in security matters. The premise of 
1957, when New Zealand had merely associated itself with the p:rovisions 
of the Anglo-Malayan Defence Treaty because there was no reciprocal 
guaraT'ltee g·iven, was still operative. Only Ylhen st.rong Great Fowers 
giving reciprocal guarantees were involved in Asian security agreements 
>vould New Zealand participate. 
In Jlli~e, 1970, the Conservative Party in Britain defeated the 
Labour government in the General Election, and_once again the British 
presence became a factor in the defence of the Malaysia-Singapore area. 
<'or New Zealand; it was a welcome bolster for her 1969 decision. In 
July, the Prime !I'Jinister ><elcomed the announced early visit of the new 
British Defence Secretary, Lord Carrington, saying that he greatly 
appreciated the high priority that Lord Carrington was giving to the 
question of the defence of Malaysia and Singapore. 81 
79 F.E.E. R. August 14, 1969, p392 
80 Ibid. 
81 N.Z.F.A.R. July, 1970, p66 
l'.fter Lord 
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carring·'con had visited NeH Zealand in August, Holyoake announced that 
in the future defence arrangement for Malaysia, New Zealand and 
Austr:alia would take a more equal role with Britain, rather than a.cting 
B2 as junior partners. The British Conservatives were no more eager 
than the British Labour government had been to continue with the firm 
co~nitment of the Anglo-Vmlaysian Defence Agreement, fu~d suggested a 
looser political agreement to replace it. This, of course , \'las very 
much in line with ,,rhat New Zealand preferred in the "Vla.y of non-Great 
Power regional treaties, but not what Malaysia felt it needed. 
In April, 1971, the five countries concerned sent delegates to 
a Conference in London to hammer out the new agreement. The resulting 
arr~ngement was a very loose and qualified commitment. The ~tinisters 
declared that in the event of any form of armed attack, externally 
organ.ised or supported, or the threat of such attack, against Halaysia 
and Singapore, their governments would immediately consult together for 
the purpose of deciding «hat measures should be taken, either jointly 
or separately, in relation to such an attack or threat. The New 
Zealand Prime Minister reported to Parliament in November that Australia, 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom were concluding separate bi-lateral 
agreements with Malaysia and Singapore in broadly similar tenns. 93 
When Marshall became New Zealand Prime Minister in 1972, there 
was no change of policy towards Malaysia and Singapore. The new Defence 
Minister, McCready, visited Singapore in March, and told the Singapore 
government that New Zealand troops would stay there even if the Australian 
contingent were to withdraw. 64 
82 N.Z.F.A.R. Au~~st, 1970, p47 
83 N Z P D 19~,1 •••• vol. 376, p4321, 4 Noveiilber, 




The proposed withdrawal of British military forces from Malaysia 
and Singapore after 1971 forced New Zeala.'1d to re-examine its ovm policy 
in regard to the stationing of military forces in ~che area. From the 
first annormcements of British disengagement, government statements 
revealed that New Zealand saw a continuing military presence in Malaysia 
as a valuable aid to stability in that countr"'J, and that New Zealand's 
inclinations '>'lere to a perpetuation of that presence by itself and 
Australia. In finally making a decision to leave its forces in t·ialays.ia, 
New Zealand showed that its security policies in Asia were nm·1 not entirely 
adjuncts of Great Power policies. The New Zealand gove1.··nment ~1as pre-
pared to do what it could by itself to aid the Malaysian and Singaporem1 
governments. On the other hand, New Zealand's policies were not free 
from Great Power policies, either. Despite its concern for Nalaysia 
and Singapore, New Zealand did not intend to commit itself to t.~em 
ialone, or in any binding way without Great Power participation. Ne" 
Zealand's decision was made in the knowledge that British back-up 
power would be available beyond 1971, and that American support would 
be given. New Zealand's decision was delayed also 1.mtil the .l'.ustralian 
government committed itself. Neither Ne>q Zealand nor Australia was 
eager to move into a "tight" defence treaty with South-east Asian 
countries without formal Great Power participation. The 1971 Five-
Power Defence arrangements reflected this. It is likely that one 
factor in New Zealand's positive decision - though not the major one 
was a desire to ensure further the involvement of its remaining Great 
Pm;er protector - the United States - in the region. In some ways, 
then, the decision of 1969 was not as radical a departure from previous 
South-east Asian policies as it appeared. 
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CHi\P'IER 13 
Ll'.BOUR AND MALAYSIA-SING..l\.PORE 1967-75: 
AN INDEPENDENT SOUTH-EAST ASI-AN POLICY? 
Introduction 
In its response t.o the intensification of the Vietnarn \--'o/"ar 1 
the Labour Party had denounced the ensuring of stability by military 
means. In regard to the Nalaysia-Singapore area, hotvever, the party 
was quite prepared to endorse the stationing of New Zealand forces 
on foreign soil to ensure stability. Labour regretted the British 
military withdrawal from South-east Asia as much as the National 
government, ru.J.d seemed eager to reinforce the ANZl;.C presence as an 
aid to the Malaysian and Singaporean governments. The protection of 
modernising governments fTom disruptive insurgencies was seen as a 
legitimate aid to the promotion of economic growth in the. area. 
The Labour Party disavowed any link now between this goal and New 
Zealand's security. The Labour Party did not envisage New Zealand 
forces taking part in the suppression of insurgency, but as ac-ting 
as a deterrent to it and boosting the morale of the host government 
thereby. If the objectives were shared with the Nationalists, some 
means to them were not. Kirk as early as 1967 was suggesting formal 
bi-lateral links with Malaysia and Singapore as regards defence, a 
policy not favoured by the National government, which preferred the 
traditional policy of linking formally with South-east Asian countries 
only in concert with Great Powers .• In office after 1972, the Labour 
Party was also prepared to contribute to Singapore • s defence •·li thout 
Australian support, a policy reject.ed by the National Party government 
in 1968. In approach to policy implementation, Kirk put Ne\\r Zec.land 
on an independent path, but his actual policies were basically a 
continuation of those of t\-ienty years before .. 
The Labour Party's reaction to the 1967 announcement of 
Britain's withdra\val from South-east Asia was, like the National 
Party's, one of regret. Defence spokesman Faulkner said in the 
House of Representatives in Nay that nnobody in the country 11 could 
be happy at the proposal of the British government to wit.lldra>; 
militarily from Sou-th-east Asia. 
"It is not merely a ques·c1on of military defence, but also 
of Britain's skill and experi~Ece, and the trust for British 
people among those in this art;:a. The stability in the area 
that this means is of very great importance, both to that 
area and to us down here in Ne,.,~ Zealand n • 1 
Faulkner's view of what ensured stabili"cy, as >Tell as his 
conviction that stability in the area was importa~t for New Zealand, 
shm·md that he shared the basic strategic assumptions of National 
Party policy. As Faulkner saw it, New Zealand had to take every 
care to ensure that it made no decision that could 11 Confirm and 
hasten" the withdra>1al of British influence in South-east Asia. 
Specifically, he referred to the run-dmm of New Zealand • s contribution 
to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve to provide a force for Vietnam. 
(In March, 1967, after the end of Confrontation, one company from the 
New Zealand Infantry Battalion stationed in Malaysia had been sent to 
Vietnam. See Chapter 11, p.444), 
1 N. z. P. D. vol. 350 1 p721 1 19 Hay 1 1967 
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'
1£.1y fear is that, for :no real nilitc:.ry ga:i.n, the trfu"l.sferring 
of some cf our forces from the Com..'Tion\-Jealth Strategic Reserve 
will stre!1gthen the arg-urr:ent of the people in the United 
Kingdom who want their troops and Bri·tish influence removed 
from that arean .. 
Faulkner claimed that if Britain did go through with its withdra•,;al, 
11 it will cost !-lew Zealand a great deal mor:e ·to have the same degree 
of security she enjoys at present 11 .. The implication v:as that Nev1 
Zeala."ld 't'lould have to increase its forces in Malaysia .. 
Party Leader Kirk reiterated Faulkner's fear in October, after 
a further infantry company from the battalion had been sent to Vietnr.un .. 
The battalion was then at half normal strength. 
". .. let me suggest that if the Government is anxious to keep 
Britain in Asia - a.>d it should be - a very good starting 
point would be the maintenance of the agreement it made with 
Britain in that respec:t, instead of dismantling this arrange-
ment premat.urely" .. 2 
Kirk claimed that by depleting the Strat.egic Reserve, the 
'government was encouraging Britain to proceed 'dth her plans to 
I 
leave Asia. 
"We are in fact saying to Britain: We no longer need you 
there; we are prepared to withdraw from the Cow~onwealth 
Strategic Reserve" .. 
Kirk said that if the United Kingdom withdrew~rom South-east Asia, 
t-1-:le American situation in that region would become completely untenable: 
the United Staces would not be able tb maintain its military presence 
in that part of the world, and the whole balance of poNer would shift 
in consequence .. He concluded: 
"From Net.'l Zealand • s point of view, the maintenance of the 
United Kingdom's military presence in that area is of vital 
importance". 
2 N.Z.P.D. vol. 353, p3679, 26 October, 1967 
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Nevertheless, Kirk had already begun to formulate Labourts 
view of \•lhat New Zealnnd 1 s response to a British v-rithdrawal should be. 
In May, 1967, he said that New Zealand had to seize the responsibility 
and initiative .in providing for the maintenance of peace and stability 
throughout the area that most vitally affected it, and suggested the 
formation of new pacts of regional defence and treaties of mutual 
assis·tance between the countries of the region and Ne..,., Zealand and 
Australia. Kirk looked forward to 
"the banding together of the small countries in pacts 
and treaties of mutual assistance \<ihich require us to 
accept responsibility for assisting in their defence" .. 3 
In August, in the Supply debates, Kirk raised the matter again. 
New Zealand, he affirmed, had a r0sponsibility to contribute t.o the 
'stability of South-east Asia, but no greater or lesser responsibility 
than that of ~~e countries situateC there. New Zealand should start 
to investigate and carry forward the idea of concluding arrangements 
1 
<1ith countries such as Malaysia and Singapore that .,-ould involve 
them in providing more manpower for the stabilisation and defence 
of the region, even if it meant assistance with equipment from New 
Zealand. 4 
The announcement of the accelerated British <1ithdrawal Cfuue 
while the Leader of the Opposition >~as in the United Kingdom. 
From Scotland it was reported that Kirk had described British Prime 
Minister's statement of January 16, 1968 as 11 extrernely disappointing". 
It was a matter of serious conce~ll to New Zealand, he said, that 
circumstances had not permitted a substru1tial revision of British 
policy. 5 Kirk's reaction was ve~y similar to Holyoake's, since the 
3 N.Z.P.D. vel. 350, p673, 18 May, 1967 
4 N.Z.P.D. vol. 352, p2l38, 8 August, 1967 
s Dominion, January 19, 1968, pl 
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Labour Party as well as the National Party ; . ;anted an indefinite 
British presence in ~1al3.ysia. 
Some days after his initial statentent on the Vlilson 
announcement, Kirk, from London:- outlined th6 Ne·v.1 Zealand Labour 
Party~ s policy response to British v1i thdrawal G New Zealand should 
stay on militarily in Malaysia after 1971, but seek to have the 
British contribution replaced by Halaysia and Singapore themselves, 
or by Australia. Kirk said that diplomatic initiatives should be 
taken with t.he objective of mair-taining a.""! allied ground force of 
brigade strength at Terendak, the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve's 
base camp. 6 New Zealand should be irr.mediately seeking a conference 
with Australian, Malaysian and Singaporean government representa~iv8s 
to discuss the formation of a ne>~ amy unit in the place of the 
Commonwealth Brigade when it >Tas disbanded in 1971. 
.. It should be possible for a brigade to be maintained at 
Terendak without any great financial burden being placed 
on Netv Zealand 11 , 
he said. 7 The first step towards this goal would be the recall of 
the two infantry companies in Vietnam. Kirk believed that New 
Zealand had an interest in l~alaysia' s security and that that security 
>Jas being undemined by British decisions. New Zealand should 
therefore withdra" from Vietnam to protect its Malaysian interest. 
"Security arrangements for Sin"gapore and Malaysia should 
have first call on New Zealand's military forces. New 
Zealand's imrr£diate -needs made it doubly-desirable to 
treat the situation in Singapore and Malaysia as one 
demanding urgent priority rating far above the Vietnam 
conflict", 
6 Dominion, January 29, 1968, p3 
7 Ibid. 
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he said~ Kirk also looked to\\?ards a ne\'7 formal security pact with 
Malaysia and Singa_pore as part of a. new regional defence groUping 
that he hoped would replace the South-east Asia Treaty Organisation. 
The new British policy had made SE~~':I'O more ineffective than before. 
11 There are now opportunities for the establishment of new 
regional groupings and treatie.s of friendship and mutual 
assistance between small countries in the South Pacific 
and South-east Asia which hold valuable prospects for the 
future 11 • 8 
After leaving the United Kingdom, the Opposition Leader called 
at Singapore fo::c discussions with Lee Kuan Yew. 
In February came the Tet offensive in Vietnam and the 
resultant .American moves to reconsider their involvement: the bombing 
halt, the standing down of President JolL~son, and the entering into 
peace negotiations. 
V.1hen the Labour Party• s annual conference came around in Hay, 
1968, Kirk and the party leadership had to face down a re~it that 
would have prevented a Labour government sending troops to Malaysia 
after British withdrawal from the area. The conference had already 
voted against a continuing New Zealand meniDership in the South-east 
Asia Treaty Organisation. Dr M.E.R. Bassett,-the Chairman of the 
Auckland Regional Council of the party, proposed that the party oppose 
any extension of New Zealand's commitment to Malaysia and Singapore 
beyond 1971. It took what the correspondent of the Otago Dai~y Times 
described as a "last-ditch" stand by Kirk and Sir Walter ·Nash to 
prevent the passage of Bassett's remit. 9 In his speech the Labour 
leader said: "This is the last thing we ought to do". 10 He 
8 Dominion, January 29, 1968, p3 
O.D.T. May 9, 1968, pS 
10 O.D.T. (parliamen·tary reporter) May 13, 1968, p4 
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emphasised Nev; Zealand's responsibility to the Social Democratic 
states of Asia, such as Singaporeo ~"las the Labour Party to desert 
them, he asked? 11 FollO\dng Kirk's speech, the conference rejected 
the Bassett remit by 385 votes to 221. 
It seems 1 however, that the strength of grass root.s party 
feeling at the party conference had w< effect on some members of ti1e 
parliamentary party, for by the time Parliament reassembled a month 
later, in June, the party line appeared to have been modified from 
the Kirkian enthusiasm for commitment. 
Labour, it seemed, was against an increased New Zealand 
contribution, and for a phased withdrawal of New Zealr...nd 1 s forces. 
Faulkner, the Front-bench defence spokesman, said in July, 1968: 
11 V'Jhile Singapore and Malaysia are undergoing this rather 
painful period of readjustment from both an economic and 
a security point of view, I believe we ought to stay there 1 
but not in any increased numbers" s 
In principle, hm.-1ever, he was for withdrawal. 
"This is not the time for us to suddenly call all our troops 
back from Malaysia; it is a time for us to .• do it by 
arrangement and by planning. Let us .•• tell these people 
that there is a time limit to our presence there. Surely 
we do not want to have New Zealanders overseas indefinitely. 
If these people want ti1eir independence,- ••• ti1en a part of 
it is gradually to accept responsibility for meeting their 
own security requirements. Let us help them to do all 
tioose things, and then let us get. out and come back to defend 
our own country" . 1 2 
Faulkner no>r seemed to be all for a 'Fortress New Zealand' 
concept. Ne'V.T Zealand 1 s pre sene~ in £.1alaysia \'las valid orily in a 
British context. He saw that context as having outlived its useful-
ness. l>lho, he asked, was likely to attack the Malaysians? 
11 Rowlands, l1.C. "The 1968 Labour Party Conference", New ZeaZand 
MonthZy Review, June, 1968, p6 
12 N.Z.P.D. val. 355, pp557-558, 17 July, 1968 
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Rq.J. Tizardr the party spokesman on finance, questioned that 
there was any vacuum to fill, and that the British \Vere a necessary 
pa~·t of the Sm.J.th-east Asian scene. He also believed that plugging 
the British gap was :much beyond New Zealand's resources. 
"If we realise that Britain is going for economic reasons 
how much more futile is it for us to talk of New Zealand, 
or New Zealand and Australia, stepping in to fill this so-
called vacuum?" 13 
P.A. Amos agreed: 
" ... it is quite obvious that it is impossible for Australia 
and New Zealand to take over the role that has been played 
by Britain over the centuries; and to suggest that we could 
even partly do that would be totally unrealistic". 14 
In November, in Parliament, when Holyoake reiterated that 
New Zealand would leave its forces in the region until 1971, Kirk 
said that he would like to make it clear thc.t the Labour Party welcomed 
the statement that the Prime Minister had made. 
"We believe that, as a Commonwealth country 1 we have a 
duty to 11alaysia and the adjacent country of Singapore 
that tra'lscends any commitments v1e may have in other 
areas in South-east Asia. For this reason, we welcome 
the decision to maintain roughly a similar contribution 
to that we have been making over the years in Malaysia, 
up to the end of 1971. I would say too that, as far as 
members on this side of L~e House are concerned, we hope 
it is possible to arrive speedily at a firm plan as to 
the nature of developments after 1971 •• " 
Kirk went on to say that he assumed that it was purely an interim 
decision not to restore the battalion to full strength in Malaysia, 
and that after the Vietnam War had ended - supposing that to be 
sooner than 1971 - the part of the battalion in Vietnam would be 
restored to Malaysia. 15 
13 N.Z.P.D. vol. 355, p563, 17 July, 1968 
14 N.Z.P.D. vol. 355, p571, 17 July, 1968 
15 N.Z.P.D. vol. 358, p3219, 20 November, 1968 
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In February, 1969, came the decision by the government to 
retain New Zealand's forces in Malaysia after 1971~ The Labour 
Party's reaction was one of approval. The Leader of the Opposition 
said on March 8 that there were good reasons for continuing to lend 
a helping hand in Malaysia and Singapore, and that the decision to 
keep limited forces in the area a·t the pleasure of those countries 
was "sensible in the circumsta..Ylces'1 .. Kirk's criticism was that 
New Zealand should have decided, as well, to apply itself more 
diligently and effectively to constructive assistance that would 
promote development and stability, so that "conditions can eventually 
be created which would make it unnecessary for New Zealar1d' s military 
forces to be stationed in those co1mtries" .. 16 
In May, 1969, however, there were race riots in Kuala Lumpur, 
which led to a good deal of uneasiness in the party. Faulkner in 
Parliament in Jur...e expressed the worry that the presence of Corrunon-
iwealth troops in Halaysia might be encouraging the Halaysian govern-
ment to resist measures of reform. He urged the Prime Minister to 
make it very clear to the Malaysian government that New Zealand troops 
would not be used in internal disorders. 
"Do not let Malaysia and singapore think that they •lill be,· 
because the possibility exists that if they think they will 
be propped up by our troops, they will ignore their duty as 
Governments to their people". 
Faulkner was all for leaving the Malaysians alone to work out their 
ot. .. "'Il destiny. He predicted that there would be a struggle between 
the poor majority in Malaysia and those who had become affluent at 
their expense, and feared that New Zealand troops could get mixed 
16 Dominion, Harch 8, 1969, p2 
5J.O. 
up in it. 'I'·his new, harsh vim;., of Nalaysian society ~,.,;as in complete 
cOntrast to Holyoake's claim that Nalaysia was a model of stability 
and social p:r·ogress \•Thich Ne\v Zealand had a11 interest in preserving. 
Faulkner declared: 
11 
••• there should be a steady reduction of our forces and 
the training of additional Malaysian replacements to look 
after their O'tm security". 
New Zealand, however, should provide the money for these replacements, 
because economically a great burden \\TO:Ild be transferred to the Malaysicm 
government. Labour's defence spokesman finished by attacking the 
Prime Minister for not mentioning an end to New zealand's military 
presence, and. by warning the Ha.laysian government to put its house 
in order. 
" Malaysia and Singapore should understand that whi.le we 
want to be friends with them • · •• they must 10easure up in 
seeing i:hat their wealth .. is shared among a.ll their peoples 
• • Until they measure up to this basic British concept .• 
they cannot expect and ought not to expect support from New 
Zealand forces to prop them up". 17 
The party's Justice spokesman, A.M. Finlay, noted that the 
Malaysian government was trying to explain a.way something of entirely 
internal origin as something externally instigated, not for the first 
time. Finlay said: 
"I should like to see us, as a condition of our even 
remaining there, make a requirement en the current regime 
in Malaysia that it will give proper representation of 
all spheres of life - economic, political, and others 
to the races as they are divided in that land". 18 
He reminded the Prime Minister that he, Holyoake, had stated earlier 
in the year that there was no question of the involvement of New 
Zealand security forces in internal security problems, and that the 
Leader of the Opposition had gone on record as supporting that staterr2nt. 
17 N.Z.P.D. vel. 360, pp538-539, 4 June: 1969 
18 N.Z.P.D, vol. 360, pp559-560, 4 June, 1959 
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1rhe following day Finlay accused the Go-,rermnent of Nalaysia of 
ha:vint.;J developed a dangerous persecution complex .. He said that in 
his view ·the repressive policies of that government were more likely 
to cause problems of civil strife than prevent them as the Malaysian 
government claimed. 
nit is \>;ell-known, of course, that Communists, and 
particularly the Chinese Corrrrnunists, are not averse 
to fishing in troubled waters, and they could create 
the very evil that the Tunku is pret.ending to combat 
at present". 19 
Labourts spokesman on Agriculture, 1rl .. E .. Rawling, stated that 
New Zealand had a real concern that her troops were in the midst of 
a steady worsening 1-'lalaysian domestic si tua"l.:ion, \vi th no indication 
of the:i.r role if the situation came to a climax. In the same spe~ch, 
hm·mver, Rowling also harked back to the old Labour theme of leavir:g 
Malaysia in the lurch by despatching troops to Vietnam. 
"What will the people of Malaysia think of us if "'e are 
unable ·to fulfil our obligations as a result of the 
dispersal of our limited military resou::!:"ces? 1120 
Rawling's speech indicated two conflicting strands in Labour's 
thinking about the Malaysian commitment: the traditional desire 
to support a Commonwealth ally set against a deep suspicion of backing 
an undemocratic government. 
This >Jas the first time that Labour leaders had publicly 
questioned ·the substance of the Commonwealth obligation. Malaysia 
>Jas no longer, it seemed, \iorthy automatically of New Zeal.and support 
because it was a 'British• country. The race riots had pushed some 
19 N.Z.P.D. vol. 360, p590, 5 June, 1969 
20 N.Z.P.D. vel. 360, p617, 5 Jnne, 1969 
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senior Labour me't.'1.bers i.t'lto publicly accusing Halaysia of not 
practising the Corn.monweo.ltJ1 ideals of democracy~ 
In July came the annormcement of the Nixon doctrine, which 
formed the background_ for a Kirk call the next yea.r for a reappraisal 
of Ne11 Zealand's policies. In Parlia~ent in April, 1970, the Labour 
leader stated that >1ithdrawal of both Britain and the United States 
from South-east Asia. would mean a change in the balance of power in 
that area, and tha·t that, in turn, would mean a fresh look a·t New 
Zealru1d's policies. Kirk did admit to continuing to support the 
interim retention of those forces. 
11 
•• much as v;e support the re·tention of some New Zealanders 
in that area, we would be extremely unrealistic not to 
realise that the decision of a single friend" - [p!."esu."Uably 
Malaysia] - 11 some time in the future could even radically 
change the policy". 21 
Faulkner in this debate wanted Ne\V' Zeala"1d to make provision 
;for eventual \V'ithdra\..;al, reiterating his position of the previous 
I 
year. 
"I am one of those who believes that these countries have 
to be informed that in due course we expect our troops to 
be brought home to defend New Zealand, and that they must 
get to a stage where they can look after their own security .• " 2 2 
The Defence spokesman said that the troops were in a very dangerous 





"Militarily, our forward presence in South-east Asia should 
be a reluctant one, a temporary situation to be ended as 
soon as Malaysian and Singaporean capability enables our 
withdrawal to be carried out without endangering the security 
. or stability of our South-east Asian partners. I believe 
New Zealand's defence forces should be totally domiciled at 
home, and that our overseas military commitments should be 
restricted to defensive alliances of immediate application 
to New Zealand •• " 23 
N.Z.P.D. vol. 365, p504, 16 April, 1970 
N.Z.P.D. vol. 365, pSll, 16 Ap!:il, 1970 
N.Z.P.D. vol. 365, p549, p April, 1970 
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The strongest statement on the subject was made, perhaps 
inevitably, by a backbencher, J.J.... Hunt .. In his list of policies 
for New Zealand in the nineteen-seventies, he said New Zeala..'"ld should 
abandon its idea of forward defence in Malaysia and Singapore by 
phasing out the troop presence there in the next two or three years. 
New Zealand could not be defended any more effectively from Singapore 
·than it could from its otm shores. Halaysia and Singapore, he said, 
were independent countries and should \\TOrk out their 0¥.111 future~ 
24 
Hunt did not seem to be as concerned with the fate of the Halaysian 
and Singaporean governments as some of his colleagues. New· Zealand, 
in his viet'l, had no role in stabilising Malaysia. 
The question of the withdrawal of troops from the region 
r.eappeared at the Labour Party conference of Hay, 1970. Hunt moved 
that the party pledge to negotiate for a withdrawal of troops when 
it became the government in 1972, but this remit was rejected. In 
presenting his moticn, Hunt said: 
"I feel this remit needs to be carried. If a bush-fire 
[sic] war developed ..• and New Zealand was asked to supply 
troops, we "'ould be putting troops in an area where they 
would not be wanted". 25 
Hunt seemed afraid that New Zealand could find itself eventually in 
another Vietnrun situation - with its troops aiding the status-quo 
·faction in a- Civil War. The Malayan emergency could well break out 
again on a bigger scale. Hunt's vie'< was supported at the conference 
by the framer of the 1968 Halaysian remit, H.E.R. Bassett, who saic 
that by having troops in that region, New Zealand could be said to 
be delving into a domestic situation.
26 In view of the British 
24 N.Z.P.D. vol. 365, p566, 17 April, 1970 
25 Christahu:Pah Star (Wgtn. reporter) 6 Nay, 1970 
2 6 Ibid. 
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t.vithdrawal from Sout.t'!-east Asia 1 and American and P~ustralian VJith-
drav.:ral from Sout.h Vietnam, New Zealand \1ould be left alone as the 
sole Western state fighting for local governments. 
The conservative view, which turned out to be the majority 
one at the conference, \<as put by C.M. Bennett, who had been the 
Second Labour governmen.t•s High Commissioner in Halaya. He said 
that Commonwealth troops had been in Halaya to prevent a Co:m."Uunist 
resurgence. It had to be taken for granted that Communist threats 
throughout South-east Asia had to be guarded against. 
rr•he troops in Malaysia were there in a peace-keeping role, 
Bennett said, and their presence was a way of helping fellow members 
of l:he Commonwealth. 27 
The conference considered another remit which proposed that 
a Labour government should not withdraw New Zealand troops from 
Malaysia and Singapore without full consultations with the govern-
ments concerned. The remit also suggested, however, that a Labour 
government should not keep the troops in the area longer tha~ 
necessary, and that the position be reviewed and analysed with the 
goverrJnents concerned from time to time. Kirk spoke in support of 
this motion. He said that if the current treaty with Malaysia were 
broken - am1 presumably he was speaking of the formal association 
with the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement - there would be little 
prospect of concluding other treaties with that country, and treaties 
28 of regional cooperation were a necessity for the future. The 
remit was passed. 
27 ChPistchurch Star, May 6, 1970 
28 Ibid. 
S'< - .. ! .•. , D 
A month after the conference 1 in June, 1970, the Leader of 
the Opposition made. a tour of the countries of South--east Asia~ 
On his return, Kirk evinced a tolerant attitude to happenings in 
Malaysia. He told the parliamentary reporter of the Christchurch 
~ess .that democracy in Asia was likely to take on a~ entirely 
different character from its Western versions. Malaysia 1 s parlia-
mentary democracy had been stable until 1969 because it. had not been 
challenged. The challenge/ \'lhen it came, revealed that while Western-
style parliamentary democracy might be suitable for the United Kingdom 
and New Zealand, it was not necessarily relevant to a different society .. 
Y-irk felt that the governing Alliance Party in Malaysia had a sincere 
desire to return to democracy in·that country. The Leader of the 
Opposition confessed himself nsurprised a.nd relieved to find that 
Malaysia was racially far more stable than he had thought".
29 
In a report of his trip circulated to fellow Parlimnentary 
r-embers of the Labour Party, the Leader of the Opposition reported 
that there was a strong desire in both Singapore m1d Malaysia for the 
retention of the New Zealand contribution to their defence assistance. 
Although the New Zealand contribution was not large, he said, tangible 
benefits were derived from the presence. 
"These forces cannot and will not be used in connection with 
any domestic trouble and there .is no sign of any external 
situation that would lead to their involvement. But it is 
not the use that is important. It is the presence. It 
broadens the relationships between both countries, demonstrates 
the determination to maintain political stability, and leads 
to greater confidence and cooperation within the community as 
\ITell as in inter-country affairs". 3 0 
29 Press, July 10, 1970 
30 New Zealand Labour Part;y Jou:t>nal, November, 1970, p53 
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Kirk, then acc~pted the governrnentts rationale for a continuing 
troop presence. 
The same month that Kirk had made his tour had seen a general 
election take place in Britain, with the return of the Conservative 
Party to office. The Conservatives caw£ to power eighteen months 
before the last British troops were scheduled to leave Malaysia, 
and they immediately instituted a review of the situation. In 
April, 1971, it was decided that Britain would leave a battalion 
of infantry in Malaysia permanently, to maintain the Commonwealth 
Brigade at full strength - three ba·ttalions. It was also decided 
that Britain would come to a new defence agreement with Malaysia 
and Singapore that would include New Zealand and Australia as equal 
partners. 
Kirk, of course, was in favour of a. ne't'T agreement, but no 
details had been settled when the Labour Party convened its fifty-
fifth annual conference in ~lay, 1971. ~No remits concerning 
regional defence were presented. Remit 29(b) asked that the party 
state that no New Zeal~~d armed forces would be stationed on foreign 
territory in a military capacity except as part of a United Nations 
force, or in so far as it was directly necessary in the interests 
of New Zealand's national security, or where it was clearly required 
under any treaty obligation. 31 
The International and Defence Committee recommended that the 
conference cut out the middle phrase ["in so far as it is directly 
necessary in the interests of New Zealand t s national securityn,] but 
31 New zealand Labcur Party, Report of the 55th Conference, p40. 
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otherwise endorse the remit. rrhe middle phrase deprived the remit 
of the tight.>1ess and meruling it had. In approving the new version, 
the conference showed itself in favour of withdrav;ing the New Zealand 
force from Singapore unless the new agreement made it obligatory that 
they stay. The Left-wing was not satisfied with this loop-hole, and 
moved Wl w~endment that no New Zealand forces be stationed on foreign 
territory in any capacity except as part of a Uuited Nations force. 
This was lost. The party as a \<'Jhole was prepared to leave troops in 
Singapore if the new agreement specifically called for it. A second 
remit called for a New Zealand withdra\1al from all regional military 
pacts and defence alliances. The conference would not endorse this. 
In a speech on foreign policy to the Auckland branch of the 
New Zealand Institute of International Affairs in June, 1971, however, 
Kirk cast doubt on the usefulness of the Five-Pov1er defence arrange-
ments to New Zealand. He said that the continuance of any Five-Power 
arrangement :vould not be related to New Zealand's needs but to the 
wishes of Malaysia and Singapore, which could change at any time. 
In the wake of changes in Great Power rela·tionships with Asia, New 
Zealand had no effective collective security measures in force, and 
no alternative policies to fill the gap. Kirk thought that New 
Zealand should welcome the opportunity provided by the changes to 
develop new arrangements with Asian countries, based not on collective 
security, but on regional economic development. To do this, New 
Zealand needed to demonstrate to Asia its involvement in Asian problems 
and in Asian affairs. 32 
' 2 Kirk, N. New Zeal-and and Its Neighbours, pp5, 9 and 12. 
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1J.lhe new Five-Power Agree!T!ent {ANZU-:'<.) that emerged in 
Noveinber, 1971 did not oblige the Australasia:n and British participants 
t:o maintain forces in Malaysia and Singapore. The Labor Party in 
Australia announced that if it came to power it would withdraw Australia~ 
troops from Singapore. In a Nm.'l· Zealand Broadcasting Corporation 
'Point of View 1 programme in November, 1971, Kirk was asked by the 
compere if the New Zealand Labour Party's policy was the same as that 
of the Australian Labor Party. Kirk said that it was not. He said 
that the party had said that it «Ould maintain New Zealand's contribut-
ion as long as the governments of Singapore and Malaysia desired it, 
and as long as the presence was of some material benefit in assisting 
to maintain stability in the region. 3 3 Stability, it appeared, 
depended on a climate of confidence which the troops could promote. 
Their role was likened to that of a policeman on the beat, giving 
reassurance: 
" ••• the fact that he's there gives a little more confidence 
in a situation where relationships on a racial basis become 
strained 11 • 
Because he regarded that reassurance as important, Kirk said: 
"I have no difficulty whatever in accepting that a request 
from two other Commonwealth countries should be met". 
Kirk did concede that he did not regard the arrangement as permanent 
or long-lasting. 34 
At the 1972 annual conference of the party, in May, Remit l2(e} 
proposed that the next Labour government negotiate with th~ goyernments 
33 New Zealand Labour Party Research Unit Files - Transcript, 'Point 
of View' Broadcast, 7 November, 1971, p49 
34 New Zealand I,abour Party Research Unit Files - Transcript, 'Point 
of Vie~r' Broadcast, November 7, 1971, p49 
' 
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of Malaysia and Singapore for a finn date for the withdrawal of 
New Zea.land' s armed forces from those countries. The International 
Affairs and Defence Committee was unhappy with the call for a ufirrn 11 
date, but apparently eager to endorse the principle of withdrawal. 
The Committee recommended ti1at the remit be amended to read: 
"that the next Labour govermnent negotiate with the 
Gover~~ents of Malaysia ar,d Singapore for a mutually 
acceptable date for the withdrawal of New Zealand armed 
forces from those countries 11 • 3 5 
In Parliament in August, senior Labour spokesmen follO'\'led 
this line up •lith an effort to get the government to put a time limit 
on the presence of the Nevi Zealand force in Singapore. Defence 
spokesman Faulkner asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs to elaborate 
on the govern..rnent 1 s statement that the forces in Singapore \-vere there 
to assist Malaysia and Singapore achieve self-sufficiency in defence:, 
and to tell the House the expected date of the achievement of that 
goal. 36 
I 
llolyoake replied that there was no target date. Faulkner 
,then made the point. that the achievement of self-sufficiency could 
not be taken as a guide to the time of return of the New Zealand troops 
in the area. 
C.F. Noyle, the party's spokesman on Agriculture, asked Holyoake: 
"Is it not a fact that New Zealand has not intimated in ar..y 
way to either Malaysia or Singapore any terminating date for 
the presence of New Zealand forces in that area?" 
llolyoake said that that was true. 37 
35 New Zealand Labour Party, Report of the 56th ilnnuaZ Conference, p53 
36 N.Z.P.D. vol. 379, pl413, 2 August, 1972 
37 N.Z.P.D. vel. 379, pl414, 2 August, 1972 
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The 1972 election policy manifesto of the Labour Party, 
released in October of that year, reflected the conference line of 
fixing a date for the bringing home of the troops, and thus nudged 
the party's policy closer to that of the Australian Labor Party. 
The manifesto declared that the party, if elected, would, in consult-
ation with the treaty countries, establish a reasonable date for the 
return home of New Zealand forces from Malaysia and Singapore.
38 
After the election of the Labour Pa.r'cy to power in Noverober, 
1972, the new Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs made i·t 
clear in an interview that this date was really dependent on the 
governments of Singapore and Malaysia. He told the correspondent 
of the Waira1•apaTimes-Age that New zealand would withdra•• its troops 
"at a mutually convenient date, and this will revolve around the 
wishes of those two governments". 
3 9 This casual attitude to the 
troops in Malaysia was at marked variance with the party's determined 
attitude towards the army training teams in South Vietnam. One of 
the new government's first acts in the foreign policy field was to 
announce the withdrawal of the teams. There was no qualification 
concerning the wishes of the two governments concerned - Cambodia and 
the Republic of Vietnam. Faulkner, who was now Minister of Defence, 
said on December 11 that negotiations were in train to establish dates 
when the teams could be released from their responsibilities and that 
it was hoped to have the servicemen back by Christmas.
40 The Minister 
said that it was no longer government policy to provide military assist-
ance to South Vietnam. 
38 New Zealand Labour Pc>.rty, 1972 Election Manifesto, p29 
39 Waira:t'apa Times-Age, December 27, 1972, pl3 (In Labour Party Research 
Unit Files) 
40 New Zealand Fore1:gn Affairs Review, December 1972, p35 
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In the Lat-our governnent 1 s first statement of foreign policy aims, 
issued on Decerr.ber 22r it 'tYas declared that Nev1 Zealand would henc:eforth 
be more self-reliant an.d pursue a more independent foreign policy. 
111Jaturally we shall \Vork in partnership with those who share 
our aims. But our decisions and actions must be our o"~· 
Our policy will be a policy of independer.ce". 41 
The Australia."l Labor government which had been elected on 
December 2 was pledged to remove Australia.n ground forces from Singapore. 
Although the New Zealand Labour Party's platform suggested that it sa" 
this as an admirable aim, Party leader Kirk had consistently indicated 
that he was willing for New Zealand forces to remain. The availability 
of logistical support for the New Zealand force was a factor in its 
continuing viability, and ·this, after the British run·-down, was supplied 
by the Australians .. Thus with logistical support about to be denied 
the remaining ANZUK ground force, the New Zealand government had three 
options open to it in regard to the Singapore force. It could accept 
the Australian decision as binding on its own ~"1d withdraw the New 
Zealand contingent; it could try and persuade the Australian govern-· 
ment to change its mind and retain at least the support elements of 
the grou."1d force in Singapore; or it could arrange to provide its 
own .supporting forces. The second option was the logical starting 
point in an independent New Zealand approach to South-east Asia, ~~d 
the evidence points to the fact that Kirk took it up. 
41 "New Zealand in the World of the 1970s," N.Z.F •. 4..R., December, 1972, 
pl2 
.S22w 
As one of his first acts in the foreign policy field, Kirk 
.invited Anstrc..lian Prime Minister tvhi tlam to confer 1'ti·th him in 
New Zealand~ The Australian Prime Minister duly came over in late 
January. TI1e official communique issued at the end of the visit 
conspicuously avoided a statement on the future of Australian ~1d 
New Zealand forces in Singapore, noting only that the future disposition 
of the forces had been discussed, and that each government would cons~lt 
with the other partners in the Five-Power defence arrangements. 42 
The two Prime Ministers did, however, acknowledge the importance of 
maintaining stability and confidence in the area while the countries 
there were adjusting to the end of the Vietnam war and the change in 
Great Po>~er relationships. 
On February 5, the Australian Prime Hinister announced that 
Australia's 600-man support 9roup would stay in Singapore after the 
infantry battalion departed in January, 1974. 43 
' 
A London Times commentator, Robert Jackson, wrote i.-. March 
that it was a "striking feature" of the relationship between Australia 
and New Zealand that in the main areas of divergence between their 
views, which included the Comrnont.\7ealth Five-Power Defence Arrangement, 
"Mr Kirk's moderate and pragmatic counsels seemed to have 
helped win the Australians over from some of the more 
extreme positions they espoused before and after the elections" ." 4 
Britain's Defence Minister, Lord carrington, visited New 
Zealand at the end of January in an endeavour to persuade the Labour 
government not to withdraw the New Zealand contingent from Singapore, 
~ 2 N.Z.F.A.R. January, 1973, pp7-8 
'' 
3 Camilleri, J .A. An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy p96 
44 ,. 
~ unes (London), !-larch 27, 1973, pl6 
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and was given the assurances he sought. After tt•m days' discussion 
with Kirk, carrington said that Britain intended to continue its 
current contribution to the Five-Power Defence AY'rangement, and nr am 
delighted to hear that the New Zealand Government intends to do co~ too 11 ;s 
Carrington went on to Canberra, where Whitlam was committed to 
removing the Australian infantry battalion, but tentatively prepared 
to leave the logistics component ·that serviced both the New Zealand 
and British contingents. Carrington publicly warned the Australian 
government that if this were withdrawn too, Britain would have to 
reassess its own contribution. 46 
In the middle of February, New Zealand 1 s Minister of Defence, 
Faulkner, announced formally that New Zealand would maintain at 
current levels its forces stationed at Singapore. 
"We have now had time and opportunity to co:J.sider the vier..;s 
of our partners on the future of our forces in Singapore. 
We have agreed that the Governments of Malaysia and singapore 
welcome their presence and appreciate the assistance they can 
continue .to give ·during this transitional period in v1hich 
these two countries are building up and strengthening their 
own armed forces". 47 
Faulkner made no mention of any intention to settle on a 
withdrawal date. He went on to welcome the Australian government's 
decision to leave the forces from all three of its services in Singapore, 
because it made it easier for New Zealand to maintain its own forces 
in Singapore. Faulkner's use of the word "easier" indicated that 
even if tl1e Australian decision had gone the other way, New Zealand would 
continued to keep its force in Singapore. Australia's decision had 
45 Times, February 1, 1973, p6 
46 Times, February 5, 1973, p6 
47 N.Z.F.A.R. February, 1973, p31 
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just made New Z-ealand's more easy to carry out~ The Defence Mjnister 
sa.id that New Zea.lcmd also nwarmly welcornedu Bri·tain 1 s decision to keep 
forces in Singapore. The Minister's only concession to the future was 
to say that the: presence of New Zealand forces in the region V.Jould be 
revie\·led from time to time in the light of local needs and the develop-
ing regional situation~ 
The London Times correspondent in \·/ellington claimed that 
Faulkner's statement reflected "the success of representations I!l.ade 
by Lord Carrington", 48 but it seems more likely that Carrington had 
been preaching to the converted. The New Zealand government had 
already declared that it did not intend to be influenced against its 
interests, anO. it was the Australian presence, rather than the British, 
that was the more important to New Zealand's continuing presence. 
Whi·tla!n' s visit in the previous ;.reek >Jas likely ·to have had more 
bearing on New Zealand's policy than arty British pleas. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, there had also been Faulkner's consult-
ations with the Malaysians and Singaporeans themselves. 
At the end of March, Faulkner left New Zealand for personal 
discussions with the governments of several South-east Asian countries. 
During these talks 1 the Minister was made atvare of the strength of 
Singaporean desire for a continued Western military presence. The 
discussions also led the government to adopt a new policy emphasis: 
a drive to strengthen bi-lateral relations with South-east Asian 
countries, as a necessary promotion of regional cooperation. In 
his introduction to the Annual Report of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs for 1973, Kirk explained .the new line. New Zealand, he said, 
>Jante<l. to see new regional arrangements that ;.;auld unite the people 
48 Times, February 16, 1973 
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of Asia and stren9then their g·overnments~ However, consultations 
wit..~ the governments had shown. tha·t they were not yet ready fol: wider 
arrangements, a..'1.C. so, for the time being, 
11 We are concentrating on strengthe:11ing our relations with 
individual countries in the area, in a 'i'lay \\•hich we hope 
w·ill strengthen their confidence·· in the values of regional 
cooperationa We have met a ready response to our expressed 
wish for closer bi-lateral relations and shall lose no 
opportunity of developing t.hernu. 49 
In order to promote bi-lateral relations, New zealand had to acquiesce 
in what the South-east Asian gove~-nments wished of her: the continuing 
military presence. 
The Prime Minister's speech to the Returned Servicemen's 
Association in ,June, 1973, underlined the change in New Zealand's policy 
towards South-east Asia that the Labour government saw itself making. 
Kirk said that until recently New Zealand in South-eas·t Asia had 
continued to see itself as essentially a helper - of Britain, the 
United States or Australia. It had been part of New Zealand's 
doctrine that her contributions to the stability and development of 
South-east A.sia made sense only in the context of a collective effort 
- that New Zealand had to belong to a tea~. However, Kirk said, New 
Zealand had steadily developed her mm contact.s with the countries of 
South-east Asia, and 11 they have come to value our contributions for 
their own sake .. n 50 New Zealand efforts had come to have more 
meaning as those of a regional nation than in the context of collective 
Western efforts. 
49 A.R.M.F.A. 1973, p9, A.J.H.R. A-1 
50 Pri.me Minister's Address to the Returned Services Association, 
12 J·une, 1973, N.Z.F.A.R. June, 1973, p20 
New Zealandts interest was in preventing further conflicts in 
South-east Asiar such as Vietnam and Confrontation, that drew in other 
powers. Differences bet\';een South-east Asian nations could be 
resolved by closer association aTJ.d "'urking together. However, since 
the nations of South-east Asia Here suspicious of one another, and 
especially of China, the only way that regional cooperation betv;een 
them was going to come about was if they had confidence in the support 
of friends. Thus, if New Zealand wished to prevent further conflicts 
she had to help promote cooperation and to do this provide confidence, 
which meant assuring the South-east Asian countries of support in / 
practical terms. 
"l-lr Faulkner's discussions have confirmed that they are all 
interested in increasing co-operation with us, not only in the 
fields of economic development, investment, and trade, but also 
in that of defence". 51 
Kirk said that New Zealand's arrr~d forces had still an irnportru't 
part to play in the area in the furtherance of the long-range goal. 
Security was a major pre-occupation of all the governments of the 
area and defence cooperation was therefore of particular importance 
to them. 
51 
nThey see our willingness to maintain- forces in the area as 
evidence that we understand their problems, that we are 
serious in our desire to help them, and that we are willir.g 
to pay a price in terms of public criticism - that we are 
prepared to stand up ~~d be counted. It therefore makes 
them more willing- to listen to our views, even on questions 
about which they are very sensitive". 52 
Ibid., p22 
52 Prime Minister•s Address to the Returned Services Association, 
12 June, 1973, N.Z.F.A.R. June, 1973, p24 
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The Prime Hi.nister seemed to be suggesting that CL."1 added 
advantage of New zealand's having a troop presence in SingapcJ.~e 
\':as that it w·ould let New Zealand press effectively for domestic 
political reform in that country - a point he may have thought 
>lOuld appeal to the left-wing of his own party. 
Kirk also said that ~'l.e Five-PD\'Ier arrangement 1 ,.,hile 
ostensibly a military arrangement, was a declaration of the support 
of three nations - Britain, Australia, and New Zealand - for the 
maintenance of stability, the preservation of territorial integrity 
and the development of independence. Its value lay not in military 
forces being employed in some violent capacity, but in that 
"the presence of military forces helps create the climate 
in which no violent conflict can emerge. Thus it is a 
political instrument to which the defence services of this 
country make a remarkable contribution 11 • 53 
The Labour government's commitment to bi-lateral ties in 
defence, as well as other matters, with Asian countries 1 and its 
determination to have its o~~. independent, policy, in South-east 
Asia was illustrated in July, 1973, when the Australian government 
changed its mind under left-wing pressure and announced that with-
drawal of all Australian ground forces from srngapore by 1975 would 
be negotiated. The New Zealand govenL~ent did not take the chance 
to similarly negotiate an expedient exit, despite the fact that 
withdrawal of Australian logistical support would have provided 
adequate justification. Prime Minister Kirk said that there was no 
53 Ibid., p23 
' 
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question of Ne\·.r zeala.ll.d forces in Singapore and Malaysia being 'tvith-
drawn in the near future. Kirk said that the Malaysian and Singapore 
governments had made it clear that they vmlcomed the continued New 
zealand preser;.ce as an instrwnent to foster stability during a 
difficult transitional period, and that for its part, the government 
had indicated that it intended to keep i·ts forces in the area as 
long as they were wanted by the governments concerned. Nm< Zealand 
was studying the modifications that would need to be made to logistics 
arrangements in the light of the Australian programme. In line \·lith 
"the Government's expresser] \·lish for closer bi-lateral relations \\'ith 
countries in South-east Asian, the command and logistics arrangements 
would in future "emphasise the national character of our contribution . . 5 ~ 
A month later, in a further comment on the situation, Kirk said 
that he thought Ne>T Zealand's policy in its relationships with the 
area was the right one, although he did not mean this as a reflection 
on Australian policy. 55 While the Ne•"' Zealand force vms a military 
one, its main purpose was political: 11 tO demonstrate our concern \'lith 
the political stability of the area". The Prime I'Iinister added that 
there was evidence from "other countries" that they would be interested 
in New Zealan~'s remaining in the ANZUK grouplrig because of the 
stabilising effect. Kirk also said that the grouping was the last 
British presence in L~e region, and at a time when changes of unpredict-
able magnitude were taking place in the area, there was "a lot to be 
said for keeping things on an even keel". 56 
54 N.Z.F.A.R. July, 1973, pl7 
55 Waikato Times, August 17, 1973, p3 (N.Z.P.A. Wellington) 
56 Ibid. 
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The withdrav;al of the J\ustralians meant the end of the old 
ltNZUK Brigade, 8..i'1d while touring South-east. 11.sia at ·the end of 1973 
Kirk announced the setting up of an independent New Zeala~d co~~and. 
At a State dinner .:Ln Singapore, Kirk reiterated that the troops 
v:ould stay in Singapore for as long as they were wanted, and went 
on to make the point that Ne;v Zec.land' s interest in the stability 
of' South-east Asia ·was no· longer related to the security t..'1reats 
to Ne\,r Zealand that could arise from ir~stabili ty .. For most of the 
previous thirty years, New Zealand's leaders had vie\·;ed South-east 
Asia principally as a potential trouble--spot, as a source from 
\\7hich might come a threat to New Zealand's security 1 he said. Ne:W 
Zealand's government no longer thought in those terms. 57 Stability 
was now an end in itself - for the benefit of th? Asian c:.J.untries. 
The protection of the government from disruptive forces meant that 
economic growt.h could be promoted and thus, hopefully, the star1dard 
of living could rise. 
The Labour government's continuation of the old mili~ary 
presence policy, albeit 'dressed-up' in justifications that may have 
been tho~ght to have been more in keeping with the traditional party 
attitude, l,;ft it open to Opposition charges of changing its election 
policy. At the opening, in March, of the 1974 parlia.'nentary sessicn, 
the goverlli~ent was subjected to needling for reversing its declared 
policy with regard to the stationing of military forces overseas. 
McCready, the Opposition defence spokesman, tabled a motion noting 
11With interest" the Labour Party' n "changed attitude" and its 
57 New Zeal.and Herald, December 23, 1973, p5 
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endorsement o~ the National Party posi·tion. HcCready charged that 
the Labour manifesto had indicated to ma.."ly people that a Labour 
government would withdra.'iv its forces, and that it was 11 common knoT,.;-
ledge that this was Labour:s thinking 11 • 58 
The Labour Party struggled to refute the charge. 
R.P.B. Drayton claimed that there had been no change in policy - and 
indeed, if the manifesto t'lere ignored as something of an aberration 
and Kirk's statements taken as the sole guide to intended policy, 
then he was correct. Drayton went on to say: 
"Because Singapore and Malaysia want New Zealand's full 
participation in the five-po'i-ver defence agreement, it 
has been decided to maintain that full participation. 
Singapore and Malaysia attach considerable importance to 
this arrangement, and desire the continued presence of 
New Zealand forces in the area 1' • 59 
Drayton reiterated that New Zealand would keep the forces in Singapore 
as long· as it was the wish of the governments concerned that it do sc. 
The Opposition's J.R. Harrison said that the.leaving of the 
forces in Singapore at the pleasure of the Malaysian and Singaporean 
governments was hardly the mark of an independent policy. He made 
the pertinent point that the consultation between New Zealand and 
Singapore referred to in the Labour manifesto-was supposed to be 
consultation as to the reasonable date for the return home, "not 
consultation on whether or not they \<ould come back; that was a 
forgone conclusion". 60 
Prime Ninister Kirk struggled to answer this point. He said 
that a reasonable date had been set for the New Zealand troops to 
58 N.Z.P.D. vol. 389, p818, 13 March, 1974 
59 N.Z.P.D. vol. 389, p819, 13 March, 1974 
60 N.Z.P.D. vol. 389, p824, 13 March, 1974 
come home, but: 
11 In the circumstances, that date v-:;as no't. a C.efined calendar 
date, but a date irmnediately both governments agreed that 
stability had been achieved11 • 61 
If Australian Prime Minister Whitlam had to some extent fallen 
victim to the power of the Labor Party's left-wing in regard to 
Malaysia-Singapore, Prime Minister Kirk seemed in no such danger. 
The party conference of May, 1974, however,. proved that the Left, 
if not powerful, was still vocal. What the press described as 11 a 
strong group1162 at the conference called vociferously for the with-
drawal of New Zealand's forces by the end of 1975. One delegate 
from a youth bra.'Och described the governments of Halaysia and Singapore 
as reactionary, and accused them of suppression of freedom. A senJ.or 
member of t.he party's executive, R. Waishing 1 said that Ne¥! Zealand 
was helping to prop up a puppet government in Nalaysia. 6 3 The 
Hinister of D~fence, however, was able to dissuade the delegates 
from passing a remit calling for a definite date for ':Vithdrawal. 
He said that the New Zealand government would pass on to the gove1cn-
ments concerned 11 Criticism of their attitudes which we find unacce.pt-
able". 64 The withdrawal ~emit was lost on a hands vote, and a remit 
affiming that New Zealand's military withdrawal should be timed i.n 
consultation with defence partners in the arra.'Ogement '!as passed in 
its place. 65 
6 1 Ibid., p827 





Just at the time tha.t the Labour government ,..las being forced 
to defend its corm:n.i tment to Sing-apo~e to its supporters, it tt.'as 
foisting off a further external threat ·to ·the ANZUK conunitment. This 
time it came from the British government, •.;hich had changed again as 
a result of snap elections at the end of February, 1974. The return 
of the British Labour Party under Harold Wilson to power set the stage 
for an action replay of the negotiations be"b<een NevJ Zealand and 
Britain over British withdra\';al plans in 1968, except, of course, that 
it was now a Labour government in New Zealand asking for a continuing 
British presence. The British Labour Party was still corrmitted to 
total withdrawal from Halaysia-Singapore. By 1974, there was only 
a batt.alion of infantry left to >Tithdraw, but nevertheless the New 
Zealand goverlli~ent urged the Wilson government not to follow the 
Australians out of the Five-.Power Defence Arrangement., 66 much as the 
Holyoake government had tried to keep a much more substantial British 
i presence in the region six years previously. 
The occasion for New Zealand's representations came only four 
days after Faulkner's speech to the Labour Party conference, when the 
new British Minister of State for Defence, William Rodgers, arrived 
in Wellington to seek the government's views on the British Defence 
Review, which involved more cuts, including the Singaporean one. 
After the talks, Faulkner said that he had made it clear that New 
Zealand did not regard its presence in Singapore as an open-ended 
commitment, but that the government felt that in view of the current 
situation [not specified] New Zealand forces needed to stay in South-
east Asia a little longer. 
66 Waikato Times, May 21, 1974, p3 
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•:our vim'l7 is that the South-E:ast .P~sian area as a \•Thole 
recognises that changes are inevitable, and a.re in fact, 
in some cases, desirable~ However, we are anxious th.s.t 
these should be at an absorbable rate so the countries 
can gear themselves to look after their O\'ffi affairs" .. 6 7 
According to the Minister, then, Singapore was not yet ~geared' 
to a~aertake its own defence. Rodgers told the Press in New Zealand 
that the governments in !•lalaysia and Singapore had indicated that 
they preferred the status quo for tloe time being. He also said that 
the British decision v1ould be made by October. 
At the end of August, Norman Kirk died, and his place as 
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister was taken by W.E. Rawling, ~<ho 
had been Minister,of Finance. The Defence Ministry was taken over 
by w. Fraser, when Faulkner moved to the Ministry of Labour. In 
October, the Labour government in Britain consolidated its power 
in a further general election, and in December announced that it 
would withdraw the remaining British troops from South-east Asia. 
The New Zealand government had a second opportunity to follow its 
allies, but its reaction was the same as it had been to the Australian 
withdrawal in 1973. 
Rawling responded to the British decis±on by saying that while 
New Zealand's forces would not stay in Singapore indefinitely, they 
would remain "as long as it was in the mutual interests of both this 
country and Singapore ar1d Malaysia u. 6 8 The introduction of a mention 
of New Zealand's interest alongside that of Singapore and Halaysia 
seemed to signal a slightly more cautious attitude on Ne>T Zealand's 
6 7 Ibid. 
66 O.D.T.December 5, 1974, p7 (Wellington - N.Z.P.A.) 
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part as regards commitment. RO\IJling said: ii!•IT- Wilson info:crned me 
several days ago that the review had ended, and that a statement 
cont.aining proposals along 'b.'1ese lines ";ould be rna.de" ~ 
Zealand gove1:nment, he said, regretted ·the decision, but understood 
the considerations that lay behind it. The Prime Hinister w·ent on 
to remark that the goveiTh.-nent was pleased that Britain had reaffirmed 
its intention of upholding the consul·tative provisions of the Five-Po'\'ler 
Defence Arrangements. This, he said 1 \'Tas a 'Vlelcome indication of 
continuing British interest in the security of the region. 
It was not until Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew paid 
an informal visit to New Zealand in April, 1975, and remarked that 
Singapore no longer minded whether New Zealand forces remained or 
not that the Rowling government began to think about withdrawal. 
At a conference of the New zealand Institute of International 
Affairs in Hay, Rowling was asked if there had been any governlnental 
reassessment of New Zealand's commitment to Singapore. 
The Prime ~tinister referred directly to Lee Kuan Yew's 
statement and said: 
"This gives New Zealand reason to consider whether the 
troops should be kept in that area for any grea·t length 
of time. At this stage no timetable has been established 
for their possible return to New Zealand ••• [but] as a 
result of tbe comments of Prime Minister Lee and subsequent 
discussions, the matter will be looked at reasonably soon". 
The Prime Hinister said then that one delaying factor was the inability 
. 9 
of tbe government to accommodate the returning battalion. 6 
69 Rowling, w.E. New ZeaZ.and in an Interdependent fl'orZ.d, pl4-15 
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The announcement of the return, when it came 1 still shied away 
from a defini·te target date. "'.rhe government has decided in principle 
·that the New Zealand force in Singapore should return home to New 
Zealand in the next two years or so". The Prime ~..inister said that 
the decision had been taken after consultation with New Zealand's 
partners in the Five-Power Defence Arrangements an.d - importantly -
\'lith their concurrence. The decision - like Australia's and 
Britain's previously- did not affect New Zealand's membership of 
the Five-Power Arrangements. Rawling said that the force had been 
helpful in promoting understanding and good>Till betvmen Mala:,•sia and 
Singapore and New Zealand. It had assisted them in adjusting to 
changing circumstances during the critical early years of their 
independence. More recently, the rcle of the New Zealand forces 
had been to help Malaysia and Singapore build up their o~~ defence 
capacities. The return home of the force would not reflect any 
lessening of New Zealand's interest in the future well-being of the 
region and its stability. 70 
Conalusion 
Despite the Labour Party's divergence from the National 
Party's approach to South-east Asia in regard to the sending of troops 
to Vieb1am, the Labour Party remained corrmitted to the stationing of 
military forces in Malaysia and Singapore. During the period up to 
the government's decision to retain the force i;·1 Halaysia after the 
British departure, the Leader of the Opposition expressed support 
for a continuing and reinforced military presence. This support 
70 Evening Post, August 26, 1975 
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was reaffirmed by Kirk even after senior members of the Parliamer~i:ary 
party began to express doubts that New· Zealand troops should be seen 
to be supporting particular gover!"I~'Tlental systems overseas. •rhe 
Labour leader believed, as did the National Party leaders, that New 
Zealand had· an interest in ensuring the stability of Asia, and 
- again in common with the Nationalists - that mili·tary forces to 
promote a climate of confidence were ari acceptable means of ensuring 
this stability. Kirk, however, was not so much concerned ~1ith 
averting a security threat to New Zealand by the promotion of stability 
as in ensuring a suitable atwnsphere for ecOnomic growth for the sake 
of the South-east Jl .. sian countries themselves. 
~fuere Labour policies differed from those of National was in 
willingness to move into bi-lateral defence relationships \vith 
South-east Asian countries. Kirk, as early as 1967, had suggested 
that New Zealand should work towards a treaty of mutual assistance 
with South-east Asian countries; something that National governments 
were not eager to do without Great Power participation. When Labour 
crune to power in late 1972, Kirk revealed that the policy of station-
ing military forces in Singapore was no longer dependent on Australian 
support, as it had so conspicuously been in 1968. Kirk lobbied 
Whitlam to keep the support unit in Singapore so that the New Zealand 
battalion could be serviced, but in July, when it t-Tas announced that 
the support unit would be wi thdra'vn, the New Zealand government was 
prepared to go on without the Australians. The Labour government's 
Singapore policy to that extent marks an independence in Ne., Zealand's 
approach to South-east Asia, but not a divorce from the premises of the 
approach of the previous twenty years. 
CONCLUSION 
Ne;.,r Zealand's China recognition and Sout..D.-east Asian security 
policies ;r;ere, to a c·onsiderable degree, deterr.:t:!.ned by the attitudes 
and policies of the country's closest friends. Although these 
policies always O\ied something to factors other ~chan t.he "lishes of New 
Zealand's major allies, and occasionally everything, the general pattern 
was for the desires of an ally to be given most 1.1eight4 The reason 
for the pattern was rooted in New Zealand governutents' perceptior..s of 
national interests, and of the objectives necessary to promote t.hose 
interests. Historically, New Zealand's main external interests had 
been seen as ensuring the country's physical security and promoting its 
economic security, although the first Labour government (1935-1949) had 
added an interest in promoting certain cultural values: the rule of 
·international law, democracy, social justice, and self-determination 
I 
for dependent peoples. During the 1950s and 1960s, ~~ese security, 
economic and cultural interests were still the paramount ones for New 
Zealand governments. The major general foreign policy objectives 
formulated to promote these interests were: to support Bfitain in the 
maintenance of its global political and military role, and, more 
generally, to support the Commonwealth; to maintain in particular a 
close relationship with Australia; to forge a close relationship 
with the United States; to promote good relations between Britain 
and the United States; and to promote the adherence of nations to the 
principles of the United Nations Charter. Since New Zealand saw these 
objectives as crucial, then all policies had to promote them rather than 
detract from theill. No policy that seriously interfered with the 
objective of an ally could normally be entertained, and at the 
same time New Zealand often felt bound to support allie.d policies 
that 'i'lere not necessarily the ones it preferred~ 
As the 1961 and 1966 Defence Reviews stated, Ne"' Zealand 
believed that it had _to \o•ork at retaining the confiC.ence and support 
of its friends by helping them defend their vital interests. In 
particular, there was a concern throughout the period that .P..merican 
friendship could be alienated, ru.J.d protection and markets thereby 
jeopardised. It was recognised that the United States had no 
tradition of outside commitments; and it \-las believed that the 
Americans had no particular :':...n::erest in protecting New Zealand. 
As well as the above general foreign policy objectives, 
New Zealand deve:>:cpe.d. specific objec·tives with regard to Asia. 
With the rise of the People's Republic of China, New Zealand govern-
ments came ·-~ believe that New Zealand had a security interest in 
1
South-east Asia. South-east Asia was the region through which 
1 
Chinese power could mos.t easily be brought to within reach of Australia 
and New Zealand. A secondary set of objectives to deal with this 
interest can be discerned behind New Zealand's Asian policies in the 
period 1949-75. These objectives were: to encourage the retention 
of a sizable British military presence in the region; to get the· 
United States militarily committed to the defence of the region, and 
to keep it so committed; to promote stability in the countries. of 
South-east Asia by supporting and strengthening non-commm1ist govern-
ments in the region, and encouraging. them in democratic tendencies 
and the pursuit of social justice; and to contain China's influence 
in the \vorld. In the 1950s, the.Labour Party adopted the further 
objective of fostering a closer relationship between China and the 
Western democracies, but this was not taken up by the National Party 
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until the later l960se 
\Vhen bot.h Bri·tain and the Unite.d States iudicated in the 
late 'sixties that they would move towards military i.·lithdro;Hal from 
South-east Asia, both Nev; Zealand political parties became more 
interested in the promotion of closer cooperation among the countries 
of the region to ensure stability. The Labour Party, particularly, 
was prepared to see New Zealand closely involved in this effort. 
l"'ben it was seen that new forms of regional cooperation were not 
likely to be achieved very quickly, the Third Labour government 
developed the substitute objective of strengthening the bi-lateral 
ties between New Zealand and individual countries in South-east Asia. 
New Zealand • s Asian polid.es had to serve both the general and 
specific objectives and preferably as m~~y of them as possible. 
Inevitably there v;ere some conflicts when a proposed policy served 
some objectives but not others. It is evident that some objectiv·es 
lwere more important than others, and that the order of importance 
changed during the period. Support for Britain did not claim the 
same policy loyalty as the cementing of the relationship with the 
United States, and in practice, l> .. ustralian more than British influence 
counted in the Co~~onwealth connection. This was probably because 
the historic and cultural link with Britain was judged strong enough 
to preserve the relationship, and because New Zealand believed that, 
in military security terms, it needed the A.~erican relationship more. 
Although New Zealand desired to keep British forces in Asia, and this 
objective was the stimulus to certain policies, New zealand governments 
were aware that overall British m:j.li.tary strength was contracting, 
and that Britain's interest in the Asia-Pacific region was lessening. 
It was believed that Britain, no less thw."'l Ne-v1 zeala."1d, ~1as ultimately 
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dependent on American po\ver in the Far Eas·t, and that Britain! s 
policy lines could not afford to move far from the American position. 
The cornbination of the decline in British po\,~er with a perceived 
tenuous .P..mericaTJ. interest in New Zealand led Ne'Vl Zealand to be very 
sensitive about opposing American policy. Even on those occasions 
when New Zealand followed a British lead, it w•as only in directions 
to which the United States would not greatly object. 
Even after entering a formal alliance with the United States 
in 1951, New Zealand did not feel that the relationship with the 
United States was secure. It was eager to secure an American 
corr~itment to the defence of its strategic approaches, so that 
American power would be employed to deflect any threat, rather than 
just be used to rescue an embattled New Zealand. The Holland 
government thus welcomed the advent of SEATO which brought American 
military support to South-east Asia. There remained, however, a 
fear that American interest in the area was marginal· and that it 
could be withdrawn if A_~erican efforts were not supported. In the 
'sixties, New Zealand had its American market interest to protect 
against a protectionist-minded Congress, too. on several occasions, 
the objectives of keeping the United States corranitted to New Zealand 
and to South-east Asia came into conflict with other objectives. 
On two of these occasions (viz. the debate over China recognition 
between 1957 and 1960, and the Vietnam intervention in 1965) New 
Zealand deferred to American policies, and on two occasions (Indo-China 
intervention in 1954 and Laos in 1959) , New Zealand opposed Pcmerican 
policies. On the occasions when American policy was opposed, New 
Zealand was upholding United Nations principles. It is notable, too, 
that on these occasions Ne.w Zealand had support from other allies .. 
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New Zealand kept very close policy identity "'ith Australia 
throughout the period, while differi!1g from both the United States 
and Britain at times. Not until 1973 did New Zealand's Asian policy 
differ from Australia's in any substantial way. ·Aust.ralia.' s vie~.;s 
appear to have been the primary determinant of New Zealand's 
Confrontation policy in 1964, and to have been influential in the 
Vietnam decision, the decision to leave troops in 1-1.alaysia -afte·r 1971, 
the decision to recognise China in 197 2, and the decision not "'co 
recognise China in 1950. Australia's influence was probably more 
important than Britain's throughout the period. 
New Zealand's United Nations ideals generally played a 
supporting role to other objectives, but when they conflicted with 
those other objectives, as in Laos in 1959, they took priority~ 
New Zealand was not prepared to intervene in Indo-China in 1954 .:ith-
out a United Nations resolution. New Zealand's objective of pro-
rooting a stable non-Con@~~ist Asia was tempered by its ideals, such 
as a loose commitment to democracy 1 by a reluctance to become too 
co1mnitted to Asian countries on its own 1 and by its relationships. 
The relationships \-lith the United States, Australia and Britain 
generally carne first. New Zealand was always more amenable to 
supporting the semi-democratic, British-oriented Malaysian government 
than the dubious regimes of Indo-China. At the same time, it did 
not care to be corrunitted to the Halaysian government. 
The first decisions considered in this study - the decisions 
not to recognise China in late 1949 and early 1950 - involved two 
clashes of objectives, and point up three constant factors in the 
Asian policy pattern: first, that from th~ beginning, British 
influence was not necessarily the strongest factor in New Zealand 
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policy; despite the knowledge that British interests "'d!~re involved 
(Britain had valuable investments in China) and t..l-te official rhetoric 
about the need to strengthen Comrnonwealth unity, other objectives 
were paramount. Second, that New Zealand had its m.m specific 
objectives in Asia and that occasionally they could be as important 
a policy determinant as its relationship objectives; the foremost 
factor in the nonrecognition decision seems to have been the 
concern to limit Chinese and Communist influence and concern for the 
governments of South-east Asia. Third, that concern for the 
American relationship was an important factor from the beginning of 
the period, and that it V.7aS more important as a stimulus or constraint 
than the relationship with Britain. It was known that the United 
States did not intend to recognise and did not wish its allies to. 
New Zealand•s security interest in Japan -as \-vell as in South-east 
Asia - made both the Fraser and the Holland govern;nents take more 
account of American than British views. 
The outbreak of the Korean War confirmed and strengthened 
the pattern of priority. New Zealand's security interest in Asia 
was heightened by the Communist attack, and the importance of the 
American relationship objective increased correspondingly. After 
the signing of the ANZUS Treaty, the American relationship carried 
st.ill more weight. China recognition policy in the later 'fifties 
shows the dominating influence the relationship had become. 
Although elements of the New Zealand government - most notably 
Minister of External Affairs Webb - had serious reservations about 
American China policy, and voiced them both privately and publicly, 
the government had no intention of adopting a policy that conflicted 
with that of the United States. Holland was quite explicit in 
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Parliament in ~955 about not taking a policy line on China 1 s ad.'T!issi.on 
to the United Nations that would upset the United States. At the 
1956 and 1957 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences 1 New Zealfu~d 
replayed its role at the 1951 conference of keeping the Commonwealth 
from coming out in opposition to American policy. 
Although the primary motive for the policy adopted was the 
objectives of strengthening the Iu-nericru1. relationship and encouraging 
Alr.erica.n commitment to Asia, it seems evident that the non-recognition 
policy was also seen as serving otJ.~er New Zealand objectives -
principally the preserving of a non-Communist South-east Asia, the 
promoting of United Nations principles, and the enhancement of the 
United Nations as an effective institution. The non-admission of 
China to the United Nations ,,-as justified by saying that China did not 
uphold the principles of the United Nations. 
The priority given to the American relationship objective is 
best shown up in the 'fifties by the China policy of the Second Labour 
government between 1957 and 1960. This government, unlike its 
National Party predecessor, was avowedly eager to grant diplomatic 
recognition to the People's Republic of China, but, like the National 
Party, was unwilling to strain the alliance with the United States by 
initiating a policy that would have been construed as unfriendly. 
The government's tactics had to concentrate on altering American policy. 
There were.other external objectives involved in New zealand's holding 
off from a recognition policy, hov1ever. The Labour government, too, 
was concerned about ~~e effect of recognition on the non-Communist 
governments of South-east Asia, and after the Formosa Straits crisis 
and the suppression of the Tibetan rebellion, there was a concern by 
the government not to seem to condone, by recognition, a breach of 
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United Nations.principles. 
Ne't-.r Zealand 1 s policies concerning South-east Jisia were, as in 
the China case, not ccmpletely a function of Great Po•.,7er policies, 
though owing a lot to them. Doidge in the early 'fifties stressed 
a perceived danger to Australasia through South-east Asia before 
either the United states or Great Britain tvas greatly interested, and 
suggested a Pacific Pact covering South-east Asia to stop the spread 
of Corrnnunism. This idea was not taken up by the United States until 
1954. When the United States proposed that a Collective Defence 
System be formed for South-east Asia that year, the Ne\V Zealand 
government \Velcomed the initiative, and said that it should be formed 
as a matter of urgency. There was no question of New Zealand's 
being levered into a scheme by its allies to protect t.'leir interests'. 
Indeed, New Zealand's policy regarding the Collective Defence System 
was distinct from those of both its major allies, although it 
parallelled that of Australia. New Zealand was more' interested in 
the immediate formation of a system than Britain, but unwilling that 
it should be used for immediate intervention in Indo-China as the 
Americans wished. 
New Zeala~d's policy, however, was to some extent constrained 
by the policy of an ally. New Zealand and Australia felt that they 
could not enter a South-east Asian alliru>ce that did not contain 
Britain, although they wanted the alliance very much. New Zealand's 
commitment to support Britain militarily in a global conflict made it 
unable to take on a commitment that Britain did not share. Britain's 
attitude, a..J.d Australia's, -may also have been important in Ne,.., Zealand's 
reluctance to enter the Indo-China War, although New Zealand's loyalty 
to the United Nations system is the one clear reason for its policy 
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regarding intervention. Jackson claims that Ne~·i Zealand followed a 
British-oriented policy in Indo-China in 1954: it could '''ell have 
been an Australian-oriented policy. 
There is no doubt that New Zealand's first major involveme~t 
in South-east Asia - the stationing of troops in Malaya in 1955 
came at the behest of an ally, and that that ally was Britain. The 
primary reason for New Zealand's policy appears to have been its 
belief in an obligation to support Britain in its global military 
role. However, two qualifying factors must be noted. First, the 
move was believed to be in Ne<< Zealand • s strategic interest. The 
transfer of wartime obligations to Malaya - if not the stationing 
of ground troops - had been desired by New Zealand for some time. 
New Zealand had suggested the transfer at the Commonwealth Conferences 
of 1951 and 1953, but had not pressed the point. By agreeing to 
station troops in Malaya as part of a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, 
New Zealand 'tvas serving its objective of keeping British troops in 
the region. The Reserve was a guarantee of a continuing British 
commitment at a time when troop withdrawals were being contemplated 
as the !4alayan Emergency died down. Second, the move was also aimed 
at reinforcing American support for New Zealand and South-east Asia. 
The government believed that t.'l.e contribution \v-ould offer proof to 
the United States that New Zealand was serious about resisting the 
con~unist threat in South-east Asia (a seriousness perhaps in doubt 
after the reluctance to intervene in Indo-ChL~a) and therefore worthy 
of help in an emergency. The contribution would be seen as an 
earnest of SEATO pledges and make it more likely that the United States 
would live up to its commitment. The corrmitment was not made against 
l'.n:erican <dshes: the Australian government had checked that it fitted 
in \'lith P..merican iO.eas .. 
The Labour go-.. rernment that carne to power in 1957 kept the 
troops in Malaya during its term of office. This was again because 
~che support for Britain objective ~ras given high ranking. In 1955, 
Labour had agreed to the stationin-g of troops in Malaya primarily 
because it believed tha·t Ne» Zealand had to assist the United 
Kingdom to meet its obligations in ·the Far East. Behind the loyalty 
to Britain and the Commonwealth, however, was the objective of pro-
mating the security of a non-Communist Asian country. 
The late 'fifties saw a second occasion on which the American 
relationship came into conflict »ith another Ne» Zealand objective 
and »as not accorded priority. ·rhis was during the Laos crisis of 
1959, »hen policy favoured by the United States >vas believed to be 
contravening a United Nations principle. Nash's opposition to the 
~American proposal for military intervention in Laos T . ;as based on his 
I 
belief that Laotian self-determination »ould be interfered »ith. 
On this occasion New Zealand was not prepared to help prop up a 
government of dubious legitimacy, even in service of the objective of 
a non-Communist Asia. 
In the 1960s, I>rhiiD-1 influence in New Zealand's Asian policy 
decisions became less, while Australian and American influence was 
maintained or increased. The first indication of this is provided 
by the Confrontation crisis, when New Zealand joined Australia in 
resisting until 1965 British pressure for them to permit their 
Strategic Reserve contributions to be used in Borneo. In 1955, 
New Zealand had seen it as its Commonwealth duty to support Britain 
in Malaya: eight years later, aiding Britain - or even Malaysia - \-!as 
not as important as fitting in with Australia, being sure of Ameri~un 
backing, a..rl.d retaining :::ndcnesian friendship. In negotiating with 
Indonesia; New Zealana 1vas developing its own policy in an area 
where traditionally it had acted as an adjunct of British pot-?er. This 
policy, ho-;vever, seemed to be an extension of Australian and American 
policy. It may be a mistake to see Confron·tation as signalling a 
sharp break with the pattern of influence in the 'fifties: in 1955, 
after all, Britain ~~d Australia were agreed on policy, so that New 
Zealand \vas 11 free 11 to be dutiful to Britain without crossing- Aus-tralia; 
in 1954, v1hen Britain and Australia. disagreed over SEATO policy, New 
Zealand r s position was \>lith Australia rather than Britain. Australian 
influence may always have been greater in New Zealand's Asian foreign 
pclic~r than Britain's. 
New Zeala"'ld' s falling in line with Australia over the BoJ."Tleo; 
issue, however, did not mean t-hat the sense of Commonwealth abliqatio:n 
was dead. Rhetorically it \~as as strong a.s ever, even if the public 
focus had transferred from Britain to Malaysia, and on the practical 
level, New Zealand met all other requests for mili·tary aid readily~ 
In 1965, after forces had finally been committed to Borneo, the ?rime 
Minister was still prepared to say publicly that New Zealand's 
Corrunon\1'ealth obligat.ions took priority over other comrnitments to 
South-east Asia., such as that to the American-backed cause in South 
Vietnam. This situation was to be reversed in 1968, however, after 
Britain announced the withdrawal of its military presence from South-
east Asia. That fact, among others, shows that New Zealand's sense 
of CornmomJealth obligation during Confrontation t<as founded on its 
continuing objective of keeping British military power in the region. 
The Ne'" Zealand government supported the creation of the Malaysian 
Federation primarily because it offered a. means of keeping British 
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military power sectrrely in the region, and it was believed that 
British power in the region was essential to continue.d stability. 
The hesitation about the troops suggests that the object.ive of main-
taining close relations with Australia 'tlas in conflict with that of 
ensuring that British troops Here able to stay in Asia - and that the 
former won out, perhaps because New Zealand was at.,rare that Britain 
intended to reduce forces drastically in the future in any event. 
There was also the belief that a policy of military action agali1st 
Indonesia >:auld not further the objective of a non-Communist Asia. 
The increased influence of the United States relationship 
objective on Netrl Zealand's Asian policy is shown up by New Zealand's 
military commitment to South Vietnam. Although the government had 
grave doubts about the >:isdom of sending troops to Vietnam, as it 
had in 1954, it swallowed them 'this time in order to service the 
American alliance and to keep the United States committed to the 
defence of South-east Asia. In 1954 the reluctance of other allies 
had convinced the Americans not to go ahead; in 1965 the United 
States >:ent ahead and then asked for support. Once the United 
States had committed itself, the government believed that it had to 
give that support, especially as Australia ~1is time supported the 
American move. New Zealand did not think that a policy of military 
intervention would help achieve the objective of a non-Communist 
South Vietnam. 
It was the American relationship that contillued to control 
New Zealand's China policy under the Second National government, too, 
although, unlike the Vietnam case·, New Zealand's other objectives 
were also believed promoted by that policy. When Britain began to 
vote for China's admission to the United Nations in 1961, New Zealand 
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did not follow suit. Despite some differences in rhetoric, New 
Zealand 1 s China policy did not start to change until the United States 
and Australia changed theirs. There were no attempts to contact the 
Chinese government until the Nixon Administration 't'l7as seen to be doing 
so in 1971, and New Zealand did not move towards implementing the t;·;o-
China policy it had espoused for some years in the United Nations 
until the Americans sw·itched to such ~ policy. It was not until a 
Labour government took office in late 1972 that Ne~' Zealand moved 
ahead of American policy and formally recognised Peking. The American 
relationship was no longer likely to be strained by such a move, howeve:r:·, 
and the move was made in tandem with Australia, at Australia's urging. 
Through most of the 1 sixties, New zealand saw non-recognition 
of China as being part of the promotion of two other objectives - the 
preservation of non-Corrrrnunist governments in South-east Asia and the 
upholding of United Nations principles. 
In the later part of the decade, however, the New Zealand 
government began to say that China should be in the United Nations and 
that New zealand's policy was not directed towards China's exclusion, 
even though China's objectives and policies were recognised to be 
unchanged. It was clear that the object.ive of upholding certain 
United Nations principles that China was accused of flouting had 
become less important than another objective. New Zealand now thought 
it would serve its ultimate security interest to have China associated 
with the co~munity of nations. The objective of self-determination 
for Taiwan continued to stand, and was explicitly given more import-
ance than relations with China. . Even with the l'.merican relationship 
objective no longer imperilled by a China recognition policy, the 
Taiwan rights objective continued to stop the National government from 
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adopting such a policy. The Labour goverllill.ent, on the other h3.nd 1 
put relations with China ahead of the self-determination principle. 
The Australian attitude >Jas particularly important, and the 
~~erican one probably so, in New Zealand's decision in 1969 to keep 
troops on in Malaysia-Singapore after the British withdrawal in 1971, 
but the initiative for the policy came this time from New Zealand -
a reversal of the 1964 Confrontation situation. New Zealand shov1ed 
an early inclination to maintain its presence, in service of the 
stability of South-east Asia. Although New Zealand troops had been 
in Asia primarily to serve the objective of keeping a British 
military presence in the region, they had also been there to bolster 
the Malaysian government 1 s security, and if the first objective was 
now dead, the second still stood. Once it had been decided that a 
lone New Zealand military presence would still serve that objective 
and could be undertaken, there was a reason for maintaining it. 
!Another -perhaps stronger - reason was the American relationship. 
The Americans had made it clear that they wanted New Zealand assistance 
in promoting regional security. A third reason was that a New zealand 
presence would assist the return of British troops to Asia if the 
British goverriment changed. 
The New Zealand government, hov1ever, was not prepared to make 
a commitment to Malaysia without Australia, and waited for en Austral-
ian decision before announcing its own. 
New Zealand's policy in South-east Asia seemed finally to 
emerge from the Australian shadow for the first time in 1973, when the 
decision was made to retain Net• Zealand forces in Singapore after the 
Australians had announced that they would withdraw. For the Labour 
government, the new objective of a closer relationship with Asian 
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cowJ.tries took priority. Labour, too, was prepared to uphold the 
old objective of supporting Commonwealth allies, whether or not 
British troops were in the region. 
It can be said, then, that although ·the policies of allies 
\'17Gre the most influential factors in. the IP.ajority of policy decisions 
involving Asia, only in a few cases did those allied policies not 
serve other New Zealand objectives. On t\VO occasions Hhere there 
was conflict between relationship objectives and other objectives 
- the consideration of the recognition of China by the Nash government, 
and the Vietnam intervention - New Zealand adopted a policy line not 
in accordance with its wishes, because of the known attitudes of its 
allies. Only the Laos case in 1959 can be cited as a clear-cut 
example of New Zealand's not falling into line, and in this insta~ce, 
rmlike the Vietnam situation in 1965, the New Zealand government was 
reacting in private to a mere proposal, and not to an accomplished 
fact. (It is not clear whether New Zealand's opposition to inter-
vention in Indo-China in 1954 was due more to Australian and British 
attitudes than to the government's convictions; in 1950, New Zealand~s 
defiance of Britain over China contained more than an ele~ent of 
deference to the United States). 
As far as Asian policy is concerned, American and Australian 
influences seem to have been constantly powerful from the very 
beginning of the period. British influence seems to have been less 
constantly powerful. It cannot be said that British-oriented policies 
prevailed through most of the 'fifties: as early as 1950, the 
American line to·wards China had been adopted by Ne\\r Zealand; the 
policy-line in Indo-China in 1954 was between the British and American 
positions 1 and closest to Australia; s; in Malaya 1 there. was no 
question of which influence prevailed, since the Americans did not 
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oppose the move, and the Australians were enthusiastic for it~ 
British influence appears to have become less bet,..;een 1955 and 1964, 
but this may be deceiving. 
Although Ne\v Zealand's China and South-east Asian security 
policies >Jere determined mainly by priorities among the external 
objec·tives of governments, it is evident that internal objectives had 
some influence on policy. The only one to surface 'i'lith some consist-
ency in this study was the desire of particular goverr..rnents to main-
tain, or strengthen, their electoral position. (Other objectives, 
of course, affected policy indirectly by restricting the amount of 
money available for the Foreign Affairs and Defence Departments). 
In 1949-50 both parties feared the electoral consequences of an early 
recognition of the People's Republic of China. In 1954, the Labour 
Party included a China recognition clause in its election platform 
partly because it thought that it would be advantageous electorally. 
IThe party deleted the clause from the 1957 manifesto because China 
had become unpopular and Labour knew it was facing a tight election. 
The influence of the domestic political situation in the follmving 
years >las probably a reinforcing factor in the Labour government's 
refusal to recognise China in its term. It S6ems probable that 
decisions on China policy by both parties in 1971 were influenced by 
party political considerations. 
It is likely that the National government's decisions to 
attempt to send trade and goodwill missions to China in 1971 were 
stimulated to some extent by Labour Party pressure: the announcement 
of the attempt to send a trade mission came eleven days after the 
Labour Party had publicly called for such an attempt, and the attempt 
at a goodwill mission followed closely upon the news that the Chi11ese 
intended to invite a Labour Party mission to Chinaa Similarly, 
Kirk's reluctance to accept the Chinese invitation on behalf of the 
Labour Party and his preferencs that the mission be mixed politicB.lly 
shows ·that the Lnbour Party saw political risks at that stage in 
being too closely identified with a forward China policy. Domestic 
political considerations played a part in South-east Asian policy, 
too. Nash believed that Labour opposition to the proposal to send 
troops to ~lalaya in 1955 would be exploited electorally by the 
National government~ With Labour b~ildL>g towards a victory in 1957, 
the party may \•1ell have counted this factor quite highly in its 
assessment of its policy. '!'here is an indication that some of the 
Second National Government's hesitation in sending troops to Vietnam 
was due to concern about the effect on the 1966 election. The 
government was apparently r~luctant to send the infantry battalion 
in Malaysia to Vietnam before it had a mandate for Vietnam policy 
at the election. Immediately after the election, it began to 
1
consider sending further aid. Clearly, however, domestic political 
considerations were never the primary stimuli to or constraints en 
policy. Fraser and Doidge, for instance, each had more fundamental 
reasons for non-recognition. Fraser sho>~ed that this was so by 
continuing to advocate non-recognition after the 1949 election was 
over and he was out of office. During the tenn of the Second Labo·.1r 
Government, it se~ns from Nash 1 s talk' with Mcintosh that the goverlliuent 
\tlas co~sidering recognising China desp.ite the majority of one, and that 
it was the external constraint that was important. 
It is clear that, to a greater or lesser degree, the pattern 
of foreign policy determination -_ (viz. determination mainly by externa.l 
objectives, and mainly by allied relationships among those objectives) 
held true for both parties ~ .. lhile in government. The parties shared 
most of their important objectives, a..11d, with occasional differences 1 
the priority ruuang theme Policies; as a result, were largely 
bi-partisan. Differences in priority, and differences in perception 
of Asian events, led to the differences in policy. The Labour Party 
did formulate some different objectives from the National Party as a 
result of its different perception of Asian events. 
Labour was much more prepared than the National Party to 
recognise the indigenous origin and popular support of Communist 
movements in Asia. This led it in the 'fifties to formulate the 
objective of bringL~g China into the community of nations, an 
objective not adopted by the National Party until the late 1960s. 
During the term of the 1957-60 government, Labour's China objective 
clashed with the American relationship objective it shared with the 
National Party. The Labour Party, like the National Party, put ·the 
American relationship first, and policy remained the same as the 
!National government's. In the 1970s, however, there was a difference 
between the parties over the priority of China-related objectives 
and this led to a change in policy. After 1971, the objective of 
establishing a relationship with China became more irr~ortant to the 
Labour Party than the restraining objective of maintaining Tai-vlan t.s 
right to self-detez~ination. The National Party kept the reverse 
priority for these objectives. The timing of the Labour Party's 
recognition of China in 1972, after Kirk's statements of a deliberate 
approach, show that the Australian relationship was as important to 
the Labour Party as the National Party in determining policy. 
There '·las little difference between the parties concerning 
policy towards Malaysia and Singapore, since both parties, for most 
of the period, accepted that the needs of the British and Commonwealth 
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relationship should be the primary de·terminant of policy 5 The 
Labour Party was prepared to acquiesce in ·the sending of tr0ops to 
Nalaya, provided progress tc-;.;ards self-government continued, and 
later the Labour government was prepared to keep troops on internal 
security duties in Malaya as a Conunom;ealth duty. The Labour Party 
believed that military aid to Nalaya a11.d Singapore did not con-travene 
its principles of letting developing peoples work out their ot .. "TT 
destiny, since the governments were t.hought democratic. In the 
late 'sixties and early 'seventies, the Labour Party was more 
interested in close bi-lateral ties ~rith Malaysia and Singapore that1 
the National govermnent. Whereas the National goverlli~ent was 
reluctant to assist galaysia in 1969 without Australia, the Labour 
government in 1973 had no such concern. 
Although Labour followed National and let relationship 
objectives play the major part in two areas of 1-~sian policy, in one 
area - Indo-China - it differed with National in not letting 
relationships be the determinant. In relation to Indo-China 1 the 
Labour Party found that relationsip objectives and the objective of 
preserving non-Conununist governments in South-east F.s:i.a which it 
shared with the National Party, clashed with the party's cormnitment to 
National self-dete~lnination and social justice. The National Party 
accepted the view that Communist movemen"'.:s in In-do-China \Vere 
externally sustained, and thus did not see any clash of objectives. 
In the 1959 Laos crisis, the Labour government put another objective 
(namely, the promotion of the principle of national self-determination) 
a.head of the American relationship, in contrast to the National 
government's 1965 actions concerning Vietnam, where the American 
relatio!lship had priority. 
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As mentioned above, the ti:Io situations are not entirely 
comparable, since Laos policy was formulated in reaction to a 
proposal, vrhereas Vietna..'"!l policy was a reaction to an accomplished 
fact. The National government, on evidence, may have opposed the 
Arne=-ican proposal to intervene militarily in Vietnam when it was 
first mooted, only to go along once the proposal was adopted. 
The Labour government was never in this situation. It must be 
noted, however, that Labour did oppose National's 1965 Vietnam 
policy. In 1972, the attitudinal differences between the parties 
>Jas expressed in policy when the Labour government withdrm'' New 
Zealand's army training teams from Vietnam. The Third Labour 
Government clearly assigned a lower priority to the objective of a 
non-Communist South-east Asia than did its National predecessor. 
In sum, then, in the period 1949 to at least 1972, it may 
be said that there was no significant difference in the pattern of 
foreign policy determination with a change of goverro..ment. The 
foreign policies of New Zealand governments of both political 
colours were heavily influenced by the attitudes and policies of 
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